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How can critical intelligence or critical thinking be
taught?

A clear, detailed answer to this question is

important to professional educators.

Philosophers, for

example, have some interest in teaching critical thinking
and in encouraging its exercise by students of philosophy.

This exercise involves the critical evaluation of philosophical arguments.

However, the educational importance of

critical intelligence goes well beyond the critical

evaluation of philosophical arguments.

Educators in the

social sciences, the natural sciences, the humanities, as

well as in professional schools attempt to encourage the

development of critical intelligence.

For example, students

are asked critically to evaluate theories, to support

certain conclusions with relevant evidence, and to organize
and to write critical essays and term papers.

Nor is

developing critical intelligence simply confined to classroom activities.

Educators often hope that their students

VI

will evaluate sales pitches, political arguments,
and pro

posed explanations through critical deliberation, not

simply in an arbitrary, emotional manner.

Given these and other motives, educators, educational
psychologists, and philosophers of education have offered

numerous answers to this question.

To answer this question,

they attempt to provide what they consider to be successful

teaching methods or to develop what they consider to be
successful curricula for this purpose.

However, such

attempted answers do not answer three obvious prior
questions.
a

To answer this question, one must first answer

prior question "Can critical intelligence be taught?"

To

answer this question, one must first answer two other prior

philosophical questions:

"What is critical intelligence?"

and "What is teaching?"

The failure to address these prior

questions is one reason why these attempted answers are
neither sufficiently clear, nor sufficiently detailed.
The original question, therefore, is really the fourth of
four questions:

1.

What is critical intelligence or critical thinking?

2.

What is teaching?

3.

Can critical intelligence or critical thinking be
taught?

4.

How can critical intelligence or critical
thinking
be taught?

Some educators, educational psychologists and
philosophers
of education have attempted to answer question

have attempted to answer question

2.

1

and others

To answer these

questions, most have attempted to provide definitions of the
terms:

definitions of 'critical intelligence' and

definitions of 'teaching'.

Yet there is an urgent difficulty

involving such definitions and the attempt to answer

questions

3

and

4

.

In debates among sponsors of alterna-

tive answers to questions
the terms

3

and 4, we must not assume that

'critical intelligence' or 'teaching' are used

univocally.

Thus, it is not always clear that educators,

educational psychologists or philosophers of education are

attempting to answer the same question.

To evaluate these

answers, we must clarify and evaluate the definitions they

offer for these terms.

Those writing in the field of education often write as if
there were no philosophical problems or issues involved in

providing such definitions.

While offering a solution to

the philosophical problems of definition is beyond the

scope of this dissertation,

I

do clarify and evaluate pro-

posed definitions of 'critical thinking' in order to reach

a

clear and defensible understanding of the concept of

critical intelligence and thereby answer question
Chapter
of

I.

I

'teaching'

1

in

then clarify and evaluate proposed definitions
in order to reach a clear and defensible

understanding of this concept and thereby answer question
in Chapter II.

cepts,

I

Given

a

clear understanding of these con-

then answer question

3

in Chapter III, and

finally answer the original question, question
IV.

In the Appendix,

I

2

4,

in Chapter

present an instructional model for

the development of critical intelligence.

9
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INTRODUCTION
['Begin at the beginning",

the King said very gravely,
and go on till you come to the end:
then stop."
Lewis Carroll, from
Alice in Wonderland

In this dissertation,

provide a clarification of two con-

I

cepts, critical intelligence in terms of critical
thinking,
and teaching, in order to answer two questions in the

philosophy of education:
taught?
taught?

,

and if so,

"Can critical intelligence be

"How can critical intelligence be

The clarification of these two concepts involves

appealing to concepts that raise important questions in meta
physics, epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, and

philosophy of action.

For example, critical thinking seems

to involve part of reasoning,

some mental activity, some

dispositions and both deductive and inductive logic.
Teaching seems to involve some intentional action, the concepts of knowledge and belief, and specifically knowledge
or beliefs about other minds.
I

In this dissertation,

however

do not, in turn, provide an answer to the important

questions raised by central concepts in metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, or philosophy of
action.

Answering such important questions may involve many

dissertations

.

xiii

The

mam

focus of this dissertation is a
clarification of

these two concepts sufficient to answer
these two questions in
the Philosophy of education.
Indeed both critical

m

thinking (as part of reasoning) and teaching
are two
central concepts in education, so their clarification
is an
important task for philosophers of education.
Furthermore,
the

tv/o

questions "Can critical intelligence be taught?,"

and if so,

"How can critical intelligence be taught?" are

two central questions in the philosophy of education.

They

bear a close relation to the question of teaching virtue

raised by Plato in the Meno

.

While many educators worry

about how to teach critical thinking, or how to develop
cr itical intelligence, no philosopher of education had

considered these two questions with sufficient clarity to
provide a definitive answer.

This is the task of my

dissertation

In Chapter I,

I

clarify 'critical thinking' and 'critical

intelligence' by providing

a

definition of what it is to be

engaged in critical thinking, D.10,

a

definition of what it

is to be engaged in correct critical thinking, D.ll, and
a

definition of what it is to be critically intelligent

to a particular degree,

D.12.

In Chapter II,

I

clarify

'teaching' by distinguishing teaching how and teaching
that, and by providing definitions of what it is to be en-

gaged in teaching that, D.20, what it is to be engaged in

XIV

teaching how, D.21, and what it is
to be engaged in
teaching, D.22.
With these two concepts clarified,
we are
in a clearer position to answer
these two questions.

In Chapter III,

answer the question "Can critical

I

intelligence be taught?" affirmatively, and
provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for
successfully
teaching critical intelligence.
I argue that determining
the success of the teaching is a contingent
matter that, in
turn, involves arguing that the conditions
of D.ll are, as
a

matter of empirical fact, met.

In Chapter IV,

I

answer

the question "How can critical intelligence be taught?"
by

providing

curriculum such that successfully teaching

a

it is sufficient successfully to teach correct critical

thinking.

I

then consider the question of method, and argue

that any method for successfully teaching correct critical

thinking must be such that the second disjunct of D.20
is satisfied, and the second disjunct of D.21 is satisfied.
I

then show that the choice of

a

method is based on at least

five contingent factors.

In the Appendix,

I

present an instructional model which

serves to show how critical intelligence can be taught

successfully.

I

clearly present a curriculum the

successful teaching of which is sufficient successfully to
teach correct critical thinking.

It is an example of the

XV

application of D.12, D.22, and my
answers to these two
questions in the philosophy of education
to a particular
curriculum.
lhis example of the application
of D.12, D.22
and my answers to these two
questions has both a theoretical
and a practical importance.

There are at least three features of
this model that are

theoretically important.

First, the model specifically

shows the kind of activity that must be taught
successfully
to teach correct critical thinking and to
develop critical

intelligence.

The depth of treatment has been shown to

vary given different curricula and different educational
contexts.

Secondly, the model shows that correct critical

thinking is not

applying philosophy to other fields."

Critical thinking, as part of reasoning, is central to many

disciplines and professions, as well as to the everyday
concerns of rational persons.

Critical thinking is not

by any means the exclusive concern of philosophy.

Thirdly,

the model shows what might pre-analytically be called a

specific interdisciplinary activity.

It,

therefore, may

help philosophers of education begin to work out a clear

concept of an interdisciplinary activity.

There are at least five features of this model that are

practically important.

First, the model serves as a manual

for instructors such that the instructor, for practical

XVI

purposes, needs no special background or training
to follow
it,

or to teach from it.

fact,

Secondly, the model shows how, in

successfully to teach critical intelligence to

particular degree in

a

college level curriculum.

a

Thirdly,

the model serves as a blueprint for a college level program
in critical thinking.

Fourthly, the model shows that

perhaps some philosophers are, in fact, better prepared to
teach critical thinking than those in other disciplines,

although there is no necessity that this be so.

Fifthly,

the model provides practical insight into the teaching
of clear,

tightly organized writing, provided we grant that

clear writing proceeds from clearer thinking.

1

CHAPTER

I

WHAT IS CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE AND
WHAT IS CRITICAL THINKING?
Those who claim to have an objective, scientific test to

measure the ability to engage in critical thinking often
construe the test as providing an operational definition of
'critical intelligence' in terms of specific critical

thinking abilities.

The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking

Appraisal is perhaps the most well known and widely used
test of critical thinking.

As such, it is easily constru-

able as providing an operational definition of

intelligence'

abilities.

'critical

in terms of specific critical thinking

In the attempt to provide a definition of

'critical intelligence',

I

shall examine and evaluate the

attempt to define 'critical intelligence' in terms of the

Watson-Glaser critical thinking appraisal.

The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal is a test

consisting of five subtests.''’

The subtests are entitled

by the general critical thinking ability they are designed
1

G. B. Watson and E. M. Glaser, Watson-Glaser Critical
Thinking Appraisal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
Other tests of critical thinking, subject to
1964), p. 2.
the same basic construal are the Ace Test of Critical
Thinking and the Principles of Critical Thinking Test,
prepared by the Illinois Curriculum Project.
,

"

:

2

to measure.

The subtest, the number of questions in each

subtest, and the specific behaviors in terms of
specific

critical thinking abilities in the test may be summarized
as follows

Column A
Sub Test

Column B
Questions

Column C
Specific Ability

1.

Inference

20

"Samples ability to discriminate among degrees of truth
or falsity of inferences drawn
from given data."

2.

Recognition of
Assumptions

16

"Samples ability to recognize
unstated assumptions."

3.

Deduction

25

"Samples ability to reason
deductively from given statements, to recognize the
relation of implication
between propositions to determine if what appears to be
an implication or a necessary
inference from given premises
is such.

4.

Interpretation

24

"Samples ability to weigh
evidence, to distinguish between a)
generalizations
from data not warranted beyond reasonable doubt, and
b)
generalizations not
necessary but warranted beyond reasonable doubt."

5.

Evaluation of
Arguments

15

"Samples ability to distinguish between strong arguments
relevant to a particular
question at issue."

A definition of 'critical intelligence' in terms of the

specific critical thinking abilities listed in Column C and

:

3

the general critical thinking abilities
listed in Column A
can be specified in terms of some
numerical test score N.

Given these five sub tests, said to test
the specific
abilities listed in Column C, someone scoring
correctly on
N out of 100 questions (Column B)
is said
to have the

ability to engage in critical thinking.
fore, consider a definition of

2

We might, there-

'critical thinking' as

follows

D.

x is critically intelligent iff x scores N
on the
Wat son- Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal.

However, D as it stands will not do as a definition of

critical intelligence'

.

We can think of cases in which x

has critical intelligence yet x does not score N on the

Wat son-G laser test.

For example, x might have taken the

test while sick with the flu, or stricken with grief, or in
a

mischievous mood; or x might be critically intelligent

yet never take the test and, therefore, never score at all;
or x might be a critically intelligent native Frenchman who

reads and speaks no English, and, therefore, cannot understand the test.

Therefore, D, as it stands, does not

I shall ignore the complex scoring of the test.
If
the test does measure critical thinking ability, then if
someone scores N out of 100, I shall grant that that someone is said to be able to engage in critical thinking
according to the test results and that, therefore, the score
N is sufficient to measure critical intelligence.
This is
sufficient for my purposes.

4

successfully provide both necessary and
sufficient conditions for critical intelligence.

We may consider modifying D to remedy this
defect:

0,1

* 1S cr 1 'tically intelligent iff if x takes
the WatsonGlaser Critical Thinking Appraisal in x s native
language and x is healthy, unemotional and serious,
then x scores N on the test.
'

However, D.l also will not do as a definition of 'critical

intelligence'

.

The problem not only concerns specific

problems with the Watson-Gla ser test of critical thinking,
but also concerns a more basic problem with any such tests

consti ued as definitions.
A)

Given the five sub tests (Column

and the specific abilities

(Column

C)

thought to be both

jointly necessary and singly sufficient for critical
thinking, there are cases in which x scores N on the test
and x is not critically intelligent.

In terms of D.l,

this

is to argue that there is an instance of x such that if x

takes the Watson-Glaser test in x's native language, and x
is healthy,

unemotional and serious, then x scores N on the

test and x is not critically intelligent.

There are also

cases in which x is critically intelligent and x does not
score N on the test.

In terms of D.l,

this is to argue

that there is an instance of X such that x is critically

intelligent and if x takes the Watson-Glaser test in x's

.

.

5

native language, and x is healthy,
unemotional and serious
then x does not score N on the
test.^

Many arguments of this sort are
offered in the
literature about this test,
See Robert Ennis, "An Appraisal
of the Wat son -Glaser Critical
Thinking Appraisa 1 " Journal
of Education Research, No. 52
(Dec
1958),
155-158":
,

pp

.

Consider as an example sub test 1.
this sub test the
t0 rGad a P ara<?raph from which a
specific
conclu^n
inst ^ctions for this section
direct ihe IL
evaluate
conclusion by choosing
anoMg thl following responses: this
"a.
True; b.
Probablv
Tr
True,
c.
Insufficient Data; d.
Probably False;
e.
False "
One such paragraph reads, in part:
"Students from high income groups took part in many more
of the extracurricular
chool activities which cost money than
did students from
W
h ° mas -"
The conclusion drawn from this paragraph
any students from low income homes felt
they couldn't
a f ° rd t0 P artl cipate in
extracurricular activities which
st money.
The answer key indicates that the correct
answer is "b.
Probably True."

m

“

•

'

Clearly, the conclusion does not follow
deductively from
-he paragraph (taken to be composed of
true statements)
Yet is the conclusion probably true, given
the paragraph?
^-uppose the testee exercises critical thinking
when facing
this question
The testee considers the possibility that
e mcome f ac t° r does not explain
participation or lack of
participation
extracurricular school activities which
cost money.
Suppose that high income students also took
part in many more of the free extracurricular activities
than did students from low income homes, a
possibility
given the paragraph.
Then the correct answer concerning
the conclusion seems to be "c.
Insufficient Data," since
there is not enough information about the relation of
income
to participation.
.

m

Therefore, one taking the test may engage in critical
f hi^iking and be marked wrong on the test.
Therefore, one
may actually be critically intelligent and while taking the
test in one's native language, in good health, unemotionally
and seriously, may not score N on the test.

Given the answer key to the test, it is also possible that
one may take the test under the appropriate conditions,
score N, and not be critically intelligent.
If one is a

6

But aside from these specific problems
with the Watson-

Glaser test, there is

a

more basic problem with construing

any such test as a definition, even
granting that the test
successfully measures critical intelligence.
Even if a test
correctly measures some ability according to
other abilities,
the test cannot intelligibly be construed
as offering a

definition of the ability measured.
example.

Suppose we construct

different

(x,

y,

z)

Consider the following

test composed of performing

a

movements on

a

machine to measure the

abilities thought to be jointly necessary and singly

sufficient to have the ability to swim.

necessary that 'movements
same meaning as

'swimming'

x,
.

y,

z

Yet it is not

on a machine' have the

The test, therefore, does not

define 'swimming' because it does not give the meaninq of
the term, even though we may assume that the test correctly

measures the ability to swim.

This charge equally applies to tests of critical thinking
like the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal.

Even

granting for the sake of argument that the test correctly

measures the ability to engage in critical thinking
according to the abilities of Column C, and thereby granting

pathological doubter, and consistently answers "d." or "e.",
because of the answer key he will score very highly on the
test.
Therefore, there are instances of x such that x takes
the test under the appropriate conditions, scores N, yet is
not critically intelligent.

7

that the test correctly measures
critical intelligence, the
test cannot intelligibly be
construed as offering a definition of 'critical intelligence'.
it is not necessary that
'score N on the Watson-Glaser
test' has the same meaning as
'critical intelligence' even though
we may assume that the
test correctly measures critical
intelligence. We must,
therefore, reject this kind of definition
and seek another
kind of definition for 'critical
intelligence'.

We can easily offer another kind of
definition for 'critical

intelligence'

D.2

:

x is critically intelligent iff x has the
ability to

engage in critical thinking.

However

,

there are several problems with D.2 as it stands.

Like other kinds of intelligence, it seems to make sense
that

different people may possess different degrees of critical
intelligence.

We might also expect different people to en-

gage in critical thinking with different degrees of

proficiency.

But D.2 attempts to define

'critical intelli-

gence' by giving both necessary and sufficient conditions
for its presence.

It is,

therefore, not concerned to

discriminate among different degrees of critical intelligence, but simply to identify its presence.

8

However

,

D.2 faces another serious problem.

define an unclear term,

It attempts to

'critical intelligence', in terms

of an equally unclear term,

'critical thinking'.

Therefore,

as a definition attempting to provide both a necessary and
a

sufficient condition for 'critical intelligence', D.2 is
little help as it stands.

We must also seek a clear

definition of 'critical thinking' in order clearly to understand D.2.

Such a definition of

'critical thinking', to be

acceptable, must provide both necessary and sufficient

conditions for 'critical thinking'.

Educators, educational psychologists and philosophers of

education have provided numerous descriptions of critical
thinking.

D.

H.

Russell notes that one of his doctoral

candidates discovered thirty-five descriptions of critical
thinking from various educational journals.^

However, from

these many descriptions of critical thinking, two basic

groups emerge.
to define

The first group of definitions are attempts

'critical thinking' in terms of some other general

notion or notions.

The second group of definitions are

attempts to define 'critical thinking' in terms of specific
behaviors, in turn specifiable in terms of specific
abilities.

In each group, many of the suggested definitions

4

Knowing How to
Russell, "The Prerequisite:
No.
40 (Oct. 1963),
Read Critically," Elementary English
pp. 579-580.
D.

H.

,

.

9

are very similar.

offered,

group
of

m

Rather than consider every definition

shall consider a representative sample
from each

I

an attempt to formulate a satisfactory
definition

'critical thinking'.

5

Other authors offering definitions
more of the definitions I consider in groupsimilar to one or
one are:
FO

Dressel

(Dec.

—

"Critical Thinking," Education Digest, No. 21
~
1955), pp
16-17.
,

.

P. F. Kavett, "An Activity Approach
to Critical Thinking,"
The Instructor No. 73 (Nov. 1963), p. 116.
,

F.

No.

H. Ferrell, "Critical Thinking," The Education
Diqest,
14 (Jan. 1949) pp
14-16.
.

C. Kemp, "Improvement of Critical Thinking in
Relation
to Open-Closed Belief Systems," Journal of
Experimental
“
Education No. 31 (March 1963) pp. 321-323. ~

C.

,

H. A. Anderson, "Critical Thinking Through
Instruction in
English," The English Journal No. 36 (Feb. 1947)
pp 75-76.
,

.

Other authors offering definitions similar to one or more of
the definitions I consider in group two are:
D. H. Russell, "Higher Mental Processes," ed
C. W. Harris,
Encyclopedia of Educational Research
(New York:
The
MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 651.
.

D.

H. Russell, "Critical Thinking in Childhood and Youth,"
The School No. 31 (May 1943), p. 76.
,

D. H. Russell, "Education for Critical Thinking,"
The School No. 30 (Nov. 1941), p. 188.
,

Karlin, "Critical Reading is Critical Thinking,"
Education No. 84 (Sept. 1963) pp 8-11.
R.

,

.

R. Ellsworth, "Critical Thinking," The National Elementary
Principal No. 42 (May 1963) pp. 24-29.
,

N
D. Herber
An Inquiry Into the Effect of Instruction in
Critical Thinking Upon Students in Grades 10, 11, and 12
(Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation Boston University, 1959)
•

,

,

,
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Definitions of 'Critical Thinking':

H.

Group One

Pulling describes critical thinking
in terms of "the
6
stimulation of original thought."
Pulling argues that
teachers and librarians need to encourage
the stimulation
of original thought in order
to encourage critical
A.

thinking.

He then supplies a brief account
of how this

might be done.

The educational purpose of stimulating

original thought, according to Pulling, is
"to develop
a sense of

wonder in children which will lead them to

make informed guesses and to develop hypotheses."

He

also argues that teachers and librarians need
to encourage
Lhe development of this sense of wonder in
children in order

to lead them to make informed guesses and to develop

hypotheses in order to encourage critical thinking.
Usery, "Critical Thinking Through Children's Literature
Elementary English No. 43 (Feb. 1966), p. 116

M.

,

D'Angelo, The Teaching
of Critical Th inking (BGR,
~
Amsterdam, 1971)
B.

.

R. Ennis, ’’The Concept of Critical Thinking," Harvard
Education Review Mo. 32 (Winter 1962)
81-111
pp
,

,

T. W. Organ, The Art of Critical Thinkin g
Co., Boston, 1965).
6

.

(Houghton-Mif f lin

H. A. Pulling, "Teacher and Librarian in Development of Critical Thinking " California Journal of Secondary
Education No. 34 (Dec. 1959), p. 459.
,

,

"
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then supplies a brief account
of how this might be done.
In both cases, the concern
is to develop critical thinking.

We may, therefore, suppose that
Pulling might consider
stimulating original thought, making
informed guesses, and

developing hypotheses as necessary components
of critical
thinking, since he claims that we need
to develop them in
order to develop critical thinking. We
might also suppose
that they are sufficient, and propose the
following

definition of 'critical thinking' on Pulling's behalf:

D.3

x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is
engaged in
a process of stimulating original thought,
or making

informed guesses, or developing hypotheses.

Like all other definitions in group one, D.3 is hopelessly
unclear.

The first problem is that "stimulating original

thought" is unclear, i.e., what is included in 'stimulating'
and what are considered 'original thoughts'?

Suppose

someone drinks a quart of wine laced with LSD and then pro-

duces a rambling, confused, but original poem.
to D.3,

According

this case of engaging in the process of drinking

quart of wine laced with LSD is

a

case of engaging in

critical thinking, since this process stimulated original
thought.

Yet this is not what we mean when we say that

someone is engaged in critical thought.

a

12

The second problem is that "making informed
guesses" is
unclear, i.e., what is an 'informed guess'?
Suppose a

bookie gets a tip that Silver Blaze will win in the
fifth,
and then bets on Silver Blaze to win in the fifth.

According to D.2, this case of

bookie engaging in making

a

an informed guess is a case of engaging in critical
thinking,
/et intuitively this is not what we mean when we say
that

someone is engaged in critical thinking.

The third problem is that "developing hypotheses" seems to

involve what we may preanalytically call creative thinking,
but does not necessarily involve critical thinking.

We may

develop hypotheses by intuition, lucky guess, accident,
native genius, or informed guess.

None of these methods

necessarily involve what we call 'critical thinking'.
Pulling, like many others offering descriptions of critical

thinking, seems to confuse critical thinking with creative

thinking.

Given these problems, it is clear that D.3 does

not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for critical

thinking.

Therefore, it is not

a

useful definition of

'critical thinking.'

C.

De Zufra, Jr. describes critical thinking in terms of

"the control of emotions, the curbing of impulsiveness; it
is recognition of cause and effects;

it is creative;

it is

13

problem solving;
choices."^

.

.

.

criti cal thinking is the making of

A definition of

critical thinking' according

to De Zufra's account is:

D

.

4

x is engaged in critical thinking iff
x is engaged in

controlling emotions, or curbing impulses, or
recognizing cause and effect relations, or
solving
problems, or making choices.

D.4 can also be shown not to provide
successfully both

necessary and sufficient conditions for critical thinking.
Again, the major problem is that the definiens is
unclear.

Suppose a four year old child falls while learning to
rollerskate.

Suppose the child is self-conscious about

crying in front of peers, so he holds back the tears.

According to D.4, this child is engaged in critical
thinking.

However, he is not engaged in critical thinking.

Therefore, controlling emotions is not a sufficient con-

dition for engaging in critical thinking.

Suppose

a

member of Weight Watchers wires his jaws to con-

trol his impulse to overeat.

In having this jaws wired,

according to D.4, he is engaging in critical thinking.
He may claim that this is a creative method of curbing the

impulse to overeat, and that this involves creative
^

C.

De Zaffra, Jr., "Teaching for Critical Thinking,
No. 31 (April 1957), p. 231.

Clearing House

,
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thinking, but does not involve critical thinking.

Therefore,

simply curbing impulses is not a sufficient condition for

engaging in critical thinking.

Suppose someone witnesses a hit-and-run accident.
someone sees

a

This

car strike a pedestrian, causing serious

injury, and then speed away.

According to D.4, in

witnessing this accident, one is engaging in critical
thinking.

Yet our intuitions tell us that this does not

involve critical thinking.

Therefore, simply recognizing

cause and effect relations is not

a

sufficient condition for

engaging in critical thinking.

Suppose a Mafia leader has

a

problem.

will send him to prison for life.

A witness' testimony

He elects to solve the

problem by having the witness murdered.

According to D.4,

engaging in having the witness murdered is engaging in
critical thinking.

This, like wiring one's jaws to curb the

impulse to overeat, may involve creative thinking, but it
does not involve critical thinking.

Therefore, simply

solving problems is not a sufficient condition for engaging
in critical thinking.

Suppose

I

choose to have strawberry topping on my ice cream.

According to D.4, in choosing strawberry topping
gaging in critical thinking.

I

am en-

Yet our intuitions tell us
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that this is false.

Therefore, simply making choices
is not
a sufficient condition for
engaging in critical thinking.
Therefore, D.4 does not provide both
necessary and sufficient conditions for critical thinking.

However, might these conditions be jointly
sufficient?
may reformulate D.4 as follows:

D.5

We

x is engaged in critical thinking iff x
is engaged in

controlling emotions, and curbing impulses and
recognizing cause and effect relations, and solving
problems, and making choices.

However, even granting that these may be jointly sufficient,
they are clearly not necessary.

Suppose

a

stranger says to

me "I believe there are men from Mars, therefore, there are

men from Mars."

Suppose

I

point out to him that while

I

have no reason to doubt that he believes that there are men

from Mars, it does not follow from his belief that there are

men from Mars.

I

also point out and explain that this error

in reasoning involves appealing to a false principle.

Intuitively we want to be able to say that in making this
reply,

I

am engaging in critical thinking.

reply,

I

feel no emotions to control; neither hatred nor

fear, nor anger nor love.

I

In making this

also feel no impulses to curb;

neither to hit him, nor to kick him, nor to tell him that
he is stupid.

There are no cause and effect relations here
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to recognize, and no choices to be
made, unless we include

as

making

a

choice" the decision to reply at all.

There-

fore, neither D.4 nor D.5 provide
necessary conditions for

engaging in critical thinking.

At most, D.5 provides

a

jointly sufficient condition.

Therefore, neither D.4 nor

D.5 is a useful definition of

'critical thinking'; neither

provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for
engaging in critical thinking.

K.

Budmen describes critical thinking in terms of "sub-

0.

jective judgments."

He argues that teachers unfortunately

confuse critical thinking with what he calls "the scientific

method."

Unlike "the scientific method," which he claims

is objective and provides conclusions based upon verifiable

evidence, critical thinking is based upon "emotive premises
and rooted in value constructs."

emotions differ among individuals.

These value constructs and
He argues that while

what he calls the scientific method allows us objectively
and mechanically to determine that a conclusion is true,

what he calls critical thinking does not allow us objectively
and mechanically to determine that a conclusion is true.

Budman

'

account seems to be based on the observation that

s

there is universal agreement about the conclusions reached
in science,
g

but no universal agreement about the conclusions

Budmen, "What Do You Think, Teacher?", Peabody
Journal of Education, No. 45 (July 1967), p. 3.
K

.

0.
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reached in ethics, or other fields that Budmen
claims rely
on critical thinking rather than on the scientific
method
to verify conclusions.

Critical thinking, therefore,

according to Budmen, involves subjective and individual
rather than objective and universal judgments.

Although Budmen never gives an account of what the scientific method might be or how it is objective and universal,
his account of critical thinking is intended to capture the

subjective, individual elements which he thinks explain the
lack of agreement concerning conclusions verified by

critical thinking.

We may, therefore, suppose that Budmen

considers engaging in making these subjective judgments,
by appeal to these individual values and emotions, engaging
in critical thinking.

D.6

x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in
making subjective judgments by appealing to individual
values and emotive feelings toward premises.

Many educators, like Budmen, mistakenly believe that critical thinking is relative only to individual values and

emotions.

They seem mistakenly to infer that because criti-

cal thinking is done by individuals, it, therefore, can be

understood only as an individual activity which is different
for different individuals, varying with individual values

and emotions.

But because all judgments are made by

.

.

.
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individuals, we need not suppose that no judgment made by an

individual can be based on universally specifiable rules, or

objective evidence.
j

Indeed, even the objective universal

udgments made according to the scientific method are made

by individuals and are subjective in that very uninteresting

sense

We can make a judgment and support it by appealing to such

specifiable rules or objective evidence and not appeal to
individual values and emotive feelings toward premises at
all.

For example, one may make the judgment that "if P

then Q; Q, therefore, P" is an invalid argument form without appealing to individual values and emotions

(assuming

we understand what these are and how such appeals work)
In this case, one may appeal to the rules of valid in-

ference, or simply take a lucky guess in making the

judgment

D.6 implies that critical thinking is concerned only with

judgments based on individual values and emotions.

Yet,

judging the above argument form to be invalid may involve

critical thinking, yet does not involve making
based on individual values and emotions.

a

judgment

Furthermore,

making such judgments does not necessarily seem to involve
engaging in critical thinking.

Therefore, D.6 is not

definition of 'critical thinking'.

a

good
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Definitions of 'Critical Thinking':

Group Two

Because general definitions like D.3, D.4, D.5
and D.6 are
hopelessly unclear, they can easily be shown to fail

in the

attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions
for
critical thinking.

Several educators have attempted to

overcome these difficulties with proposed definitions
of
'critical thinking' by providing definitions of 'critical

thinking

in turn specifiable in terms of specific skills

and specific abilities.

Such a definition, if it can be

shown to be successful, has two obvious advantages.

First,

the presence of such specific skills and specific abilities
is presumed to be empirically testable, and,

therefore, we

may construct tests to measure critical thinking.

Secondly,

once We determine what teaching is, we need only examine
the specific skills and abilities composing the definition

and determine if they can be taught to determine whether

critical thinking can be taught.

With these advantages in

mind, we must carefully examine such definitions and de-

termine if one is successful.

Pingry suggests a basic guideline for such definitions

R.

E.

of

'critical thinking' based on a desire to secure these
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two obvious advantages.

He argues that:

Critical thinking has a great number of
means many different things to different aspects and
people.
S a de cr iptive phrase
critical
thinking is
?
r f
little use ^by itself to describe outcomes
of
learning
it is necessary and important that
hinkmg be defined or supplemented by specificcritical
outcomes of learning in terms of actual
behavior characteristics and skills desired. "9
,

Elliot W. Eisner attempts to follow this
guideline and to
define 'critical thinking' in terms of specific
skills and
abilities, evidenced by specific behavior.
"Terms such as

'critical thinking'

.

.

.

He argues that

can be found in

almost any education journal but the specification of
the

particular behaviors that constitute it is another
matter

.

.

.

'critical thinking'

is often so broadly con-

ceived as to make (the term) functionally meaningless ."
Therefore, his concern is to provide

a

definition of

critical thinking' that will allow us clearly to delineate
"specific behaviors that contribute to or consitute

critical thinking.

.

.

.

"H

g

R. E. Pingry, "Critical Thinking:
What Is It?,"
The Mathematics Teacher No. 44 (Nov. 1951) pp. 466-470.
,

^

E. W. Eisner, "Critical Thinking:
Some Cognitive
Components," Teachers College Record No. 66 (April 1965),
pp. 624-634
,

.

E.

W.

Components,"

Eisner,
p.

626.

Critical Thinking:

Some Cognitive
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Eisner characterizes ‘critical thinking' in
terms of what
ne calls "four cognitive components
12
The first component
he calls "questing."
Questing, according to Eisner, involves asking questions of a specific kind.
One is not

questioning if one is merely asking questions of
clarification like "Miss Jones, did you say page 237 or
238?"

One

is questing if one is asking questions like

Black Muslims become Black Buddhists?"

"Why didn't the

He asserts that such

questing questions may be distinguished from other sorts of

non-questing questions in that questing-questions "are
catalytic to further inquiry."

Critical thinking,

therefore, in Eisner's view, begins with questing.

The second component he calls "speculation."

Speculation,

according to Eisner, is "the ability to generate models or
theories to explicate phenomena." 13

The third component

13 He does not claim to provide an exhaustive
analysis,
but it is useful to evaluate his suggestion as a definition
to begin to see what such a definition is like.
I

O

J

We can see, that each of these components is very
unclear.
However, this unclarity seems to trap Eisner in
his own account of speculation.
He states that "If the
students feel anxious or if they feel inadequate, if they
feel their remarks will suffer critical evaluation, they
tend to be less able to give free rein to those processes
which make this behavior possible." He also points out
Principles and
that Osborn (in Applied Imagination:
Procedures of Creative Thinking N.Y. Scribners, 1953) has
a standing rule prohibiting critical evaluation or critical
comments during such speculation.
I shall, however, assume
that such speculations are not immune to the evaluation he
mentions as the third component of critical thinking.
,
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he calls

evaluation."

Evaluation, according to Eisner,

involves three distinct operations; first,
evaluating the
logic of propositions; secondly,
evaluating the evidence
supporting a claim; and thirdly, evaluating
"the way in
which language is organized, types of words
selected, and
the emphasis on certain words." The fourth
component
he

calls "constructing."
is the

Constructing, according to Eisner,

production of relationships between seemingly un-

related concepts; the perception of elements as part
of

a

larger whole."

Given Eisner's account, we might, therefore, expect that to
say that someone is engaged in questing,

speculating,

evaluating and constructing is to say that that someone is
engaged in critical thinking.

Apparently these four com-

ponents are meant conjunctively to describe or define
'critical thinking' since no component alone is sufficient
to describe or define critical thinking, although he claims

that each one is a necessary component.

Suppose someone asks "Why does grandmother dye her hair?",
yet fails to suggest any reason why.

This question appears

to accord with Eisner's vague notion of a questing question.
If we construe questing as a sufficient condition for

critical thinking, asking this question is engaging in
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cr -^i ca l thinking.

Yet nnr>
<
our -»„+.
intuitions
tell us that simply
asking this question
is not a sufficient
.

.

condition for

engaging in critical
thinking.

One may generate
models or theories
C£>

»

yet ifail
ail in
to engage in

thinking.

Suppose someone speculates
that the
Earth is round because
God loves circles.
We may claim that
speculating in this sense is
a sufficient condition
for engaging in creative thinking,
but
uuu not a
a suilicient
condition
for engaging in critical
thinking.

We may grant that engaging
in some suitably clarified
notion
of evaluation is sufficient
for engaging in critical

thinking, yet one may engage
in what Eisner calls "constructing," producing relationships
between seemingly unrelated concepts, and not engage
in critical thinking.
Suppose Stan claims that he is
thinking of grandmothers and
tuna fish.

relationship between seemingly unrelated
concepts like
grandmothers and tuna fish, in this case is
"grandmothers
and tuna fish are both thought of by
Stan." Yet we would
not want to claim that in thinking of
grandmothers
A

and tuna

fish,

Stan is engaging in critical thinking.

Therefore,

producing these relationships is not a
sufficient condition
for engaging in critical thinking.

To rule out the

.
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anticipated failure of these "components
of critical
thinking" to provide sufficient
conditions for critical
thinking, we might consider these
components as jointly
sufficient conditions for critical thinking.
Therefore, a
definition of ’critical thinking' in terms
of these specific
components evidencing specific behavior is
as follows:

D.7

x is engaged in critical thinking
iff x is
questing and speculating and evaluating and engaged in
constructing

Assuming that these four components are clear, the
first

problem with Eisner's account and, consequently, with D.7,
is

that it is not exhaustive.

There may be other components

of critical thinking that are also jointly sufficient

conditions for critical thinking.

To provide this type of

definition for 'critical thinking' is to attempt to provide
an exhaustive account.

l4

Secondly, the notions of "questing, speculating, evaluating,
and constructing" are sufficiently vague to include almost
any thinking activity.

^

Consequently, these notions do not

He does not claim that his account is exhaustive,
since he does not directly propose a definition, so criticism at this point is decidedly unfair.
However, he does
claim that these four cognitive components and their
resulting behaviors "are considered important necessary
aspects of critical thinking" but he adds "it is recognized
that others may have made other selections."
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usefully distinguish critical thinking from any
other kind
of thinking.
These notions may, under certain circumstances, provide a jointly sufficient condition for
the

presence of what we preanalyt ically call critical thinking,
but this does not help us to provide a definition of

critical thinking'

.

These notions, under certain circum-

stances, provide a jointly conjunctively sufficient con-

dition for critical thinking the same way that

a bullet

in

the chest, under certain circumstances, provides a suf-

ficient condition for death.

'

However, these notions,

under no circumstances, provide a conjunctively necessary

condition for critical thinking, the same way that
in the chest,

a

bullet

under no circumstances, provides a necessary

condition for death.

To see that these four notions are not jointly necessary

conditions for critical thinking, we must see that Eisner
has not provided four correct necessary components of

critical thinking.

Consider a case in which x is engaged in questing,
speculating, evaluating and constructing, each at different
We do not want
times and each about something different.
to say, without reservation, that x is engaged in critical
Therefore, we must carefully formulate the case
thinking.
It is sufficient for my point, however, to
in question.
grant that such a case may be successfully formulated.
-*-5

.
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Consider 'questing."

Certainly such questing
questions may
be catalytic to further
inquiry, and the further
inquiry

may

involve critical thinking.

But it need not.

There are many
oases of what we want to call
critical thinking that do not
Involve questing in Eisner's
sense.
Consider the following
example

Suppose that a knowledgable
logician faces an argument with
the following argument form:
if P then Q; Q, therefore P.
He need ask no questing
questions to reply that this argument is invalid because it is an
instance of an invalid
argument form.
He is sufficiently familiar with
such simple
argument forms to be able to evaluate them
without asking
"What could be wrong with this argument?/’
or "Why is this
argument invalid?/’ or some other general
question, construed as a questing question, catalytic to
further inquiry.

Yet, because the logician has a high degree of
familiarity

with such simple arguments, and is able to evaluate
them

without asking a questing question, we do not want to say
that he is not engaged in critical thinking.

This would

amount to claiming that at some degree N of familiarity with

certain critical thinking operations, the operations cease
to be critical thinking operations and become something

else.

Yet, we will want to be able to claim that someone

is engaged in critical thinking, no matter what degree N of
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familiarity that that someone has
with some critical
thinking operation.
Therefore, questing, as it now
stands

m

Eisner’s account, is not a necessary
component of
critical thinking.

Consider "speculation."

Certainly engaging in speculation

may engage one in critical thinking,
but speculation is not
a

necessary component of critical thinking.

Models or

theories can be produced by insight,
imagination, intuition,
or methodical invention.
As such, speculation
is a kind of

thinking, but it is mistaken to assume that
every form of

thinking is a form of critical thinking.

There are cases of

what we want to call critical thinking that
do not involve

speculation.

Consider the following example.

Suppose an

environmentalist encounters the following argument:

1.
2.
3.

If the reactor is built, then the river is polluted.
The river is polluted.
Therefore, the reactor is built.

He need not engage in speculation to think critically about

this argument and to determine that it is invalid.

To

engage in critical thinking, the environmentalist need not

engage in generating models or theories to explicate

phenomena.

Therefore, speculation is not a necessary com-

ponent of critical thinking.
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Consider "constructing

.

»

Certainly engaging in constructing

may engage one in speculation
and speculation may, in turn,
engage one in critical thinking,
but it need not.

Constructing is not a necessary component
of critical
thinking.
Relationships between seemingly unrelated
concepts and between parts and wholes can
be produced by
accident, lucky guesses, intuitions or
methodical invention.
As such,

constructing may be a form of thinking, but

it

is

mistaken to assume that every form of thinking
is a form of
critical thinking.
There are cases of what we
want to call

critical thinking that do not involve constructing.

Consider the above example of the environmentalist.

He need

not engage in constructing to think critically
about the

argument and determine that it is invalid.

To engage in

critical thinking, the environmentalist need not engage in

producing relationships between seemingly unrelated
concepts, or between parts and wholes.

Therefore, con-

structing is not a necessary component of critical thinking.

At most, what Eisner calls these four components of critical

thinking provide, under certain circumstances, a conjunctively sufficient condition for the presence of our pre-

analytic notion of critical thinking.

Yet at least three

of these components do not appear to be necessary components
of critical thinking at all, nor do these four components

provide a jointly necessary condition for the presence of
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critical thinking.

For these reasons, D.7 does not
appear

to be a promising definition
of

'critical thinking'.

However, we may conclude that some
notion of "evaluation"
may be important in the attempt
to define 'critical

thinking' in terms of specific abilities,
evidenced by
specific behavior.

Robert Ennis also attempts to define

’critical thinking' in

16
terms of abilities evidenced by specific
behavior.

He

adopts and revises a definition of ’critical thinking’

suggested by
what

.

.

.

B.

(a)

Smith:

0.
.

.

"Now if we set about to find out

statement means and to determine

.

whether to accept it or reject it, we would be engaged in
critical thinking." 17

Smith defines

"the assessing of statements."

'critical thinking' as

Ennis points out that Smith

does not say "the correct assessing of statements" and that
this allows Smith to talk about correct and incorrect

critical thinking.
a definition of

Ennis, however, as a first step toward

'critical thinking', claims that

'critical

thinking' should be defined such that one does not in-

correctly engage in critical thinking.
R.

Ennis,

"A

The Reading Teacher

,

Rather, one simply

Definition of Critical Thinking",
No. 17 (March 1964 ), pp
599-612.
.

^

B. 0. Smith, "The Improvement of Critical Thinking",
Progressive Education No. 30 (Ptorch 1953), pp. 129-134.
,
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fails to engage in critical thinking.

Ennis, therefore,

proposes the following definition:

D 8
•

x is engaged in critical thinking iff
x is engaged in
the correct assessment of statements.

Ennis does not seem to be aware that D.8 as it stands will
not do as a definition of ’critical thinking’.

points out that:

a)

However, he

"there are various kinds of state-

ments," b) "There are various relations between statements
and their support," and c) "there are various kinds of

assessment."

Yet he does not reformulate his definition,

or clearly spell out the implications of a,
D.8.

He simply lists what he calls

b

and

c

for

"nine major aspects of

critical thinking based on the definition."

We must now

consider an objection to D.8 and then see how we can reformulate D.8 according to Ennis’ suggestions in an attempt
to form a workable definition of 'critical thinking'.

Consider the following counterexample, designed to expose
the weakness of D.8.

Suppose we program a computer to scan

job applications for a large company, and to sort them into

groups according to a statement of job description.

The

computer is in some sense engaged in the correct assessment
of statements.

It

is correctly scanning the statement of

job description and feeding the applications into the

.
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appropriate group.

Yet we would not want to claim
that the

computer is engaged in critical thinking.
does not provide

a

D.8,

therefore,

necessary and sufficient condition for

critical thinking.

The obvious problem with D.8 is that
it is too vague.
We
may reconstruct D.8 by appealing to
Ennis' discussion of
what he calls "nine major aspects of
critical thinking."
Ihe nine major behavioral aspects of
critical thinking,

according to Ennis, are:

1.
l.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.

Judging
Judging
Judging
Judging
Judging
Judging
Judging
Judging

whether a statement follows from the premises
whether a statement is an assumption.
whether an observation statement is reliable.
whether a simple generalization is warranted.
whether a hypothesis is warranted.
whether a theory is warranted.
whether an argument depends on an ambiguity.
whether a statement is vague or overspecif ic
Judging whether an alleged authority is reliable.

We may begin our attempt to reformulate D.8 by eliminating
the unnecessary reduplication among these nine aspects of

critical thinking.

First,

1

may be clarified to involve

judging statements that follow from inductive arguments,

statements that follow from deductive arguments, and statements that follow from neither inductive nor deductive
arguments.

With this clarification, 2,

included in this revision of
^ i f ^ icul t

to understand.

1.

4

and

As it stands,

can be

5

2

is

An assumption may be simply

a

8
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statement which is taken to be self-evident,

a

which is generally believed to be true, or

statement which

is offered without support.

a

statement

In any case, whatever an

assumption is, this reformulation of

1

can include such

statements, no matter how this vague term is construed;

judging whether a statement is an assumption involves
judging whether a statement, in fact, follows from neither

inductive or deductive arguments, since no such arguments
are presented.

1

Four is simply a case of judging whether

statement of a generalization follows inductively from

a

some statement or set of statements as premises, and

simply

a

,

8

and

is

case of judging whether there is any inductive or

deductive support for the statement of
7

5

9

a

hypothesis.

involve judging whether a statement or

statements is an instance of an informal fallacy.

a

Three,
set of

Since

these statements are somewhat unclear, some instances may be

captured by

a

reformulation of

1.

But we may also combine

them under one heading and broaden that heading to include
all forms of informal fallacies.
1

R

This revised list of

I shall assume here that any statement can be shown
to follow deductively, even what have been called assumptions, since we may trivially provide a deductively
valid argument with the assumption as the conclusion.
The deductive argument
(Assume that the roof will not fall.
roof will not fall.
then
the
is that if Nixon was President,
will not fall.)
the
roof
Nixon was President. Therefore,
The point here, however, is recognizing that no such argument is, in fact, provided. This requirement can be built
into any clarification of 1.

:

.
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behavioral aspects of critical thinking
mentioned by
Ennis, therefore, is:

1*

2

.

3.

fudging whether a statement does or does not follow inductively from a presented statement or set of statements, or does or does not follow deductively from
a
presented statement or set of statements, or does not
follow inductively or deductively from any presented
statement or set of statements.
Judging whether a statement or a theory can be supported
by sound arguments.
Judging whether a statement or set of statements commits
an informal fallacy.

Each of these behavioral aspects involves, in turn,

a

set of

abilities which presumably can be clearly enumerated.
Therefore, we may consider adding these three behavioral

aspects to Ennis' proposed definition in an attempt to

reformulate D.8.

D.9

x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in

correctly
(1)

judging whether a statement does or does not
follow inductively from a presented statement or
set of statements, or does or does not follow
deductively from a presented statement or set of
statements, or does not follow inductively or
deductively from any presented statement or set of
statements, or

(2)

judging whether a statement of a theory can be
supported by sound arguments, or

(3)

judging whether a statement or set of statements
commits an informal fallacy, or
any combination of doing

(1)

,

(2)

and

(3)
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D

*

9

as a definition of

serious objection.

’critical thinking’, is not immune to

The first objection to D.9 is that it

seems to ignore an important aspect of critical
thinking.
One of the most important aspects of critical thinking
is
the ability to reformulate or clarify a term or a
statement

that may be unclear as it stands.
is unclear,

If a term or a statement

then it may have a number of possible

interpretations.

The task, then, is to clarify the term or

the statement in such a way that the interpretation selected

makes explicit what the user of the term or the author of
the statement could be reasonably construed to intend.

This

often involves applying what has been called the principle
of charity.

D.9, for example, requires that we suppose in

statement of a theory is clear.

(2)

that the

However, one of the most

important tasks of critical thinking is to provide

a

clear

statement of a theory that is initially unclearly stated.
This often involves explicating certain concepts used in the

statement or clarifying the statement itself.

The expla-

nation of concepts and the clarification of statements can
be loosely specified in terms of specific abilities.

D.9 omits this important behavioral aspect of critical

thinking.

At most, D.9 provides, under certain

Thus,

^

9
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circumstances sufficient conditions for critical
thinking,
but not both necessary and sufficient
conditions

.

There is a second objection to D.9 to support this
claim.
Ennis argued that unlike Smith's definition of 'critical

thinking', his definition of 'critical thinking' involved
"c o r rectly a ssessing

statements."

statements," not simply "assessing

This implies that one cannot incorrectly en-

gage in critical thinking, but that one simply fails to

engage in critical thinking.

counterintuitive.

This view, however, seems

For example, consider a philosopher

laboring over a theory who publishes his defense of the

theory in the Journal of Philosophy

.

Suppose that he is

accused by a second philosopher, who publishes this attack
on this defense of the theory in the next issue of the

Journal of Philosophy

,

of supporting the theory with an

unsound and an invalid argument.

philosopher is correct.

Suppose this second

One complex argument is unsound,

another complex argument is invalid.

We might want to

claim that the first philosopher failed correctly to support
the theory, and consequently, engaged in incorrect critical

thinking when reviewing his work, but we would not want to

claim that in laboring over his theory and reviewing his
1

This assumes that we can describe a case where
statements, terms, etc. are clear, and that the case
described avoids the other problems with D.9.

,
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work, he failed to engage in critical thinking.

Therefore,

D.9 rules out instances of critical thinking that
pre-

analytically need to be ruled in.

A satisfactory definition of

'critical thinking' must

succeed in ruling out activities which are obviously not

instances of critical thinking, yet rule in activities which
our intuitions strongly suggest are instances of critical

thinking, even though they involve incorrect critical
thinking.

A satisfactory definition should rule in

instances like the above philosopher reviewing his own work.
If you are engaged in flying an airplane, but do it badly

and crash, we cannot reasonably argue that you were never

engaged in flying the airplane without distorting our
intuitions.

It is clearer to argue that you were engaged in

flying the airplane badly.

There is a third objection to D.9 which can be seen by

considering the following counterexample.

Suppose in

judging whether a statement of a theory can be supported by
sound arguments
spin it.

(2)

we lay a Coke bottle on its side and

If the top points East,

supported by sound arguments.

then the theory can be

If the top points West, then

the theory cannot be supported by sound arguments.

If the

top points North, South, or anywhere in between, we spin
the bottle again.

Now suppose, in a particular case of

a

,
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particular theory, the top points East, and we are correct.
The theory in question can indeed be supported by sound

arguments.

Therefore, according to D.9, engaging in

spinning the Coke bottle to make this judgment is engaging
in critical thinking since D.9 does not specify how one must

make a particular judgment like
made is to be supported.

spinning

a

(2)

Making such a judgment by

Code bottle, of course, is not what we want to

call engaging in critical thinking.
a good

or how the judgment

Therefore, D.9 is not

definition of 'critical thinking'.

We can attempt to reconstruct D.9 to avoid these objections
so that it might successfully provide both necessary and

sufficient conditions for critical thinking.

To attempt to

avoid the third objection, we might distinguish what has, in
the philosophy of science, been called the "context of

discovery" from what has been called the "context of
justification."

The intuition here is that in considering

necessary and sufficient conditions for critical thinking,
we are not interested in the context of discovery, but only
in the context of justification.

Considerations of the con-

text of discovery may more reasonably belong in discussions
of what might constitute creative thinking.

The Coke bottle counterexample is addressed to the notion in
D.9 of "correctly judging whether

..."

The effect seems

,

.
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to be that we may discover the correct judgment by
accident,

by lucky guess, by intuition, or by spinning a Coke bottle.

This involves the context of discovery.

None of these

methods of discovering the correct judgment necessarily
involve critical thinking.

Discovery may involve creative

thinking but that is of no concern here.

The role of

critical thinking, once such a discovery is made by whatever
mysterious means, is, in this example, to support the
(1)

judgment with reasoned arguments, applying the skills which
are supposed to make up

(1)

,

(2)

and

(3)

We must, there-

fore, state some conditions for justifying judgements like
,

(2)

and

(3)

in a definition of

'critical thinking'

such that these conditions avoid involving methods of

discovering correct judgments and such that these conditions involve methods of justifying the judgment made

which intuitively involve critical thinking abilities.
(2)

To attempt to avoid the second objection, we might simply

eliminate 'correct' from the definition, since we want

a

definition which does not rule out all instances of critical
thinking which turn out to be incorrect.

To attempt to

avoid the first objection, we might first introduce two

other behavioral aspects of critical thinking and modify
.

We might introduce the following:

(4)

judging whether a term or a statement is unclear

.

.
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and requires explication or clarification.
(5)

And modify
(6)

judging whether the proposed explicatum or the
proposed clarification selected explicates or
clarifies what the user of the term or the author
of the statement can reasonably be construed to
intend
(2)

to read:

judging whether a clear statement of a theory can
or cannot be supported by sound arguments.

Therefore, we may consider applying these suggestions in an

attempt to reformulate D.9 and avoid these three objections:

D.10

x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in:
(1)

a)

b)

judging whether a statement does or does not
follow inductively from a presented statement
or set of statements, or does or does not
follow deductively from a presented statement
or set of statements, or does not follow inductively or deductively from any presented
statement or set of statements, and
x has the ability to produce an appeal to in-

ductive or deductive rules of inference from
which x believes the statement follows, or x
has the ability to produce an appeal to inductive or deductive rules of inference that
x believes are violated in concluding the
statement, or x has the ability to provide an
explanation that x believes explains why the
statement does not follow inductively or
deductively to support the judgment, or

There is an objection to (2) related to the Coke
by stating
bottle counterexample which might be avoided
like
(1), (2) and
some conditions for justifying judgments
The objection is does (2) require just deciding
(3)
whether a theory can be supported by sound arguments, or
actually supporting the theory with sound arguments?
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(2)

(3)

a)

judging whether a term or a statement is
unclear and requires explication or
clarification, and

b)

if x has the ability to produce what
x believes
to be more than one plausible construal of
the
meaning of the term or the meaning of the
statement to support the judgment, or

a)

judging whether the proposed explicatum or the
proposed clarification selected explicates or
clarifies what the user of the term or the
author of the statement can reasonably be
construed to intend, and

b)

x has the ability to produce an appeal to what
x believes to be reasons for supposing that the
proposed explicatum is, in fact, an explicatum
(by appeal to what an explication is) or an
appeal to what x believes to be reasons for
supposing that the proposed clarification is,
in fact, a clarification (by appeal to (2)) to

support the judgment, or

(4)

(5)

a)

judging whether a clear statement of a theory
can or cannot be supported by sound arguments,
and

b)

x has the ability to produce either what x
believes to be a valid, sound deductive argument or what x believes to be a strong inductive argument to support the theory, or
produce either what x believes to be a valid,
sound deductive argument or what x believes to
be a strong inductive argument to support its
denial, to support the judgment, or

a)

judging whether a statement or a set of statements is an instance of an informal fallacy,
and

b)

x has the ability to produce the rule which x
believes the fallacy in question is an instance

of,

or any combination of doing
and 5
(

)

.

(1)

,

(2)

,

(3)

,

(4)
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D.io is a definition of engaging
in critical thinking in
terms of engaging in certain
mental activities, as stated in
(1) through (5) a)
and in terms of having certain
dispositions which may not be actualized,
in terms of (1) through
(5) b)
As we have seen, just engaging
in certain mental
activities such as judging (in
(1) through (5) a)) is not
sufficient to define engaging in
critical thinking. For
example, we may engage in judging by
lucky guess and not be
engaged in critical thinking. Nor
is just having certain
,

.

dispositions which may not be actualized
sufficient to define engaging in critical thinking.
For example, we may
have such dispositions while sleeping
and not be engaged in
critical thinking. However, defining engaging
in critical

thinking in terms of both engaging in certain
mental

activities and having certain dispositions which
may not be
actualized avoids these problems.

Consider

(1)

through (5).

in each, a)

simply requires a

judgment, which may be arrived at even by spinning
a Coke

bottle.

Therefore,

bility of

a

a)

lucky guess, which does not involve engaging in

critical thinking.
a

alone does not rule out the possi-

However,

(1)

through

(5)

b)

functions as

requirement which is meant to rule out such lucky guesses

which do not involve engaging in critical thinking.
((1)

through

produce

a

(5)

b)

)

These

require that x have the ability to

specific kind of justification that x believes to

.
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be adequate to support the judgments.

Note that

b)

does not

require certain behavior of x, but simply
requires that x
have certain dispositions to behave.
These dispositions to
behave are what serve to distinguish judging
by lucky guess
from judging by critical thinking.

For example, suppose that x judges that

a

statement does not

follow deductively from a presented set of statements

(d) a)).

Suppose that

I,

in fact,

ask x to justify this

judgment and he tells me to go to hell
case,

((1)

b)

)

In this

suppose that x is simply busy, and thinks of me as a

conceptual troublemaker, even though he, in fact, has the
ability to justify the judgment by an appeal to the appropriate deductive rule of inference.

According to D.10, in

making this judgement, x is engaged in critical thinking
since he still has the ability to justify the judgment, even

though he has, in fact, told me to go to hell.
case,

In another

suppose that x again tells me to go to hell; however,

suppose that x does not, in fact, have the ability to

justify the judgment by an appeal to the appropriate de-

ductive rule of inference.

According to D.10, x is not

engaged in critical thinking since he does not have the dis-

position to justify the judgment by an appeal to the

appropriate deductive rule of inference.
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In another case,
is very drunk.

suppose that x makes this judgment, yet x

Suppose x is

,

in fact,

asked to justify this

judgment, and x simply reaches into his pocket and
pulls out
a slip of

paper on which is written "P

follows from this."

•

% p"

and says "it

According to D.10, x is engaged in

critical thinking provided that x believes the given
statement follows from the presented statement, or set of
statements, according to this rule.

If x simply reaches

for this slip of paper out of habit and has no belief that

the given statement follows from the presented statement or
set of statements according to this rule, then according to

D.10, x is not engaged in critical thinking.

However, D.10 rules in as instances of engaging in critical

thinking certain instances that nay involve incorrect
critical thinking.

For a definition of 'critical thinking',

it seems intuitively virtuous to be able to understand that

one is engaged in critical thinking, yet be able to decide

independently that one is doing it badly.
by seeing that

(1)

through

(5)

b)

We can see this

do not require that x

have the ability to justify such judgments correctly.

It

seems intuitively clear that even if one were incorrectly
to justify such a judgment,

for example by appeal to an in-

correct deductive rule of inference, in making the attempt,
one would be engaged in critical thinking, even though
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incorrectly.

in such a case, one would not clearly
be en-

gaged in any other activity, given the
dispositional
-

equir ement stated in

(1)

through

(5)

b)

D ’10,

therefore, provides a general definition of what it
is
to engage in both correct and incorrect critical
thinking,

lowever

given an interest in eventually answering the

,

question "Can critical thinking be taught?," we are less
concerned with particular mental activities like judging
D.10,

(1)

through

(5)

a), than with the question of whether

by teaching we might instill the sort of dispositions and

abilities required to justify such judgments, D.10
through

(5)

b)

,

in fact, made.

(1)

by whatever means the original judgment is,

Further fore, such

a

concern is not a concern

for the actual dispositions that some person x happens to

have when engaging in critical thinking, but rather a much

more limited concern for the abilities that are necessary
and sufficient for some person correctly to engage in

critical thinking.

Having specified these specific disposition in terms of

through

(5)

b)

,

(1)

we are now in a position to formulate a list

of specific abilities which are necessary and sufficient for

engaging correctly in critical thinking.
useful for at least three purposes:

This list will be

first, to reformulate

D.2 and provide a satisfactory definition of 'critical

1

.

:
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intelligence' in terms of the ability to
engage correctly
critical thinking; secondly, to help
determine if, or to
what extent correct critical thinking,
and thereby, critical
intelligence, can be taught; and thirdly,
to help guide the
formulation of a curriculum for attempts to
teach critical
intelligence, if it is decided that it can be
taught.

m

Given D

.

10

,

we may provide the following definition of
the

ability to engage correctly in critical thinking.

Paralleling D.10,

D.ll

x has the ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking to degree N (for N > 0) iff x has the ability
correctly to
(1)

perform deductive operations according to the
rules of some deductive logical system that is
both consistent and truth preserving, or perform
inductive operations according to some rules of
inductive support,^ 1 and x believes that the
conclusions follow from the premises according to
these rules to degree nl or
,

(2)

2

formulate plausible interpretations of a given
statement or set of statements in which terms from
the given statement or set of statements differ in
meaning in the plausible interpretations, or a
statement differs in meaning or truth value in the
plausible interpretations, to degree n2, or

While there are not, as yet, clearly justified
principles of inductive support, there are clear cases of
inductive support for which we do not, as yet, know the
correct justified principles.
It is beyond the scope of
this work to provide such justified principles of inductive
support, yet we can talk intelligibly about an ability to
worx correctly with some notion of inductive support, or
evidence

,
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(3)

etermme that a proposed explicatum of a
term
used by an author or speaker, or
a proposed
elarif roation of a statement presented
by an
r
eake is in fact, an explicatum or
JP
?
f
is,
fact, a clarification
to degree n3, or

m

(4)

'

e a d ev luate
5
r?
rul-es
of
some

deductive support (according
deductive logical system that
s both consistent and truth
preserving)
statements not necessarily translated intofor given
the
language of that system, or to provide
and evaluate inductive support (according to
some rules of
inductive support) for given statements; to
degree
n4

K°ih^

_

,

(5)

or

recognize (psychologically persuasive) errors in
informal reasoning that employs natural language,
to degree n5,
or an combination of
and

(6)

(1),

(2),

(3),

(4)

and

(5),

N = nl + n2 + n3 + n 4 + n5
5

I

shall now consider the abilities stated in D.ll.

explain what it is to have these abilities,

(1)

I

shall

through (5),

to a certain degree n and how having these abilities to a

certain degree n allows us to determine the degree N,

(6)

to which someone has the ability to engage correctly in

critical thinking for N

The first disjunct of

>

(1)

0.

is meant to capture the ability to

perform deductive operations to evaluate given arguments by
testing their validity with deductive systems of varying

degrees of formality and sophistication, from simple

syllogisms to the lower predicate calculus and quantified

.

.
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modal systems.

The degree nl to which one has the ability

to perform these deductive operations
is a function of the

power of the system(s) known as well as the
speed, relia-

bility and economy with which one correctly
performs these
deductive operations.

The second disjunct of

(1)

is meant to capture the ability

to discriminate among strong and weak inductive
arguments by

appeal to inductive rules; to determine by appeal to in-

ductive rules if a presented statement requires more

evidence to be judged highly probable or to determine by
appeal to inductive rules if

a

presented statement is

improbable, given the evidence offered to support it.

degree nl to which one has this ability is

a

The

function of the

speed, reliability and economy with which one correctly per-

forms these inductive operations

Disjunct

(2)

is meant to capture the ability to determine

if a term or a statement is unclear in a given context by

considering the logical and factual relationships among
presented statements to, in turn, produce more than one
plausible construal of the meaning or the term or the

meaning or the truth value of the statement.

The degree n2

to which one has this ability is a function of the speed,

reliability and economy with which one correctly makes this
determination

)
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Disjunct
a

(3)

is meant to capture the ability to evaluate

proposed explication of a term or a proposed clarification

of a statement by determining

explication)

(by appeal to the rules of

that the explicatum is, in fact, an explicatum

or by determining

(by

appeal to

clarification is, in fact,

a

(2)

that the proposed

clarification of the statement.

The degree n3 to which one has this ability is a function of
the speed, reliability and economy with which one correctly

makes this determination.

Disjunct
a

(4)

is meant to capture the ability to evaluate

clear statement of a theory by performing deductive

operations on statements of the theory or providing deductive arguments to support the theory or to refute the
theory, translating statements into a formal language to

prove that the theory is consistent or to show that it is

inconsistent, or to prove that the arguments supporting the
theory are valid or to show that they are invalid, or by

performing inductive operations to support the theory or to
refute the theory, or providing inductive arguments to
support the theory or to refute the theory.

The degree n4

to which one has this ability is a function of the speed,

reliability and economy with which one correctly evaluates
such statements.

.
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Disjunct

(5)

is meant to capture the ability
to recognize

informal fallacies in reasoning
that employs natural language
by citing the error in reasoning
that the fallacy commits.
The degree n5 to which one has
this ability is a function of
the speed, reliability and
economy with which one correctly
recognizes such fallacies.

Disjunct

(6)

is meant to account for degrees
of ability to

engage correctly in critical thinking.

According to

(6),

the degree N to which x has the ability
to engage correctly

m

critical thinking is the average of the sum
of the

degrees nl through n5 to which x has the ability
correctly
to engage in

(1)

and

(2)

and

(3)

and

(4)

and

(5)

Since we

have no clear reason to suppose that one of these
dis-

positions is more important for critical thinking than any
other, all are weighted equally for determining the degree
N of the ability to engage correctly in critical thinking.

In this way, then, D.ll allows us to talk of one improving

one's ability to engage correctly in critical thinking, or
of having the ability to a greater or lesser degree than

someone else who also has the ability.

According to D.ll

(1)

,

x

may be said to have an ability to

perform deductive operations if x knows some simple rules of
syllogism and takes hours to evaluate the validity of simple
deductive arguments.

However, x is said to have this
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ability to a lower degree nl
than someone else who can perform the operations quickly,
reliably and economically.
Similar considerations apply to
(2), (3), (4) and (5).
One who can only do (1), even to
a fairly high degree nl,
who cannot do (2), (3), (4) or
(5), is
said to have the

ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking since in
0-11,

(1)

is a sufficient condition for
such an ability.

Yet according to D.ll

(6), he may be said to have the

ability to a very low degree N.

Given D.ll, we may now reconsider D.2 as
critical intelligence'.

a

definition of

D.2 was unacceptable because

critical thinking' was as unclear a term as 'critical
intelligence'.

Now, however, we have a definition of

'critical thinking' in terms of D.10.

Yet as it stands,

D.2 is still unacceptable because critical intelligence

seems to admit of degrees, yet D.2 does not allow us to

account for degrees of critical intelligence.

D.2 is also

unacceptable because according to D.10, one may engage in
critical thinking, yet do so incorrectly.

It is not

satisfactory to say that someone is critically intelligent
when that someone engages incorrectly in critical thinking.

However, given D.ll as a definition of the ability to engage

correctly in critical thinking to degree N, we may
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reformulate D.2 to avoid these objections
and to provide an
acceptable definition of 'critical intelligence':

D.12 x is critically intelligent to degree
N (for N

>

0)

iff

x has the ability to engage correctly in
critical

thinking to degree N (for N

>

0)

(as

defined by D.ll).

D.12 allows us to account for the degree
N of critical in-

telligence in terms of the degree N of the ability to engage

correctly in critical thinking as specified in D.ll.

This

degree N is, in turn, accounted for in D.ll by determining
and considering the degrees n to which one has the ability
to engage correctly in

(1),

(2),

(3),

(4)

and

D.10

(5).

allows us to understand what it is to engage in critical
thinking, either correctly or incorrectly.

With these notions clarified in answer to question

1,

we are

now in a clearer position both to determine if or to what

extent critical intelligence, as defined by D.12, can be
taught in answer to question

3

and to formulate

a

curriculum

for attempts to teach critical intelligence if it is decided

that it can be taught, in answer to question

4.

First,

however, we must attempt to understand the notion of

teaching and answer question

2,

"What is teaching?"

.
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CHAPTER

II

WHAT IS TEACHING?

Kany educators, educational psychologists
and philosophers
of education have provided descriptions
of teaching which
may, in turn, be reformulated as
defintions of

’teaching’.

However, these many descriptions seem to
fall into at least
four distinct groups when reformulated as
definitions of
teaching'.
to define

22

The first group of definitions are attempts

'teaching'

in terms of some method or methods.

The second group of definitions are attempts to define
'teaching' in terms of some specific action or sets of

actions.

define

The third group of definitions are attempts to

teaching' in terms of directing learning, while the

fourth group of definitions attempt to define 'teaching' as
a kind of

intentional performance.

In each group, many of

the suggested definitions are very similar.

consider every definition offered,

I

Rather than

shall consider

Each definition among the groups of definitions that
consider critically make some reference to the notion of
learning, so distinguishing a group of definitions of
'teaching' that make reference to learning does not usefully
individuate any such definitions.
I shall later point out
that taking 'learning' as a primitive term in the definiens
of a definition of 'teaching' is not useful for my purpose
here because then to ask "Can critical intelligence be
taught?" is to ask in some form "Can critical intelligence
be learned?", and without a thorough explication of
'learning', we simply substituted one obscure question for
another
I
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a

representative sample from each of
the four groups in an
attempt to formulate a satisfactory
definition of 'teaching'

Definitions of 'Teaching':

Group One

In his account of teaching, B.
F. Skinner specifies the goal
of teaching in terms of learning;
"Teaching is the

expediting of learning; a person who is
taught learns more
quickly than one who is not." 23 Ye t
clearly, according to
Skinner, teaching is not a necessary
condition of learning:

Teaching is simply the arrangement of contingencies
of reinforcement.
Left to himself in a given environment, a student will learn, but he will
not necessarily
have been taught.
The school of experience is not
school at all, not because no one learns in it,
but
because no one teaches." 2 ^

Skinner specifies what he takes to be the most significant

aspect of teaching.

"A student is taught in the sense that

he is induced to engage in new forms of behavior and in

specific forms upon specific occasions." 23

Yet not

just any form of behavior will do in Skinner's account.
23

B.

F.

Skinner, The Technology of Teaching,
1965), p. 5.

Appleton-Century-Crof ts
O

(N.Y.,

,

A

B.

25

B.

F.
F.

Skinner, The Technology of Teaching

,

p.

5.

Skinner, The Technology of Teaching

,

p.

33.
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Inducing
u*
teaching."
4-

student to behave in a given way is not

a

26

Skinner is concerned to limit what he takes

to be the most significant aspect of teaching
to include

learning behavior, since in his view, teaching involves
the

expediting of learning.

To explain what he takes to be the most significant aspect

of teaching and the relationship of teaching to learning,

Skinner applies his notion of operant conditioning.

He

claims that:

"The application of operant conditioning to education
is simple and direct.
Teaching is the arrangement of
contingencies of reinforcement under which students
learn.
They learn without teaching in their natural

environments, but teachers arrange special contingencies which expedite learning, hastening the appearance
of behavior which would otherwise be acquired slowly
or making sure of the appearance of behavior which
might otherwise never occur.

Skinner, therefore, explains the relationship of teaching
and learning by claiming that teaching is a sufficient

condition for learning, although teaching is not

a

necessary

condition for learning.
26

27

B.

F.

Skinner, The Technology of Teaching

,

p.

B.

F.

Skinner, The Technology of Teaching

,

pp

223.
.

65-65.
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Given Skinner's specification of
the goal of teaching, his
account of what he takes to be the
most significant aspect
of teaching, and his explanation
of the relation of teaching

and learning, we may formulate the
following definition of
'teaching' on Skinner's behalf:

0,13 x
en 9 a ged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged
in
inducing y's learning 0 by arranging
contingencies
of reinforcement to expedite y's learning
0
.

Like most definitions of 'teaching' in group one,
D.13

confuses the way in which teaching is or can be
performed

with a definition of 'teaching'.
counterexample.
a

Consider the following

Suppose that PBS broadcasts

a

lecture by

noted horticulturist on the process of organically raising

tomatoes.

The television lecture does not contain the con-

tingencies of reinforcement.

He simply explains the process

of organically raising tomatoes.

Yet we intuitively

would like to be able to claim that the horticulturist is

engaged in teaching the process of organically raising

tomatoes to the TV audience.

For example, when one walks

into a room and asks one viewing the broadcast "What is that

man doing?," one would like to be able to reply "Teaching
us the process of organically raising tomatoes."

Therefore,

inducing learning by arranging contingencies of reinforcement to expedite learning is not a necessary condition for

engaging in teaching.

.
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We may grant that in some cases inducing
learning by

arranging contingencies of reinforcement to
expedite
learning is engaging in teaching, but only by
trading the
unclarity of 'teaching' for the unclarity of 'learning'.
D.13 rules out cases of arranging contingencies
of rein-

forcement for y's that cannot learn.

But this assumes that

we can make a clear distinction between y's that can learn

and y s that cannot learn in order to distinguish those y's

one can engage in teaching from those y's that one cannot

engage in teaching.

forcement to modify

One may arrange contingencies of reina

worm's behavior, but is that to say

that worms can learn?

worms?

Are we, thereby, engaged in teaching

The answer seems to depend on an account of

learning

Consider a case in which y is a person who can learn.
Suppose an expert in torture is engaged in inducing y's

learning that he must cooperate with his captors by

arranging tortures to expedite y's learning that he must
cooperate with his captors.
engaging in teaching y?

Is engaging in torturing y

One might reply no, since y cannot

be truly said to learn in such a case, or one might reply

yes,

torturing is teaching since y learned some

that he must cooperate with his captors.

0

,

namely

Yet answering

this question involves appealing to some definition of

'learning'.

D.13, in this case, simply trades the unclarity

.

:
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of

teaching' for the unclarity of 'learning' and is not
a

successful definition of 'teaching'.

John Brubacher presents what he calls a definition of
’teaching'

that also can be construed as an attempt to

define teaching in terms of some method.

28

Brubacher

argues that to teach means to "arrange and manipulate

a

situation in which there are gaps or obstructions which
an individual will seek to overcome and from which he will
29
learn in the course of doing so."
To explain his

definition he appeals to his discussion of the relation between problem solving and learning.

He argues that if one

seeks to solve a problem, then one learns both by seeking
and by solving.

30

In Brubacher s view,
'

therefore, teaching is a sufficient

condition for learning, since teaching is defined in terms
of setting up such problem solving situations which an

individual will seek to solve.
28

(N.Y.

29
p.

108

J. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education
McGraw Hill, 1939).
J.

Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education

J

Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education

.

30
p.

However, he also claims that

105.

.
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learning may occur without teaching.

In Brubacher s view,
'

therefore, teaching is not a necessary condition for

learning

Given Brubacher

'

s

account of teaching and its relation to

learning, one may formulate the following definition on

Brubacher'

s

behalf:

D 14 x is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in
•

arranging and manipulating problem situations such that

y will seek to solve the problem, and in so doing, y
learns 0
.

D.14, however, provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient

condition for teaching and, therefore, also fails as a

definition of 'teaching'.

Suppose that x is engaged in

teaching y how to tune an antique auto engine

.

Now x may

choose to do so by arranging and manipulating problem
situations, but x need not choose this method to teach y how
to tune his engine.

Instead, x may simply explain the

physical laws governing the operation of any internal

combustion engine, the mechanical principles of such engines,
and the engineering decisions applying these laws and

principles in x's antique engine.

Then x may simply

explain the procedure for maintaining the most efficient

operation of these laws and principles given these specific

engineering decisions.

In this case,

x can be said to be
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engaged in teaching y how to tune his auto
engine.

Yet, x

cannot be said to be engaged in arranging
and manipulating
problem situations for y to overcome so that
y will learn to
tune his antique auto engine.

X has simply been engaged in

explaining physical laws, mechanical principles,
and
specific engineering decisions.

provide

Therefore, D.14 does not

necessary condition for teaching.

a

Now suppose that y is driving an antique auto down

stretch of highway to deliver it to

a

only if he can deliver it before 5:00.
to a halt.

a

lonely

man who will pay him

The auto sputters

Furthermore, y allowed 30 minutes to make the

20-minute trip so that y has 10 minutes to solve the problem,
to arrive before 5:00, and to make the sale.

In carefully

examining the engine, y learns that there is no gas in the
carburetor and traces the problem back to
filter.

a

dirty fuel

He removes and cleans the filter, and motors on to

make the sale.

Only in an odd and metaphorical sense could one claim that
the antique auto taught y that its fuel filter was dirty

since ordinarily cars are not the kinds of things that

engage in teaching, nor do they arrange and manipulate
situations.

First, suppose that it was y who desired to

sell the auto and gave himself the time limit, failed

earlier to inspect the fuel filter, and thereby arranged and
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manipulated (even if unknowingly) the problem
situation he
sought to solve.

Yet it is also odd that
y taught himself

that the antique auto engine's fuel filter
was dirty.

Brubacher has argued that one may learn without
being taught
and this seems to be such a case;
y learned that the antique
auto engine's fuel filter was dirty, although
no one taught
him that it was dirty.

Secondly, suppose it was x, the car’s owner, who hired
y to
deliver the car.
Then x desired to sell the auto, gave
y

the time limit, failed earlier to inspect the fuel filter
and thereby arranged and manipulated

(even if unknowingly)

the problem situation y sought to solve.
to say that x taught y that the

filter was dirty.

Yet it is also odd

antique auto engine's fuel

Therefore, x may be engaged in arranging

and manipulating problem situations such that y will seek to
solve the problem, and, in so doing, learn 0, and yet x may

not be engaged in teaching.

Therefore, D.14 does not pro-

vide a sufficient condition for teaching.

Therefore, D.14

fails as a definition of 'teaching'.

Definitions of 'Teaching':

B.

Group Two

Othanel Smith argues that not only can one learn without

being taught, but also that:

s

"
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earning does not necessarily issue from teaching;
that teaching is one thing and learning is quite
another is significant for pedagogical research.
it
enables us to analyze the concept of teaching without
becoming entangled in the web of arguments about the
processes and conditions of learning.
In short, to
carry on investigations of teaching in its own right.

3

^"

Smith then carries out his own investigation of teaching and

offers his own account.

He argues that "teaching is a

system of actions directed to pupils." 32

He claims that

these actions are varied in form and content and they are

related to the behavior of pupils whose actions are, in
turn, related to those of the teacher."

Smith then distinguishes a teacher's verbal and a teacher's

non-verbal actions, and claims that these actions are

necessary conditions for teacher-induced learning, yet not
sufficient conditions for teacher-induced learning.

Nor,

he claims, are they necessary or sufficient conditions for

any non-teacher induced learning.

Yet these actions may be

construed, according to Smith, as necessary and sufficient

conditions for engaging in teaching.

34

Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," Teacher
College Record Vol 61, No. 5 (Feb. 1960), p. 233.
B.

0.

,

32

33

'

.

Concept of Teaching,"

B.

O.

Smith,

"A

p.

233.

B.

0.

Smith,

"A Concept of Teaching," p.

233.

B.

0.

Smith,

"A

34

Concept of Teaching," pp

.

233,

236.
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Smith lists these verbal actions
as defining, classifying,
explaining, conditional inferring,
comparing and contrasting
valuating designating, correcting
performance errors,
directing, and admonishing.
Smith lists these non-verbal
actions as showing or expressing non-verbal
signs of
,

approval or disapproval. 35

Given his account of teaching and its relation
to learning,
we may formulate the following definition
of
'teaching' on

Smith's behalf:

D.15 x is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in
performing the actions necessary for y to learn
0
which is for x to engage in performing

,

(1)

verbal actions such as defining, classifying,
explaining, conditional inferring, comparing and
contrasting, valuating, designating, correcting
performance errors, directing, demonstrating, or

(2)

non-verbal actions such as showing or expressing
non-verbal signs of approval or disapproval
for y to learn 0

.

According to D.15, one is engaged in teaching if and only if
one is engaged in performing the actions Smith claims are

necessary conditions for teacher-induced learning.
according to D.15, performing these actions is

a

Thus,

necessary

and a sufficient condition for engaging in teaching.
35
B.

0.

Smith,

"A

Concept of Teaching," pp. 237-240.

.
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One may grant that these actions are
disjunctively necessary

conditions for teacher-induced learning,
yet they avoid
counterexamples only because they are sufficiently
vague to
do so.

One may, therefore, grant that because of
their

vagueness, these actions provide disjunctively
necessary

conditions for engaging in teaching.

However, because of

their vagueness, engaging in these actions is not
a

sufficient condition for engaging in teaching.
D.15 fails as a definition of

Consider the verbal action

(1)

Therefore,

'teaching'

in D.15.

Suppose that a

lexicographer writes the definition of 'spelunker'.

Suppose

that he writes the dictionary simply to make money and that
his is the only dictionary to include

'spelunker'.

Ten

years later, a student looks up 'spelunker' and learns its
meaning.

Clearly the lexicogrpaher was engaged in per-

forming the actions necessary for the student to learn the

definition of 'spelunker'.

However, in performing those

actions, the lexicographer was not engaged in teaching the

student the meaning of 'spelunker'; he was simply engaged in

writing a dictionary to earn money.

Therefore, engaging

in the action of defining for y to learn 0 is not sufficient

condition for engaging in teaching y 0

medical officer at

a

.

Suppose that

draft physical examines

a

a

prospective

inductee, and finding that he has no left leg, classifies
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him 4-F

Engaging in classifying the
prospective inductee
4-F is not engaging in teaching,
even if the prospective
inductee learns that he is classified
4-F.
Therefore,
engaging in the action of classifying
for y to learn 0
is not sufficient condition for
engaging in teaching y 0.
Suppose that a clerk at a clothing store
explains to a
customer that he owes another $13.00 to
cover alterations
on a pair of $80.00 slacks.
Engaging in explaining
.

to a

customer that he owes another $13.00 is not
engaging in
teaching, even if the customer learns that
he owes another
$13.00.
Therefore, engaging in the action of explaining
for y to learn 0 is not a sufficient condition
for engaging

m

teaching y 0.

Suppose that Gerald Ford, in

a

speech

to the leaders of AIM, conditionally infers
"If the Moon
is green cheese,

then

I

conditionally inferring

am not an Indian."
"I

Engaging in

am not an Indian" from "the

Moon is green cheese" is not engaging in teaching, even
if the leaders of AIM learn that Ford is not an Indian.

Therefore, engaging in the action of conditionally in-

ferring for y to learn 0 is not

engaging in teaching y 0

.

a

sufficient condition for

Suppose that

a

car salesman is

comparing, contrasting, and valuating two different used
cars ior a prospective customer.

Engaging in comparing,

contrasting and valuating two used cars is not engaging
in teaching,

even if the prospective customer learns

that one car is a better buy than the other.

Therefore,
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engaging

m

the actions of comparing, contrasting
or

valuating is not
teaching y 0

a

sufficient condition for engaging in

Suppose that Bart Starr designates Bill Cooke

.

as a starring offensive tackle.

Engaging in designating

Bill Cooke a starting offensive tackle is
not engaging in
teaching, even if Bill Cooke learns that he
is a starting

offensive tackle.

Therefore, engaging in designating is

not a sufficient condition for engaging in teaching.

Suppose that David Pearson's Mercury is running roughly
on

a

rest lap before the Daytona 500, and he drives into
the pits
to let the Wood brothers correct the performance
error.

Engaging in correcting the performance error in David

Pearson's Mercury is not engaging in teaching, even if
Pearson learns that the carburetor restrictor plate was
dirty, causing the rough running.

Therefore, engaging in

correcting performance errors is not a sufficient condition
for engaging in teaching y 0

.

Suppose that

a

traffic cop

is directing traffic around the scene of a rush-hour

accident.

Engaging in directing traffic is not engaging in

teaching, even if groups of motorists learn when to stop
and when to proceed.

Therefore, engaging in directing is

not a sufficient condition for engaging in teaching y 0

Suppose that

a

.

group of Washington secretaries are demon-

strating their secretarial skills before the House Ethics
Committee.

Engaging in demonstrating secretarial skills is

not engaging in teaching, even if the Congressmen learn

,

.

.
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that no Washington secretaries
can type.

strating is not

a

Therefore, demon-

sufficient condition for teaching
y 0

Consider the non-verbal actions

.

in D.15.

(2)

Suppose that
Grandpa Larkin is arrested for exposing
himself to a group
of Girl Scouts.
Engaging in showing is not engaging in
teaching, even though the Girl Scouts
learn something about
geriatric biology. Therefore, showing is
not a sufficient
condition for teaching y 0.
Suppose that Rick Reichardt
strikes out and the Kansas City fans express
non-verbal
signs of disapproval by silently standing
and extending

their middle fingers.

Engaging in expressing non-verbal

signs of disapproval is not engaging in teaching,
even if

Reichardt learns that he should retire from baseball.
Therefore, expressing non-verbal signs of approval
or dis-

approval is not a sufficient condition for teaching
y
Therefore, D.15 fails as a definition of 'teaching'

0.

Paul Komisar is concerned to provide a definition of

teaching in terms of what he calls teaching acts.
so,

he is concerned to rule out "indoctrinating,

In doing

training,

propagandizing, preaching, insinuating, deceiving, coun—
seling, and moralizing" as teaching acts.
36 „
P.

T

36

In an attempt

Komisar, "Teaching: Acts and Enterprise,"
Studies in Philosophy and Education No. 6 168-193,
,

(Spring 1968)

p.

179

,

::
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to define

'teaching' and to rule out the above,
he distin-

guishes, among teaching acts, what he
calls learning-donor
acts, learner-enhancing acts and
intellectual acts. He
spells out learning-donor acts as
"acts intended to contribute rather directly and pointedly to
the production of
learning, such as prompting, cueing,
reinforcing, drilling,
censuring or censoring, showing, etc." 37
Learning-donor
acts, therefore, have this specific goal.

Learner-enhancing

acts are "acts intending to put or maintain
the learner in
fit state to receive instruction ...
to reduce anxiety,

alleviate perceptual dif f iciencies

,

a

arouse interest, focus

attention, and other ego-strengthening acts." 38

Learner-

enhancing acts, therefore, have this specific goal.

Intellectual acts, according to Komisar, are acts such as
introducing, demonstrating, citing, reporting, hypothesizing, conjecturing, confirming, contrasting, explaining,

providing, characterizing, justifying, explaining, defining,
rating, appraising, amplifying, vindicating, interpreting,

indicating, instancing, elaborating, identifying, desig-

natmg, and comparing." 39
•

pp.

Komisar

"Teaching

Acts and Enterprise,"

Komisar

"Teaching

Acts and Enterprise,"

Komisar,

Teaching

p.

180

p.

181

180-181
39

P.

Acts and Enterprise,
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Given his account of teaching acts,
in terms of learningdonor acts, learner-enhancing acts
and intellectual acts,
we may formulate the following
definition of teaching on
Komisar's behalf:

D i6 X
*

en gaged in teaching
y 0 iff x is engaged in
performing actions intended to:

(U contribute directly and pointedly to the
production
s
learning 0 such as prompting, cueing,
°.y
reinforcing, drilling, censuring or censoring,
approving or showing, or other learning-donor
acts
and

(2)

'

put or maintain the learner
y in a fit state
receive instruction for 0 such as reducing to
anxiety, alleviating perceptual deficiencies,
arousing interest, focusing attention, or other
ego-strengthening learner-enhancing acts, and
,

(3)

introduce, demonstrate, cite, report, hypothesize,
conjecture about, confirm, contrast, explain,
prove, characterize, justify, define, rate,
appraise, amplify, vindicate, interpret, indicate,
instance, elaborate, identify, designate, or
compare 0 for y.

However, Komisar's attempt to distinguish three kinds
of

teaching acts to rule out indoctrination, training, propagandizing, preaching, insinuating, deceiving, counseling,

moralizing, etc., and to rule in teaching, is unsuccessful.
To reflect Komisar's attempt to rule out these non-teaching

actions and to rule in only teaching actions,
(3)

are conjunctive elements in D.16.

following counterexample.

(1),

(2)

and

However, consider the
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Suppose that an Insane
individual, whose ml nd
has been
destroyed by drugs, performs
acts intended to
contribute
rather directly and
pointedly to the production
of his nurse
learning first order
logic and performing actions
intended
to put or maintain
the nurse in a fit state
to receive instruction, and performing
actions intended to introduce,
demonstrate, cite, report,
hypothesize, conjecture
about,

contract, explain, prove,
characterize. Justify,
define, rate, appraise,
amplify, vindicate, interpret,
indicate, instance, elaborate,
Identify, designate, or compare iirst order logic for
the nurse.
However, while having
these intentions, this insane
individual actually engages
physically assaulting the nurse,
while screaming obscenities at her.
According to D.l6, having these
goals in mind
(having the above intentions
for his actions) 40 requires
us
to say that this insane
individual is engaged in teaching
his nurse first order logic.
However, he is engaged in

Physically assaulting the nurse, while
screaming obscenities
at her, and is not engaged in
teaching her first order logic.
Therefore, D 16 fails to provide a
sufficient condition for
.

'teaching' and, therefore, fails as
a definition.

Having

such intentions may be necessary for
engaging in teaching,
but it is certainly not sufficient.
1]

0

T

pages 73 and

a
^

tlclpates my brief account of intentions on

,

,

"

,
,
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Definitions of ’Teaching’:

In his influential book,

Group Three

How We Think

.

John Dewey presents

his views on the nature of
teaching and its relationship to
learning.
Dewey describes the teacher as a
leader, and

teaching as a kind of leading.

In reality,

the teacher is the intellectual leader
s°cial group.
He is a leader, not in
oliicial position, but because of wider and virtue of
deeper
knowledge and matured experience 4 1
.

As an intellectual leader,

the teacher, according to Dewey,

"determines the educational purpose to be carried out." 142

To be an intellectual leader, or a teacher, one must
satisfy

certain conditions.
knowledge,

According to Dewey, one needs abundant

abundant to the point of overflow.

It must be

wider than the ground laid out in the textbook, or in any
fixed plan for teaching a session."^

one must also,

41 John Dewey, How
We Think (Revised Edition, N.Y.:
Heath 1934 ) , P. 273i-76
42

43
44

John Dewey

How We Think

P

•

275.

John Dewey

How We Think

P.

275.

John Dewey

How We Think

p.

275.

"

,

,
,
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according to Dewey, "have his
mind free to observe the
mental responses and movements
of the student members
of
the recitation group.
The problem of the pupils
(learning)
Is found In the subject
matter; the problem of the
teachers
(teaching) Is what the minds of
the pupils are doing with
this subject matter." 44 Dewey
also requires technical or
professional knowledge. Including a
basic knowledge of human
psychology and "educational methods
found helpful by others
teaching various subjects." 45 However,
Dewey adds
that

"unfortunately this professional knowledge
is sometimes
treated not as a guide and tool in personal
observation and
judgment
but as a set of fixed rules of procedure
in
.

action

.

.

.

46

"Finally, the teacher, in order to be a leader
(and
thereby be a teacher
must make special preparation
for particular lessons.
Otherwise, the only alternatives will be either aimless drift or else sticking
literally to the text.
The teacher must ask beforehand: what do the minds of the pupils bring to the
topic from their previous experience and study? How
can I help them make connections? What need, even
if unrecognized by them, will furnish a leverage by
which to move their minds in the desired direction?
What uses and applications will clarify the subject
and fix it in their minds? How can the topic be
individualized? "47
)

45 J ohn Dewey

46
47

,

How We Think

P-

27 6

.

John Dewey

How We Think

P-

276

.

Dewey

How We Think

P-

277.

J ohn
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Dewey also recognizes that
learning and teaching are
distinct concepts, yet he is
concerned to relate them

a
n
compared to selling commodities.
y
No
one
ne cai
can ?en
sell unless someone buys.
We should rid-i^n
a merchant who said that
he had sold a re“ manv
goods, although no one had bought
any.
But perhaps
8 wh0 thlnk that thay
ha
gSord^Vtefh^^6, rrrespective of what pupils have
learned
T
ls the same ex act equation
between
a 5
4
d learnln
6 that there is between selling
?
U
ThS ° nly ” ay tD increase the learning
'of
DUDilshShtd augment the quantity
and quality of real
teaching
6 1
rnlng 18 some thing that the pupil
has to fA k ahimself
?
?c and for
himself, the initiative
ieo with ??
the learner.
The teacher is a guide and
ec^or, he steers the boat, but the energy
that
propels It must come from those who are
learning."^

1

“
r

-

-

T

hhlth

Again, in Dewey’s view, teaching is not
necessary for

learning.

Yet if one is engaged in teaching, then the
one

taught must learn.

In Dewey's account, teaching is a suf-

ficient condition for learning, and learning is a
necessary

condition for teaching.

Given Dewey's account of teaching as intellectual leading
and his account of the relation of teaching and learning, we

may formulate the following definition of ’teaching’ on

Dewey's behalf.

D.17

x

is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in

intellectually leading

^

y

such that

John Dewey, How We Think

,

pp

.

x

directs y’s

35-6.

’
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e
f
e r
f 0
d 1
*" te Uectual ly leads
y to 0^ tLn y iearns
0 ’and x int
to 0 only if l learns
^here x s lntel lectually y
:

leading y to learn 0 iff- "If,o
a Particular subject'

^ in^erT

f

t0 ° X ln Phonal observation
and
judgment of v !and
makes special preparations
for
1
particular lessons leading
y to 0.
’

T

1

D.17 Is an Interesting
definition in that it attempts to
provide an account which takes
seriously the relation of
teaching and learning.
However, D.17 fails adequately to
account for the relation of teaching
and learning by failing
adequately to account for teaching as
an intentional
activity.
However, before considering this definition,
a
brief discussion of intentional action
is in order.

Providing

a

clear account of the notion of an intentional

action is a notoriously difficult philosophical
task.
However, for the discussion of teaching as an
intentional

activity which is to follow, it is sufficient to point
out
that intuitively, intentional activities are activities

undertaken with some purpose or goal in mind for doing the
activity.

An action performed without some purpose or goal

in mind for doing the action is not an intentional action.

Therefore, if

x is

an action, then one may be said to do x

intentionally only if one does

x

with some definitely formu-

lated purpose or goal in mind for doing

x.

Note that while

74

this is a necessary condition
for intentional actions, it
is
not a sufficient condition.
Nor does doing x intentionally
mean that one actually accomplishes
what one intended in
doing x.
While this is by no means a complete
account of
the notion of an intentional action,
noting the above
necessary condition will clarify what I
shall mean by an

intentional action in this discussion of
teaching. 4 9 We
must now consider D .17 and see how it
fails adequately to
account for teaching as an intentional activity.

Suppose that a swimming instructor is working
with
of beginning swimmers.

a class

The class has been meeting daily for

three weeks and still no one in the class has learned
to
swim.

According to D.17, the instructor is not engaged in

teaching the class.

A proponent of D.17 may defend the con-

clusion that the instructor is not engaged in teaching the
class by arguing that instead he is engaged in failing to

teaching the class.

However, to advance such an argument in defense of D.17 is
to miss an important distinction between intentionally and

unintentionally failing to teach.

Suppose that the

49

This notion gets very complex very quickly.
For a
definitive discussion of intentional action, see Reason
and Action a manuscript by Bruce Aune to be published by
the Rydell Press.
See, especially, revised "Chapter Two:
The Springs of Action", p. 6l-126-17a, p. 65-76a, and
p. 106-115.
,

,

.
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instructor were engaged in failing to
teach the class how
to swim.
If his supervisor came to him
and asked

"What are

you doing?", we should expect him to
answer "Trying to teach
them to swim but failing." We should
not expect him to
answer "Trying to fail to teach them to
swim. " with the
first reply, the instructor has a better
chance of keeping
his job than with the second.
Clearly the instructor repeals an acceptable goal to the supervisor in
the first
r.-piy,

but reveals an unacceptable goal to the supervisor

in the second reply.

To use Dewey's example, the two senses of engaging in

failing to teach may be compared to two senses of engaging
in failing to sell.

to sell,

If one is actually engaged in failing

one may do so intentionally or unintentionally.

Suppose that a salesman does not intend to sell a valuable
rug because he intends to buy it himself.

When would-be

customers arrive, we may say that the salesman is engaged in
trying to fail to sell the rug.

However, this is quite

different from engaging in trying to sell the rug, but
failing

Being engaged in trying to fail to teach is distinct from
being engaged in trying to teach but failing, much like
being engaged in trying to fail to sell is distinct from
being engaged in trying to sell, but failing.

We must be
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sure that when we claim
that the swimming i nstruc
tor is not
engaged in teaching, but
rather engaged in failing
to teach,
that we carefully consider
the instructor's intentions;
the
definitely formulated purpose
or goal he has in mind
for
uomg his teaching. Simply being
actually engaged in
failing to teach is not a
clear activity, given a concern
for teaching as an
intentional activity.

To say that someone is
simply engaged in teaching seems
to
be to say that someone is
either engaged in trying to teach,
or engaged in succeeding
to teach.
It is not to say that
someone is engaged in trying to
fail to teach, since this is
a distinct activity.
Yet D.17 fails adequately to distinguish these activities by failing
adequately to consider
the question of intentions in the
relations of teaching and
learning.
Consider the following counterexample.
Suppose
that a bureau chief in a government
bureaucracy is charged
by a superior with teaching an efficiency
expert the inner

workings of his bureau.

The bureau chief is insecure, fears

losing his job, and also fears that the efficiency
expert
wixl discover that his job is eliminable.
The chief
must appear cooperative, yet intends to try to
fail to
teach the efficiency expert the inner workings of his

bureau in order to save his job.

Yet the efficiency ex-

pert is smart and insightful, and although
unintentionally,
the bureau chief directs the expert's
learning the inner
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workings of his bureau, and the
expert learns them. The
bureau chief has a more abundant
knowlege of survival in
bureaucracies, which includes a knowledge
of the inner

workings of his bureau, than does
the efficiency expert; he
is free to observe the expert's
mental responses and movements, he has a knowledge of psychology
and past successful
educational methods, and applies this knowledge
as a guide

and tool in personal observations and
judgment of the expert
in his attempt to try to fail to teach
the expert, and he

makes special preparations for particular lessons,
reviewed
by his superior, leading the expert to learn the
inner

workings of his bureau, although he does not intend
that he
learn them.

Clearly

,

the bureau chief is engaged in trying to fail to

teach the efficiency expert the inner workings of his
bureau, and not simply engaged in teaching.

Nor is failing

to fail to teach the same intentional activity as succeeding
to teach.

Yet, according to D.17, the bureau chief is en-

gaged in teaching the efficiency expert the inner workings
of his bureau.

Therefore, D.17 fails to account for the

role of intentions in the relation between teaching and

learning.

The efficiency expert learned the inner workings

of the bureau in spite of the bureau chief.
is not an adequate definition of

'teaching'.

carefully consider intentions in such

a

Therefore, D.17
One must more

definition.

.
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Definitions of 'Teaching':

Group Four

Israel Scheffler attempts
carefully to consider intentions
proposing an account of 'teaching'.
"Philosophical
Models of Teaching, "50 Scheffler
gives a brief characfceri _
zatron of teaching which is amplified
in his book The
la nguage of Education 51
in the article he briefly chacterizes teaching as follows:

m

m

.

Teaching may be characterized as an activity
aimed at
the achievement of learning and
practiced in such a
manner as to respect the student's intellectual
integrity
and capacity for independent judgment.
Such a characterization is important for at least two reasons:
irst, it brings out the intentional nature
of teaching,
tbe fact that teaching is a distinctive
goal-oriented
a t V tY
rather than a distinctively patterned sequence
i i
of? behavioral
steps executed by the teacher.
Secondly,
it differentiates the activity of teaching
from such
other activities as propaganda, conditioning, suggestion,
and indoctrination, which are aimed at modifying the
person but strive at all costs to avoid a genuineengagement of his judgment on underlying issues.
-

The Language of Education

,

Scheffler distinguishes what

he calls the success use from the intentional use of

Israel Scheffler, "Philosophical Models of Teaching",
Harvard Educational Review No. 35 (Spring 1965)
,

51

I. Scheffler, The Language of Education.
Thomas, Springfield, IL", I960).

52
p.

131.

I.

Scheffler,

(Charles C.

Philosophical Models of Teaching",

.

,

,
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'to teach'.

"The success use refers to more than just
doing

something; it refers to the successful outcome of
what one
is doing.

For example,

"To have taught someone how to swim

is more than to have been occupied in teaching
someone to

swim;

it is also to have succeeded." 53

Scheffler provides

the intentional use to account for those cases that we
want
to call cases of teaching where learning has not as yet

occurred.

For example, a case in which someone attends a

series of classes to learn to swim, we want to be able to
say that the teacher is engaged in teaching swimming, even

though the student cannot as yet swim.

In this intentional use of

teaching with trying.

'to teach'

Scheffler associates

He states that "the goal of an

activity may lie beyond the boundaries of the activity or
some segment of it or may lack temporal conditions

altogether, nevertheless engaging in the activity involves
trying, generally.

55

Scheffler, of course, recognizes that one may learn without

being taught.

In the success use,

if the teacher is engaged

in teaching, then the pupil is engaged in learning.
53
54

55

60-1

I

Scheffler

The Language of Education

PP

I.

Scheffler

The Language of Education

P-

62

I

Scheffler

The Language of Education

P.

63.

.

.

..

,,

,
,
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Therefore, in the success use,
teaching is a sufficient condition for learning and learning
is a necessary condition
for
teaching.
However, in the intentional use,
if the teacher
is engaged in teaching,
then the pupil is not necessarily
engaged in learning.
In this sense, according to
Scheffler,
teaching involves an effort to achieve
learning, but teaching
is not a sufficient condition
for learning, nor is learning a
necessary condition for teaching.
Scheffler then provides an
intentional account of 'to teach'.

In providing such an account,

he argues that

volves trying as well as doing
learn something." 56
a

-

"teaching in-

trying to get someone to

Yet he is clearly not concerned to give

definition of 'learning'.

He states that "what this

learning consists in, how it may be exhibited are
important
but separate questions

purposes."
ai

.

.

.

irrelevant to our present

He also argues that attempts to provide such

account in extreme behavioristic terms; for example, in

terms of rules of behaviors to follow; are misguided.

Such

behavioristic "rules of teaching may at best improve
ceaching in the sense of rendering it more effective;

cannot exhaustively rule out failure." S
56

ft

they

They rule out

I

Scheffler

The Language of Education

P-

63

I

Scheffler

The Lanugage of Education

P-

78

.

I

Scheffler

The Language of Education

P-

78

.

57

58

.
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neither failure to succeed in
teaching (success use) nor
failure to engage in teaching
(intentional use)

Scheffler is also concerned to distinguish
what he calls the
intentional sense of 'to teach' from 'to
propagandize', 'to
condition', 'to suggest', and 'to indoctrinate',
which may
also be construed as somehow involving
trying to get someone
to learn something.
He attempts to do so by requiring
that

the pupil, or the person that is the object
of the teaching

activity,

"is not systematically prevented from asking
the

teacher 'how' or 'why' or 'on what grounds'." 59

He argues

that in the other activities, one is systematically
prevented

from asking such questions and that, therefore, this
require-

ment for the activity of teaching distinguishes teaching
from
tnese other intentional activities that also involve trying
to get someone to learn something.

Scheffler argues that to see if someone is engaged in

teaching (the intentional sense)

"we must see if that some-

one is engaged in trying to get someone to learn something,
but with appropriate qualifications." 60

Given Scheffler

's

brief characterization of teaching and his amplification and
i.

60 I.

Scheffler, The Language of Education

,

p.

68.

Scheffler, The Language of Education, p. 68.
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clarification of the concept, we may
formulate the following
definition of 'teaching' in what
Scheffler calls the intentional sense of 'to teach':

'

18

engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is
achieve the goal of initiating y's engaged in trying
learning suet/
n fc systematically prevented from
asking x
how'
h ?
how
why
or on what grounds'.

L
to

,

F

,

Intuitively, one wants to be able to say with

a

general

definition of 'teaching' that one engaged in
teaching is
either engaged in teaching 0 and actually
failing to teach 0
or engaged in teaching 0 and actually
succeeding in teaching
0

.

,

In providing a definition of what he calls
the in-

tentional sense of 'teaching', Scheffler has attempted
to
capture the first of these intuitions.

However, Scheffler

has unclearly made a distinction between what he misleadingly

calls the

intentional sense" and what he calls the "success

sense" of teaching.

Teaching is a goal-oriented activity, according to Scheffler.
From the fact that one does some action intentionally, it
does not follow that one actually accomplishes the goal one
had for doing the action.

Nor does it follow from the fact

that one does some action intentionally that one fails

actually to accomplish the goal one had for doing the action,
in this sense,

then, teaching and actually failing to
realize
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the goal of teaching, and
teaching and actually
succeeding
in realizing the goal
of teaching are both
intentional
activities.
Teaching, as an intentional
activity, allows for
both actually failing and
actually succeeding in realizing
the goal.
For this reason, it is misleading
to distinguish
an "intentional sense"
from a "success sense" of teaching,
since properly speaking, teaching
is an intentional activity
regardless of success or failure in
attaining the goal of the
activity.
Therefore, I shall abandon Scheffler's
terms for
the distinction and simply distinguish
the activity of en-

gaging in teaching which fails to realize
its goal, and the
activity of engaging in teaching which
succeeds in realizing
its goal.

D.18 is an interesting definition in that
it attempts to

provide an account which takes seriously this
intentional
nature of teaching.

However, D.18 fails adequately to

account for the complexity of the intentional nature of
teaching, and thereby fails to distinguish teaching from

other actions.

Consider the following counterexample.

Suppose that another insane individual, whose mind has also
been destroyed by drugs, is engaged in trying to achieve the
goal of initiating her nurse's learning the basic principles
of Marxist economics.

They are seated across from one

another at a table and the nurse is not
systematically

prevented from asking her 'how',

'why', or

'on what grounds'
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(In fact,

m

this nurse has just completed
a philosophy course
night school and is constantly
asking everyone
'how',

'why', or

'on what grounds'

in her own attempt to help
her

patients regain their reason.)

Suppose that while trying to

achieve this goal, this insane individual
is moaning,
drooling, and shaking her head at the
ceiling while the nurse
asks her 'how', 'why', or 'on what
grounds'.

The problem here is failing to distinguish
between engaging
in teaching Marxist economics but failing
to initiate the

nurse's learning Marxist economics, and trying to
engage in

teaching Marxist economics but failing to engage in
teaching.
In this case, while we may grant that she is
trying to en-

gage in teaching Marxist economics, she has failed to engage
in teaching.

But, according to D.18, this insane individual

is engaged in teaching her nurse the basic principles of

Marxist economics, even though the nurse may fail to learn
them.

However, our intuitions tell us that she is merely

engaged in moaning, drooling and shaking her head at the
ceiling, and that she is not engaged in teaching, even

though she may be engaged in trying to reach.

Therefore,

D.18 fails to capture the notion of engaging in teaching

which fails to realize its goal.

It will not do to modify a definition like D.18 by simply

adding that the trying be done successfully to capture the

,
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notion of engaging in teaching which
succeeds in realizing
Its goal.
Surely we must be able to distinguish
successfully
trying to teach from successful teaching;
otherwise anything
could be successfully taught simply by
succeeding in trying
to teach it.

We might modify D.18 in an attempt to
provide a definition of

teaching' which captures the notion of engaging
in teaching

which succeeds in realizing its goal as follows:

D-19 x is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in
achieving the goal of initiating y's learning 0
such that y is not systematically prevented from
asking x 'how'
'why'
or 'on what grounds' with
respect to 0
,

.

Given D.19, one might expect to derive the notion of engaging
in teaching which fails to realize its goal simply by in-

serting "or x is engaged in trying to achieve the goal of

initiating y's learning 0 " and thereby defining 'teaching'
such that one is able to say that one engaged in teaching
is either engaged in teaching and failing to realize the

goal of teaching, or engaged in teaching and succeeding in

realizing the goal of teaching.

However, D.18 failed to capture the former sense of
'teaching' and D.19 fails to capture the latter sense of

teaching.

Consider the following counterexample.

Suppose
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that a bright five-year-old girl is
attending an advanced
school, where on Tuesday she will
successfully learn the

Pythagorean theorem.
to school.

Tuesday morning her mother walks her
As her mother drops her off at the
door to
her

classroom, her mother asks her -Do you have
any questions
about geometry?", and the child answers
"No, Mommy." in this
case the mother engaged in successfully
walking her child to
school and is engaged in achieving the goal
of initiating her

daughter's learning the Pythagorean theorem.

Certainly the

child is not systematically prevented from asking
her mother
'how',

'why', or

'on what grounds'

with respect to the

Pythagorean theorem since the mother asks her if she has any
questions about geometry.

Therefore, according to D.19, this

mother is engaged in successfully teaching her child the

Pythagorean theorem.

However, the mother is enqaged in

successfully walking her child to school, not engaged in

successfully teaching her child the Pythagroean theorem.
Therefore, D.19 fails to capture the notion of engaging in

teaching which succeeds in realizing its goal.

Both D.18 and D.19 have at least two other significant

defects that it is useful to consider and avoid in attempting
to provide a workable definition of

purposes here.
'learning'

'teaching'

for my

First, in both definitions, the term

is used in defining

'teaching'.

Given such a

definition of 'teaching' in terms of learning, to ask if
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critical intelligence can be taught is simply
to ask if
critical intelligence can be learned.
Instead of providing a
clear definition of 'teaching' in order
decisively to answer
the original question, such a definition
merely trades the
original obscure question for another equally
obscure
question.

Therefore, for my purposes here, it is desirable

to provide a definition of

’teaching' that avoids appeal to

'learning' as a primitive term.
to avoid

teaching

Secondly, given this desire

'learning' as a primitive term in a definition of
,

one must distinguish among the kinds of

activities preanalytically assumed to teaching activities.

Among the activities preanalytically assumed to be teaching
activities, one may distinguish the activity of 'teaching
how'

from the activity of 'teaching that'.

Given this

distinction, a definition of engaging in teaching must allow
for the activities of engaging in teaching how and failing
to achieve learning, engaging in teaching that and failing
to achieve learning,

engaging in teaching how and succeeding

in achieving learning,

and engaging in teaching that and

succeeding in achieving learning.

By making the distinction

between the activity of teaching how and the activity of
teaching that, and by defining what it is to do each such
that the definition allows for both failing to achieve

learning and succeeding in achieving learning, one may, in
turn, offer a clear and complete definition of

'teaching'.

.
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several philosophers have
attempted to distinguish
among the
activities intuitively
included as teaching
activites. Many
have distinguished
teaching to, teaching to
be, teaching
when to, and teaching
the difference between,
as well as
teaching how and teaching
61
that
However, these disamong activities intuitively
thought to be teaching
activities, upon analysis,
reduce to either 'teaching
.

that'

'teaching how', or reduce
to some other intentional
activity like inculcating,
conditioning, imploring,

admonishing, etc., depending
upon the situation. Consider
the activity 'teaching to'.
One may engage in teaching

someone to sew, to swim, or
to speak French.
But it is
difficult to see the philosophical
difference between
teaching someone to sew, or how
to sew; to swim, or how to
swim; to speak French, or
how to speak French.
it seems,

therefore, that 'teaching to'
is simply shorthand for
teaching how to', and that, therefore,
the teaching activity
called 'teaching to' is simply
the teaching activity called
'teaching how'

Consider the activity of 'teaching
to be'.
Presumably one
may be said to engage in teaching
someone to be thrifty, to
be patriotic, or to be honest.

g

61 a
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that one may teach thrift,
patriotism or honesty by advancing
certain arguments, stating certain
propositions, or stating
certain rules to follow in order
to be thrifty, to be

patriotic, or to be honest.

This may involve the activity of

'teaching that' or the activity of

'teaching how', yet one

may successfully be taught certain
arguments, propositions,
and rules about thrift, patriotism,
or honesty and still not
be thrifty, patriotic, or honest.

What has been called

teaching to be' seems to involve other
intentional
activities which are not teaching activities.

For example,

one may inculcate, condition, implore or
admonish someone to
be thrifty,

patriotic, or honest.

not teaching activities.
to be'

Yet these activities are

Therefore, engaging in 'teaching

may be said to be teaching only insofar as it is

engaged in 'teaching that' or 'teaching how'.
cistinct. teaching activity;

It is not a

it involves other intentional

activities that are not teaching activities.

Consider the activity of 'teaching when to'

Presumably one

may be said to engage in teaching someone when to call

a

pass play, when to sacrifice a rook, or when to frost a cake.
However, it is difficult to see that engaging in this

activity differs from engaging in teaching someone how to
call a football game, how to play defensive chess, or how to
bake a cake.

Therefore, the activity of 'teaching when to'

simply reduces to the activity of 'teaching how'.
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Consider the activity of
'teaching the difference
between'.
Presumably one may be said
to engage in teaching
someone the
difference between the
propositional calculus and the
predicate calculus, the
difference between truth and
validity, or the difference
between Hume's view and Kant's
view of consciousness. However,
it is difficult to see that
engaging in this activity differs
from engaging in teaching
someone that the propositional
calculus deals with

the logic
of propositions and that the
predicate calculus deals with
the logic of predicates and
quantification; that truth is a

property of propositions and that
validity is a property of
arguments; or that Hume's view can
be understood with
difficulty and that Kant's view cannot
be understood.
Therefore, the activity of 'teaching the
difference between'
simply reduces to the activity of 'teaching
that'.

Therefore,

'teaching that' and 'teaching how' exhaust
the

kinds of activities that are teaching
activities.

We must

now consider the distinction of 'teaching
that' and 'teaching
how
'

.

Indeed, the basic question of the greatest importance
to one

attempting to provide a definition of 'teaching' is whether
teaching that is ultimately distinguishable from teaching
how.

What is at stake in answering this basic question is

the distinction commonly made between the
requirements for

teaching informtion and the requirements for
teaching skills.
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being taught that Sussex is an
English county, the boy is
participating in the relationship of
knowing or believing
between himself and the proposition.
In being taught how to
play chess, one is participating in
the relationship of
knowing between oneself and such skills.
Knowing how and
knowing or believing that are distinct
since knowing how
admits of degrees in a way that knowing
or believing that
does not admit of degrees.

Similarly, one engaged in teaching the boy that
Sussex is an
English county is concerned with applying methods
that will
most likely insure that the boy is successfully
taught that

Sussex is an English county.

These methods will ultimately

depend for their success upon their success in
establishing
the relationship of knowing or believing
between pupils and

such propositions.

In this way,

teaching that involves

knowing that or believing that.
62

Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind,
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One engaged in teaching the
boy how to play chess is
concerned with applying methods
that will most likely insure
that the bo^ is successfully
taught how to play chess.
These methods will ultimately
depend for their success upon
their success in establishing
the relationship of knowing
between pupils and such skills.
In this way, teaching how
involves knowing how.

Teaching that and being taught that,
therefore, involves
knowing that or believing that, since
one may be taught
propositions that are false. Teaching how and
being taught
how, therefore, involves knowing how,
since these skills are
not the kinds of things that can be false.
One may, of
course, teach someone how to play chess incorrectly,
but

that involves teaching some skill other than chess.

The

process still involves knowing how, although the one being
taught may still not know how to play chess, but know how
to

engage in some other activity.

The distinction between the activity of teaching that and
the activity of teaching how is, therefore, based upon the

distinct requirements of knowing that or believing that for
teaching and being taught that, and knowing how for teaching
and being taught how.

However, many philosophers have argued

that knowing that is not distinct from knowing how 63
.

If

knowing that simply reduces to knowing how, and they are not

—

.

,

'
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distinct, then these are not
dinstinct requirements upon
which to base the distinction
between teaching that and
teaching how.
Before adopting this distinction
for a
definition of 'teaching', we must
first consider the arguments purporting to show that
knowing that and knowing how
are indistinct.

The most common argument offered
to support the claim that
knowing that is indistinct from knowing
how is the argument

attempting to show that knowing that
simply reduces to
knowing how.
John Ilartland-Swann argues that in
Ryle's
example the boy's knowing that Sussex
is an English county
is simply a version of his knowing
correctly how to reply to
65
a question.
He argues that:
,
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John Ilartland-Swann offers such an argument, and
his

is taken by many to be the most
influential for the field of

education

ln Bar tland-Swann
"The Logical Status of 'Knowing
Analysis (1956).
He also considers whether knowing
is a dispositional or an episodic verb.
He argues that it
is dispositional, and that since Ryle also
argues that it is
dispositional, Ryle ought to give up the distinction between
knowing how and knowing that. The nature of Ryle's view of
knowing and Hart land-Swann s arguments with Ryle on this
issue are not within the scope of present interest.

That

,

M

'

'
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~

Either he knows this fact or he
must surely be translated 'either does not know it'
he is able (knows
t0
th COrreCt
r
he ifnot aSi:
(doL
oes not know ;how) to give the
correct answer’."^ 6

fr

(

,

-

(

Given this means of translating
'knowing that' statements
into 'knowing how' statements, in
being taught that Sussex
is an English county, the boy
is participating
in the

relationship of knowing between himself
and the skill of
giving the correct answer to a question,
not between himself
and some proposition.

Similarly, one engaged in teaching

the boy that Sussex is an English county
is concerned with

applying methods to insure that the boy successfully
gives
the correct answer to the question "Is Sussex
an English

county?," not to insure the establishment of the
relationship of knowing between the boy and the proposition.

If Hart land.-Swann s translation is correct,
'

a

distinction

between teaching how and teaching that based on a distinction
between knowing how and knowing that is useless for the
attempt to provide

a

clear definition of 'teaching'

.

The

usual distinction between the requirements for teaching in-

formation and the requirements for teaching skills simply
collapses.

Hartland-Swann concludes that:
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John Hartland-Swann, "The Logical Status of 'Knowing
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All cases of knowing that can
and, indeed must (if
know’ is a capacity verb and
therefore
di^positiinal)
be reduced ultimately to cases
of knowing
however, wishes to insist on a
non -paraHeUa
B^t
these non— para lieiisms though
defensible by an appeal
PP
Y 1 n uistic u ^ge
break down
atter
alter
i
?
7
philosophical analysis."”
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Hartland Swann's attempts and similar
attempts to reduce
knowing that to knowing how are,
however, unsuccessful.
Hart land- Swann adopts a dispositional
view of knowing in an
attempt to explain all knowing exclusively
in terms of
dispositions to behave. According to
Hartland-Swann the
,

disposition to behave involved in every case
of knowing that
is the disposition to "state
correctly what is the
case."

However, this reduction of

'knowing that' to 'knowing how'

produces an indefensible account of 'knowing
that

.
'

Hartland Swann argues that someone who knows that

disposed to state that P when asked.

P

would be

Thus, his dispositional

account of knowing that involves a counter factual

.

This can

John Hartland-Swann, "The Logical Status of 'Knowinq
That'," Analysis
(1956) p. 114.
,

68 muu
This has
been argued by others, including Robert
Amrnerman, "A Note on 'Knowing That'," Analysis
(Dec.
p.

30-2.

,

1956),

attacks the unclarity of 'correctly',
and argues that the reduction is "either inadequate to the
essential features of knowing that, or circular." (p. 32).
His arguments are weak or no good at all.
Airanerman

.
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be seen by presenting the
following definition of
that' on Hartland-Swann
'

K.l

s

'knowing

behalf:

x knows that P iff if x were
asked, then x would be
able to state correctly that P
(where P is a true
proposition)

Intuitively, knowing, believing, as
well as thinking have
a certain dispositional
character, part of which may be
captured by such counter factual conditionals 69
However,
K.l clearly does not provide a sufficient
condition for
.

knowing that P, and, therefore, fails
as a definition
designed to reduce knowing that to knowing
how.

Suppose that some authority tells x that Paris
is the capital
of France.
Suppose that x mildly distrusts this authority,
yet x has no other inclinations concerning the
proposition

expressed by the statement "Paris is the capital of France,"
and when asked, x would answer that Paris is the
capital of

France since x has no other available response on the topic.
Since the definiens is a counter factual

specific behavior, but simply requries
69

,

a

it does not require

specific disposition

Again, I shall ignore the problem of providing truth
conditions for such counter f actuals and consider the matter
on an intuitive level.
Certainly to grant that knowing,
believing, and thinking have a dispositional character is
not to grant that they may be given an adequate account
simply in dispositional terms.
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to behave:

being able to state correctly that
Paris is the
capital of France.
Suppose that we attempt to determine,
according to K.l, that x knows that Paris
is the capital of
France.
Clearly, if x were asked, then x would be
able to
Suate correctly that Paris is the capital
of France.
Therefore, according to K.l, x knows that Paris
is the

capital of France.

However, in this case, x cannot properly

be said to know that Paris is the capital of
France; x has
no evidence to justify the statement, only
the unsupported

Lestimony of a mildly distrusted authority.

Therefore, K.l

fails to provide a sufficient condition for knowing that.

One problem, therefore, with K.l seems to be that nothing in
the definition requires the justification of the statement P.

Intuitively, some sort of judgment of justification is

required to support a claim that x knows that

P.

However,

we may not attempt to repair this difficulty with K.l on

Hartland-Swann

'

s

behalf by any appeal to some mental

activity such as judging a proposed justification, since he
is attempting to show that we may dispense with such appeals

to mental activities in favor of a purely dispositional

account.

Therefore, we may repair this defect only at the

expense of Hartland-Swann

'

s

proposed reduction.

Nor will it

help to attempt to repair K.l by eliminating the counterfactual in favor of a material conditional; then x knows that
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whenever x is not asked, since a
material conditional is
true whenever the antecedent
is false.
P

Therefore

Hartland-Swann has not shown that
knowing that
and knowing how are indistinct.
it seems,
,

then, that the

intuitive distinction between knowing
that

(information) and

knowing how (skills) holds against such
arguments, and that
our intuitions may be reflected in
distinct requirements for
each.

Therefore, the distinction between the
activities of
teaching that or being taught that and the
activity
of

teaching how or being taught how, based upon
the distinct

requirements of knowing or believing that and knowing
how,
is not affected by Hartland-Swann s arguments.
'

From examining D.18, we saw that an adequate definition
of
teaching must include both the activities of engaging
in

teaching which fails to realize its goal, and engaging in
teaching which succeeds in realizing its goal.

We must now

attempt to provide a definition of 'teaching that' in terms
of knowing or believing that, such that it captures both

failing to and succeeding in realizing its goal.

We must

then attempt to provide a definition of 'teaching how' in

terms of knowing how, such that it captures both failing to
and succeeding in realizing its goal.

We will then be in a

position to combine these definitions and to define

0
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'teaching'

and

in terms of these definitions of

'teaching how'.

'teaching that'

Therefore, consider the following

definition of 'teaching that', based on believing that:

D

20

.

x is engaged in teaching y 0 at t iff:
(1)

y does not believe that 0 at t-1 or x does not
believe that y does believe that 0 at t-1, and

(2)

x is trying to bring it about that y believes
that 0 at t+1, or if x is acting in place of z,
then x's activity, designated by z to bring it
about that y believes that 0 at t+1, involves

what z believes to be z's justification for
believing 0, and
(3)

y comes to believe that x believes that 0 at t,

and
(4)

y comes to believe that x believes that x is
justified in believing that 0 at t or
,

(5)

y does not believe that 0 at t-1, or x does not
believe that y does believe that 0 at t-1, and

(6)

x is trying to bring it about that y believes
that 0 at t+1, or if x is acting in place of z,
then x's activity, designed by z to bring it
about that y believes that 0 at t+1, involves

what z believes to be z's justification for
believing 0, and
(7)

(8)

D

.

2

y comes to believe that x believes that 0 at t
and y comes to believe that 0 at t+1, and
y comes to believe that x believes that x is
justified in believing that 0 at t and y comes
to believe that y is justified in believing that
0 at t+1.

defines 'teaching that' as an intentional activity.

Therefore, D.20 rules out teaching machines as engaging in
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teaching that, since teaching machines are not the
kinds of
things that have intentions, goals, or beliefs.

One might

argue that teaching machines might more properly be called
'

learning machines

teaching.

'

,

since learning may occur without

D.20 also avoids using 'learning' as a primitive

term, and thereby avoids the charge of defining an unclear

educational activity in terms of an equally unclear
educational activity.

The definiens of D.20 is a disjunction.

The first disjunct

captures the activity of engaging in teaching that, which
may fail to realize its goal, while the second disjunct

captures the activity of engaging in teaching that which
succeeds in realizing its goal.

In both senses of teaching

that, our definition must allow for the possibility of

teaching something that is false.

Therefore, we need to use

the weaker belief requirement rather than the stronger

knowledge requirement in both disjuncts.

D.20, therefore,

allows that x may both teach and fail or teach and succeed
in teaching something that either x believes to be false, or

that x believes to be true but is, in fact, false.

The definition also allows that x may teach and fail, or

teach and succeed in teaching y something that y may already
believe.

The case of failing is clear.

The case of

succeeding requires that y come to believe that y is
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justified in the belief.

The definition also allows for
the

following kind of case. 70

Suppose that Miss Lowell Qf

^

designs an intermediate logic course
for early morning
educational television.
However, the producer realizes
that
she is far too ugly to appear
on television.
She, therefore, hires Mr. Forrester, a
non-method actor, who dresses
like a teacher, and who memorizes
Miss Lowell’s
lines.

We

tune in the T.V. and ask "What is Mr.
Forrester doing?" and
reply "He is teaching the axiom of
choice." However,
Mr. Forrester is an ignorant slob
who reads comics, and

cannot understand

a

word he has memorized.

D.20 allows us

to say that Mr. Forrester is engaged in
teaching that,

in

either sense that fits a particular situation,
since
Mr. Forrester is acting

.in

place of Miss Lowell and his

activity, designed to bring it about that someone in the

audience believes that 0 at t+1

involves what Miss Lowell

,

believes to be her justification for believing

J0

(provided,

of course, that the other conjuncts of the relevant disjunct
of D.20 are satisfied).
of Forrester's

(y)

If,

for example, an actor colleague

tunes in the program, knows Forrester is

an actor and an ignorant slob who cannot understand a word
he has memorized and, therefore, does not believe that
70 This
is a proposed counterexample to Scheffler's

account of what he misleadingly calls the intentional sense
of 'to teach' proposed by James McClellan, "A Review of
Scheffler's Language of Education," Journal of Philosophy,
No.

58

(1961)',

p.

415-20.

'
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Forrester believes the axiom of choice,
then conditions (3)
and (4) or conditions (7) and
(8) are violated.
In this
case, Forrester cannot be said to
be engaged in teaching his
actor colleague according to D.20. He
may simply
be

said to be engaged in acting.

Therefore, D.20 is also

designed to legislate cases for which our
intuitions may
be uncertain.

D.20 also allows one to distinguish both
senses of teaching
that from other intentional activities.

Consider the case

of a CIA agent torturing a prisoner, thereby intending
to

convince him that he should cooperate.

D.20 does not

specify how y comes to believe anything, so D.20 may at
first be thought to allow torturing to be teaching.

However, there are problems with this case.

The first

problem is that 'that he should cooperate' is not straightforwardly a proposition, but rather seems to have the

character of an imperative, or

a

moral principle, 71 unlike

'that Columbus discovered America'.

Therefore, according to

D.20, torturing may not be a case of 'teaching that' at all,

but a case of what has been called 'teaching to'; the agent
is simply thought to be engaged in teaching the prisoner to

cooperate.
7

1

However,

I

have argued that 'teaching to' is

As such it may be true or false or it may not.
Either case requires some argument. The point, however, is
that the issue needs to be addressed in this case.
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neither 'teaching that' nor 'teaching how'.
way

in fact, the

teaching to' is used, it is not 'teaching' at
all.

For

example, one may teach someone either how to be
thrifty, or
that thrift is economically useful;
one may successfully

teach either without having the one taught be thrifty.

Teaching someone to be thrifty is not teaching, but
involves
indoctrinating, conditioning, and other activities. 72
Therefore, if 'that he should cooperate' really means 'to

cooperate', the case is not applicable to D.20, and D.20

allows us to distinguish teaching that from activities like
torturing, indoctrinating, and conditioning.

Suppose that we modify this torturing case slightly to

accommodate this problem.

Suppose that the CIA agent is

torturing a prisoner, attempting to convince him of the
truth of the proposition that 'cooperation with the CIA is

politically useful'.

There have been studies on the effects

of torture on individual beliefs, but the problem with this

case involves
junct of D.20.
(2)

and

(3)

(4)

,

(7)

and

(8)

.

Consider the first dis-

Such a case of torture may satisfy

(1)

and

of D.20, but such a case does not unproblem-

atically satisfy (4).
72 As John P.

It is not clear that torturing is the

Powell points out in "Philosophical
Models of Teaching," Harvard Educational Re view, Vol. 35,
(1965), p. 494-96, indoctrination and conditioning certainly
have their place in education.
My point, however, is that
they are distinguishable from teaching.
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kind of activity which
may be said genuinely
to affect the
prisoner’s belief about the
agent's justification for
his
belief.
The prisoner may outwardly
assent to (1|) under
torture, but it is doubtful
he could be said to
believe
that the agent believes
that he is justified in this
belief
Tn fact, he may believe
that the agent believes he
is unjustified in his belief, but
believes that the agent simply
enjoys torturing prisoners.
Torture is not the type of
activity that promotes confidence
in, or gives much insight
into justification.
Therefore, the notion of justification
in (4) serves to distinguish
teaching that from torturing.

Consider the second disjunct of D.20;
such a case of torture
may satisfy (5) and (6), but
such a case does not unproblematically satisfy (7) and (8). Again,
it is not clear that
torturing is the kind of activity which
may be said to

genuinely affect the prisoner's beliefs.

He may come to

believe that he had better say that he
believes that

cooperation with the CIA is politically useful
(to save
himself from pain) and yet still not believe
'that cooperation with the CIA is politically useful'.

Again, torturing

is not the type of activity that promotes
confidence in, or

gives much insight into justification.
in fact,

The prisoner may,

come to believe that he is justified in believing

that he had better say that he believes that cooperation
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With the CIA Is politically
useful, but this certainly
does
not satisfy D.20 (8).
Therefore, D.20 successfully
distinguishes teaching that from
activities like torturing.
One may object to D.20 on
the grounds that It falls to

distinguish teaching from telling.
serious objection.

However, this Is not a

Again, D.20 Is designed to legislate

such cases for which our Intuition
may be unclear.
Suppose
that x comes up to y and says
"your house Is on fire."
Clearly this can be made to satisfy either
disjunct of D.20,
and, therefore, according to D.20, x
is engaged in teaching
y that y's house is on fire.
It is claimed that this is
extremely odd, and that really x is simply
engaged in

telling y that y's house is on fire, not engaged
in teaching
y that y’s house is on fire.

This claim depends on assuming that telling is not
teaching
that, and this assumption seems to depend on a certain
view

from ordinary language.

We ordinarily say that, in such a

case, when asked what x is doing, that x is engaged in
y

that y

T

s

house is on fire.

However, what is of

interest here is not what ordinary linguistic practice
licenses, but rather what distinction, if any, is to be made

between the necessary and sufficient conditions for engaging
in these activities.

In defense of D.20, we can claim that

1

.
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the activity of teaching that
is the activity of telling
that, since they have the same
necessary and sufficient

conditions

This is not very surprising.

For example, when Moses

descended from Mount Sinai with the Ten
Commandments, he was
said to be engaged in teaching the
Israelites that

the First

Commandment is "Thou shalt have no other
Gods before me,"
and so on through the Ten Commandments.
However, suppose
that there was only one Commandment,
namely the
First.

We

might imagine -in this case that Moses was
said to be engaged in telling the Israelites that The Commandment
is
"Thou shalt have no other Gods before me."

The point is,

however, that in either case the same necessary and

sufficient conditions must be satisfied in terms of Moses

doing the teaching that, or telling that, and the
Israelites being taught that, or being told that.

The

distinction between teaching that and telling that seems to
be based on linguistic practice and not on any conceptual

differences between the activities
7J

.

Therefore, that D.20

It may strike native speakers of English oddly to
state that x is engaged in teaching y a proposition that is
specific such as ’that y’s house is on fire' but it may not
strike the same native speaker oddly to state that x is
engaged in teaching y a proposition that is general, such
as ’that houses burn'.
Of course, these feelings may vary
given different specific and general propositions.
However, the point to be made here is that this is simply a
matter of linguistic convention.
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fails to distinguish teaching that
and telling that Is not
a serious objection to D.20; the
activity is the same.

Consider the following definiton of 'teaching
how' based on
knowing how:

D.21

x

is engaged in teaching y how to 0 at
t iff

(1)

x

believes at

t

t-1, and
(2)

is trying to bring it about that
how to 0 at t+1, or if x is acting
then _x s activity is designed by z
about that y does know how to 0 at
x

'

(3)

that y does not know how to 0 at
y does

know

in place of z,
to bring it

t+1, and

y does not know how to 0 at t-1 and if x does
not engage in providing a model between t-1 and
t+1 for y to 0, then y does not know how to 0
at t+1, or
x does not believe that y does know how to 0 at
t-1 and x engages in providing a model between
t-1 and t+1 for y to 0,

where x provides a model for y to 0 iff x intends,
or some z intends that x make evident the
applications of the rules according to which
someone can do 0, or
(

*0

x believes at t
0 at t-1, and

that y does not know how to

(5)

x is trying to bring it about that y does know
how to 0 at t+1, or if x is acting in place of
z, then x’s activity is designed by z to bring
it about that y does know how to 0 at t+1, and

(6)

y does not know how to 0 at t-1 and if x does
not engage in providing a model between t-1 and
t+1 for y to 0, then y does not know how to 0
at t+1, and
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(7)

(

8

en ga8e in P rovidln
g a model between t-1
Ld°Ki
f
and
t+1 for
y to 0, and

)

to 0 iff x intends, or some z
intends th
make evident the applications of the
rul
according to which someone can do 0.

D.21 defines

'teaching how’ as an intentional activity.

Therefore, D.21 also rules out teaching
machines as engaging
in teaching how, since teaching machines
are not the kinds
of things that can know or believe.

D.21, like D.20, avoids

using 'learning' as a primitive term and thereby
avoids the
charge of defining an unclear educational activity
in
terms

of an equally unclear educational activity.

The definiens of D.21 is a disjunction.

The first disjunct

captures teaching how and failing to realize the goal of
teaching, while the second disjunct captures teaching how
and succeeding in realizing the goal of teaching.

D.21 also

allows for trying to teach someone how to do something he

already knows how to do.

It

also handles counterexamples

like the aforementioned case of the actor, Mr. Forrester,

teaching someone how to do a proof in a first order natural

deduction system.

D.21 allows us to say that Mr. Forrester

is engaged in teaching how,

in either sense that fits a

particular situation, since Mr. Forrester is acting in place
of Miss Lowell and his activity is designed by Miss Lowell
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to bring it about that someone
does know how to do a proof
in a first order natural deduction
system.
Suppose, again,

that an actor colleague of Forrester’s
tunes in the program
knows Forrester is an actor and an
ignorant slob who cannot

understand a word he has memorized.

possibility that

y

D.21 allows for the

does not know how to do a proof in a

first order natural deduction system and
that Forrester may

provide a model for

y to do

such a proof, since Miss Lowell

and the producer intend that Forrester make evident
the

applications of the rules according to which someone can do
such a proof, whether Forrester understands what he
has

memorized or not.

In this way D.21 allows for the

possibility that Forrester may engage in teaching how, in
either sense that fits a particular situation.

Therefore,

D.21 is also designed to legislate cases for which our

intuitions are unclear.

D.21 also allows one to distinguish teaching how from other

activities.

Suppose that a psychologist is concerned to

treat a patient who cannot regulate his eating habits.

The

psychologist sets up a system of rewards for proper eating
habits and punishments for improper eating habits, designed
to reinforce proper eating habits, and to cause the patient

to learn how to regulate his eating habits.

Our intentions

tell us that in this case, the psychologist is not engaged
in teaching the patient how to regulate his eating habits,

Ill

but instead is engaged in
some other intentional activity

namely conditioning the patient
to regulate his eating
habits.
This intuition is born
out by D.21.

Consider the first disjunct of D.
21
(1)

This case may satisfy

.

and (2), but it does not satisfy

(

3 ).

The psychologist

IS not engaged in providing
a model for the patient to

regulate his eating habits;

the psychologist does not

simply intend to make evident the
applications of the rules
according to which someone can regulate his
eating habits.
In this case, the patient may already
know how to regulate
his eating habits, but simply lacks the
will to,
in fact,

do so.

The psychologist is attempting to address
the latter

problem, rather than the former.

One may conceive a case in

which the psychologist may engage in intending to
teach a
patient how to regulate his eating habits, but D.21 allows
us to distinguish such a case from the case of engaging
in

some other intentional activity like conditioning.

Consider the second disjunct of D.21.
satisfy (4) and
fails to satisfy

(

5 ),
(

6

)

This case may also

but it does not satisfy

(

6 ).

Again, it

since the psychologist cannot be said

to be engaging simply in providing a model for the patient

to regulate his eating habits.

When the psychologist is so

engaged, he can be said to be engaged in teaching the

patient how to regulate his eating habits, provided the

.

:
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other conditions are satisfied.

When the psychologist is

not so engaged, he cannot
be said to be engaged in
teaching
how, but rather is engaged
in some other intentional

activity.

In this way, D.21 allows us
to distinguish the

activity of teaching how from other
intentional activities.

We are now in a position to
provide a definition of

'teaching'.

I

have argued that 'teaching that' and

'teaching how' exhaust the kinds of
activities that we may
call 'teaching activities, 71 and that
each activity has two
'

senses; a sense in which the teaching fails
to realize its
goal, and a sense in which the teaching
succeeds in

realizing its goal.

We now have definitions of these

activities; D.20 for ’teaching that’ and D.21 for
’teaching
how’.

Given D.20 and D.21, consider the following

definition of ’teaching’

D.22 x is engaged in teaching y 0 at

t

iff

(1)

x

is engaged in teaching y and 0 at

(2)

x

is engaged in teaching y how to 0 at t

t

(D.20), or
(D.21)

D.22 provides a definition of ’teaching’ which will

legislate difficult cases in order to distinguish teaching
7M

I have argued that the activities preanalytically
thought to be teaching activities either reduce to teaching
how or teaching that, or are, in fact, other intentional
activities
'
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from other intentional
activities,
0.22 provides, on the
basis of D 2 0 and D.21,
an account of teaching
in answer to
the question "What is
teaching?"
.

With the notion of teaching
clarified in answer to
question
2 by D.22,
we are now in a position
to determine if or to
What extent critical
intelligence as defined by D.12
in
Chapter One can be taught,
and answer question 3,
"Can
critical intelligence be taught?"

~
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CHAPTER

III

CAN CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE BE
TAUGHT?

To ask if critical intelligence
can be taught is, according
to D 12
to ask if correct critical thinking
can be taught.
.

,

Attempted answers to the question "Can
critical thinking be
taught?" may, for convenience, be divided
into two groups.

Philosophers and educational psychologists in
the first
group have directly addressed the question "Can
critical
thinkirfg be taught?" 75

Their discussions involve both an

appeal to some notion of critical thinking as well
as some

view of teaching.

Rather than consider each attempted

answer in this first group,

I

shall critically consider one

representative attempt.

Philosophers in the second group have indirectly addressed
this question by addressing the question "Can virtue be

taught?" 7 6

Their discussions involve an attempt to provide

an answer to this question by appealing to some view of

teaching and some view of the relation of teaching and
7S

Thomas G. Devine, "Can We Teach Critical Thinking?,"
Elementary English (1964). Edmund L. Pincoffs, "What Can
be Taught?," Monist No. 52 (Jan. 1968), pp
120-132.
I
shall consider Devine's argument.
.

,

76

I shall consider the question as raised by Plato in
the Meno and the answer as provided by Israel
Scheffler in
The La nguage of Education
The bibliography on 'virtue'
.

enormous

.

is

,
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learning

Rather than consider each
attempted answer in
this second group, I
shall critically consider
one representative attempt and its
importance for answer ing the
question "Can critical thinking
be taught?"
i shall the n
provide my own detailed
discussion by applying the
defination of critical
intelligence', D.12, the definition
of
'teaching' from Chapter II,
thereby directly answering
the
question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?"
.

Direct Answer to the Question:

Group One

Thomas G. Devine directly answers
the question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?" by directly
answering the question
"Can critical thinking be taught?"

His answer is no;

according to Devine, critical thinking
cannot be taught.
He claims that:

0t teaCh Critical thinking as such.
No matter
how no^
U
inten lons
how grandly we phrase our
<^°
obTec t i^ve
+-h
tY e un P lea sant truth remains:
we
w
ach
critical} thinking as a process in itself.cannot
We
a ou t critical thinking.
We can select
f?
latles wl}ich seem to be associated with
critical
thinking and we can discuss these
abilities with our
pupils.
77
But we cannot teach these abilities as
such.
!"

•

^

1

Thomas G. Devine, "Can We Teach Critical Thinking?,"
Elementary English Mo. 41 (Feb. 1964)
pp. 154-55.
,

.
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To support this claim
that one cannot teach
critical

thinking abilities, Devine
offers two arguments. First,
Devine argues that critical
thinking abilities cannot
be
taught because critical
thinking abilities are what
he calls
only postulated mental
constructs." He argues
that:

which we believe to be involved
in the
critics
ln9 Pr ° CeSS <such as
recognizing inferences
gnlZlng aSSUmptions distinguishing
releva n r?from irrelevant
relevant
evidence
constructs." We can only postulate etc
ttelr existence
n9 promote growth in these
abilities.
We
clnll|
iSPOVer whet her or not growth has
uaxen place.
The ^
best we can say, in our present
state of knowledge, is that
critical thinking' seems
to be a composite of as many
as forty separate
abilities, and that these abilities,
so far remain
postulates or mental constructs
'

1

)

-t-

i

Devine's first argument seems to
be that specific critical
thinking abilities such as the ability
to perform deductive
operations according to the rules of
some deductive logical
system that is both consistent and
truth preserving, or to
perform inductive operations according
to some rules of inductive support to degree n ((1) from
D.ll)

construct”

is a

"mental

the existence of which is "postulated.”

it

seems that in Devine's argument, abilities
that are "postulated mental constructs" are by definition
artificial

abstract entities that cannot be developed,
affected,
Thomas C. Devine,
p.

155.

Can We Teach Critical Thinking,

.
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and measured for growth by any educational
or psychological

means since, as artificial abstract entities,
they are detached from persons, or at least unavailable
to outside
observers.

It, of course,

follows from this definition that

the ability to perform deductive operations according
to the

rules of some deductive logical system that is both
con-

sistent and truth preserving, or to perform inductive

operations according to some rules of inductive support, is
an ability that cannot be developed, affected and measured
/

for growth by any educational or psychological means since,

as a critical thinking ability, it is also a postulated

mental construct.

Devine's first argument can be represented as

a

valid argument of the form all A is B; all B is

deductively
C;

there-

fore, all A is C.

1.
2

:.

.

3.

All specific critical thinking abilities are
postulated mental constructs.
All postulated mental constructs are incapable
of being developed, affected, and measured for
growth
All specific critical thinking abilities are
incapable of being developed, affected and
measured for growth.

However, Devine's first argument is unsound.

reasons offered to support either premise

1

There are no
or premise

2.
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Assuming that premise

2

is true, 79 premise

1 depends on some
view of critical thinking
as an individual activity
that
occurs unobserved by others
and that therefore, others
may
only postulate critical
thinking abilities in

an individual.

This view of critical thinking,
however, is mistaken.

Consider the ability to perform
deductive operations
according to the rules of some
deductive logical system
that is both consistent and truth
preserving, or to perform
inductive operations according to
some rules of inductive
support (from D.ll) as a critical
thinking ability. Suppose
X is engaged
judging whether a statement does or

m

does

not follow deductively from a presented
statement or set of
statements, or does not follow inductively
or deductively
from any presented statement or set of
statements (from
D.10).

We cannot observe x making this judgment
insofar as

we cannot observe another's mental events
but suppose we

suspect that x is simply guessing and has no such
critical

thinking ability.
judgment.

We therefore ask x to justify the

If x replies,

are confirmed.

If,

"I

guessed," then our suspicions

however, x produces an appeal to in-

ductive or deductive rules of inference to support the
79

The notion is very unclear.
This unclarity
necessitates lengthy reconstructions of the notion which
would ur nece ssar i ly complicate and lengthen the argument.
Therefore, I shall simply assume, for the purpose of the
argument, that premise 2 is true.
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judgment, then

m

this case

(according to D.10) we must say

x is engaged in critical
thinking.

it seems possible,

then, to measure at least the
presence or absence of this

specific ability to engage in critical
thinking.
if „ e may
at least measure the presence
or absence of this specific
critical thinking ability, then we may
measure x at t and
again at t+1 to determine if this
ability is absent at t
and present at t+1.
In this way we may begin to measure
its
growth.
If all postulated mental constructs
are incapable
of being developed, affected, and measured
for growth, then
premise 1 is unsound; not all specific critical
thinking

abilities are what Devine calls postulated mental
constructs.

Therefore, Devine's first argument does not

support the conclusion that all specific critical thinking

abilities are incapable of being developed, affected and

measured for growth.

Critical thinking abilities are not

postulated mental constructs

.

^

The first argument,

therefore, is inconclusive for the purpose of determining if

critical thinking can be taught.

Secondly, Devine argues that critical thinking abilities

cannot be taught because one only observes these abilities
in what Devine calls "language contexts."
80

He argues that:

Again, I shall ignore the issue of whether postulated mental constructs can or cannot be developed,
affected
and measured for growth because the
notion is hopelessly
y
unclear.
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can see these abilities at work
only in some
WS can only Postulate the existence
critical thinking abilities but we can
measure a corresponding critical reading teach and
or critical
listening ability.
For example, the ability to
recognize an inference is a mental construct,
but
the ability to recognize a writer's
inferences is a
critical reading ability we can teach."
''We

.

Again, this argument depends on the view that
specific

critical thinking abilities are what he calls
'postulated
mental constructs

'

Indeed the problem with his second

.

argument as well as the problem with his first argument, is
a

hopelessly inadequate view of the nature of critical

thinking abilities and a hopelessly inadequate account of
what it is to engage in critical thinking.

Devine seems to argue that the only educationally meaningful account of critical thinking abilities and the only

educationally meaningful account of engaging in critical
thinking must be given in terms of some other abilities

which are not themselves critical thinking abilities.

In

Devine's view, after all, critical thinking abilities are

mental constructs.

Indeed, he claims that "the language

arts teacher can best translate critical thinking abilities
into operational terms."
O

This presumably involves

I

T.

G.

Devine,

Elementary English
T.

p.

82

155.

G.

,

"Can We Teach Critical Thinking?,"
p. 155.

(1964)

Devine,

"Can We Teach Critical Thinking?
^
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translating what he calls "the ability
to recognize an
inference," which in his account is a
postulated mental
construct, into what he calls "the ability
to recognize a
writer's inferences," which in his account
he calls a critical reading ability.

However

,

as

I

have argued, critical thinking abilities are

not what he cails

'postulated mental constructs'.

Devine

provides no further arguments to support his claim that
critical thinking abilities cannot be taught.

Both his

arguments depend upon the claim that critical thinking

abilities are postulated mental constructs, and cannot be
taught because postulated mental constructs cannot be
taught.

He offers no reasons to distinguish what he calls

critical reading abilities, which he grants can be taught,
from critical thinking abilities, which he claims cannot be
taught, other than his definition of critical thinking

abilities as postulated mental constructs.

Therefore,

Devine fails to show that critical thinking abilities cannot
be taught.

He therefore fails to provide a determinative

answer to the question "Can critical thinking be taught?"

The general problem with Devine's attempt and similar

attempts directly to answer the question "Can critical
thinking be taught?" is the lack of

a

clear definition of

what it is to engage in critical thinking, and what
it is to

I

have the ability to engage
correctly in critical thinking.
In Chapter I, I have provided
both a definition of what it
1& to have the ability to
engage correctly in critical
thinking (D.10) and a definition
of what it is to have the
ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking
(D

.

11

)

as

first step toward directly answering
this question.
However we have seen that an account
of teaching is also
a

,

important for providihg an answer to this
question.

We

may, therefore, first consider a
distinction between two

success senses of 'teaching' which may be
construed as providing an indirect answer to this question
"Can critical
thinking be taught?"

Indiiec t Answer to the Question:

Group Two

In the Meno 83 Plato raises the question "Is
virtue
,

teachable?"

At 86d, Socrates asks "Is virtue teachable, or

do men have it as a gift of nature?"

This question and

attempted answers to it resemble the question "Is critical
intelligence teachable?" and answers to it.

Both questions

raise similar prior questions; the prior question "What is

virtue?", compared with the prior question "What is critical

intelligence?"; and both raise the question "What is

successful teaching?"

The latter prior question is the

8 3

The Collec ted Dialogues of Plato (Huntinqton
Carrens, Edith Hamilton, ed
NY:
Random House, 1961).
.

,
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point of interest in the
discussion of the question
"Can
virtue be taught?" for the
discussion of the question
"Can
critical thinking be taught?"
We may, therefore, consider
a proposed answer to
the latter prior question
in the
discussion of the question "Can
virtue be taught?" and hope
to apply this proposed
answer to a discussion of
the
question "Can critical thinking
be taught?"

Socrates asks at 87b "What
attribute of the soul must virtue
be if it is to be teachable,
or otherwise?" He
then

rhetorically asks

".

.

.in

the first place,

if it is anything else but knowledge, is
there a possibility of anyone
teaching it
.?"
At 37e he says "Suppose that
virtue is
a kind of knowledge.
If it is, then it will be
teachable;
otherwise it will not."
.

.

Israel Scheffler claims that
Socrates argues that no one
willingly and knowingly chooses to
do evil or to reject
virtue.
Scheffler states that, according to
Socrates,

If someone knows what the good is,
he cannot fail to
choose it
Thus virtue can be taught. We need merely
to succeed in teaching people to
know what is good,
ana virtue is guaranteed.
In contradiction to this
view, most philosophers have held that
men frequently
84

PP

Israel Scheffler

84 — 85

'

The Language of Educa tion.
'

.

"
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choS^if^
for virtue

the

“^ ^

Lafr

tha

fr

V

V,°

be g °° d 3 nd knowingly
"
sufficient
required y5

“

.

Scheffler points out that
Socrates' view that virtue
is
knowiedge and his claim
that one who knows
virtue will be
virtuous in action generates
a disagreement over
the meaning
of 'successfully teaching'
virtue, and he argues that
is not,

this
in fact, a disagreement
over whether or not virtue

can be taught.

Given that virtue is knowledge,
Socrates
argues that virtue is successfully
taught iff the pupil is
Virtuous in action, while other
philosophers have agreed
that virtue (being knowledge)
is successfully taught

iff the

pupil knows virtue, but that
this knowledge is in no way
a
sufficient condition for being
virtuous in action, it

appears that defenders of the
latter position disagree with
defenders of the former position
over whether or not virtue
can oe successfully taught.

However, Scheffler attempts to
offer an account of this disagreement over whether or not virtue
can be taught by
arguing that what is at stake is
really a disagreement over
the meaning of 'successfully teaching'
virtue.
To do so,
Scheffler provides a distinction between
what he calls
"successfully teaching in an active sense"
and ''successfully
85

Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education

,

p.

85

-

.
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teaching in a non-active
sense "
If -thls
h,
distinction helps
,
Y and reSOlVe thiS
^tsagreement over whether
or not
virtue can be taught,
perhaps such a distinction
win help
311 3ttemPt t0
anSWer the question
"Can critical
intelligence be taught?,"
since we might
anticipate
° f diSa
*
of this guestion.
'

^

"" ""

-~ -

"—ion

^

If we view critical
intelligence in terms of
specific

critical thinking abilities,
then critical intelligence
can
be viewed as knowledge.
Given that critical
intelligence
is knowledge, one
may either argue
(paralleling

Socrates)
that critical intelligence
is successfully
taught iff the
pupil is critically
intelligent in action, or
argue
(Paralleling other philosophers)
that critical intelligence
rs successfully taught
iff the pupil knows
critical
intelligence, but that this
knowledge is in no way a
sufficient condition for
being critically intelligent
in
Thus, we appear to have
a disagreement over
whether
not critical intelligence
can be successfully taught
much like the disagreement
over whether or not virtue
can be
successfully taught.
if Scheffler can show
that such a
greement simply reduces to
applying equivocal senses of
'successfully teaching', then
we will be in a clearer
position to answer the question
and to resolve the
disagreement
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In an attempt to
clarify
^
-Larify and
resolve th-ic
^
tnis adisagreement
and
to show that the

disagreement
greement „,n
really involves
equivocal
senses of .successfully
teaching., Scheffler
argues that the
success sense of
.teaching, can he given
what he calls an
active interpretation
Th-io
according to Scheffler,
means
e question 'Can
virtue be taught?")
that if the
teaching is successful,
then the pupil, in
fact acquires
rtue in his conduct.
In the active
interpretation, the
oral aquisition of
virtue is automatically
insured by
the success in teaching
it.
However, the success
sense of
teaching, can also be
given what he calls a
non-active
interpretation.
This, according to
Scheffler, means that
the teaching is
successful even if the
pupil fails to aquire
his own conduct.
In the non-active
interpretation,
the behavioral
acquisition of virtue is
independent of the
of teaching it.
Scheffler argues that both
the
active and the non-active
interpretations of the success
sense of 'teaching':
•

•

,

^

h
1T tellectu al apprehens
ion of moral
orinnT
principles
and] intellectual avowal
of them may go
ogether with a rejection of
such principles in
conduct, but one view (the
active interpretation)
describes such a case as a
failure
whereas the other (the non-active in teaching
ig£erpretation)
describes it as a failure in
will.
i

86

PP.

84-85?

rael Schef£ler

'

The Language of Education

.
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Schef f ler concludes by stating
that both the active and
the
non-active interpretations of
the success sense of
'teaching' "recognize the
actual cases recognized by
the
other, but describe them
differently." 87 Therefore,
according to Schef f ler, there
is no real disagreement
over
whether or not virtue can be
taught; what is at issue is
simply equivocal notions of
'successfully teaching'.

According to Schef f ler, the clarification
and resolution of
the disagreement over successfully
teaching virtue is the
following:
the clarification, given that
virtue is knowledge, is that virtue is successfully
taught (active
sense)

iff the pupil is virtuous in action
and virtue is success-

fully taught

(non-active sense) iff the pupil knows
virtue,

even though this knowledge is in no way a
sufficient

condition for being virtuous in action.

The resolution of

the disagreement is that in disagreeing over
whether virtue

can be taught, both sides have appealed to equivocal
notions
of successfully teaching'.

notion of

Provided that we clarify the

successfully teaching' by distinguishing the

active and non-active senses, the disagreement over whether
Oftc

is successfully taught virtue even though one is not

virtuous in action becomes a failure in teaching for the
87

Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education

,

p.

86.

.

;
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active interpretation and
a failure ln wil1
for the nonactive interpretation
both describe the same
phenomenon,
blit simply account
for It with different
terms, according to
Scheffler's account.

Grven Scheffler's account,
the disagreement over
whether or
not virtue can be taught
simply reduces to a
disagreement
over the description of the
same phenomenon with
different
senses of 'successfully teaching'.
However, suppose that a
stubborn philosopher named
Socrates argues that there is
no
such distinction between
successfully teaching in the
active
and the non-active senses,
and argues that one
successfully
teaches a pupil virtue iff the
pupil is virtuous in action;
otherwise, while one may be engaged
in trying to
teach, one

IS not engaged in successfully
teaching the pupil.
is,

m

fact, no "non-active sense" of

teaching

.

in this case,

There

'successfully

the disagreement is a disagreement

over the nature of 'successfully
teaching' and the disagreement requires further arguments giving
an account of
'

teaching

'

In this case,

with the disagreement over the concept of

teaching, we still have a genuine disagreement
over whether
or not virtue can be taught, assuming that
both parties to

"
I
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the disagreement
agree that virtue
is knowledge. 88
Therefore, Schef f ler
s arguments do not
show that suoh
'

disagreements which reduce
to disagreements
over the nature
successfully teaching'
are resolved by
distinguishing
what he calls the active
from the non-active
senses of

'successfully teaching'.

A detailed account
of teaching
supported by arguments is
required to resolve the
disagreement over the nature of
'successfully
u
successfully teaching'
and thereby
to answer the
n
_
e cruesf
one
questions Can virtue be
taught?" and "Can
critical intelligence be
taught?"
+-

<-<

i

in Chapter II,

•

.

have provided arguments
designed to support
a clear definition of
'teaching' (D.22) in terms of
'teaching that' (D.20) and
'teaching how' (D.21).
No less
than a complete account of
'teaching' is sufficient to
answer the question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?"
Anything less, like Scheffler's
attempted distinction, fails
to provide a satisfactory
answer.
We must now apply the
definition of 'critical intelligence'
in terms of the
I

definition of 'critical thinking' in
Chapter

I

to the

definition of 'teaching' in Chapter II
to directly determine
the answer to the question "Can
critical intelligence be
taught?
88

I shall ignore the disagreement
over the nature of
^
Knowing, and ^
of knowing
how and of knowing that
-P

1

1

#•
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A Direct Answer
to the Question

Can Critical
Intelligence Be Taught?"
The question "Can
critical Intelligence be
taught?" requires
some preliminary
clarification.
One point specifically
need of clarification
is the function of
'can- in this
Question.
For example, one may
attempt to interpret
'can'
in terms of a modal
term like 'possible'.
this modal
interpretation, to answer the
question "Can critical intelligence be taught?" one
simply shows that teaching
critical intelligence is not
logically impossible, since
the
modal term 'possible' includes
all propositions except
logically impossible ones.
However, this interpretation
of -can' is disallowed by
D.21.
For example, given the
second disjunct of D.21
(8), one cannot successfully
teach
how
to jump to the Moon, since
y
D.21 (8) requires that
y
know how to jump to the Moon
at t+1, evidenced by
y jumping
to the Moon at t+1.
Yet jumping to the Moon is not

m

m

logically impossible.

Therefore, this modal interpretation

of 'can' will not do.

Nor will it do to attempt to interpret
some notion of physical possibility.

'can'

in terms of

The notion of physical

possibility is extremely difficult to specify,
yet even if
it could be clearly specified, for example
in

terms of con-

sistency with certain laws of nat ure

,

it

is unnecessary to

f

.
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do so, glven the
seoond dl5junct Qf
given D.21 ( 8 ), one
oannot SUC e eS sf ully
teach y how to bench
press 900 pounds unless
y does know how to bench
press 900
pounds at t+1, evidenced
by y bench pressing
900 pounds at
t+1.
Bench pressing 900
pounds does not violate
any
Physical laws, yet does not
appear to be clearly
..physically
possible H There
u,. .
ereif ore
this interpretation of
'can' also
W ^H no ^ do.
However, feiven
given u.pi
D Pi ('Ri
0 *
(«) and
a particular
form of the question
"Can critical intelligence
be taught?",
function of -can’ becomes
clear and points toward
an

^

.

•

,

,

,

empirical determination of
the question.

Oiven D.12 and D.22, the
question "Can critical intelligence
be taught?" may take
several forms which also must
be
clarified in order to determine
which question is being
answered.
For example, when asking
this question, one may
be interpreted as asking
"Can one engage in trying to
teach
critical intelligence?" Yet this
is an unenlightening
version of the question for one
interested in developing
successful methods for teaching
critical intelligence.
Under this interpretation, for
example, one can try to teach
someone how to do almost anything from
jumping to the Moon
or bench pressing 900 pounds, to
engaging correctly
in

critical thinking.

vacuous answer:

yes

The result of asking this question is
a
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However, there is a
stronger form of the question.
When one
asks "Can critical
intelligence be taught?", one
may be inas asking if it is,

taught.

in fact,

ever successfully

To answer this question,
one may provide necessary

and sufficient conditions
for successfully doing
it, and
then argue that these
conditions are, in fact,
satisfied to
provide an affirmative answer,
or argue that these con'tions are not, in fact,
satisfied to provide a negative
answer.
Given D.21 (8) and the specification
of these
necessary and sufficient conditions
for successfully

teaching critical intelligence, the
precise function of
Coin
in this form of the question
becomes a matter for
empirical determination in the same
way that it became a
matter for empirical determination in
deciding whether one
can successfully teach
y how to jump to the Moon,
or in

deciding whether one can successfully teach

y

how to bench

press 900 pounds; that y does know how to
do these things
is

evidenced by

y

doing them.

Similarly, critical in-

telligence can be taught if these necessary and
sufficient
conditions are, in fact, satisfied.

Therefore, the satis-

faction of these necessary and sufficient conditions is
a

matter for empirical determination 89
89

This parallels Socrates’ view requiring that in
order to teach virtue successfully, the pupil must, in fact,
be virtuous in action.
D.21 (8) therefore sides with
Socrates in the dispute with other philosophers.
The first
disjunct of D.21 accounts for cases of teaching that are
instances of trying, but failing.
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'Critical intelligence- is
defined by D.12 in terms
of the
ability to engage correctly
in critical thinking.
If these
abilities are successfully
taught according to D.21
(8),
then y does know how to
engage correctly in critical
thinking at t + l, as evidenced
by y engaging correctly
in
critical thinking at t+l.
The success is a matter
for
empirical determination.
It depends not only on
assuming
that the teacher has sufficient
training and ability, but
also on assuming that the
student has sufficient intelligence and will.

shall consider this stronger form
of the question and
answer it affirmatively by providing
the necessary and
I

sufficient conditions for successfully
teaching critical
intelligence, and arguing that determining
the success of
the teaching is, as it should be,
a contingent matter.

I

shall then answer the question "How can
critical intelli-

gence be taught?" in Chapter IV by showing how,
in fact, to
satisfy these necessary and sufficient conditions
for

successfully teaching critical intelligence, given
teachers
with sufficient training and ability and students
with
sufficient intelligence and will.

This, as it should,

places questions about teaching methods and their success in

guaranteeing the successful teaching of critical intelligence in the realm of empirical investigation.

:
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Given teachers with sufficient
training and ability and
students with sufficient
intelligence and will, „ e may
specify the necessary and
sufficient conditions for successfully teaching the students
how to engage correctly
in

critical thinking. 90

x is engaged in successfully
teaching

ow to engage correctly in critical
thinking (from D.ll)
if and only if x is engaged
in successfully teaching
y how
(according to the second disjunct of D.21)
to engage
correctly in critical thinking. This can
y

be seen as

follows

D.23 x is engaged in successfully teaching
y how to engage
correctly in critical thinking to degree
N at t iff
(1)

x believes at t that y does not know how
to engage correctly in critical thinking to degree N

at t-1
v2)

,

and

x intends that y does know how to engage correctly
in critical thinking to degree N at t+1, or
someone intends that x bring it about that
y does

know how to engage correctly in critical thinking
to degree N at t+1, and
(3)

y does not know how to engage correctly in
critical thinking to degree N at t-1 and if x
does not engage in providing a model between t-1
and t+1 for y to engage correctly in critical

The notion of the degree N of the ability to engage
in critical thinking, determined in terms of the degree n of
the specific abilities, is meant not only to account for
dif f erences due to training, but also to capture and account
for contingent differences in the intelligence, ability and
will of students as well as the contingent differences in
the intelligence, ability and training
of teachers. Therefore, I do not consider these
contingent, empirical factors.
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thinking to degree N, then
y does not know how
to engage correctly
in critical thinking
to
degree N at t+1 and
.

<4>

e
pr ° Vidin 9 a
S
and°t+i ?or
or Y
v to
tn en gage correctly between t -1
t-n
Y in critical
al
thinking
to degree N, and
•

(j)

•

i

kn ° W h ° W t0 en a e
9 g
correctly in critical
to degree N at t+1
evidenced
gaging^corteetiy in critical thinking by y en
to

J-hfw
thinking

degree

e
m el 0r Y tD engage
erectly
rn critical
criM?arthInkfn
thinking °tto degree N iff x intends
ome z intends that x make
evident the applications of the rules according
to which someone
0

/

6

degree^N?

in

thinking

" 0" 6

D.23 offers necessary and
sufficient conditions for

succeeding in teaching how to engage
correctly in critical
thinking. To determine the specific
abilities, necessary
and sufficient for having the ability
to engage correctly
in critical thinking, we need only
refer to D.ll and apply
it to expand D.23.

This can be clarified as follows:

D.24 x is engaged in successfully teaching
y how to engage
correctly in critical thinking to degree
N at t iff x
is engaged in successfully teaching
y at t how
correctly to
(1)

perform deductive operations according to the
rules of some deductive logical system that is
both consistent and truth preserving, or perform
inductive operations according to some rules of
inductive support; to degree n, or

(2)

formulate plausible interpretations of a
given
statement or set of statements in
which terms
from the given statement or
set of statements
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the plausible interpretations;
to degree n, or
(3)

3 pr °P° sed explicatum of a term
used
by un author or speaker,
or a proposed clarifia Sta ement Presented by
an author or
speaker°is
r ls
^
E
fact, an explicatum or is, in
.
,
,
fact
a clarification; to
degree n; or
'

'

(4)

e
e
luate
uctive support (according
h
?o°the
ru?es
o?f some ded
f1
1
uctive
logical system that
fu
IS K
both
consistent and truth presLving*
for given
statements not necessarily translated
into thl
e ° f that system or to
provide and evaluate
lnrh^?
inductive
support (according to some rules of
inductive support) for given statements;
to degree

(5)

recognize (psychologically persuasive)
errors in
formal reasoning that employs natural
language,
^
to degree n, or
any combination of

(

1 ),

(

2 ),

(

3 ),

(

4

)

and

(

5 ).

D.23 provides the necessary and sufficient
conditions for

successfully teaching correct critical thinking.

it,

there-

fore, according to D.12, provides the necessary
and

sufficient conditions for successfully teaching critical
intelligence.

D.24 provides a clarification of D.23 in

terms of D.ll by providing the abilities which must be

successfully taught according to the second disjunct of D.21
for correct critical thinking to be successfully taught.

The question "Can critical intelligence be taught?"
becomes
a

manageable empirical question; can these
abilities from

D.ll in D.24 be taught successfully?

We know that they can

.

,

:

137

given that they, in fact,
satisfy the secon d disj
unct of
second disjunct of D.21.
This will become, as
It should, a contingent
matter of empirical
fact.

Consider D.24

(

1

)

.

can

(1)91

successfully taught?
According to the second
disjunct of D.21
fae

D 25 ^ is engaged in
succe ssfully teaching
y correctly to
(1) at t iff
.

(

1

)

x believes at k

to
(

2

)

(1)

at t-1

y does not know how correctly

ndS that y does know how
correctly to (1)
*+ ?^?
+1 ', or s ° me one intends that
x bring it about
^jL£
at y does know how correctly
to (1) at t+1
and
,

(3)

y does not know how correctly to
(1) at t-1 and if
engage in providing a model between
t-1
° r Y correctly
(1), then y does not
know how
h
correctly to (1) at t+1, and

^

(4)

x does

engage in providing

t+1 for y correctly to
(5)

a

model between t-1

(1)

y does know how correctly to (1) at t+1,
evidenced
by y correctly doing (1) at t+1,

where x provides a model for
y correctly to (1) iff
x intends or some z intends that
x make evident the
applications of the rules according to which someone can correctly do (1)

Disjunct

(1)

can be taught successfully provided that these

conditions in D.25 are, as a matter of empirical fact,
met.
For example, we do successfully teach
some students
91 mu
1 he

numbers are the same for D.ll and D.24.
I shall
use the numbers as abbreviations
j.,
for +hooa conditions
the
discussion that follows.
.

m
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correctly to perform
deductive operations
according to the
rules of some deductive
logical system that is
both
consistent and truth
preserving in elementary
logic courses
We do successfully
teach some students
correctly to perform
inductive operations
according to some rules
of inductive
support in elementary
science courses. We also
test

students to determine
whether they can do these
things
correctly, and our determination
that they can do them
to
degree n is based upon
their actually doing them
to degree
in a test situation.
Therefore (1) is the kind of
ability
that can be taught
successfully.

Consider D.24
Disjunct

(2).

Can

(2)

n

be successfully taught?

can be taught successfully
provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as a
matter of empirical fact, met,
When substituting (2) for
(1).
it seems that these conditions are, in fact, met.
For example, we do successfully
teach some students correctly
to formulate plausible interpretations of a given statement or
set of statements in which
terms from the given statement
or set of statements differ
in
meaning in the plausible
interpretations, or a statement
differs in meaning or truth value
in the plausible interpretations, in elementary philosophy
courses.
We also test
students to determine whether they can
correctly decide if a
term or statement is unclear in a
given context, correctly
(2)

consider logical and factual relationships
among presented
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statements

and p rodu ce alternative
construals of the
meaning of terms or the
meaning or truth value
of the
Statement.
Our determination
that they oan do this
to
degree n is based upon
their aotually doing
this to degree n
111 3 tSSt
SitUati0n
Therefore
(2, is the hind of
ability
that can be taught
successfully.
,

'

,

Consider D.24
Disjunct

(

3

)
'

*

fan
Can

r*\
(3)

u
be
successfully taught?

can be taught successfully
provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as
a matter of empirical
fact, met
When substituting (3) for
(!)
it seems that these conditions are, in fact, met.
For example, we do
successfully
teach some students correctly
to determine that a
proposed
(3)

.

explicatum of

term used by an author or
speaker, or a
proposed clarification of a
statement presented by an author
or speaker is, in fact, an
explicatum
a

or is, in fact, a

clarification in introductory or
intermediate philosophy
courses.
We also test students to
determine whether they
can evaluate a proposed explication
of a term by appeal to
the rules of explication, or a
proposed clarification of a

statement by appeal to some rules of
clarification.

determination that they can do this to degree
upon their actually doing this to degree

Our

n is based

n in a test

situation.

Therefore

taught successfully.

(3)

is the kind of ability that can
be
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Consider D.24
Disjunct

(4).

Can

(4)

be successfully taught?

can be taught successfully
provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as a
matter of empirical fact,
met
when substituting (4) for
(1).
It see ms that these CQn _
ditions are,
fact, met.
For example, we do successfully
teach some students correctly
to provide and evaluate
deductive support (according
to the rules of some deductive
logical system that is both
consistent and truth preserving)
for given statements not
necessarily translated into the
language of that system, or to
provide and evaluate inductive support (according to some
rules of inductive
support) for given statements, in
logic, philosophy or
science courses.
In such courses we also test
students to
(4)

m

determine whether they can correctly
evaluate a clear statement of a theory by correctly
performing deductive
operations on statements of the theory,
or correctly provide
deductive arguments to support the theory
or refute the
theory; to determine correctly whether
they can correctly

translate statements into formal language
to prove that a
theory is consistent, or to show that it
is inconsistent, or
correctly to prove that the arguments supporting
a theory
are valid or to show that they are invalid,
or, by

performing inductive operations on statements of the
theory,
to support the theory or to refute the theory.

Our determi-

nation that they can do this to degree n is based
upon their
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actually doing this to
degree n in a test
situation.
Therefore, (4) is the
kind of ability that
can be taught
successfully.

Consider D.24
Disjunct

(5,.

Can

,5)

be successfully taught?

can be taught successfully
provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as
a matter of empirical
fact, met
when substituting (5) for
(!)
it seems that thes0
con _
ditions are,
fact, met.
For example, we do successfully
teach some students correctly
to recognize psychologically
persuasive errors in formal
reasoning that employs natural
language in introductory
philosophy and communications
courses. We test students to
determine whether they can
(5)

.

m

correctly recognize informal
fallacies by producing the rule
the fallacy in question is
an instance of.
Our

determination that they can do this
to degree n is based
upon their actually doing this
to degree n in a test
situation. Therefore (5) is the
kind of ability that can
be taught successfully.

Consider, finally, any combination of
D.24
(4)
(4)

and
and

(5)

(5)

.

Can doing any combination of
be successfully taught?

(1),

(2),

(

(1)

(2)

(3)

,

,

3 ),

,

Doing any combination

of these can be taught successfully
provided that each of
(1)

through

(5)

can be taught successfully.

shown that each of

(1)

through

(5)

Since

can be taught

I

have
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successfully, it follows
that doing any combination
of these
can be taught successfully.

Therefore, since each of the
abilities to degree n for
engaging correctly in critical
thinking to degree N can
be
taught, the ability to engage
correctly in critical thinking
degree N can be taught.
Therefore, given D.12, defining
the degree N of critical
intelligence in terms
of the

degree N of the ability to
engage correctly in critical
thinking, critical intelligence
can be taught successfully.
With the strong form of the
question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?" answered
affirmatively, we are now
a position to provide a clear
answer to question 4
How can critical intelligence be
taught?"

m
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CHAPTER

iv

HOW CAN CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE
BE TAUGHT?

To ask how critical intelligence
can be taught is, according
to D.12, to ask how correct
critical thinking can be taught.
Yet the question "How can critical
thinking be taught?" has
been interpreted in at least two
ways by educators

attempting to answer it.

First, some educators have in-

terpreted the question as asking for a
method for teaching
such that teaching by this method is a
sufficient condition
for teaching critical thinking.
Many educators
have

attempted to answer this interpretation of
the question by
proposing methods designed, when teaching is done
by them,

to be sufficient conditions for teaching
critical thinking.

Secondly, some educators have interpreted the question
as

asking for a curriculum to teach such that teaching this

curriculum is
thinking.

a

sufficient condition for teaching critical

Many educators have attempted to answer this

interpretation of the question by proposing curricula
designed, when taught, to be sufficient conditions for

teaching critical thinking.

Educators attempting to answer the question "How can
critical thinking be taught?" can, accordingly, be divided
into two groups.

The first group includes those attempting

6

^

6

,
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to answer the question by providing
a method designed, when

teaching is done by it, to be a sufficient
condition for
teaching critical thinking. The second
group includes those
attempting to answer the question by providing
a curriculum
designed, when taught, to be a sufficient
condition for
teaching critical thinking.

Rather than consider all pro-

posed methods in group one, and all proposed
curricula in
group two, I shall critically consider a representative
sample from each group.
92 Other
authors offering accounts similar to one or
more of the accounts I consider in group one are: M. L.

Marksberry, "Kindergarteners are Not Too Young," Elementary
School Journal, No. 66 (Oct. 1965), pp 13-17; J. Shotka,
Critical Thinking in the First Grade," Childhood Education
No. 36 (May i 960 ), pp
405-09; J. C. Aldrich, "Developing
Critical Thinking," Social Education No. 12 (March 1948),
pp. 115-18; F. T, Arone, "Developing Critical Thinking in
Junior High School," Clearing House No. 34 (April i 960 ),
456—61 E. Dale, "Teaching Critical Thinking," Education
pp
Digest No. 24 (May 1959), pp 29-31; K. B. Henderson,
"Teaching of Critical Thinking," Phi Delta Cappan, No. 39,
(March 1958), pp
280-82; A. Milton, "Method for Teaching
Thinking," The English Journal No. 27 (Oct. 1938),
6 0—6
B. 0. Smith "Improvement of Critical Thinking,"
pp
Progressive Education No. 30 (March 1953) pp 129-34.
Other authors offering accounts similar to one or more of
the accounts I consider in group two are:
W. S. Howell,
"The Effects of High School Debating on Critical Thinking,"
Speech Monographs No. 10 (1943), p. 100; R. Karlin,
"Critical Reading is Critical Thinking," Education No. 17
(Sept. 1963 ), pp
9-H; A. 0. Kownslar, "Fact or Fiction in
History: Vehicles for Critical Thinking," Clearing House
No. 41 (Sept. 1966), pp
18-20; G. R. Greutz and K. I. Grezi,
"Developing Critical Thinking in the Current Events Class,"
Journal of Educational Research No. 58 (April 1965)
H7 e7 Kelley
"The Thinking Process in Relation
366 - 67
pp
No. 17 (June 1939), p. 28l;
to Arithmetic," Ohio Schools
K. B. Henderson and M. P. Fulton, "Critical Thinking:
Geometry Classes Use Radio Programs," Clearing House
.

,

.

,

,

.

;

,

.

.

,

.

;

.

,

,

,

.

,

.

,

.

;

,

,

,

145

shall argue that the methods offered
by educators in the
rirst group are not sufficient
conditions for teaching
I

critical thinking, and that simply teaching
by some method
is not a sufficient condition
for teaching critical thinking
without a curriculum which, when taught,
is a sufficient
condition for teaching critical thinking.
I
shall then

argue that teaching the curricula offered by
educators in
the second group is not a sufficient
condition for teaching
critical thinking, yet a curriculum C.3 that is
a

sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking
can be
provided by an appeal to D.10.
I shall argue that if
we

interpret the question as asking for

a

curriculum for

successfully teaching correct critical thinking, then C.4
can be provided in terms of D.20, D.21, and directly by
D.24.
C.4,

I

shall then provide a complete, detailed curriculum,

in answer to this interpretation of the question "How

can critical thinking be taught?"
No.

24 (Nov. 1949)
pp 155-58; E. R. Downing "Does
Science Teach Scientific Thinking?," Science Educatio n, No.
17 (April 1933), p. 89; C. M. Dunning, "Developing Critical
Thinking Through Elementary Science," School Science and
Mathematics No. 51 (Jan. 1951), pp 61-63; P. M. Smith, Jr.,
"Critical Thinking and the Science Intangibles," Science
Education No. 47 (Oct. 1963), pp. 405-08. Note also that
all the educators considered in Chapter I, providing
definitions of 'critical thinking' may also be construed as
attempting to provide such curricula.
,

.

,

_

,

.
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Then

shall arque
that
ac,i- for
p
at -t-o
9
to ash
some method for how to
teach C.4 is simply to ask
for some method such
that it
satisfies the second disjunct
of D.20 and the second
disjunct of D.21.
i shall conclude
that the selection of
such a method, given this
requirement, is simply a matter
of
empirical consideration, depending
on contingent factors
such as the personality and
individual strengths of the
teacher, the size and length of
the class, and the background and the ability of the
students and the degree N to
which critical thinking is taught.
I shall then, in the
appendix, provide a detailed model in
terms of this complete
I

detailed curriculum C.4, and in terms of
a method that
satisfies the second disjunct of D.20 and
the second
disjunct of D.21, for how to teach critical
intelligence.

Proposed Teaching Methods

:

Group One

Bernard Mehl proposes a method for teaching critical
thinking that has two component methods.

The first he calls

the creative discovery method" and the second he
calls "the

double -dare -you method." 93

The goal of this method composed

of these two component methods is, according to Mehl, to
B.
Mehl, "Motiviation of Critical Thinking,"
Progressive Education No. 33 (Jan. 1956)
pp 12-15.
,

,

.

"

.
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motivate students to think
critically and
1 1 Ke parrots,
robots or Univacs."° 4
This

claims,

"

not to behave

"

motiviation

,

he

is part of the teaching
method and cannot be

separated from it."^

In the method of creative
discovery,
a

the student "is given

chance to discover relationships
by himself.

sets the stage,

The teacher

so the student will think
through con-

clusions to the problem studied
by means of his own creative
Q
experience.
lhe teacher then simply
presents material
related such that the relations are
unstated and allows the
student to discover these relations.
Mehl considers the
relation of "being incompatible with"
and offers an example.
•

In his example,

the teachers ask for a list of the
racial

characteristics of Mongolians, Negros, and
Caucasions 97
He then asks for a list of the
political, religious, and

racial characteristics of various nationalities.

He may

then, given the reply, for example, that
Americans are

Republicans, Protestant and white, elicit information
that

95
96

B.

Mehl,

"Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 13.

B.

Mehl,

"Motivation of Critical Thinking,"

B.

Mehl,

p.

14.

"Motivation of Critical Thinking," I take
"think through problems to the
conclusion,
unless he means to say "study the arguments to
see if they are valid and sound."
it he means to say

97

One might modify the example such that a contradiction results.
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IS incompatible with this
reply.

The students must then

discover and point out this
incompatibility. Mehl claims
that in the method of creative
discovery, the teacher "may
direct their attention to the
slip, but if the students
do
not pick up the cue, he must
formulate another scheme by
which the revelation can come
from the student. Note that
the teacher does not force the
conclusion on the class." 98
Therefore, according to Mehl, in the
creative discovery
method, "the teacher brings into the
teaching picture
elements which he knows can be spotted
as incompatible with
each other by the average student.

In the double -dare -you method, the
student is challenged to

justify his position on

a

particular issue.

The teacher

then raises a controversial issue, or states
a proposition

which he believes at least some students believe is
false.
Mehl claims that "when a student can't accept

sition

.

.

.

and

.

.

.

a

propo-

counters with his own notion, the

teacher challenges the student to prove his own contention.
The important thing here is to gauge the challenge so that
it is either within the student's range or just beyond

it."

The object of the double-dare-you method, then, is
98

99

B.

Mehl,

"Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15

B.

Mehl,

"Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15.

l0 ° B. Mehl,

"Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15

.

.

,
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to provide a situation
in which the student
to produce arguments
to prove his point.
He will also
according to Mehl, be forced
to examine his position
in

^

terms of various alternative
positions.
"'I bet you can't do if
(is
a phrase)

According to „ eh l

used by parents
as they attempt to get
their children to clean
up the yard,
.

.

.

wash dishes, or perform other
distasteful chores. The
teacher who wishes to motivate
for critical thinking can
do well to borrow a page
out of the parent's manual
to
effect participation in a far
from distasteful task." 101

This method, composed of these
component methods, may be
summarized as follows:

M.l

x is engaged in teaching
y how to engage in critical
thinking if x is engaged in
(1)

presenting y materials related such that
presented material is incompatible with some
other
presented material such that the incompatibility
is unstated and such that
y is encouraged by x to
discover and state this incompatibility
(creative
discovery component) or
,

(2)

presenting y issues or propositions such that
y
is challenged to take a stand on the
issue, or
produce an alternative proposition, and to
justify this stand or support this alternative
proposition with arguments (double-dare-you
component)

101
B.

Mehl,

"Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15

.
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M.l is stated such that
both the creative discovery
component and the double-dare-you
component are sufficient
conditions for teaching critical
thinking.
There are,
however, difficulties with
M.l.
Neither what Mehl calls
creative discovery (M.l
(1)) nor what he calls the

double-dare-you component (M.l

(2))

are sufficient con-

ditions for teaching critical
thinking.

Consider M.l

Suppose that x asks for a list of
the
racial characteristics of Mongolians,
Negroes and
Caucasions
X then asks for a list of the
political,
religious, and racial characteristics
of Americans, and
receives the reply "Republican, Protestant
and white."
accord with the creative discovery
component, x now asks
for the political, religious and
racial characteristics of
(1).

.

m

Harlem ghetto dwellers and receives the reply
"Communist,
Moslem and black." After some prodding and
cues by x,

suppose that y raises his hand and states
his discovery that
Republican, Protestant and white Americans are
incompatible
with Communist, Moslem and black Americans".
However, y
has not committed a use-mention confusion
since y intends

his statement as an explanation for political,
religious

and racial strife, not as a statement intended
to point out
the inadequacy of characterizing Americans as Republican,

Protestant and white.

M.l

(1)

is satisfied,

yet even

.
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according to D.10, y is not engaged
in critical thinking.
At most, y is engaged in creative
thinking.
Therefore,
M 1 U) 15 n0t a suf ficient
condition for teaching how to
engage in critical thinking.
'

Consider M.l

(2).

Suppose that x states that "blacks
are

not inferior to whites."

Now suppose that x challenges
y to
justify this proposition with arguments,
and y replies that
"all men are created equal."

We may want to claim that
y is

indeed engaged in creative thinking, but
y is not engaged in
critical thinking, even according to D.10.
In simply proposing this proposition, y does not engage
in evaluating any
arguments. M.l (2) also confuses engaging in
critical

thinking with engaging in creative thinking.

Therefore,

the double -dare-you component is not a sufficient
condition
for teaching how to engage in critical thinking.

Therefore,

M.l fails as a method for guaranteeing the teaching
of

critical thinking.

Herbert Thelen also proposes a method for teaching
critical thinking that is called "the method of

confrontation

Thelen states that "inquiry

.

102

.

.

.

starts

H. Thelen, "Materials That Promote Inquiry and
Thinking," Educati onal Screen and Audiovisual Guide, No. 44

(Dec

.

1965)

,

p.

26

..
.
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with the arrest of attention
103

- a

confrontation of some

He then proposes four ways to
arrest the

student's attention with confrontations
designed to teach
critical thinking.

The first way is to demonstrate
an experiment without

explanation.

According to Thelen, this requires the
student
to observe carefully and to engage
in critical thinking
to

answer the teacher's questions.

Then, according to Thelen,

I d ask
What was my hypothesis, what were my data, and
what have 1 shown?' ... you tell the class too
little
and demand that they fill in the gaps in some
way, but
you don't tell them how.
In genuine inquiry, it doesn't
matter whether speculations are "good" or
or
antisocial; so long as they close the gap "JgcJ"

The second way Thelen mentions is to overwhelm students
with

different ideas and material.

In this way,

students confront

these ideas and material and exercise critical thinking to

organize them.

According to Thelen, "you require them to

so^t out, categorize, and abstract an idea from the jumble
of impressions." 105
103

Thinking

,

104

Thinking

"

p

"

p

"

.

p

.

"Materials That Promote Inquiry and

26

"Materials That Promote Inquiry and

26

Thelen,

H.
,

.

Thelen,

H.
,

105

Thinking

Thelen,

H.

The third way Thelen mentions is to

26

"Materials That Promote Inquiry and
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violate the student's
expectations.
"You make sure the
class has ... a good idea
of what is going
happen and
then you arrange it so
the opposite happens. "106
This CQn _
fronts them with something
that requires explanation,
since
it violates the pattern
they have come to expect.
This
explanation, according to Thelen,
requires critical thinking.
The fourth way Thelen
mentions is to confront the
students
with a problem, and then
"ask how can we investigate
this

problem?"

Thelen claims that "any good
problem can be investigated in a million ways.
There is no reason why everybody should do the same thing,
so let them do what is interesting to them. "107 According
to Thelen, in generating
alternative methods for investigating
this problem, the
students are exercising critical
thinking.

The method of confrontation may be
summarized as follows:

M.2

x is engaged in teaching
y how to engage in critical
thinking if x is engaged in arresting y's
attention by
confronting y with
(1)

demonstration without explanation such that
y is
required to observe the demonstration carefully,
and x asks y "gap filling" questions that
answers
such as "What has the demonstration shown?,y
What is
the evidence presented?," etc., or
a

106
Thelen
Thinking," p. 26.
.

,

,

107 h*
Thelen,
,

Thinking,", p. 26.

"Materials That Promote Inquiry and

Materials That Promote Inquiry
T and
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(2)

(

(

3

4

)

)

overwhelming materials
or ideas such that
required to sort out
y is
categorize and abstrac
idea from them, or
t an
a violation of
y's
such that y is
required to explain expectations
this violation of
the expected
pattern, or
a problem such
that y is required
to propose a
method for solving the
problem.

M 2 iS StatSd SU ° h
that
'

Helen's four ways

to arrest

student

attention by confrontation
are each sufficient
conditions for teaching
critical thinking. There
are,
however, also difficulties
with M.2.
The methods Theien
groups as the method of
confrontation specified in M.2
(1),
(2), ( 3
and (4), are not sufficient
conditions for teaching
critical thinking.
Consider M.2 (1).
Observing a demonstration, then answering what
Theien calls "gap filling
questions" may involve creative
thinking, but
,

)

it does not

involve critical thinking.

Critical thinking, according to

D.10, may occur only after
we are given a statement of
what
the demonstration has shown.
This may then, for example,
be critically evaluated
according to D.10

(1).

However,

M.2 (1) simply involves creative
thinking in terms of discovering what the demonstration
has shown, but does not

involve creative thinking.

Therefore, M.2 (l)

is

not a

sufficient condition for teaching
critical thinking.
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Consider M.2 (2,.

Sorting out, categorizing
and abstracting
an idea from overwhelming
materials or ideas may also
require that one discover
a pattern, but this
discovery requires creative thinking,
not critical thinking.
Critical
thinking, according to D.lo,
may occur only after we
are
given a statement of the
pattern.
This may then, for
example, be critically
evaluated according to D.lo
4 ).
However, M.2 (2, simply involves
creative thinking in terms
of discovering the pattern
in data, but not critical
(

thinking.

Therefore, M.2

(2)

is not a sufficient condition

for teaching critical thinking.

Consider M.2

(3).

Explaining

a

violation of an expected

pattern also involves creative thinking,
but does not involve
critical thinking.
Critical thinking, according to D.10,
may occur only after we are given
an explanation of this
violation. M.2 (3) simply involves
creative thinking in
terms of explaining the violation of
expectations, but not
critical thinking.

Therefore M.2

(3)

is not a sufficient

condition for teaching critical thinking.

Consider M.2

(4).

Proposing a method to solve a problem also

requires creative thinking
thinking.

,

but it does not involve critical

Critical thinking, according to D.10,
may only

occur given a proposed solution
to a problem.
then,

This may

for example, be critically
evaluated according to

'
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(3)

or

(4).

However, M.2

(4)

simply involves creative

thinking in terms of proposing
a method to solve a
problem
but not critical thinking.
Therefore,
M.2

(4)

is not a

sufficient condition for
teaching critical thinking.
Like Mehl, Thelen also
confused critical thinking with
creative thinking. Therefore,
teaching by the method of

confrontation is not a sufficient
condition for teaching
critical thinking. M.2 also fails
as a method for
guaranteeing the teaching of critical
thinking.

Rubin Gotesky also proposes

a

method for teaching critical

thinking that can be called the
lecture method. 108
asks

Gotesky

:

Can the ordinary classroom lecture be
so organized that
it wiil stimuiate the student to
ask "do conclusions
follow directly from the evidence? if they
do not, what
sort of evidence is needed? And where
the arguments are
not conclusive and differences of opinion
exist, what is
the real problem, issue or issues?

His answer is yes, the lecture can be used
as a method to

teach critical thinking.
R. Gotesky, "The Lecture and Critical Thinking,"
Education Forum No. 30 (Jan. 1966), pp 179-187.
,

109

R.

Gotesky,

.

"The Lecture and Critical Thinking,"

"

,,
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Gotesky lists three devices
that make up the lecture
method,
First, the lecturer may
present false information or
data,
according to Gotesky,

SM

"To determine whether the
student
presence from true information in can detect their
his
Thn
employment of such false information possession
oHata musi be
™3 ° f
a
degreHf £li091Cal con ™ction, and
c) irielevance
’

^

T

•

•

•

>

Secondly, the lecturer may present
what he calls misleading
data.
Misleading data, according to Gotesky,

"Is data that tends to arouse
unjustified inferences in
the student.
This can be done a) by surrounding such
ata with emotion arousing expressions,
b) by
insinuating conclusions not actually expressed,
throuqh
over emphasis upon such data, c) by stating
such data' in
ambiguous language, and d) by failing to
provide a clear
meaning for technical words or expressions
which, lead
the student to derive conflicting
conclusions.
.

Thirdly, the lecturer may present arguments
drawing

irrelevant or contradictory conclusions.

However, simply presenting false information, misleading
data or drawing irrelevant or contradictory conclusions
in
110
p.

184

111
p.

R.

Gotesky

"The Lecture and Critical Thinking

,

R.

Gotesky

"The Lecture and Critical Thinking

,

.

186.
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a

lecture does not insure
teaching critical thinking.
Gotesky also states that

6

kn ° W exactl y what
he is doing?
He^ust 'kno^ex^M
tly
t0 USe false
data, misleading da?a nr
?
0
"
0111
over
More ~
?'10118
he must know
hls assignments are
logically related to his exactl^how^?
he must know
exactly where in hiQ oo4 lecturee

...

*

•

-i

_

rrelevant or

•

.

.

i m plausible^ onclusinns~r ;r t1r2

It is intuitively clear
that lectures embodying false
infor-

mation or data, misleading data,
or irrelevant or contradictory conclusions may provide
subject matter for the

pplication of critical thinking,
according to D.10.
However, it is not clear that
the lecture method described
Gotesky is a sufficient conditon
for teaching critical
thinking.
He requires that the teacher
"place the
student

the position to discover false
or misleading information,
or irrelevant or implausible
conclusions." 113

Yet such a

requirement is simply a requirement that
the teacher teach
the student how to engage in
critical thinking. This is
both a requirement for the proper use
of the lecture method
and the proposed result of the lecture
method.
112
p.

R

*

Gotesky,

187, my emphasis.

113

The lecture

"The Lecture and Critical Thinking,"

Quoted above, emphasis.
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method, therefore, is not
a method for teaching
critical
thinking at all since critical
thinking ability is required
for its proper use.
It is more usefully seen
as a means of
testing for, or exercising
critical thinking, once the
student is "placed in the
position" Gotesky mentions.
Simply confronting the student
with subject matter for the
application of critical thinking
is not a sufficient condition for teaching critical
thinking skills. The question
IS not Simply "How can
teachers place students in a

situation where if they know how to
engage in critical
thinking, they would?"
The question is "How can teachers
teach students how to engage in
critical thinking?" Gotesky
has answered the first question
but has failed to answer the
second.
Therefore, Gotesky has not provided a
method for
teaching critical thinking.

Gotesky

's

and similar attempts to teach critical
thinking

simply by teaching according to some method
like M.l or M.2
tail because they fail to specify what
is to be taught by

the method.

effective,

It appears that for any such method to be
a

curriculum is required in order to specify

what is to be taught by the method.

The curriculum,

therefore, appears to need careful specification before
any

specification of method.

This can be seen intuitively by

seeing that one must know what to teach before one can
ask
for some method for how to teach it.

.
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Given the specification
of some curriculum,
the specification of some method will
then be determined according
to
the definition of teaching
and the specific curriculum
to
be taught.
A concern for providing
a method without a con
cern for providing a
curriculum is like a concern
for providing transportation without
a concern for providing
a

destination.

We must, therefore

consider the alternat ive

curricula designed, when taught,
to be sufficient conditions
for teaching critical thinking.

Proposed Curricula:

Group Two

Several educators have attempted to
answer the question
'How can critical thinking be taught?"
by providing
curricula designed for teaching critical
thinking.
The
concern here is to provide material that,
when taught to
students, is sufficient to teach them critical
thinking.

H.

A. Anderson proposes that specific material
in English

instruction be used to teach critical thinking. 114

He cites

114

H. A. Anderson, "Critical Thinking Through
Instruction in English," The English Journal, No. 36
1947
pp. 73-80
.

)

,

(Feh

""
,

'
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"three aspects or phases
of the English

curricula

which contribute effectively
tQ teaching
critical thinking. -U5 The
firsfc aspect
caUs
situations for communication."
According to Anderson,
.

.

.

^

in'Lngua^e
l

co^^fcItfon^nrieveLp^rcri^Lar^' 61106

.Provision for abundant opportunities
for
speak ina ?
* nd Writin ?
normal.
meaningful sltua^s !'

«

Such "meaningful situations"
occur, according to Anderson,
"only when the student 1) has
something
to say,

reason for saying it,
4)

2)

has a

has someone to whom to say it,
and
has the facility for saying it." 117
These opportunities
3)

for speaking, listening, reading
and writing then make up

what Anderson calls "normal situations
for communication."

The second aspect Anderson calls "the
nature of language."

According to Anderson, teachers of English
115

H. A. Anderson
Instruction in English
,

"Critical Thinking Through
p.

74.

116

H. A. Anderson, "Critical Thinking Through
Instruction in English," p. 74.

117

H. A. Anderson,
Instruction in English,

"Critical Thinking Through
p.

75

.

"
,
"
,,

,
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"Attempt to develop critical
instruction by giving childrenthinking through Enqlish
a bettlr unlerstanding of
300131 institution and as
a
psychological P^ocIssthJs
.

.

.

According to Anderson, teaching
language as a social institution and a psychological
process involves teaching "the
nature and function of language
as an instrument of
communication
vocabulary ... uhow words get meaning,
and how experiences are attached
to printed and spoken
1
9
symbols."
.

.

.

1

The third aspect Anderson calls
"instruction in grammar."

According to Anderson, "grammar, properly
taught, will improve written and oral discourse and the
ability to read and
i_

listen.
i

•

,.120

He claims that "understanding principles
of

word order of sentences, the functional
relationships among
words, principles of modification of ideas,
of the coordination and subordination of ideas in sentences

.

.

much to clarify thinking and expression.
118

H
A. Anderson
Instruction in English

p.

119 H. A.
Anderson
Instruction in English,

p.

,

120

"Critical Thinking Through

"Critical Thinking Through

H. A. Anderson
Instruction in English,

p.

121 H.
A. Anderson
Instruction in English

p.

,

75.

76

.

"Critical Thinking Through
78.

"Critical Thinking Through
78.

.

will do

.
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The curriculum for teaching critical
thinking proposed by
Anderson can be more clearly seen as
follows:
(1)

C.l

* is en 9 a ged in teaching
y how to engage in critic
thinking if x is engaged in teaching
n

(2)

by giving y opportunities for speaking,
listening,
reading, and writing such that
y has something to
say hear or read, and
y has a reason for saying,
hearing, or reading it, and
y has some z to speak
to or listen to, and y has the facility
for
saying, listening and reading, or
,

(3)

to better understand language as a social

institution and as a psychological process; how
words get meaning and how experiences are attached
to printed or spoken symbols, or
the principles of word order, the functional
relationships among words in a sentence and the
principles of the modification or subordination of
ideas

C.l is stated such that teaching

(1),

(2)

or

(3)

(Anderson's

three aspects of the English curriculum) is a sufficient

condition for teaching critical thinking.
ever, difficulties with C.l.

There are, how-

Teaching any or all of the

three aspects of the English curriculum Anderson cites is
not a sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.

Consider C.l

(1)

.

Suppose that in an English course,

Richard Nixon is saying to the class that he was hounded from
office by the press, is listening to Rabbi Buruch Korff
agree,

is reading early James J. Kilpatrick columns, and is

writing his memoirs to establish his role in history as
great moral leader.

a

However, the teacher in teaching Nixon

164

by giving him these
opportunities for speaking, listening,
reading, and writing is
certainly not engaged in teaching
Nixon how to engage in
critical thinking; at most he
is
giving him the opportunity
to exercise his delusions.
Therefore, c.l 1 is not a
sufficient condition for
(

)

teaching critical thinking.

Consider C.l

(2).

Again, suppose that the English
teacher

teaches Nixon to better understand
language as a social
institution and as a psychological
process, how words get
meaning and how experiences are
attached to printed and
spoken symbols.
Suppose that Nixon then provides an
account
his memoirs showing how the language
used by his

m

enemies affected public opinion
concerning his guilt,
showing how the language used by his
enemies showed an
obsession with his impeachment, and that
he provides an
etymology of 'crook' and argues that
'Nixon' and 'crook'
have different linguistic sources and
functions and that
Nixon'

is not

'crook'.

The teacher engaged in teaching

Nixon to better understand language as

a

social institution

and as a psychological process, how words
get meaning and

how experiences are attached to printed and
spoken symbols,
is certainly not engaged in teaching Nixon
how to engage in

critical thinking.

Therefore, C.l

(2)

is not a sufficient

condition for teaching critical thinking.

.
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Consider C.l

(

3 ).

Suppose that Rabbi Rorff

^

Nixon apply the
principles of word order,
the functional
relationships among words
in a sentence and
principles
edification or subordination
of ideas taught by
the
glish teacher. Nixon
applies these principles
while
writing the section of
his memoirs tracing
his development
a great moral
leader.
The teacher engaged in
teaching
Nixon these principles
is certainly not
engaged in teaching
Nixon how to engage in
critical thinking. Therefore,
C.l
(3) is not a sufficient
condition for teaching critical
thinking.
Therefore, Anderson has not
cited aspects of an
English curriculum which,
when taught, are sufficient
for
teaching critical thinking.

^

Earl Murry proposes that
specific material from a mathe-

matics curriculum be used to
teach critical thinking 122
flurry's concern is to use
a basic geometry course
to teach
critical thinking by teaching
what he calls "conflicting
assumptions." According to Murry,

h
a
haSe ° f t inkin whl °h
to nie
life adjustment
adiSsiment is very l'likely ? to be is so essential
neglected in n
geometry course because we have
thought of our
self - evident truths which were

unchangeable?"
122

E. Murry, "Conflicting
Assumptions, " The
Mathematics Teacher No. 37 (Feb.
1944), pp. 57-63.
,

123

E.

Murry,

"Conflicting Assumptions,

"

p.

57.
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Murry

announced goal in teacMng
criticai
teaching what he calls
"conflicting assumptions"
are first,
to teach students
to select underlying
assumptions, and
secondly to determine
their consistency with
a particular
conclusion.

^

,

Ke offers the study
of parallel lines
in geometry as an example of "conflicting
assumptions." Murry presents
what he
calls "the assumptions"
that Euclid, Riemann and
Lobachevsky

made about parallel
lines.
that thr ° U9h a giVen
polnt

He claims that Euclid
assumed
'

line could be drawn
parallel

to a given line,

that Riemann assumed that
through a given
point, no line could be
drawn parallel to a given
line,
and that Lobachevsky
assumed that through a given
point, two
lines could be drawn
parallel to a given line. 125
Murry
then claims that from thesp "mnf i
cnese conflicting assumptions,"
one
derives contradictory concl n<;i nnc
r>
conclusions.
y
For
example, in Euclidean
ometry,
g
the sum of the angles of
a triangle equals 180°,
while in Riemannian geometry,
the sum of the angles is more
than 180° and in Lobachevskian
geometry, the sum of the
angles is less than 180°.
According to Murry,
,

124 ^
E. Murry,

125 ^
E. Murry,

"Conflicting Assumptions,"
p

61

"Conflicting Assumptions," p. 58.

167

“

C °n
1Ctln 9 assumptions lead to
conflicting concisions
the study is to notice that- Ahi e greatest outgrowth of
° Ur assum P ti °"a
leads us to entirely aitte
?
7ent
1
conclusions
even thouqh
no prrnr < „
hinkill 9In other words, our
conclusions are de"
PS °f nt UP ° n ° Ur ass ^ptions and
no
conclusion can h^
m
rellable than the assumption
upon which it is based °126
.

diff^n^

•

!;

Murry then considers the "use of
assumptions in everyday
life."
Students are asked to determine the
assumptions
underlying their behavior of walking
or running in the
halls, obeying or disobeying
traffic laws,
etc.

Given this discussion, Murry seems
to mean by 'assumption*
anything from 'suppressed premise in
an argument using
ordinary language’ to 'hypothesis or
axiom in mathematics'.
Given this looseness and flexibility in
the use of
'assumption', Murry seems to be making a fairly
safe point;
that two deductively valid arguments can
reach either

contrary or contradictory conclusions, and that this
can be

explained by the choice of the premises, not by the rules
of valid inference.

The curriculum for teaching critical thinking proposed by

Murry can be more clearly seen as follows:
126 E. Murry "Conflicting
Assumptions," p.

58.

.
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L

ho
t : a ching

9 9e in crlticai

y

(1>

suppressed premises
P
hypotheses o r

I^ordinf

‘ 88U »P«*»»l
°r

<2>

18

C.2 is stated such that
teaching

1

or

(2) is a sufficient
condition for teaching
critical thinking. There
are,
however, difficulties with
C.2.
Teaching (1) or (2) is not
a sufficient condition
for teaching critical
thinking.

Consider c.2

(

1 ).

(

)

The role of critioal thinking
ig

^

simply to recognize and to
state such underlying assumptions,
but to evaluate them, in hopes
of determining, according
to
(1) through (5) b) of D.10,
if the statement or the
assumption is true. Again, we may
recognize and state underlying assumptions by lucky guess,
intuition, or some method
discovery.
The application of critical thinking
to

underlying assumptions, however, is
not simply their discovery or statement, but also their
evaluation.
C.2 (1),
therefore, seems to involve
y in methods of discovery but
not necessarily in methods of evaluation.
Therefore, C.2
(1)

is not a sufficient condition for
teaching critical

thinking

t

,
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Consider C.2

A proposition is logically
consistent
wrth a proposition or set
of propositions iff their
conjunctron is not a contradiction.
However, c.2 (2) simply
says that if x is engaged
in teaching y to determine
if a
given assumption is consistent
with a given conclusion, then
X is engaged in teaching
y how to engage in critical
thinking.

,2).

This, like C.2

modification.

(1),

win

not do without

For example, x will satisfy
this condition

by teaching y that when a
spinning Coke bottle points East,
the propositions under
consideration are contradictory,

otherwise not.

In this case, however, it cannot
be said

that x is engaged in teaching
y how to engage in critical
thinking.
Therefore C.2 (2), as it stands, is not
a

sufficient condition for teaching critical
thinking.
Therefore, Murry has not cited aspects of a
mathematics

curriculum which, when taught, are sufficient
for teaching
cr itical thinking.

These and similar attempts to specify a curriculum
which,
when taught, provides a sufficient condition for teaching

critical thinking fail because they fail to provide

a

sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.
However,
(1

)

(2)

,

(1),

(2),

(3)

(4)

(3),

and

(4)

(5)

and

(5),

or any combination of

of D.10 can be seen to provide a

curriculum which, when taught, is
for teaching critical thinking.

a

sufficient condition

Since, given the disjuncts
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°f D.io, engaging

gaging in critical

in

^

each is

„ lf

a

f

•

for en-

ng enga 9 in
9 in teaching each
...
is
s
sufficient
condition for engaging
in
n
y
g
to
h
teaching
critical
1
'

.

,

,

.

.

’

*

•«**

_ „j.

-

=o„ aill o„

lM

can be seen as
follows:

thinking if x'is
"engaged
(1)

a)

L^LcMn^ho^to^" 10 * 1

judge whether a
statement a eS ° r d
° es not
follow inductively
P rcsen ted statement
or set of statementsfrom a n?
or d ° GS °
r does not
follow deductive] v f4
a
reSented
or set of
stat ement
sSemintf or does not follow
ductively or dpHn^f
inf
.

/

(2}

a)

oa deducti ve
support
upport^hl
the judgment, or
judge whether a term
or
e
and requires
explication or clfrif
icatio^and

vvc

the^eaning^f^th^term

0

-

plaasible oonstrual of

statement to support the
9 °f
judgment?^?
(3)

a)

e

auS“ o fS Sfs^temf^
construed
to intend,

b)

and

~

°f

reasona bly be

i;3€"S*s HEE-"I;F K^:

appeal to reasons for
n g tnat
that t^
the proposed clarifi’pnf,^ 1S supposing
3 clarif Nation (by
appeal to 2 ))/
M to
r
support the judgment, or
•

(

a

,
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w

«

is- y

SKSSJSSlsSr-* “

to be a valid

sound deductive, or
what v h ?

is In

b- *

S

instance^f ^a^informal^fallacy

'

ementS
and

b>

in

the falla =y

question^* an^nstance^f

any. combination of doing

(

1 ),

(2)

,

(3)

,

(4)

and

C.3 provides an answer
to the question "How
can critical
thinking be taught?" by
providing sufficient conditions
for
teaching critical thinking.
However, c.3 has two serious
educational defects for
educators interested in teaching
critical thinking. First,
C.2 does not limit critical
thinking to correct critical
thinking.
Secondly, c.3 does
not limit teaching to
successful teaching. The

educationally interesting form of
the question "How can
critical thinking be taught?"
is, therefore, "How can
rrect criti-cal thinking be
successfully taught?"

—
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The Answer

«e may begin

:

a

Curricula and the Question
of Method

edification of

c. 3 to answer
this education-

ally interesting for™
of the guestion by
noting that given
we know what it is
to engage correctly
in critical
thinking to degree N.
Furthermore, given the
second disDuncts of D 20 and 0.21,
we know what it rs
to engage in
successfully teaching that,
and know what it is
to engage
in successfully teaching
how.
G i ve n 0.23, we know
what it
is to engage successfully
in teaching how to engage
correctly in critical thinking,
and given D.24, we know
this
in terms of the specific
abilities necessary and
sufficient
for having the ability
to engage correctly in
critical
thinking.
I have argued that
these specific abilities
can
be taught because we,
in fact, succeed in
teaching them.
We may, therefore, simply
cite D.24 as the curriculum
for
successfully teaching correct critical
thinking.
.

D.24 is not a complete answer
to the question "How can

correct critical thinking be
successfully taught?"
recalcitrant educator may ask, given D.24,

"How can

(2),

(3),

(4)

and

(5)

be successfully taught?"

a
(1),

The answer

to this question can be given by
listing what is to be

taught, according to the second disjunct
of D.20 and the
second disjunct of D.21, in (1),
(3), (3), (4) and (5).
The answer,

then, is "by successfully teaching
these

;

t
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specific propositions, and
by successfully teaching
these
specific skills." This can
be 5een in detaU
,

C.4

_

^

f

x is

engaged in successfully teachinn v v,~ TT
correctly in critical thinking
to degrL N at
is engaged in successfully
teaching
.

atV??T
t if x

y

(1)

that arguments consist of
statements called
premises and statements called
statements have a logical form; conclusions that
that
logical
° an be ca P tured in PC
by
prooosit?o°
etters and logical connectives;
that
capturing the logical form of
statements is called
S a
h
Statement f
ordinary language
intS a fornal
-ormal language,
l
either PC or LPC that a
ement iS either true
and not
both" tha^ prop ° sltlon letters
are
used
univocallythat' the logical connectives
Y
that
are
=
% 3
v
and are derivable from just %
and •; that the
logical connectives can, in turn,
be defined contextually by truth tables; that
truth tables can
also be used to define ’logical
equivalence’,
contradiction’ and ’tautology’; and the
logical
form of statements can be captured
in LPC with
predicate constants, quantifiers
successfully
representing all, some, and none, 126 the
logical
Ct VeS
relation constants; the predicate
rnnqf f replace predicates
constants
like red, old, bald,
etc.; that universal quantifiers
are defined in
terms of domain D and conjunction
(•), and that
existential quantifiers are defined in terms
of
domain D and disjunction (v)
that relation constants replace relations like between,
to the left
of, is identical with, etc.; that
relations may be
symmetrical, asymmetrical, transitive, intransitive
reflexive, irreflexive or totally reflexive;
that
identity is a special kind of relation;
that
identity is transitive, symmetrical, and
totally
reflexive; that identity allows us to capture
the
logical form of statements including "exceptive"
statements, "at most" statements, "no more than"
.

^

.

•

i

•

'

,

'

^

126 Man
Y logicians before Frege had unsuccessfully
attempted to represent all, some, and none.
However, not
until Frege published the Begrif f s sc hr if
(Concept
Ideography) was an attempt provably successful.

'
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e

e
S
^°" ®^®tements^ C
eXaCt ^^
that°identity also ali

of

£H
£“£ T^tlpf
Ih^vf

£Sr?

up
is
PC
pr<?nises iff
the argument is valid;
r valldlt
Uditv®
y is a property
Of the logical form
arguments; that validity
can be defined
?
d
terms of accordance with
the
rulpfnf
rules
of inference in PC or
LPCpremises of an argument are tru4 that Tf ih l
and if
ld
th n the conclu sion must
be true- that the
fhp argument ^is sound
if it is valid
X
ihf; the premises
lad
and that
are true
uue
but
if is
0 unsound
Dut
it
if if ic3 valld andj one
or more premise is falsethat ^J
the rules of valid inference
for PC are f
a
by stating the logical
condition! £r IntrolulinT
a ting the iogicai
connectives, and that
“e
Vall
inference for LPC are formed by
adding
addina ^ the
the°ilogicalf conditions
for introducing and'
‘

f

^

'

'

i

,

^“y

t^'pc^ules

Universal and existential

guanas

,

any (by teaching y) all other
propositions
necessary to teach these propositions,
h
t^n^nte ordinary language statements
into
int 0 PC
pc or LPC, and how to perform
operations according to PC and LPC deductive
rules- to
degree n or

£

'

,

that an inductive argument is
not a deductive
argument or an enthymeme; that
inductive arguments
are strong or weak; that a strong
ment is an inductive argument in inductive arguwhich
clusion follows from the premises such the conthat it is
not probable that the conclusion
is false and the
premises are true; that a weak inductive
argument
is an inductive argument in which
the conclusion
follows from the premises such that it is
not
probable that the conclusion is true while
the
premises are true; that the premises of a
strong inductive argument provide inductive support
for the
conclusion; that the elucidation of rules of
inductive support is distinct from the
justification
.
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;

^
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of induction d 2
th^+principles in terms of wh^h^ 6 ! 501116 general
3 ° f inductive
support can be developedthatF?

hese general
principles involve n
^
Wright on Mill's Me
Inciples v °n
thodsT and°m
2
an lnter Pretation
of probability
(Von Wright
qv
Kyburg)
(1) involves Von
th *t
Sriq^?s
Ctl
° n ° f " Mills
Methods"; that "pres
p"'
e t
ln terms of
for present and FF
p
for C
en tf ma Y be constructed
for properties and
end complex predicates? G> gro P ert ies (predicates
38
truth Abies' in
terms of 'T^and
miv^f
sitions and complex nrnnoc V onstructed for propotatement s and
complex statements)
f
-Fhrt
a Property
F is a
sufficient condi trtA e
P ^° p ® rty G iff whenever
F is present, G is
present
necessary condition for
F iS
property G iff .whenever G 3
is present, F is
present thtl l
63 suspected
of being necessary
o
ujf c n co dltions
given conditioned P ?ooerfvSr
for a
?
called
'possible
conditioning properties '•
tbat we ma Y select the
necessary or suffrtrtnf
r
diUo
properties from among
l°
the°possiSe
°
ndltlonin
properties by a) the direct
g
'

<

'

'

;

'

'

,

i

•

(

^

^

'

.

S

6

difference

/™

“F
S

iCning
properties inc?ndfthe°ac tua?
cond>
tl0ning
(either necessary,
P ro Perty
sufficient or

^

ertain ty; that
a) proceeds to allow
the discovery of necessary
conditions fnr =
COndltloned Property
elimination
>auun or
of possible
oossib? necessary conditinne by the
P ° SSible neces
r/cSndU^n c'is
eliminated™!^! CO
ed P r °pyty H is present
“?
and
lb t ;h ! b) P roceeds to allow the
discover nf l f,
conditioned property°by
?

“

^hfeUmJnaUonM possible

r: ss

present and conditioned property
H is absent!
127

They are, however, related oup^iapc
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j

;
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1
particula^sufficient conditi discover y of

a

occurrence of a conditioned
pC ty
the same as
b
except the attemm 0
d ^cover which of
the
properties present
It
sufficient
d
combines a
and b) to allow the discoverv
sufficient conditions for
i
a pr
ien
'

i

+

•

Stions

V

^

,
)

h

D3Sed UP ° n e ™ pir i cab
knowledge- ""that the
nature^f fl)
1 3 pr ° blem for this
method; that
ere are fj®
“ere
J?
inductive
arguments that do not hau P
S
U
th
SUCh inducti
-gumen^inux .e statistical
voive
sta tiS^al concepts and
probability t-haf
LVS imputations of'
F robability
based on the probability calculusm
6rnatiVe interpretations of
^D?otar ?
S

a«

f

-

“

•

'

?“

are interpretations called
a)
classical hi
classical,
b) empirical, c) logical,
d) subjectivist, and e) epistemological;
that the
probability calculus can be developed
to apply
Y to
statements, arguments or properties;
that
the
probability calculus states how the
probability of
a comp! ex statement is
related to the probability
of its simple constituent
statements,
problem of determining the probability that the
of simple
statements is not solved by the
probability
problem of determining the truth
valn^nf'
e ° f S1 ™ ple statements is
not solved by PC or
T pJ
lf 3 statement is a tautology,
then its
k
probability
= 1; that if a statement
is a contradiction, then its probability = 0, that
if
statements are logically equivalent, then two
they have
the same probability; that P
p) = 1 - p (p)
that P (pvq) = P (p) + P (q) _ P
th ^ t con _
ditional probability, P (q given p = q);
P
p)
p)
P (p)
that the rules of inductive logic (q
are the
rules that assign probabilities to conclusions
that the probability of a conclusion, given
the
premises and all relevant available knowledge is
conditional probability of the form P (conclusion a
given premises
K) which may be calculated P
(premises
k
conclusion) t p (premises
K)
that rules of inductive logic may be formulated to
assign statement probabilities, and then probakility calculus rules may be used to calculate the
conditional probabilities of inductively reached

^

.

.

'

(
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•

•

•

•

•
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i-v

3
that there is no
general agreement
ment probabilities-abou/hoITto as sign these statethat tL Z pistemic
of a statement is
Probability
the
f
given all relevant
the stat
^ilence^tL^
tbat hhere
th
problem with 2)
is a
+-h<= nrProblera of justifying
induction, given thn
indu ctive ruies
is the inability
to jusU^thf
laltlal assignment
of statement
probabilities^ -*
wh,y not some
other
assignment?- that
13161
"
°
f
justif y in 9
induction, stated
byiw^ariS”
attempts to formulate
indictiJe ruJes
te
dissonfthl p^bnm ?r et d t hto either solve
those offering a viei
**
of
?

™

•

.

'

•

i

i

,

nL

'

^obfbUityT

^

n

r propositions
to teach these
necessary
propositiOTs?

and how to perform
inductive operations according
to
1) and according to
2) to degree n, or
(

2

3

)

^

clear

™

may be unclear

Set ° f st atements may
be un-

blcaLftS^eLiofo? theln-^
u

.V^ -

s

vagueness or
or\B
the ambiguity of terms in
the
statement,- t^t the use of a
term in a statement
UnC Sar because of the
presence of a referenf
ential
ly opaque context; that PC
or LPC can be used
6
alterMtive logical forms o? such
statement
tements or sets of statements;
that the extension
of a term is the entities the
te™
is trul of ^nd
the intension of a term is the
meaning of the term*
n 13 USin9
he Same WOrd in the “me
context t.
t°leas?
?
least ttwice, at least
once with a differn ° r extension
that a use-mention con?
fusion involves
confusing a word with its
extension; that properly vague terms
can be used clearly without clearly like 'bald'
specifying the
extension; that improperly vague terms
have no
clear intension; that a term in a
given context is
an ambiguous term when we are
unable clearly to
determine which of the possible extensions
or which
o
e possible intensions of the
term are being

^

i

.

'

'
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“

1
statement
^s^n^no^occur^eferentially
1 ly !
'
a ?
lon 9 er
statement formed by embedH n c
s
chol
P
y
°9ical
context such as 'is aware
^hat' “he
;say s that
knows t£at "doubL
’

,

,

;

tha^tc^

’

s;;s 2™ lves««
applying
to r a
e
tlVe

1
the
principle of charitv
arguments
valid where possible, to
clarity the meaning and
clarifv
extension rae
rm
re
e
to proviie
u
f
s
t ren"i 't
confusions, to eliminate the
improper^agueness"

“:r LV:
4-

,

L™

construal of a given statement
or set of statements consistent with the
author's expressed or
implied views must be provided
before conceptually
Y
nt
ticis ” " a y occur; that once
pro
v ded
°P
d/ tH
thls Plausible interpretation
is open to
e
significant criticism; that conceptuY
ally significant
allv
sian!f
criticism involves arguing that a
ly V Ud arg
is unsound and ?hat
c!frif!Id statements
t ;
clarified
are false; and

“

all other propositions necessary
to teach these,

how to capture the logical form(s)
of a statementow to recognize the extensions and
terms; how to recognize the equivocalintensions of'
uses of
terms; how to recognize use-mention
confusionshow to recognize the improper vagueness
or the'
ambiguity of terms; how to recognize an
author's
expressed or implied views; how to provide
plausible interpretations by applying the
principle of charity, how to provide conceptually
significant criticism; to degree n, or
.

(3)

hat to clarify statements using unclear
terms,
^ e mitions,
analyses, or explications can be proviced for such terms; that definition is not
explication; that it is claimed that there are
many types of definitions such as lexical,
stipuative and contextual; that there are philosophical
problems about the nature of definition; that the
.
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S

iS C3lled the
def Tniendum^ tha t
definiendum is called th™def phrase defi ning the
i
SnS
that Providing
necessary and sufficient
condi
<aS 3 defi
for a definiendum)
provides
defl mtion of the
definiendum- that
x*

^

'

^ns

,

by considering
counterexamples
s
p
tnat counterexamples are
that 3 glven
definition or
s
Sh
°
wing
Y
that the
definiens and the defined
are not extensionally equivalent that
may'be^evaluated S' othe^wav^rVf definiti ° 3s
t lat an explication
is the transformation nf
^
n lnexact
prescientif ic
concept called the exnl
t0 a new exact
concept called the
tu
?
that the explicandum
cannot be explained
in
6
be made
clear by ln forL
^
x
the explicandum cannot
Ee maSe^eS^fth,
C
W
nSider 9iving U P the attempt
to'expS:
cate
cttTlt
the term
question; that there
tensional overlap to be
preserved between the
expiicendum and the explicatum;
that the decision
an expllcatum is based on
considerations
other°?h
USS that an ex P lica tum may
not be
i
evaluated in terms of synonomies
evaluatec^in^^
or even degree of
between explicandum and
explicatum^
^Piicatum may be evaluated
according to
f ?
following
explicit criteria:
f 2H
l) Ih
^
1)
the
explicatum
must be similar to the
explicandum in that there must be
tensional overlap, however, in a significant exgivfn context for
a given purpose, the best
explicatum need not be
the one with the most extensional
overlap with the
2
th eXpU
"»»t
be a^oncept
teaman te'd h a ln 3 Clear P^cise
manner,
and it must
m,
have an extension, 3) the explicatum
must be theoretically fruitful
as determined
by an appeal to context and to
purpose, and 4)
the expi return should be as simple
as conditions
i) tuiough 3) allow; that
in an explication of
fish' is an example of an explicandum
and
member of the class Piscus is an example
of an
explicatum; that a proposed clarification
of a
statement may be evaluated in terms of its
relation
to the principle of charity by asking:
is this the
clearest construal of a given statement?;
that
asking this involves asking if the
clarification
clearly exhibits the logical form of the
statement.
'
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^

e
extenIion ofierms°where r
Snsion and
pos^ b
cation provides
the
clarif iunivocal uses of^
the improper
vagueness or ih am ter ms eliminating
where possible anS
ui ty of terms
^9
if the °
e?larif
sls tent With the
ication is conauthor'*
thor s expressed
view, and
or implied

r

,

P

Propositions? and
how

ti0nS necessar to
y
teach these

T'

^nitions,
countered
and evaluate a
h
°? t0 ^cognize
proposed
P
Um; how to
recognize and evaluafp , SpTic??;'
P posed ciarif ication
a statement: to
of
degree nj
to°

°f

”

<4>

^t
of

for a

^—

suppressed premise
an enthymeme with
the aiv
Stateme nt S as the
conclusion, or provid^ 2
6 "”' 555 in a valid
deductive argument
as the conclusion; form with^he giVen statement S
that dednrf1Ve ar
ln ordinary language
9uments offered
are
enthymemes are deduct?™ of tin enthymemes; that
3
unstated premise called
° ne ° r more
a sunnres
P
Premise
capturing the logical
that
1
form 2?
u
enth
PC or LPC symbols
eme b Y
helps°in
° f the
suppressed premise or^
the oppressed
premise must be stated premises I th
to nnf th<2
h
enth yTnem e in
deductively valid form1
giVen
a deductively
valid form, the arqumenf !
Y be evalu ated for
soundness- that nn2
tic deductive arguments arl e^uateST th
n9
t0
rUles of P =
or LPC for validity?hatn
UCtlvel i' valid
form, the argument
^ay be evalua ted for
that providing inductLf evaluaL^f
soundness;
ve support for a given
ment s can involve
statenvoive Twl
two alternative methods11
if c
th^+*
conditioning pro^rtftf a° Ut
then providing inductive
support fo^S invof^'
8
1
Sl 1
P
dit 0n ng
sup^rt L% ?L r\
j the
I conditioning
°f
proper y
ln S
(thfn^essar?? the^suf
3
f
t
nditi ° n) by
^PWing^rtef
Srect meteod o
of agreement, c)
thfmeteod of Slfetence' dftf
d) the
double method of agreement or
!
!
of agreement and
difference; that 2 ^if ““is^
'
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0 ™,' then
ductive support^ for
Providing ins f
dent of evince E
dlnS a statefor s™ ir t ha E
Such that P (S
ls true and
given
support for statementsE) > p ^ s f ph at inductive
of form 1
^
ls evaluated
by applying methods
a) or k?
C) ° r d) ° r e
to test for the
presence
conditioning properties and °k “"“ of Possible
among the conditioning to 1?
the relations
the cond itioned
property; that when
providing 1lndu
d*^
oti ve support for
statements s of form^)
str
With a high degree
9 lnductiv e arguments
of concHt?o
ndltloml probability may
be said to support
g
1 ductive
with a low degree of
arguments
conditio
?
0
be said to fall
1
3
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to^p^r^T

propositions'/ and

11 ° nS
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necessar y to teach these

V

m
0 fc S
h ° W t0
a ded U ctively v a
lid a rgument f
s
°
“ nd " ess
provide
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inductive support for l!

ductive support for
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n
at *** 3
^ ^^ °^ ^e ie persuasivenessl
^
th
at
fali
fallacies
are often used when th 1
„
" 9U '
Y
°PP°nen?s or°fn“
a

a

1

i

=

,

S

audience that t h°
probable; that wl
n
? is

r

^define I'tS'Sc?

!S a^V L

a

lld and f ls “Jt an
inductive argument’
,
and f s conclusion
is reached by an error
in

persuaded by r to accept

c)

“tlUrStS

13

bload
'

aS Wel1 aS errors in reasoning;
that
at the interesting feature of
fallacies is that
they invoive errors
reasoning that are also
psychologically persuasive: that so
construed

^

r
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this broad notion^that^’intu ^.? er uasive given
nt urtively,
^
blatant
contradictions aro
09iCally P ers ^sive
but that contradIctions P
bur^d
argument may be psvchoW? ?? ln complexity of
3
8
some violations of
tha t
^les ttat^
'

” "^

K

S
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therefore m o- fhaf -.-pf-jvP
u
ff ming
the
consequent involves an error of
the form P°4'
4, therefore p
that the
I
co ^unction
involves an error of the
form
fore mq that formal
there ~
%P
fallacies
cin
b
ex
s
by capturinq the Inni^iT
P° ed
S
applying PC or LPC rulesth L fallacies of
ambiguity involve error<,' n T™
f reasonin
g resulting
from ianorinq the emh
0
°
rdi
" ar y language
like ambiguous words
i
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phrases

^r

r

to

£it7
distinct°extens

P

than
ling

ion ^or "intension s^in the
hiboly involve a the ambigui^of
F
y
grammatical constructionsl
that fho f,n
°
is commdtted wh «n a
conclusion is
in validly
3 ^" am

‘

f

the

t
P

n
.

.

?hat

cer tam words in the premisethat

b ° th in ™lve -attention
o language Tt
t^lanquaqe
attributing properties to a part,
or
m m
r

class and Properties to a whole
that thS fallac y of composition
is
committed when
wh
one argues that if the parts of a
Ct
memhers of a class have a
operty, then
Property
?h
th
p
the
complex object or the class has
rt
that thS fallacy of division is
coLittPd when
h
committed
one argues that if a complex
object
or class has a property, the
the parts of the
complex object or class have this
property;
that fallacies of relevance
involve errors in
reasoning resulting from no rational
connection
between premises and conclusions:
that the
or

tn

r ^?
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^ T* 1
ofpr 0 ba b u!ty offh eS conclusion
specific fallacies of fhi
ad hoLn ™'
r

the trSth

+-

pop^rirad
quCtion, o^“stion: 1S H
that ad baculum
ciuSf ift^r
to'accep^the

“

d
?

T

“?

ad

i
the
^he question

rir e

"rr^^tne’

to

"* 868 iab

that

^ing

mos^M

involves the

;

t

13 10 ”
that ad hominum arguments
involved!
!
felll!
3
0
Per n 35 P remises in an
arllmlnl
against
f° 1
SUpports that there are
two forms oTZhis fa lacy;
abusive and circumstantial- ?Lt
i
0
in ~
volves directly attacki^th ™! 0 " the falla
man
makes
by
directly attacking the minthat the circumstantial
thl^th**
form of thP fgii,
?
33 pre " ises
reasons Sy,
stances, one should “ce^t
rejertTSSt?^?™"
n
n
that
Verundiam arguments involve
aI appIai to
unsuitable authority as premises
to
o support a
I given
I?
conclusion; that not r 11 annoau
to authority are fallacious,
for example that Linil
auling says he believes that
Vitimin C affects the
b °. invadin
^ vi ™ses counts as
^idenerio^Sr.
S11 ce Paulin
9 is a noted
?
biochemist t^f
bat an example
of the fallacious
aonla?
^
appeal io
to authority
is an example which appeals
to
a given authority in
a field to support “ i-lata
about something
an unrelated field; that ad
P P
a
e tS involve an a peal to
P
generally
a c°c
td beliefs,
accepted
bir I or majority opinion
as
premises
to support a given conclusion
that is not" about
accepted beliefs or people’s opinions;
that populc
opinion is used as an authority;
that ad
ignorant 1am arguments involve offering
appeals to
ignorance as premises to support a
given
conc usion, that the fallacy
involves arguing that a
certam condusion is true or probable
because
cither it has not been disproved
or one does not
now how it could be disproved;
that false cause
arguments involve an appeal to premises
stating
that event A came before result C
to support the
conclusion that A caused C; that ignoring
the
question involves offering an argument in
support
?
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°f some concluqinn -i-k
3
the question at
irrelevant to
hand; that cn^i^
mpleX questions involves supposing
that a simn?
a question
containing a hldden YSS ° r no answer to
question is
sufficient evidence for
1
answer and the hidden
based on this
questiS^fh
that be 99ing the
question involves
assminc
3 premise the conelusion to be proved
t?
premise often simply
that the
dlfferent words what
the conclusions
affirm; ^nd
•
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all other propositions
necessary
these propositions,
y to te ach
and

”

how to recognize informal
9
3 C ° ntinin
9
degree

f=11

informS?^^^

31 "'
to

combinations^f "th^sliiis 0 ^ 1 V1 ieS involvin g
(3),

C.4,

(4)

and

in

i"

(5)

"to degree

(1>

<2).

-

then,

exhaustively answers the
question "How can
correct critical thinking
be successfully taught?"
by providing the specific
propositions and the specific
skills
which, when successfully
taught to degree n, are
sufficient
to teach correct critical
thinking to degree N. The
degree
N of critical thinking
is, again, like in
D.ll, a function
Of the degree n of each
of
a
u
(3)

m m m
'

>

'

t

r

(4

and

\

)

or

(5)

any combinations.

However,

suppose that the recalcitrant
educator insists on
pursuing the first form of the
question "How can critical
thinking be taught?" and demands
to be provided with some
method for successfully teaching
C.4
1 ),
(2)
4
( 3 )
and
(5)
To be provided with some such
method is to be provided
(

.

,

(

)
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wxth a method that
satisfies the second
disjunct of D.20,
the definition for
engaging in successfully
teaching that,
and that satisfies the
second disjunct of D.21,
the
definition for engaging in
successfully teaching how.
First, consider the
second disjunct of D.20.
To satisfy
this disjunct, any i*
rro+- „
must get
y M musty to come to believe that x

believes that 0 at

t;

y to come to believe that
0 at t+1;

y to come to believe that x
believes x is justified in
believing that 0 at t; and
y to come to believe that
y is

lustified in believing that
0 at t+1.
Secondly, consider
the second disjunct of D.21.
To satisfy this disjunct,
any
ethod must allow x to provide
a model for
y to 0 between t-1
and t+1, where x provides
a model for
y to 0 iff x intends
or some z intends that x
make evident the applications
of
the rules according to which
someone can do 0 and the
hod must get y to 0 at t+1.
Any method must satisfy
these disjuncts, otherwise it
cannot be said to contribute
to successful teaching.
,

However, the choice of a method to
satisfy these disjuncts
will depend on at least five contingent
factors.
The first
factor is the personality and individual
strengths
of the

teacher.

For example, some teachers are patient,
outgoing,

and good at asking leading questions,
while other teachers

186

are more -tolerant,
reserved, gC od at
lecturing and g ood
at answering questions.
The second factor is
the size and
length of the class. For
example asking leading
questions
may work well
a small class with
sufficient time, but
work poorly in a filled
lecture hall with
insufficient time
The third factor is the
background and ability of
the
students.
For example, lecturing
and answering questions
may work well for a class
with bright students with
a
sufficient background who
are unafraid to ask
question,
however, it may not work
well for slower students
without
sufficient background who are
afraid to ask questions.
The fourth factor is the
degree n to which c.4
(1), (2),
(3), (4) and (5) are to be
successfully taught. This
determines the degree N to which
correct critical thinking
is to be successfully taught,
and by D.12, determine the
degree N of critical intelligence
to be taught.
For
example, one may expect successfully
to teach second
graders correct critical thinking by
successfully teaching
some of C.4 (5) to degree n, yet
this will be a very low
degree N of critical thinking. One may
approach college
freshmen with the expectation of successfully
teaching
all of C.4 to degree n, and this will
be a much higher
,

m

degree N of critical thinking, and a
correspondingly higher
degree N of critical intelligence. Of course,
we may also
modi 1 y C.4 itself to add more advanced skills
such as modal

.

)
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chan

-

—

the

<* degree n of
critical
" lng ln the SCOpe
° f the proposed
curriculum
such alternative
curricula also affect
the
^gree N to which critical
intelligence is taught.
.

The fifth factor
is the particular
combination of the first
four factors that
128
obtains
v
For
example, an intolerant
eacher good at lecturing
with a large class
of bright
students ma y adopt a
different method than
a patient teacher
asking leading questions
with a small class of
slow
students, even though
both teachers are
teaching the same
curriculum, for example,
C.4.
They may also be said
to be
teaching ,1, , ( 2
(3)
,4) and <5, of c.4
to a different
n.
9
Therefore, given these
five contingent variable
factors it is unfruitful
to provide a single
method for
successfully teaching C.4
y
(1)
(?)
(?)
ni\ and (5):
(3)
(4)
there
simply is no Single
method.
In the absence of a
particular
set of these five factors,
it must be sufficient
to show
that to be successful,
any such method must
satisfy the
second disjunct of D.20
and the second disjunct
of D.21.
•

)

,

,

,

1

}

'

'

'

^

aPP r t0 be
possible
combinations^of ^hese^f ac ttors
° rs
Ho
However
there are many
sub-factors under C
^
fact ors I mention, and
the combinations of these
sub
rS
mUSt also be taken
into account
Lt nJ thro ^ n5? represent
the number of
these sub-factors under
rS
through 5.
The possible
combinations of these fartnr°
+ n
n2 +
*

/

.

t?

n4

t n5 ) <5 + Si

&

•

"3
t
J large
A
number!
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with the question "How can
correct critical thinking
be
successfully taught?" answered
in terms of C.4 and the
second disjuncts of D.20 and
D.21, „ e have answered
the
tion
q
How can critical intelligence
be taught?"
We are
now in a position to provide
a model for successfully
teaching correct critical
thinking, and thereby for successfully teaching critical
intelligence, as an appendix.

.

t
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APPENDIX
a MODEL FOR TEACHING
CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE

Applying D.21, x successfully
engages in teaching
y how to
teach critical intelligence
by successfully engaging
in
teaching y how to teach
correct critical thinking.
To do
this, according to the
second disjunct of D.21,
is
among
other things, to provide
a model for
y successfully to teach
correct critical thinking.
this Appendix, I shall
provide such a model designed
to teach y how to teach
correct
critical thinking in terms of
C.4, the successful teaching
of which is a sufficient
condition for the successful
teaching of critical thinking.
As I have shown, this model
must not only satisfy the second
disjunct of D.20
,

m

and D.21
but must also specify a specific
context in terms of at

lease five contingent factors which
in turn may help
determine a method for successfully
teaching correct
critical thinking.

In Part I,

I

shall specify and discuss five particular
con-

tingent factors to provide a specific context
for this
model and to provide a method for teaching C.4.

To do so

,

shall critically consider a model presented by
Matthew

Lipman designed to teach
y how to teach what Lipman calls
"philosophical thinking." i shall
first consider the goals

I
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Of the curriculum
Lipman provides and
argue ttat
tx Pm a„. s curriculum
may Uke C 4;

^

,

correct; critical
thinking,

there

sufficient tQ

^

nQ

between engaging in
philosophy and engaging
in correct
critical thinking
! shall conclude
that critical thinking
may m ° re Pr ° Perly be
interdisciplinary
activity that need not
be bound to any
particular subject.
.

«-

Shall secondly consider
the method Lipman
provides tQ
teach what he calls
"philosophical thinking." i
sha ll
argue that Lipman confuses
the consequences of
initiating
teaching from information
or interests familiar
to students
with the consequences of
initiating teaching from a
limited
point of view, and that
initiating teaching from
information
or interests familiar
to a student is not a
sufficient condition for developing harmful
pedagogical consequences.
I shall conclude
that Lipman does not offer a
convincing
pedagogical reason to reject the
method of initiating
teaching from information or
interests familiar to students.
I

shall thirdly draw two consequences
from this consideration of Lipman 's model that are
important for the specification of the model I shall provide
for teaching y how to
teach correct critical thinking.
First, I shall argue that
I

.

.
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eachmg correct critical
thinking

as a ourriculum
Uke
C.4 need not be
bound to one subject;
its teaching can
be
accompiished b y considering
aiternative subjects to
fit

particular educational
situations.

sublet and such
factors

1,

2,

and

!

shall specify such a

an educational
situation in terms of
3.

Secondly,

I

shall argue that
teaching

correct critical thinking,
as defined in D.ll,
need not be
tound by any one
particular curriculum like
Lipman

s or
like c. 4 to any one
particular range of degree
N of correct
critical thinking. Given C 4
y
0.4, TI shall specify the
range of
degree N and in turn specify
factors 4 and 5
'

shall fourthly point out
that the model I shall
provide
will satisfy the second
disjuncts of D.20 and D.21;
it will
satisfy D.20 by presenting
and justifying material,
and it
will satisfy D.21 by
presenting models and student-involving
I

exercises

Given this particular educational
context, specified in
Part I, I shall then clearly
specify this model in Part
II.
First I shall state a) the nature
of the model, b) the
curriculum of the model, c) the method
of initiating
teaching in the model, d) the subject
for critical thinking
in the model, and e) the specific
organization of the model.
Regarding a), I shall distinguish a
textbook to be read by

202

students from an
instructional model to
be followed by
teachers
X shall note that
the latter i s
sufficient for
" y PUrPOS6S here
Warding b) I shall refer to
c 4
a
curriculum the teaching of
which is suffrcient to
teach
correct critical thinking.
Heading c, x shall point out
the benefits of adopting
the method of initiating
teaching
from information or
interests familiar to
students for this
instructional model.
X shall explain
the method in terms of
presenting the material,
presenting models, and
presenting
student-involving exercises.
Regarding d)
x shall provide
a bibliography of
pseudo-scientific works offering
.

-

,

,

,

planations of various phenomena
which are to be the
subjects for critical thinking
in the model.
Regarding e)
I shall explain the
division of this instructional
model
into five sections.

Secondly,

shall present the instructional
model for the
development of critical intelligence
outlined as follows:
i

Introduction:

Arguments and Their Evaluation

Section One:

Deductive Arguments and Their Evaluation

Section Two:

Inductive Arguments and Their Evaluation

Section Three:

Clarifying Arguments

Section Four:

Providing Arguments

Section Five:

Informal Fallacies In Arguments

,

.
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PART

I

A CONTEXT FOR THE
MODEL

“ P “" “

“

t

* 1 “'“

”' h

Lipman

,

•“»»»*« *»
"h

“

the Director
xj_cuLor for
T
ror 4-w_
the Institute
3
tute tor the Advancement
.

° f Phil ° SOPhy f ° r
Chilare "' has written a
book, Harry

designed as a basic
teachrng
resource to develop
•philosophical thinking- among
5th and
6th grade student
q 129
T
tuaents.
In a review, Gerald
L. Gutek
describes Harry _stott i e
meier s Discovery as
L

0
ELrchaptL^eporC'a^IscuL^ttat^
sion
that
^ Chapters
takes
among
place

a groun of
9
character
er
never1 dabstr^ot
^stract and never
m:ic
brings philosonh na +.W,- pedantir
and ethical°concerns

^H^rfstotU^"

*

^
•

,

i

Montclair!

Marga^f

l

•

*

hi f

the f
book? is
Each discussion
.

•

i

S^hSd^SV**
!° ntclai t

S

^ate College

(Upper

r

P™‘>-

_scov|7^, same publisher,
lgfe

i^shall

'

fH

i Re reference

130 Gerald
L. Gutek, "Philosophy in the
Elementary
School
A Growing Movement?," Phi Delta
Kappan
(April
1976)
:

.

:
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Gutek also states its
objective in the elementary
school
curriculum and points
to the nature of
"philosophical
thinking." He claims
that

tternptS are made to
teach children to
Ibout°h?V
about history, mathematics
think
sc
lence,
and many other
subjects little in the
child' s education
introduces
" ature and Process
of his own thinking
to the thinking of
and
others
the most efficacious
examining thinking and
valuing is to use the
P ilosophical tools of
ethics end logic. "131
•

Lipman's curriculum can
be construed as attempting
to teach
critical thinking by
attempting to teach what
he calls
"philosophical thinking."

That Lipman is concerned
to provide a curriculum
to teach
critical thinking can be
seen by considering his
discussion
°f "Philosophical thinking"
in the Ins tructional Man „ a1

Critical thinking
IS a component of what
he calls "philosophical
thinking."
He states that

"A course in philosophical
thinking,

whether for
children or for adults, can never
be
guilty of servino
as a means for implanting the
teachers values in the
uncritical minds of the children in
the classroom
when students have reached a point
in the
.

School
1976)

.

.

Gerald L. Gutek, "Philosophy in the
Elementary
A Growing Movemen t? '" Phi Delta
Kappan
(April
,

.

205

development of their nvu,
11
they can deal
68 SUch that
objectively wihh^
the
without feeling coerced
teacher's opinions
hv Jh
l£ the studen ts
desire to know what
the
teacher’/^'
harm would likely
opinion is, no great
Y result from
fro™ hls
f explaining just
he thinks. -132
what
,

,

.

^

“

Furthermore, the development
of critical reasoning
abilities, as a component
of philosophical
thinking,
necessary component.
According to Lipman,

is

a

"Indeed, it is only by
mastering
S
°° nStitute the
backbone°of our
explorati
.

Stottlemeier^s

th^r^phiiosopTn^mthiHking?h^!
This development of

a

Raptors of
can master

critical mind through the
development

Of critical reasoning
abilities as the "backbone of
Philosophical thinking" is provided
for in Lipman 's
curriculum by at least five of
the six specific goals
listed
for this course in
philosophical thinking. He lists
these
goals as

"The improvement of reasoning
abilities,

perceptual influence s, logical inference including
from evidence,
132 Gerald L. Gutek,

School
1976)

:

"Philosophy in the Elementary
A Growing Movement?," Phi Delta
Kappan (April

pp.

,

nn^??l
1976), p.
:

3-4

Gerald L. Gutek, "Philosophy in the Elementary
^ Growing Movement?," Phi Delta
Kappan (April
l.

3

,
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the ability to
di
consistency the f
,

" “

'**"

easibili^f

“•

Li

critic

?

of

these abilities
is a suff<
abilt to engage corrpof!
ability
9
meetly

However, while

rn tiVes

4. 1,

,

•

'

lm Partiality

«...

tl

„

.

„
haV1 " 9

.

m
•

condition for having
the
critical thinking.

.

ln lng 1S a nec
essary component
of
,

*— «**«- ~ - ««« jl.
abllltleS are

native

thinking abilities
llities to recognize
distinctively philosophical
Problems.
Lipman argues that
a

develop his logical^h ^?*^ 1196 (the student to
al h U h SUCh
development is
certainly^ecessary
?
R ? hls
But
(m philosophical
growth
thinkina)
^
c
1
9
de Pends upon
stimulating9 nis
his invent-*,
inventiveness and creativity. "135
)

1

4

School:

A Growing Movement
19 ’6), pp. 4, 6.
yhe
to 11.
j shall grant that

in the EleI"entary

(April

provided from pages 6
1 T
3 " describes
these abilities and
them/having
being able io™
ln them c °rrectly
is a sufficient
condition
,aVin9 the abilit1, to
correctly in cr i?icarthLkffor ha,H
“gage
•

c,

Sg!

School
1976)

:

Gerald L. Gutek
"Philosophy in the Elementary
A Growing Movemen t? "
Phi Delta Kappan (April
p. 5
,

,

.

207

Lipman is also concerned
to teach an ability
to recognize
distinctively philosophical
problems as they arise
among the
children's own concerns.

1 problem of the
nature of the mind and
ideas^
the
ds
lan 9uage
analysis in examining
definitions
f ob 9 ects and
activities; they deal wi
erences of kind and
degree ; they disentangle
f
fact
?:lni0n by Pining
(moral) problems that
arife
thair own idea a of
politics, race, and civil h from°th°
n?
ghts;
they explore methods
of inquiry. 136

\

Therefore, while
"philosophical thinking" as
described by
lipman includes critical
thinking as a necessary
component
"philosophical thinking" is
not the same as critical
thinking.
Granting that teaching
"philosophical thinking"
is a sufficient condition
for teaching critical
thinking,
teaching critical thinking
is not a sufficient
condition
for teaching "philosophical
thinking" as described by
Lipman

Indeed, there is a pedagogical
danger in confusing
"Philosophical thinking" with critical
thinking.
Both
136 Gerald
L. Guteck, " Philosophy
in the Elementary
School
A Growing Movement? " p hi Delta
Kappan (April 1976).
:

'
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Lipman and Clyde Evans come
dangerously close to teaching
that critical thinking is
the unique province of
philosophy. 137 For example,
Lipman talks about "philosophical thinking" and Evans
talks about "the philosophical
method," seemingly implying that
critical thinking and
creative thinking as components of
"philosophical thinking"
and "the philosophical method"
are the unique province of
philosophy, and uniquely applied to
philosophical problems.
The pedagogical danger is that
students will fail to
see

the relation of critical thinking,
or creative thinking as

basic reasoning skills to other academic
disciplines and
to problems that are not philosophical
problems.

Critical thinking is not an activity that is
unique to any
one academic discipline or professional field,
but is an

activity that cuts across many academic disciplines,
professional fields and everyday concerns.

There is no

necessary connection between engaging in philosophy and
engaging in correct critical thinking.

Artists, physicists,

political scientists, sociologists, historians,

psychologists, mathematicians, clerks, physicians, and

philosophers each may be called upon to engage in some
137 See Clyde Evans, "Philosophy
With Children: Some
Experiences and Some Reflections," Metaphilosophy, Vol 7,
No. 1 (Jan. 1976)
pp. 53-69.
.

,

"
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^

degree N of critical
thinking
arguments relevant to
their respective f
ields
Nor
critical thinking limited
u
o,
y
to such narrowly
conceived
.

professional concerns.

Consumers, advertisers
voters, politicians,
pta members, boards
of education
members husbands, wives
and children each
may also be
called upon to engage
in some degree N of
critical thinking
when evaluating particular
arguments.
xt is in this sense,
then, that critical
thinking may be said to
be an
,

interdisciplinary activity.

Lipman also provides

a

basis for his method to
teach

Philosophical thinking that
we may consider as a
possible
basis for a method to teach
critical thinking. Lipman
states that

We should begin with the
large outlir
g adually move towards specializec
wS
fK f
with
large brushstrokes, and then
pair

By

subject

he seems to mean

s of a subject,
areas
Begin., _
in details. 1JJ
.

"academic discipline".

For

example, he mentions history,
economics, and sociology.
138 n
.
Certainly the same could be said for
creative
Iowever
the concern here is limited to
.

,

.

.

*

what I
have^^i
have
called critical thinking.
139
Ma t thew Lipman, Instruction
Manual to Accomoanv
Harry Stottlemeier s Pisc^Tery
1=17
'

1

,

p.

.
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Furthermore, he argues that

We ve been told that we should start with
what is
familiar to the child and then work outwards
to
frames of reference, from himself to his family, larqer
to'
the community in which he lives, to his
state, his
nation and the world. There is much to recommend
in
this method - teaching should begin where the
child
is, the only question is, where the devil
is he?
On
the other hand, what is chiefly wrong with the method
is that it gives him an egocentric perspective
which
^
or reeducation may not be able to overcome. " -^-4 0

Lipman seems to argue, given that we know what is familiar
to,

or of interest to a child, that if we begin our teaching

from this point, then it follows that this will develop in
the child a harmful egocentric perspective.

Therefore, we

must not begin teaching from information or interests
familiar to a child, but instead, begin with the large outlines of a subject, and gradually move toward specialized

areas

Lipman argues that

"We stress American history, then European history,
then World history. Maybe not in that order, but
the emphasis is clear enough throughout in our point
of view.
We seldom ask what the British point of view
is regarding the American Revolution, or the Japanese
point of view in World War II, etc. But every history
is a history from some perspective, and we cannot

Matthew Lipman, Instruction Manual to Accompany
Harry Stott lemeier s Discovery, p. 1-1.
1

.
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r

true and
° UrS iS the
on^y^erspective^ithojf
°
run
h is growing up
nmg
the risk
a bigot. " 141

However, Lipman seems
to confuse the
consequences of
initiating teaching
from information or
to a child with
the consequences
of -miniating
initiate teaching
t
„
r° m a limited
Point of view.
Clearly
rly, these
th
have distinct
consequences
•

initiating teaching from
information or interests
familiar
to a child is not
a sufficient condition
for developing
what Lipman calls a
.'harmful egocentric
perspective.'. This
does not necessarily
result in teaching from
a limited point

of view.

Consider Lipman

'

example of teaching history,

s

suppose that
we initiate the teaching
of history by eliciting
a child's
own family history.
This is certainly familiar
to the
child.
We may then compare one
child's family history

with another child's family
history, and note relationships
among families; for example,
that the two children are
friends.

However, we may also immediately
teach that a
history of a family is a history
from a given point of view.
L pman
Instructio n Manual to Accomoanv
Harry Stottlemeier f s Discovery
y
p. l-i.
'

1

,
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For example, we
might ask a child if h
6Ver f ° Ught with
his
friend- the
„
hlS friSnd S br °
ther S
tion to
the f 'h
a
What WaS WS
br ° ther S action,
eto
etc.
We mi gh t thereby
elicit it'ernative
accounts of the

^
" ^ "
ZT'r l09/

y

.

h1

T

-hang

fr ° m
frora

'

—

'

'

'

-* «

... ....
t0 dlSCUSS Ameri
«a. European, or World

aUernatiTO

—

information

^

e ore,

-

^

yet we initiate
our

^

^

initiating our teaching
from this point of
view
°es not result in
teaching f rora a Uraited
point Qf

^

This approach may
also introduce the
child to other points
° f V1SW re93rding
hiS
personal history, and,
therefore
wni not necessarily develop
in the child what
Lipman calls
"a harmful egocentric
perspective,. Therefore,
initiating
teaching from information
or interests familiar
to a student
rs neither the same
as teaching from a
limited point of
sufficient condition for
developing this harmful
egocentric perspective.
Therefore, Lipman does not
provide
a convincing reason
to reject the method
of initiating
teaching from information
or interests familiar
to students
and to adopt the method
in initiating teaching
from the
large outlines of a
subject.

This consideration of
Lipman

•

s

model for teaching "philo-

sophical thinking" has shown
first, that critical thinking
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is not the
exclusive concernn
Of „any one
of
subiect
f

°r

th-

reason, be said
tQ ,
-tivity, an d second,
that

th
fr ° m information
or interests

—
-n,
model

-

P-gogically

t

^

xm
imp
Portant

ch^i provide fnr
snail
•

J-

"

.

-

'

—

alternative sublets
to fit

a

«“*
*»

consequences
ce s tor
for *-u
M
the

.

,

The first
consequence is that
thinkin 9
3 CUrri ° UlUm
UkS C
3 b3SCt
sub
bUt C ° Uld

^^

teachln 9

^

o bj

allows us to draw
tw
I

^

u-

'

4

-

09 COrreCt

—

^tica!

*»t be bound to
one

by considering

particular

"

—

Way SUCCeS3fUUy
t0 teaCh
-king
is
Y that 91VeS the
Student something to
think
critically
mu,rout.
y about
This way to teach
critical
v mav,
itical thinking
_
j_i0rS aPPeal t0
“">* Alternative subjects.
There is
no need to limit
the subject to
philosophy since critical
hmking is not a uniauelv
iquely philosophical
tool." The
second consequence is
at we "Ay adopt the
method of
initiating the teaching
of critical thinking
from information or interests
familiar to students and
still avoid
pedagogically objectionable
results,
results and,
and
in
e
therefore,
we may
C °° Se any
SUbjeCt that
Of interest or familiar
to
students to initiate
teaching correct critical
thinking.

ITwT

.

.

'

•

n

,

.

'

'
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or example

^

given these two
consequences, c><
taught by using the
subject of the naturai
sciences
a
subject that gives
the students something
to thin*
critically about, given
a group of students
interested in
famUiar Wlth thS
sciences
Or c.4 should be
taught by using the
subjects of philosophy,
sociology,
psychology, history, or
mathematics, as subjects
that give
the students something
to thin* critically
about, given a
group of students
interested in
in or c
familiar with philosophy,
sociology, psychology,
hist or y or mathematics.
Or c 4
could also be taught by
using more general
subject matter,
for e. .ample the
subject of popular
explanations of
UFO’s, ship and plane
disappearances, and faith
healers as
a subject that
gives the students something
to think
critically about, given a
group of students intersted
in
or familiar with such
popular explanations. 142
,

^
^

”

'

.

,

,

These consequences also
allow us to state grounds for
the
selection of a subject for
students to think critically
about, by stating grounds
for selecting a subject that
is
familiar or of interest to
students who are to be taught
C.4.
It is pedagogically
desirable to select a subject
142

this period of historv, such
pooular P vnb0
6 " 5 Chariot gf the G^ds ?
Charles Berlftl
B gpnd Ea rth: _MajTT cg^ac?
WithTo
,

.

.

’^heY

"^

T^ulTer

•

TVS

™

S

.
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that is familiar or
of

cnticaHy

i nterest to

students

^

^

about because in
teaching c.4, one must
teaching critical
thinking, and not focus
simply
on teaching a
particular subject which
students are to think
critically about. Por
example, in using the
subjects of
the natural sciences,
philosophy, sociology,
psychology,
history, mathematics
or popular explanations
as subjects
that give the students
something to think critically
about, one is not
focusing on teaching these
subjects.
Students, then, will not
be faced with difficult
subject
matter that is either
uninteresting to them or new
to them
and will i nst e ad simply
be faced with a curriculum
like
C.4 and some familiar
subject matter that they
may begin
to think critically about.

Therefore, the choice of a
subject to think critically
about and thereby to present
C.4, depends upon the
students major fields of interest
or familiarity.
This is
often easier to determine at
the college level than
at the

elementary level.
model,

Therefore, for the purposes of this

shall stipulate that the students
are interested in
the natural sciences and at least
vaguely familiar with
current popular pseudo-scientific
explanations of various
I

phenomenon
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now

m

a

position to stipulate
the first
contingent
factor to further
specifv
th
® COntext for
y
this model
the
Personality and
Aground of the teacher.
The model is
signed for college
level students with
some interest in
natural sciences.
Therefore
or 0
th e teacher must
have the
background and ability
t0 «success fully
y to
teach them correct
critical thinking in
terms of c.4, given
the subject of
current popular
pseudo-scientific explanations
of various
phenomena to think
Y about, and given the
student's
interest in the natural
sciences
es.
For in
the purpose of this
model, it is desirable
thatthat t-h^
the teacher know
some natural
science, and have worked
through (in terms of
c 4) the
current popular
pseudo-scientific explanations
of various
Phenomena which are to be
the subject for
critical thinking
t urthermore
given C.4, it is desirable
that the teacher
Know first order logic,
have the ability to work
:

'

.

t

4-

,

,

in a

suitably specified first
order object language
with rules or
axioms, know that consistency,
completeness and soundness
can be proved in a
meta-language, and have a basic
familiarity with non-deductive
inference,
and the

associated problems with
non-deductive inference.
It is
desirable that the teacher also
know how to engage in the
skills listed in D.ll, and be
relatively comfortable
lecturing and answering questions.
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The second contingent factor
is class size and length and
the third contingent factor
is the background and ability
of
the students.
For the purposes of this model,
the class
Will be limited to no more than
24 students meeting at least
3 hours per week for at
least two full semesters. Also for
the purpose of this model, the
students will be limited to
college students above average in
both intelligence and
motivation, with some interest in the
natural sciences and
some familiarity with current popular
pseudo-scientific

explanations of various phenomena.

However, it is useful to point out that
critical thinking
as defined by D.ll need not be bound by any
one particular

curriculum like C.4 in any one particular context to what
we may call any one particular range of degree N of
critical

thinking.

Intuitively, the range of degree N can be raised

or lowered according to the needs of a particular
academic

discipline, professional field, or to the particular needs
of dealing with everyday concerns in a particular

educational context.

It can also be raised or lowered

according to the background and ability of the teacher, and
the age, background, interest and ability of the students.

Intuitively, we can see that the range of degree N may be

raised or lowered by proposing alternative curricula such
that successfully teaching some curriculum is sufficient
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successfully to teach correct
critical thinking, but to
a
higher degree N than C.4.
Therefore, for educational
situations unlike the one
specified for the purposes
of
this model, alternative
curricula may be provided to
teach
correct critical thinking
to a higher or lower
degree N.
For example, C.4 is a
curriculum suitable for bright
college
level students, but not
suitable for 5th and 6th grade
students.

Similarily, Lipman's curriculum
is suitable for
5th and 6th grade students,
but not suitable for bright
college level students.

Given C.4, however, the fourth
contingent factor to
stipulate is the degree to which
(1),

(5)

are to be taught successfully. 143

purposes of this model,

I

(2),

(3),

(4)

and

Intuitively, for the

shall require their successful

teaching to a medium degree n, which
will in turn result in
successfully teaching a medium high degree N
of critical
thinking or critical intelligence. For
example, while
teaching (1) of C.4 involves teaching LPC
it does not involve teaching mod4l logic.
If it did, then the degree N
,

of critical thinking taught by C.4 may be
higher, given the

successful teaching of
degree n.
143

(1)

plus modal logic to a medium

Therefore, C.4 is designed to allow for increases

Or the degree n to which any component of any
ternative curriculum which is designed successfully
to
teach correct critical thinking to a
higher or lower degree
N
ls to be taught successfully.
a

,

2.19

1,1

thS dS9ree N ° f
CritiCal

by providing a frame _
work to incorporate
additional skills, that
fit into
1 ),
2 >(3), (4) or ,5, that
are learned in logic,
science,
Philosophy, math, literature
or religion courses.
(

<

In this sense,

then, a curriculum
like C.4 provides what
may be called an
interdisciplinary framework
to reject or
to evaluate and to
incorporate basic reasoning
skills

acquired in specific academic
disciplines, where such
rejection maintains the degree
N of critical thinking
and
where such incorporation
increases the degree N of
critical
thinking.
In this way, then, we may
account for increasing
the degree N of critical
thinking by so incorporating
basic
reasoning skills acquired in
specific academic disciplines.
I shall call this
increasing of the degree N the
development
of critical intelligence.
Therefore, successfully teaching
correct critical thinking, thereby
teaching critical
intelligence, provides the basic
framework which, in turn,
allows for its further development
through exposure to
various academic disciplines.

The fifth contingent factor serves
to summarize the first
four contingent factors specifying the
educational context
o_

this model for teaching y how successfully
to teach

correct critical thinking.

The teacher is required to
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have so»e background
and interest in the
natural sciences
and to have worked
through the current
popular pseudoscientific explanations
of various phenomena
which are to be
the subjects for
critical thinking. The
teacher is also
required to know both
deductive and non-deductive
logic, and
to know how to engage
in the skills listed
in D.ll.
The students, grouped
in classes of no more
than 25,
meeting at least three hours
per week for two semesters,
are
ed to be college level
q
students, above average in
both
intelligence and motivation,
with some interest in the
natural sciences and some
familiarity with current popular

pseudo-scientific explanations of
various phenomenon. The
omponents of C.4 are required
to be taught successfully
to
a medium degree n, which
will in turn result in successfully
teaching critical thinking, or
critical intelligence, to a
medium high degree N.

Given this educational context for
this model, and given
this method to initiate teaching
from information or

interests familiar to the students, we
must see how the
second disjucnts of D.20 and D.21 are
to be satisfied by the
model.
First, the model must satisfy the second
disjunct of
D.20 simply by presenting and justifying
the propositions to
be taught.

This may also be done by showing the student

the implications of these propositions for
his own areas of

f
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interest and fa m il
iarity and
tl0 „ S ° f a
that they are
^uming
false f or his
raise
„
own areas of
t
interest
and
familiarity
,,,
econdly,
the model may
satisfy
y the se cond
disjunct 0 f n n
simply by presenting
models (as defined
do
D -21) and by
by
presenting
,
student-involvi nrr „
incises. These
student-involving
g exercise
xercises provide
evidence both to the
acher and to the
student that the
student does or
do
kn ° W h° W t0
""
in a particular
activity b Y 91Vln9
student the chance
actually to Sn9a9e
aCtlVity
In
this way, then
t-nen, this
thi model
„
o
=
will
Se °° nd dis i™cts
Of D* 20 and D.21.
•

;

.

«.

^

'

.

u
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PART II

AN INSTRUCTIONAL
MODEL FOR
UK THE
THF development
™,
OF CRITICAL
INTELLIGENCE
This model is
not designed
Xt is designed
to be

t-

K
“

-^ructional

^*

-udent,

rao d el to
show a
teacher ho W SOme °
ne might
successfully teach
correct
critical thinking,
in terms of c
4 ' in th
d
the educational
context1
context stipulated
in Part I
This is suf f ic pnf
icient to show
teaphpy
w someone might
successfully teach
correct
critical thinking.

^

r

i

+-

a

“

tamiliar to students
its.

Th).
This method has
three related
Practical benefits for
this model. First,
presenting the
material in C.4 in
terms of a familiar,
or interesting
subject matter may
help the students
to learn c.4 without
the
e unnecessary
confusion of unrelated
examples.
Secondly,
t
may help them to
expose confusions and
misconceptions
earlY 51396
th6ir ln
t:ion since they
supposedly
61 SOme COnfidenCe
in
with this topic. Thirdly,
this may help the
students to become interested
in the
student-involving exercises.
interest in . problem
is a

^ "

^

»—

necessary condition
for active
participation in its
solution.
Likewise, interest
in a particular
sublet is
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necessary to involve
students in a more
hard-headed
intellectual approach
to the subject.
This method allQws
-e teacher to presuppose
such interest while
P rovidin g the
intellectual tools to
direct it critically.
As Albert
Einstein remark about
such interest in a
sublet, - lt is
a very grave
mistake to think that
the enjoyment of
seeing
and searching can
be promoted by means
of coercion and
sense
of duty."

In this way,

the method in initiating
teaching from infer-

mation or interests
familiar to students
uses student
interests practically to
apply the content of c.4.
This
-y ideally eliminate the need for teacher
developed student
interest, but it does
not eliminate the need
for teacher
directed student interest.
In this model, for
example,
students interested in UFO's
may, in fact, believe
that
UFO's are best explained
as an extraterrestrial
visitors,
his, however, immediately
allows the teacher to consider
the grounds for such a
belief and the standards
for an

acceptable explanation.

This method then is designed
to

save time and allow for the
inmediate application of c.4 to
arguments in which the students
have some interest.

As stipulated in Part I, the
subject matter to be critically
thought about for the purposes of
this model is to be

I
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current popular
pseudo-scientific explanations
for various
phenomena
The annotated
bibliography is as follows:
.

1

.

Avon Books
8hi

2

.
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K
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in *

r

an
y
Ban ££ BSS;

4

chronicle explaining
as encounters with
3

New

,

(A su 9gestive
indiviig
°'
extraterrestr^r^sUors!) UF S
'

.

Pocket' Book s?
Knife
sug 9 estive chronicle
of the supposedly
miraculous "he
healing power of a
Brazilian
,

hillbilly??

4.

Gardner Fads anrl poi 1 Cles
i n the Name of
rv-ssrScience: The cc.-errurious
Theories oTltodern Pseudo- ~
,i nH pS2g. Amusj-ng an d Alarming Cu lts
th'at Surround ThemL ” Human
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(An e
dustl ve exposition of
many different pseudo
i‘ ex lanati
°- i" "any
P
different areas^I

—

i

,
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.

t

^

.

.

'

^

scllncl?r

K1

York^igyi
1974

•

mA
<

tS^Exelained,

S

;b
thoughtful

explanations for UFO's).

Random House, New
collection of natural

Lawrenoe D. Kusche The Bermuda
Trianqle MvstPrvr B° oks F"N e « 7 °rk, 1975
coTTec^tion^f natUral explanations forS^thS^ihiful
missing planes
and ships?)
,

.

7.

Erich VonDdniken, Chariots of the
Gods?:
Unsolved
Mzsteries^o^the PliT Bantam^k
TT-suggestive chronicle purporting to explain
various
architecturai and archeological data,
supposedly unexplainable, by appealing to the actions of extraterrestrial
,

^,

visitors.)

Books 1,

2,

3,

4

and

7

may be assigned as books to be read

by the class, and are to provide the
raw material for
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critical evaluation.
about books

1,

2,

3

Most students will
have read, or read
and 7.

The model will be
organised into five sections.
Each
section will be divided
into subsections, and
each subsection will be divided
into a presentation
of material, a
-del (as defined in D. 21
and student-involving
exercises
Each section will be
followed by a bibliography
of resource
material for the teacher
relating to the aspect of
C.4
covered in the section.
,
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Introduction:

Argument s and Their
Evaluat ion

The purpose of this
model is to provide
the teacher with
a
asrc guideline for
successfully teaching
correct critical
thinking
This involves

teacMng

.

abilities and the ability
to detect incorrect
reasoning.
The way we, in fact,
reason is often silly,
fallacious,
unsound or incomprehensible.
Such reasoning may be
said to
be incorrect reasoning,
our concern win be
to show ho „
reasoning, as embodied
in our use of language,
can be
exposed and studied. For
this purpose, we shall
limit our
concern with language
to combinations and
relationships
among statements and
their constituent parts.

_

uhe study of language,
of course,
j
course
j-

u
is not exhausted
by the

study of reasoning.

Language has many functions;
for
example to ask questions,
to tell jokes,
iok P q
to issue commands,
to agitate or to arouse
emotions, as well as to make
statements 144 More specifically,
our interest is limited
to the basic reasoning
unit, the argument.
•

.

ssr;
are beyond the scope if

however

'

.
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"Argument" commonly describes
the actions among persons
with
opposing Views about the
same subject. For example,
among
parents and children over
the use of the family
car, or
among siblings over the
use of the television set.
Sometimes these actions involve
crying and screaming, other
times they involve physical
blows. One consequence of
this
View is that it takes at
least two people to have an

argument.

However, we shall not use
"argument" as it is
commonly described.

We shall mean by "argument"
a bit of reasoning consisting
of statements called premises,
and a statement called a

conclusion.

In such a bit of reasoning,

said to "follow from" the premises.
then,

the conclusion is

Presenting an argument

is to state premises from which
a particular con-

clusion is said "to follow."

One consequence of this view

is that it does not take at
least two people to have an

argument.

it simply takes a statement of
premises and a

statement of conclusion said "to follow"
from them.

Consider the following argument presented by Wilbur
Glenn
Voliva designed to support his view that the Earth
is

motionless and flat, with the North Pole in the center and
the South Pole distributed around the circumference
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First consider his
argument designed to show
that the Earth
is motionless.

Can anyone who has
considered
,+Q>
aerlc
honestly say that he believes this mp
ly
the
earth
"F
at such an impossible
raveling
speed’ T f
g ° lng S ° faSt
which way is it goingv ?
it ^ho^rt
he easier to travel
ould be
with it than aaainsti+the opposite direction tn t-v, 6 Wlnd alwa Ys should blow in
But where is tSe" °
h °b
it does?
is the man who believes that he
Where
c ® n ^ um P irto the air,
remaining off the Farth r ne
secorl1^/ and come down
to
the Earth
rth 193
19? 7l miles from
„
where he jumped up?”« 6
4-

.•

-

M
+.

•

.

'

.

'

‘

l

Like many arguments we will
be considering, this argument
is
not presented as clearly as
it might be.
To present his
argument as clearly as possible,
we may consider putting the
argument into the following form,
and calling it A.l:

A

.

1

1

2

If the Earth is traveling at
600,000 mph as

.

astronomers claim, then the wind always
blows in
e opposite direction from which
the astronomers
claim the Earth is traveling.
If the Earth is traveling at
600,000 mph as
astronomers claim, then if one jumps off the
Earth's surface; for one second, then one
will come
aown 193.7 miles from where one jumps off.

.
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Gardner, Martin, Fads and Fallaci es in the
Name of
cience:
The Curi ou s Theories" of Modern Pse udo-Scientists
nd the Strange A mu sing and Alarming
Cults that Su rround
idem pp. 16-19.
.

s

—

,

science

Gardner, Martin, Fads and Fallacies in the Name of
The Curious Theories of Modern Pseudo^Scien tists
e Strange Amusing and Alarming Cults that
Surround
:

—
Them, p.

IT.

—

0

.
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We know that it
is not th~
that the wind
always blows in the
^rection
the astronomers
from which
claim ?he Fa
13 traveling,
We know that it
is not the
that if
off the Earth's sur?l
j™P s
s
cond then one
will come down 193
7 miles fr^
f
from where
off.
one jumps
'

W nd
the opposite
direction ^rom^hh h£ t always blows in
le ast ronomers
claim the Earth is
^
oase that the Earth traveling *t
is not the
is trave,' lng at
as astronomers
600 000 mph
claim.
•

^ U

•

'

EartVs%urLce forone h secoL 0 n j ™ PS
th
e

iHot^hl c^e^th^Tthe^E 6 l?

•

° ff the

^^"then^t
traVeUng
^

"aim?

0330 that the Earth
tr^vlung'at
b u 0 SSo
y at 600
00
noh as astronomers
mph
claim.
,

Secondly, consider his
argument desinged to show
that the
Earth is flat. He
presented a double-spread
photograph
owing 12 miles of the
shoreline of Lake Winnebago,
Wisconsin

™

camera.
for

The^lns^as^xacu/a flet^bovrthe 6 "
A

them™s

b

opposite shore
surface of
enormous. 14 ^

Science-

^TTTh
m so,^

la

f
“ SSc^th.

SH

a N y°cL°ar d a?

provin

T

S ° lentlflC

"!

SH

S

£ith

value of this picture is

^

Ga tdner, Martin, Fads and
Fallacies in the
of
:urio us TheoHes of Mo dern Iseudo-S
oientf
ge Amusin 9 and A larming Cults
-"
that Surround

pjfir

~

2
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Again, this arqument ic «,...
t 18 n0t
9
Presented as clearly as
it
mi9ht be
T ° PrSSent thiS
ar 9 um ent as clearly
as possible,
we m ay consider
petting the argument
into the following
form
and calling it A. 2.
'

A.
1
2

,

.

3.

An eight b y ten Eastman
view camera
ai
era ftakes
undistorted pictures.
accurate,
& Camera at distance
three ^eet^bove^he
d,
ahowin 9 12 miles of
shoreline on a clear
° n Lake Winae bago
shows the small °^
objects
ects tha t are on the
12 miles
of shoreline.
The picture shows that
the surface of th^8 lake
a plane or horizontal
ls
line.
This procedure may be reDpat-pri a-iany sultable
location on the Earth w!th'
Therefore
flat
•

4

.

57

7

,

.

Both arguments A1 and A2
have statements numbered
as
premises and a statement as
a conclusion that is
said to
"follow from" the premises.
Yet A.l and A. 2 appeal to
two

different notions of "following
from" the premises. A.l i s
called a deductive argument.
In A.l, the conclusion 7
is
said to follow deductively
from the premises. A. 2 is called
an inductive argument.
In A. 2, the conclusion
5

follow inductively from the
premises.

is said to

.
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In order to be able
to construct and to
evaluate arguments
Uke A.l and A. 2, „e must first
consider a detailed dis _

cussion of both deductive
arguments and inductive
arguments
ihe question to raise
regarding A.l and A. 2 is
"Do the
premises entitle us to claim
that the conclusion is
true?"
To ask this question
about an argument is to
begin to
evaluate the argument.

First, however, we must
become familiar with deductive
and
inductive arguments.

_L iD

h

thr UghOUt are desi ned to
9
provide suggestions
ing the material presented®"
t£e
For the f
S

to the°?ea h r ? r rel

reading
by the
1

.

JLhertt

f

tranSf ° med

Active

arguments

Go through Giirdner, Chapter
2, and point out the
krch contam arguments to support
a particular
conclusion
1
Consider the rest of Gardner's book and
present arguments of both types.
!!

2

.

3.

Clarify these

arguments by putting them into the form
of premises and conclusions.
(No need to worry about
inductive versus deductive at this point.)

Distinguish an argument from an explanation.
Show how
arguments are used to support explanations.
Show
that
the other books present explanations which
are supported
by arguments
Exercises

1.

Have the students go through Gardner, Chapter
3, and
find an argument to support Donnelly's claim
about the
giant comet (p. 35-37)
Number the premises and
indicate the conclusion.
Have them find and record
other arguments in Gardner.
.
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W

d

tl
°° nclusion of A.l supported
by
y the premises.
premises^" Is the
the^
conclusion true? Are the
1 S ® S tr ue?
Construct your own argument to show
that the conclusion is not true.

^

,

1

^

C

nClUSi ° n

° f A 2 supported
?
bfthe'premises^
y me premises?
?^
is th
the conclusion
true? Are the
Construct y° ur own argument to show
mat
thaTthe
the conclusion
cone?'
is not true.
*
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tion One.

Subsec tion

1

Deductive Arguments
and Their Evaluat
ion
The Logical Form of
Statements

A-l is a deductive
argument composed of
statements called
premises 1, 2, 3,
4, 5 and 6
and a statement called
a
conclusion, 7.
Statements nave
have certain properties
that are
important for their use
in arguments.
For our purposes
here, every statement
is either true or
false,
though we
often say in everyday
language that some statement
is
"nearly true," this is
not strictly speaking
correct.
We
do not distinguish
degrees of truth or falsehood.
A statement's truth or falsehood
is called its truth
value.
The
ancient Greek philosopher
Aristotle was the first to
recognize the systematic
importance of treating every
statement as either true or
false.
Aristotle's statement
of this principle is often
called the Law of Excluded
Middle because it excludes
the possibility of any truth
value "m the middle" between
true and false.
,

,

Another property of statements
that is important for
statement use in arguments is that
no statement is both
true and false.
This is called the law of non-contradiction.
To state, without qualification,
that something
both is and is not the case is to
say something logically
self-contradictory, or logically impossible.
Logical

.

•
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impossibility is gust
one kind of
impossrbility
lar lfy the notlon
of logical i

mpossibUity

ifc

_

To

is h

We might say that
some state
8 °
off affairs
iff-,
is technologically
impossible if with our
curr^ni tech
u
CUrrSnt
nology, we are unable
to
nng it about. For example,
it is technologically
im possible to perform a
human brain transplant.
Such surgery
oes not violate any
known laws of science.
However giv en
our current technology,
such surgery cannot
be perform.
Therefore, we say that
a huraan brain
,

,

transplant is currently

technologically impossible.

We might say that sorae
state of affairs is
physically i m possible if it violates any
known natural laws (in
the

broadest sense).

For example, it is
physically impossible
to travel faster than
the speed of light.
However, it is at
least conceivable that the
universe could have been
different such that we could
travel faster than the speed
of
light

There are many other kinds
of impossibility, but we need
not
consider them all to see that
anything that is technologically or physically impossible
is not necessarily
logically
impossible.
some statement is logically
impossible iff it
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violates the laws of
logic, in particular
the law of noncontradiction. For example,
it is logically
impossible that
the Earth is traveling
at 600,000 m ph and it
is not the case
that the Earth is traveling
at 600,000 mph.
The law of
contradiction states that all
such statement must be
£^lse because of their
logical form.

To clarify the notion
of the logical form of
a statement,
let us use the letter 'P'
to stand for the statement
'the

Earth is traveling at 600,000
mph' and let the symbol '<v
stand for the phrase "it
is not the case that', or
'not',
and let

'•'

stand for the English word
'and'.

sentence can be represented as

'p

•

a,

p'.

Thus, this

Th i s repre-

sentation of the sentence captures
its logical form.
No matter what statement
we substitute for P, the resulting
statement with this logical form
is logically impossible and
therefore must be false.

Therefore, we may distinguish statements
which happen to
be false because of the way the world
is and statements
which must be false because of their
logical form. Consider a statement from A.l.
Statement 7 happens to be
false because of the way the world is:

the Earth is

traveling around the Sun at approximately
600,000 mph.
To determine that

7

is false, we must refer to
the way the

s

.
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world is.

However, this is not necessary
with statements
having the logical form 'P and
not P'.
To determine that
the statement ’the Earth is
traveling at 600,000 mph and it
is not the case the the Earth
is traveling at 600,000
mph'
is false, we
need only examine its logical
form.
We need
not refer to the way the world
is.
The law of non-contradiction guarantees that any statement
with that logical
form must be false.

Models
1.

Go through Gardner, Chapter
4, to point out
Charles Fort's views about the Earth, its
etc., and formulate a list of statements. motion,
Show
that they are false because of the way
the world
is, not because of their logical form.
Do the
same thing for the other arguments you have
presented to them from Gardner.

2.

Define consistency and relate it to explanations.
Show that Charles Fort's explanations are consistent.
Relate this to A.l, and show that
argument A.l is consistent.
Provide an
explanation for lightning that is consistent but
obviously false. Ask the students to produce an
argument to show that it is false.

3.

Present an explanation that is inconsistent (with
non-blatant contradiction)
Consider
VonDilnikeh s acceptance of Vellikof sky
explanation of the creation of Venus 10,000 years
ago, and VonDSniken's assertion that ancient cave
drawings of the heavens over 100,000 years old
accurately show the position of Venus. Go through
any of the other books you choose and do the same
thing
a

.

'

'

i
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Exercises

Read Gardner, Chapter

9.

Determine „ hy the
following statements
are
Dowsing with a hazel
twig
y will rind
find
h)

c)

The Earth is
in the middle,
and the souf
diameter.

f alse:

oil every time.
011

-p 1

1

th the north pole
P°ie spread around the
'

The Earth is fia+^ miles and a
circumf

diam ® ter of
erenc^of
3
volume of the Earth may
and the
be calculated ,;
formula to find the
109 the
volume
an^phere .^
-

d)

second?
e)

6^ ° f ®

El^n

flying saucer is
930,000 miles per

rig^^ L tf
^

,

he
rth iS flat
uul one harth
r
is not flat.

Write up an argument
to refute
explanation for lightning
presented

Subsection

2

'

,

.

^the Lf^r.

-

^--Z^2£j^al_Fo r m and Logical Conn^+- lves

All statements with the
logical form 'P
„ p
must be
false.
But statements can have
other logical forms as well.
We may capture the logical
form of statements by
replacing a
sta cement at each of its
accurrances with a letter called
a propositional
constant, like P above, and
connecting the
statements to other statements
with what are called logical
connectives like 'and' and 'not'
above.
It should be
.

obvious that the other statements
replaced
sitional constants like 'Q
Q.

*

.

by other propo-

have the same logical

.
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form as

p

^ P

To express this insight,
let us use
geometrical shapes such as 0 and
A as variables which
take
'

.

these propositional constants
like P and Q as values.
Thus,
the logical form of all
these statements can be
represented
by propositional variables
'0
as

•

% o'.

Since we know, given the law
of excluded middle, that
every
statement is either true or false,
and given the law of non
contradiction, that every statement
is not both true and
false, we may use propositional
variables like 0 and A and
this knowledge about statements
to understand what are
called the logical connectives.
In English, the logical
connectives are 'not', and 'and', 'or',
'if-then', 'if and
only if
'

Not

Negation

.

v 0 is the negation of 0.

is true and if we deny 0,

is false,

Letting

Clearly if o

then that negation is false.

if o

and if we deny 0, then that negation is true.

't'

stand for true and

'f

'

for false, these in-

sights can be represented in what we call a truth table.

0

% 0

t

f

f

t

This is called a truth table for 'not'.

The important point

239

here that we will apply
to complex statements
like 1 in A.l.
can be seen by seeing that
the truth or falsity of
„ 0
varies with the truth or
falsity of 0. We say that
the
truth value of ^ o is a
function of the truth value
of o.
in general, we say that
the truth value of a
statement with
a complex logical form,
where logical form is limited
to

relations among statements, is
a function of the truth
values of the simple statements
composing the complex
statements.
This is called truth functionality
of statements and forms the basis for what
we call the propositional
or statement logic.
,

A nd

-

Conjunction

Consider such

.

a

complex statement

Which ls a conjunction of two simple
statements.
statement will have the logical form 0

•

a.

This

There are four

possible combinations of truth values of the
component
statements.

We can determine the number of logically

possible combinations of truth values for a complex
state-

ment by the formula 2n

where n equals the number of simple

,

statements used to form the complex statement.

Thus, there

are four possible combinations of truth values for a state-

ment having the logical form 0

•

A,

and there are eight

possible combinations of truth values for
the logical form 0

•

A

•

V.

a

statement of

«

,
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*

rrr «««„ v.l«,
-

.

“

“•

io9i “‘

„ f this s„„

•

•

*

M„

„

statement «.
c„
of the four possible
truth valuess ot
of th„
the component statements satisfying 'o'
and 'A'.

we see that a conjunction
of statements is true
iff all the
component statements are
true.

Consider

a

complex statement which is

disjunction of two simple
statements.
glish word

or

is ambiguous.

Unfortunately the

Consider the following:

(i)

It is raining or it is
blowing.

(ii)

Either we shall go to the Bahamas
or we shall go
to Arizona.

Disjunct

(i)

a

is interpreted as stating that
it is raining,

or blowing, or both,

(ii)

is

interpreted as stating that we

shall not go to the Bahamas and
Arizona; we shall go only to
one of the two.
These two senses of 'or' are
called, for
(i),

the inclusive sense, and
for

(ii)

the exclusive
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sense.

lor the purposes
P r poses nf
of ikq
the propositional
calculus, „ e
only recognize the
inclusive sense (1)
(i)
w
We can always make
the exclusive sense
explicit
in the
P
ln
Propositional calculus
y rewriting the statement
suchn that hnfh
both component statements cannot
+-nn^
true, using conjunction.
*

.

(iii)

It

“

Baha^dVArfzonf ^
i

consider a statement of
the logical form
the propositional
constants 'P'

9 ° to the

,i,

.

If we let

stand for 'it is raining'

and

'Q'

stand for

'it is blowing', and
let the wedge

'V

stand for the inclusive
sense of 'or'or
,
U) has the logical
form P v 0
Nnw
p tt
W
°W
P
V n
13 true if any one of
Q
the
'

'

'

*

»

,

m

.

following are the case:

P is true and Q is false.

'

P is

false and Q is true.

P is

true and Q

P V Q

'

is

true.

is false if both P an Q are false.

Consider the

following truth table for disjuntions
using propositional
variables 'O' and 'A':

.
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0

A

t

t
t

f

t
f

f
f

OVA
t
t
t
f

We see that a disjunction
of statements is false
iff both
the component statements
are false.

If - Then

Conditional

We may now consider

statement used as premises

1,

2,

5

and

6

a

complex

in A.l

Instead of
being one word like 'and', or
'or' standing between two
component statements, a conditional
statement is formed by
writing 'if' before the first
component statement, and
en between the first and the
second component statement.
This can be seen by considering
premise 1 of A.l. The
logical form of A.l 1, can be seen by
substituting the

propositional constant

'P'

for

'the Earth is traveling at

600,000 mph as astronomers claim' and by
substituting the
propositional constant 'Q' for 'the wind always
blows in
the opposite direction from which the
astronomers claim the
Earth is traveling' and letting the horseshoe
stand for
'r?'
the conditional connective 'if

becomes

.

.

.

then’.

Thus, A.l

1

'PDq',

Three technical terms must now be introduced.

ment following 'if' and preceding
'then',

P

The state-

above, is

.
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called the antecedent
of the conditional.
The stateraent
following 'then.,
Q above, is called the
consequent Qf
conditional.
Note
th^+fv,
ote that the antecedent
does not include 'if
n ° r d ° es the
consequent include 'then'
on
These
inese words are the
logical connective.

^

.

Letting

and 'A' be propositional
variables to capture
the logical form of
statements like A.l 1, we
must now
consider the truth values
of the complex statement
0 3 A
in relation to each
of the four possible
truth values of
the component statements
satisfying o and A
To do so, we
must recall that such
complex statements are truth
functional and that the law
of excluded middle states
that
every statement is either
true or false, with no truth
value
"O'

.

in between

The problem with applying
these principles to the English
use of if
then
arises since the English
'

.

.

.

.

.

.

'

connective signifies many ^iff eren
t types of connections,
For example, sometimes it is
used to mean class inclusion;

If Spot is a dog,

then Spot is an animal.

or to mean causal connection;

if Steve is late,

then he will miss the bus.

,
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Or sometimes it is
used with no apparent
connection at all;
(iii)

if voliiva was a
scientist,

then Nixon was a saint

The problem, then, is
that there
ere is
i s no ~
easy way to capture
all these different
senses of the conditional
in our
symbolic system.
However, we can solve this
problem by
noticing that all these senses
(i)
(ii) and (iii) have
common that each is false if
the antecedent is true and
the
consequent is false. Note that
this is the same as saying
that 0 => A is false when 0
v A is true, because
when A
IS false, V A is true.
Now
is false when 0
s, A
is true, then O
A is true when 0
a,
A is false.
This is
so because of the truth
table for negation and because of
the law of excluded middle.
This can be seen as follows:
•

ifObi

•

•

-P

^

t

t

t

f
f

ft
f

0

^ A

•

^

(0

•

% A

)

0 ID A

f
f
t
f

We see that a conditional statement is false
iff the

antecedent is true and the consequent is false.

intuitively clear.

This is

However, the other assignments of
truth

values to the conditional are
not intuitively clear.
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KS mUSt

therefo -' provide some
motivation for making
the assignments in these
unclear cases.
'

No matter how we interpret
the conditional, there
are

certain logically complex
statements that we want to
have
certain truth value, given the
assignment of truth values
to its component statements.
By considering such a
statement and what assignments it
requires us to
make, we can

determine the assignments of
truth value to conditionals
when the antecedent and the
consequent are both true, when
the antecedent is false and
the consequent is true, and
when
the antecedent and consequent
are both false.

Consider the logically complex
statement "if 0
A then 0."
First, consider the problem of
assigning a truth value to a
conditional in which both antecedent and
consequent are
*

true.

Intuitively, given that 0 is true and

want to be able to say that "if 0
t

*

t,

then

t)

.

•

A

A

is true, we

then 0" is true

Since given this true antecedent,

consequent follows.

true

To capture this intuition, we must

assign a value of true to

consequent are true.

a

(if

'

0

A

'

when both antecedent and

Assigning false to such

would violate this intuition.
call such conditionals true.

a

conditional

Therefore, we rule it out and

.

.

'
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Secondly, consider the problem of
assigning a truth value to
a conditional in which the
antecedent is false and the
consequent is true.
Intuitively, given 0 is false and W
is
true, we want to be able to say
that "if o -A then 0" is
true (if f
t
then t)
since given this false conjunction
as antecedent, this true consequent
follows since 0 is true.
To capture this intuition, we must
assign a value of true to
.

'0O

,

,

A' when the antecedent is false and
the consequent is

true

Thirdly, consider the problem of assigning

a

truth value to

conditional in which the antecedent and the consequent
are

a

both false.

Intuitively, given 0 is false and

we want to be able to say that "if 0

then

f

f)

•

A

A

then 0" is true

since given this false antecedent, a

false consequent truly follows, since 0 is false.

capture this intuition, we must assign
1

0

r> a

is false,

a

To

value of true to

when both the antecedent and consequent are false.

We distinguish this conditional from the many other con-

ditionals used in English and we call it the material

conditional

If and Only If - Biconditional

biconditional as
a

a

.

A statement using the

logical connective is the conjunction of

conditional and what we call its converse.

If we switch

/

*
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the antecedent and
the consequent of a
given conditional
statement we get the
converse of that conditional
statement.
Thus the converse of
the statement A.l 1
sy „ boIized
an terms of
propositional constants as 'p
dq' is Q
p
Note that we cannot
automatically conclude from
the truth
of a statement the
truth of its converse.
,

,

,

(

A-

-

,

,

and its converse, then,
can be represented in
terms
Of propositional constants
as
1

1

(i)

p Z) Q,

(ii)

Q zd P

and

Another way to translate
°'

(

i

e

•

'P

Q-

=D

into English is

’P

only if

the Earth is traveling at
600,000 mph as astrono-

mers claim only if the wind
always blows in the opposite
direction from which astronomers
claim the earth is
traveling).
of saying

This is not the same as

’P

if q-

Q only if P'.
if Q'.
(Q

T)

P)

is to say

English is

Q then pI

and

(i)

Another way to translate
'P

,

Another way

Qr equivalently

This is obviously not the same as

This conjunction of
.

,

if Q*.

'P

if and only if Q*

for the logical connective

.

(ii)
(P

is

dq)

(iii)
•

(P

(Q zd P)

Let triple bar

'if and only if'.

'P

’s'

^

only
Q)

into

stand

We can form

the truth table for this logical connective
by considering

.
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the truth tables for
conjunctions and conditionals.
using 'O' and 'A as propositional
variables.

9

A

t
f
t

t
t

.

f

f
f

0

•!>

t
t
f
t

A

A

o

Q

0

E

t

t

f

f

t
t

t

Again,

A

f

Models

truth values.
Point out
tne logical connectives in all the
arguments you have
considered

rite up truth tables showing the possible
truth value
assignment to various negations, conjunctions,
disjunctions, etc. Have the student pick out the
assignments that are, in fact, the case and show why.
3.

Mix in with the above statements statements both
true
/II interpretations and false in all interpretations
and ask them to pick out the assignments that
are, in
fact, the case and show why.

m

Exercises
1.

Assemble a body of complex statements from Gardner
or any of the other books the students are reading.
Ask
them to point out the logical connectives, and provide
truth tables for the complex statements.

2

Ask the students to present an informal argument
refuting one or more of the explanations Gardner
considers. Ask them to use the symbols for logical
connectives we have provided.

.
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Subsection

3

Form Qf

CnTTip lQv

Statements: PC

Given the notion of a
statement's logical form,
propositional
constants which are chosen
to stand for specific
statements
un. L vocally, and the
logical connectives, we may
capture the
logical form of simple statements
and of complex statements
composed of simple statements
joined by one or more of the
logical connectives. This we
shall call translating

statements into the propositional
calculus. However, before
discussing translating English
statements into PC, we must
formally introduce another
notational device informally used
above.
Suppose we are trying to determine
the truth value
of the statement 'P
Q v R'.
We seem to be stuck because
•

our truth tables for conjunction
and disjunction only tell
us how to deal with two symbols
and one connective.
However
we may use parenthesis in logic the
way we use them in

mathematics to solve this problem.
the value of 27 +

3

will be 27 or

remove the ambiguity (i.e.,

Similarly in PC,
V R' and

'P

•

(Q

Q V R'

'P

V

R)

(27

For example, in ENT,
3

*3)

depending on how we
x 3, or 27

*

is ambiguous between

(3x3)).
'

(P

•

q)

1

.

However, once such complex statements are
grouped by

parenthesis, we may determine its
truth value given that we
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know the truth values of its component
statements. For
example suppose that P is false,
Q is true and R is true.
Given
(P
Q) V R\ we can substitute (P
Q) for the 0 and
R for the A in our truth table
for disjunction.
,

'

•

•

We then

substitute

for 0 and Q for

P

junction, and see that
R is t,

'

(P

•

disjunction.

Q)

'P

A

Q'

•

in the truth table for conis f,

since P is f.

Since

V R' will be t given the truth table for

Writing truth values in place of propositional

constants to assist the computation, we see given these
truth values for

(f

•

V t =

t)

Q and R:

P,

f

V t = t.

Applying the same principles to

f

*

(t

V

= f

f)

•

'

P

•

(Q

•

(Q

V

R)

'

we see that

t = f

We can easily see that

equivalent to

'P

'

V

(P
R)

•

'

Q)

V R' is

not logically

since given the same truth

values for the same propositional constants, the truth
values of the complex statements are different.

It is important here to see that we may substitute complex

statements for the 0 and the
the logical connectives.

A

in truth tables for any of

Therefore, we may use this method

.
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to calculate the truth
values of statements as
complex as we
want, given that we know
the truth values of the
component

statements

To translate such complex
statements into PC, we need
only
(1) recognize logical
connectives, and (2) assign
propositional constants univocally.
Let's consider the premises
and conclusions of A.l, and
translate the statements composing this argument into PC.

Consider premise
PC.

Premise

1

We have translated this
statement into

1.

becomes

'POQ'.

Once deciding that

'P'

stands for 'the Earth is traveling
at 600,000 mph as
astronomers claim; we must replace this
statement with P
wherever it occurs in the argument, or
in a complex statement.
This guarantees that we capture the
logical form of
the particular statement of this sort
and the logical form
of the argument, as we shall consider
it in a minute.
This
is what (2) means above.

Consider premise

2.

Premise

statement than premise
parenthesis.

ment is

a

1,

2

is a logically more complex

and requires the correct use of

The logical form of the large complex state-

conditional.

However, we see that the consequent

Of the conditional is simply
another conditional. Following
the univocal assignment
of propositional constants,
we see
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that the antecedent of this
premise is 'P'. The consequent
is yet another conditional.
Let R stand for 'one
jumps
off the Earth's surface
for one second’ and let
's' stand
for 'one will come down
193.7 miles from where one
jumps
off. We may use parentheses to
capture this consequent
which is also a conditional
as follows:
'

'P

(R

'

S)

This is the translation of
premise

Consider premise

3.

2

into PC.

This is very simple.

'

Q
'

already

stands for ’the wind always blows
in the opposite direction
from which the astronomers claim the
earth is traveling'.
Premise 3 is the negation of ’Q\ so
premise 3 is simply
translated as
Q'.
Likewise, premise 4 is simply the
negation of the consequent of premise
2, so premise 4 is

translated as

Consider premise

(R

5.

s)

'

.

Following the recognition of logical

connectives and the univocal use of propositional constants,
premise

5

is simply a conditional with the negation of
Q as

the antecedent and the negation P as the consequent

premise

5

is translated as

Q3

% p'.

.

So
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consider premise
the negation of

Premise

6.
(R

S)

° f P as the consequent.
P

^

^

'

•

6

is simpiy a conditional
with

as the antecedent and
the negation
So premise 6 is
translated as

^he conclusion,

as the negation of
p,

7

,

is

simply translated

p»

we may, therefore,
present the translation of
the statements
forming A.l as follows:

A.l
1

.

2.
3

.

4

.

5.
6

.

7.

P
Q
P
(R
% Q
\ (R
S)
% Q
^ P
% (R
S)
% P

Given Voliva

s

original statements, we see the
difficulty

m

clearly translating chunks of English
prose (that are
claimed to be arguments) into our
symbolic notation.
However, in summary, here are some
suggestions.

1

.

Locate the conclusion.
It is often preceded by the
word 'therefore' or the word 'thus'.
However, it need
not be.
Practice is a sure way to locate conclusions.
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Locate the premises.
Not *n
en tences that
a bit of prose
are statl nts
appear
P
f
statements that
®
Furthermore not an
appear n
*

i

ca^urinf til^^ogicar^or^ofth

an

TheY 3re the ke
y to
the logical form
of the argu?e?ts? Vant statemen ts and

Models
1

.

3

7^

translation? Consider
aU^hl
Tr Slate them,
very°care
fully.*

2

“

.^InTtlTA,

.

them as exercises to
he
3

eXam P les of

.

“^nts

provided

worhed^o^^^r^^Lnsl^ions

Fss student exercisp^
_j_.
Ses andj attempt
to translate them
PC.
into

Exercises
n

ran

°™ argument (from
Subsection 2? L?to%c
?f ^hey^^
°" if they do
so incorrectly, they
nay di c „
13 m ° re to
logical form than just
PC
11 antlcl P a te later
developments in Section One. ?hi? „,???

L

S

n

a
Ce
0 translate some PC
arguments that y? u p ?i?t
?
b °° ks
that you find in any
or
o? the loaift
°l listed in the
texts
^
bibliography.
.

'

Subsection

4

—Capturing

the Log ical Form of
Arguments

Having captured the logical
form of the statements used
in
premises and the statement of
the conclusion in an argument

.
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like A.l, we may now
consider what we may call
the logical
form of the argument itself.
For (deductive) arguments
like A.l, to discover the
logical form of the argument
is
to discover whether or
not the argument is valid.
Validity
is a logical relation
among statements. An
argument with a
logical form that is valid is
an argument whose conclusion
is true if its premise are
true, and the premises are
said to logically imply the
conclusion.
Informally
speaking, we can say that the
conclusion is, in some sense,
already "contained in" the
premises.

For example, consider the following
simple argument designed
to show a valid logical form:

4.1
If Columbus is right, then the
Earth is round
Columbus
is right.
£j_
Therefore (here written
3.
The Earth is round.
1.

••

The translation of the premises and
conclusion of this

argument can be seen as follows using

propositional constants.

4.2

:

.

1

.

2

.

T C? U
T

3

.

U

T
'

'

and

'U'

as

'
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If we know that
premises

argument has

ana
and

1

2
.

are true,
,
and that the

valid logical ^form,
then we may determine
that the conclusion
3 is true
wifhn
thout circumnavigating
the
globe.
a

'

4.

However, in fact, an
argument with a valid
logical form may
have a false conclusion,
but only if at least
one of the
premises is false. Consider
the following argument:
4.3
1

.

2j_
.

3.

Voliva is ri ght
Voliva is right.
The Earth is flat.

then the Earth is flat
riat

,

translation of the premises
and conclusion of this
argument can be seen as follows
using 'T
and u
as
1

'

'

*

propositional constants:

4.4
1

.

.

3.

T
T

'

ZD

U

'

'

U'

This shows us clearly that
4.3 has the same valid logical
form as 4.1, since 4.2 and 4.4
have the identical form.
However, unlike 4.1, 44.-53 nas
a false conclusion:
'the
Earth is flat' is false.
Yet also unlike 4.1,
4.3 has a
false premise: premise
2 in 4 3 is false.
The only
,

t

pi

.

.

.
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requirement that a valid argument
with a false conclusion
must satisfy is that at least
one of the premises must be
false

An argument with a valid
logical form and with one or
more
false premises may also have
a true conclusion.
Consider
the following argument:

4.5
If Voliva is a turkey, then
he is mortal
Voliva is a turkey.
Voliva is mortal.

4.5,

like 4.1 and 4.3, has a valid logical
form, and the

conclusion is true.
1

is true:

Premise

2,

however, is false.

as a fact of biology,

Premise

if anything is a turkey,

then it is mortal.

It should be clear from these considerations
then, that

arguments with valid logical form may have conclusions that
are true or false, but it is logically impossible for
an

argument to have a valid logical form and true premises, and
a

false conclusion.

To distinguish such arguments with valid
logical forms and

true premises from arguments with valid
logical forms but
one or more false premises, we
introduce the notion of a
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*-

:r
bUt

4

*•

.. ..

«-<«..
3

‘

......

ana 4.5 are unsound.

USSfUl

^

,„ a

„„

.

rTO .„,

P ° lnt ° Ut

an invalid
ardent is
si mP y an argument
that does not Have
a valid logical
for
alld
=- have any combination
of truth values
premises and conclusions.
Therefore, just because
an argument is invalid,
we cannot assume
that the conclusion
13 falSe;
may be the conclusion
of another sound
argument, or it may be
factually true anyway.

,

^

Many students confuse
the notion of truth
with the notion
of validity.
Recall that truth is
a property of
certain
statements and validitv
aridity is= a- logical
i„
relation between
certain statements.
Therefore, strictly speaking,
it makes
no sense to say that
a statement is valid
and an argument
true
Validity and truth are
quite different sorts of
thln9S
In faCt
in advanced logics, we
can define validity
without any recourse whatsoever
to the notion of
.

i

.

‘

'

truth.

*

1

V_ JL

O

.

Pro^^^^a^l^^oreach^orth"6

^™
S

“

already dug out of
Gardner- show !^
reconstructed that are
valid, yet
valid
VP h unsound.

^

9

eSS
Y ° U haVe
Y ° U haVe

611113

'

.
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2

.

3

.

Exp la i n carefully what the
importance of validity is
for arguments - to preserve
truth.
complex arguments where the logical Anticipate more"
obvious and use some examples from form is not
science.

import nce of validity for organizing
wr i tmg
tina and
^nd presenting
J
original arguments.
Show how
it can be used to organize long
as well as short
essays.
Consider Charles Darwin's letter to Gray
as
an example of this use of valid
logical form.
•

4.

.

Emphasize the usefulness of valid arguments
importance for presenting original arguments,and their
critical
arguments, as well as evaluating given
arguments.
Exercises

1.

Have the students point out unsound
arguments offered in
support of the explanations Gardner considers.

2.

Have the students examine arguments with true
conconclusions that are valid and unsound, with true conclusions that are invalid, and with true conclusions
that are valid and sound. Ask them to explain the
relation of these concepts in the particular arguments
(You may take these from the logic texts, or make
them up yourself.)

Subsection

5

Testing the Validity of Arguments

Given the above, we can modify the definition of validity
to provide a test for validity.

An argument is valid just

in case it is logically impossible for the premises to be

true and the conclusion false.

That is, the argument can be

determined to be valid just in case you get
by asserting the

a

contradiction

(conjunction of the premises) and the

denial of the conclusion.

This, then, gives us the means

to test the validity of arguments;

conjoin the premises with
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the denial of the conclusion.

if a contradiction results,

then the argument has a valid
logical form.

Recall that a contradiction is false
in virtue of its
logical form alone.
We can give a clear meaning to
this by
a truth table.
Consider a contradiction 'P
%
•

p

1

.

to

provide a truth table, we need only consider
two cases case 1 where P is true and ^ P i s false,
and case 2 where
is false, and

p 1S

a,

true.

P

The law of non-contradiction

rules out the cases where P and ^ P are both
true or both
false

:

P

^ P

t

f

p

ft

As expected,

^ p

•

f
f

'P

•

^ P'

is false under every possible

assignment of truth values to the propositional constant

P.

The insight to see here is that any contradiction is false

under every possible assignment of truth values.

Consider an argument we said was valid above, 4.2, and let's
test it for validity by applying the test.

,
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5.1
1
2

T
T

.
.

U

In order to test for validity, we
take the conjunction of

the premises and conjoin that with the
denial of the con-

clusion and test to see whether or not it is
Thus,
'

(

(T

a

contradiction.

to test 5.1, we shall test the statement

3

U)

truth table

T)

*

^ U'.

We carry out this test by using a

Since there are two predicate constants

.

there will oe four possible combination of truth values of

component statements.

T

U

t

t
t

f

t
f

f
f

(

3

(T

(t
(t
(f
(f

*
*
*

*

U)
t)
f)
t)
f)

•

*
•

•
•

T)

•

f = t
f = f
t = f
t = f

v U
f

•

=

f

f = f
t = f
t = f

*
•
•

Since this statement is false under every possible assign-

ment of truth values to the component propositional constants, it is a contradiction.

Therefore, 5.1

(and any

argument of the same form) is valid.

We shall call this method for testing arguments for validity

the method of truth tables.

This method also allows us to

test and point out invalid arguments as well.

Consider

:

T

'
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the following invalid
arguments:

5.2
If Voliva is right. the
the Earth is flat.
The Earth is flat.
Voliva is right.

Again, substituting

'

'the Earth is flat,'

T"

'

for

'Voliva is right' and

'u" for

5.2 may be translated into PC
as

follows

5.3

2_^_

T
U

3.

T'

1.
:

.

'

.D

U

*

Again, to test for validity, we conjoin the
conjunction of
the premises with the denial of the conclusion
and see if we
get a contradiction.

statement

1

1

(

(

U

22

Thus, to test 5.3, we shall test the
U')

1

•

)

* T

•

'

Again, we carry out

.

this test by using a truth table.

T
t

1

U

f

t
t

t

f

f

f

1

(

(T

(t
(t
(f
(t

1

H?

U

1

)

•

t)

*

•

t)
f)

•

•

*

f)

*
*

•

U'

f = t
t = t
f = f
t = f

.

)

% T

'

•

f = f

*

t = t

•

f = f

•

t = f

,
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m

only one case (where T'
is false and
statement under consideration
true.

U'

is true)

is the

But one case is

sufficient to show that this
statement is not a contradiction; a contradiction is
never true. Therefore, this
argument (and any other
argument of the same logical
form)
is invalid.

We,

therefore, have a powerful
method for testing an
argument for validity. Given a
symbolic translation of any
such argument in English, we can
test that argument by the
method of truth tables and prove
that it is valid or prove
that it is invalid.
However, longer and more complex
arguments, for example like A.l, make
this process rather
cumbersome.
One way to shorten this process
is to name
certain recurring valid argument forms,
allowing
us to

recognize a particular argument, or step
in

a

complex

argument, as an instance of one of these
valid argument
forms.
However, the problem with this method is
that we
cannot be sure that every possible argument
will be an

instance of one or more of these forms.

For this reason,

we may simply state certain rules that apply the
logical

connectives to relations among statements.

We may then

simply cite these rules in what we shall call

argument's validity.

a

proof of an

?
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Models
1

.
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^Attempt to^use^"^

arguments^atPr^
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9

provided^y "th^students? *?'*?*

e tSStS

f°r

f

formulation and
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^

**

“ents

obviously non-deductive araumpnf out the ones that are
antici P ate the
discussion of induction bv g qhm> ,S

^ ^-h^g

ument

Exercises
UdentS W ° rk many truth table tests
for the
validitv ®f
you have provided" from tteh^'ading?^

(vSnMnfken^rf

indicate whether it is sound.

5

y

Provide them with at least one long,
more complex arcuS
U1 SSe bY ex P erience that the
eY
method of
truth tables
?ah?
h
has
serious limitations.

Subs ection

6

-

Rules of Valid Inference

The intuition here is simple.

Given the logical connectives

and propositional variables, we need a rule
that allows us

validly to introduce each logical connective and
a rule that
allows us validly to eliminate each logical
connective.
These rules are based on the law of non-contradiction
and
the truth functionality of propositions.
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Consider negation.

The rule applying

^Mo^ad.Absur^,
lnt ° tW ° diStinCt
PartS and

valid.

Fi rst

but we shall divi(Je
st>ow

^

negation has

^

rule

why the move is logically

consider negation introduction,
written v j.
This states that we may
assume the negation of
any
proposition in order to derive
a contradiction.
Having
derived a contradiction,
we may then conclude the
negation
of the introduced negation.
We know that if i
,

0

i ea ds

us

validly to a contradiction,
then a, i 0 will
avoid the contradiction.
* I requires what we
shall call
sub proof, or a proof
within a proof. We will
indicate
this type of subproof by
drawing an arrow to the first
line
of the subproof, and boxing
the subproof such that the
conclusion proven by the subproof
is just below the box.
The
sunproof for 1 I requires that
from an assumed negation, we
validly produce a contradiction.
Once proving this contradiction, v i allows us validly to
conclude the negation of
our assumption.
We shall see how this works more
clearly
a moment.
For now, it is sufficient to see
that n, i
allows the following valid inference
from a subproof:

m

1.
:

.

2

.

3

.

^ 0 assume
^ o leads validly to a contradiction
^
0
I)
'Xi

.
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Secondly, consider negation
elimination, written t E . a, E
allows us to write
o' as simply o since the
negation of
a negation of any proposition
is logically equivalent to
the proposition; they have the
same truth value under the
same interpretation of 0
.

^ 0

0

^ ^ Q

ft

t

f

Therefore

,

t
f

0 is logically equivalent to v v o.

Whenever two

logically complex statements have exactly the
same truth
values for all possible assignments of truth
values, those
two statements are logically equivalent.

However, this

does not mean that the two statements are equivalent
in all

respects

Consider conjunction.
conjunction.)

(Refer to the truth table for

Conjunction introduction, written

.1,

allows

the following valid inferences:

1

:

•

.

0

2j_

A

3

0

.

*

A

( .

I)

Again, we may use the truth table method to prove this

inference valid.

..
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0

A

t
f
t
f

(

t
t

(0

t
f
f
f

f
f

•

A

•

)

%

(Q

.

a)

)

f = f
t = f
t = f
t = f

*

•
•
•

Conjunction elimination, written

.E,

allows the following

valid inference:

0
0

1
:

2

•

.

•

A

(

.E)

Again, using the truth table method:

0

A

t

t
t

f

t

f
f

f

(

(0

t
f
f
f

•

•

•
*

‘

A)

•

f = f
t = f
t = f
t = f

Consider disjunction.
junction.)

% Q)

(Refer to the truth table for dis-

Disjunction introduction, written VI, allows the

following valid inference:

:

.

1
2

0
.

OVA

(VI)

)
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Again using the truth table
method:

P

A

t

t
t
f
f

f

t
f

(Q

•

t
f

•

t

•

f

•

•

^

(O

%
^
m
m

(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)

V

A)

=
=
=
=

)

f

f
f
f

Disjunction elimination, written VE,
allows the following
valid inference:

1.
2

0 V

A

^ o
A
(VE)

.

3.

Again, using the truth table method:

0

A

t

t
t
f

f

t
f

f

(

(

V

(0

(t
(t
(t
(f

*

•

*

*

A)

f)
t)
f)

t

% 0)

*

.
•

•
•

f =
f =
t =

t =

f
f
f
f

Consider the material conditional.

(Refer to the truth

table for the material conditional.)

introduction, written

3

I,

like m

has been called conditional proof.

I

,

Conditional
has its own name.

As we shall see,

like m I, requires that we shall call a subproof.

allows us to assume 0 and then if we can prove

A

This

31

ZD I

using valid

:

)
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rules of inference and the
other propositions available
to
us, then we can conclude
0=4.
allows the following
valid inference from a subproof:

1.
2

Assume

0

h

.

vaSdly
TT

o

A

(

toT

er Pr ° p0sitions available to
us lead

ZDl

Conditional elimination, written

-p E

,

includes two rules of

inference traditionally known as modus
ponens and modus
t o liens
C2 E allows either of the following valid
inferences
.

2

0
0

3

A

1

0
^

1

^A
(t>E)

OR

2_
3

a
A

0

E)

Again using the truth table method:
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0

A

t

Li (O

t
t

f

t

(t
(t
(f
(t

f

f

f

A
•

t)

•

•

f)

•

t)
f)

•
•

p)

-

)

.

.

%

.

ai

f = f
f = f
t = f
t = f

:

.

3.

•

*
•

•

•

A)
f)
f)
t)
t)

•

%
t =
f =
t =
f =

•
•

•
•

A)

^ ^ 0

)

f
f
f
f

Biconditional introduction,

allows the following valid
inference:

,

0 ZD a
A Z> 0
0 E A

1.
2

1

(O v

(Refer to the truth table
for

the material biconditional.)
E

(

(t
(t
(f
(t

Consider the biconditional.

written

(

(E

I)

Again using the truth table method:

A

-2

t

(_(

t
t

f

t

(t
(t
(f
(t

f
f

f

(0 3> A)
•

t)

•

•

f)
t)
t)

•

•
•

(A ZD 0)

«

•

•

%
%
%
^

(t)
(f)
(f)
(t)

=
=
_
=

)

•

1

.

2
J

•

^

•

•

0
0

E

A

(E

A
E)

(0

E

A)

)

f
f
f
f

Biconditional elimination, written
valid inferences:

^

e

e,

allows the following

.

271

OR
0

1.

E

A

2
:

:

3

.

^ A

.

1.

O

2

.

A

3-

0

1.

O

2

% a

•

.

(e

E

E)

A

(E

E

E)

A

Again using the truth table:

P

A

t

t
t

f

t

f
f

f

(

(

(0

(t
(f
(f
(t

E

•

*

*

•

(t

•

(f

•

(f
(t

•

•

‘A)

A)

t)
t)

e

(0

*
’

f)

‘

f)

*

a

t)
f)
t)
f)
*

= f
=
t
f
f = f
t = f

0)

*

)

^
^
^
^

(t)
(t)
(f)
(f)

% Q

(

*

*

*
’

^

*

f

A

= f
= f
= f
= f
(Q

E

(t

*

(f

•

(f

•

(t

"

In addition to these rules,

(

=

(t

*

(f

*

(f

*

(t

*

A)
f)
f)
t)
t)

(o

^

•

•

*

•

*

A)
f)
t)
f)
t)
A)

-

•

•

‘
*

% Q)

% % A

t = f
t = f
f = f
f = f
^ % 0

t = f

= f
t = f
f = f
f

allowing us validly to introduce

and validly eliminate these logical
connectives, we may

:
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consider an additional
valid rule of inference>
called
reiteration written R.
R allows the
following valid
inference

1

0
o

.

2.

(R)

Again using the truth
table method:

o
t
f

(0

% cn

•

f
f

Certain premises of arguments,
which do not logically
follow from other premises
by these rules, we shall
call
assumptions.

We shall use

'assumption’ as a term referring

to the logical status
of a premise,

just as the rules of

valid inference refer to
the logical status of the
moves
from one premise to another
in an argument.
Therefore, we
need a rule of assumptions,
written A, to guarantee that
the conclusion is validly
reached from those assumptions,
and no others, using the
above valid rules of inference. We
may keep track of these
assumptions by a simple proof
procedure.
Consider A.l, as translated into PC.
Premise 1,
2, 3, and 4 are all assumptions.
They stand on their own;
they are logically independent.
That is, they are not

.

.
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derived from other premises by the
above rules of valid
inference

However, to test the validity of A.l,
we must show that the
conclusion, 7, is validly derived from
just these four
assumptions. We may not introduce other
assumptions, unless
they are part of what we have called
a subproof
for %

for 7^1.

I

,

or

(Notice that these assumptions drop out
of the

proof when the subproof is concluded.)

Consider A.l as

translated into PC:

1
2

•

3

•

.

4.
5.

6.

P
Q
P -O (R
S
^ Q
% (R
s)
Q and P
Q

3

A
A
A
A

)

allows us, by 3 E, to derive ^ P.
So we
may, with Voliva, state:
% Q -3 % p.
This follows from 1, 3 and
E
Similarly, ^ (R 3S) and P
(r jp S
allows us again
by c? E, to derive v p.
So we may, with Voliva,
state
% (R
S) 3? v p
This follows from 2, 4 and 3 E.
% P, the conclusion, follows from 3, 5 and
4, 6 and
J
E.
Note that 3, 5, 4 and 6 are derived from 1, 2,
3 and 4.
Therefore, 7 is derived from 1, 2, 3 and 4,
and this argument satisfies the rule of assumptions.
)

:

.

7.

A.l can really be seen as two deductively valid arguments

joined together.

11

)
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A

(i)

-

P

?

Ll

'V

Q

3

% p

1
:

.

-

.

Q

AND
A

(ii)

•

1
2
:

.

3

.
-

.

P 3? ( R -:=> s
^ (R z? S)
'v
p

Both are valid, and
instances of

—

SjJb££ct_ion 7

-

-o E

Logical EquivaJenr^

Given the above rules of
valid inference, we are
now in a
position both to evaluate
given arguments like A .l,
and
also, given premises as
assumptions and a conclusion,
to
attempt validly to deduce
a conclusion from the
assumptions
However, there are several
other important logical tools
to
consider before constructing
such proofs in earnest.

The first is a notion we
already mentioned, logical
equivalence. Given this notion,
we may introduce what are
called Demorgan's laws and the
concept of a tautology. We
stated that when two logically
complex statements have
exactly the same truth values
for all possible assignments

:

.
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of truth values
to their component
statements, those two
complex statements
are logically
equivalent. To test
for
logical equivalence of
two such statements,
we simply use
the truth table
method.

Two sets of logical
equivalences have such
usefulness that
they are called
Demorgan's laws, after
the 19th century
logician Augustus Demorgan.
(However, they are also
stated
by William of Ockham
in the 14th century.,
These laws state
that

%

(i)

(0

A)

*

and that
(ii)

(OVA)

^

Consider

1

is logically equivalent
to % o V

is logically equivalent
to v o

•

Again, these can be proven
logically
equivalent by the truth table
method:
(

)

.

%

P

A

t
f
t
f

t
t

%(f)=t

f
f

%

Consider

^

(

0

(t)

%(f)

(ii)

(f)

•

A

OVA

)

= f

=t

= t

f
f
f
f

v f = f
v f = t
v t = t

V t = t

Again, these can be proven logically

equivalent by the truth table method:

v
% A

A

,

.

.
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O
t
f
t
f

A

^

(0

t
t

^
^
^
^

(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)

f
f

Demorgan

V
=
=
=
=

A)

% o

f
f
f

f

.

t

•

f

•

t

t

•

%

A

f =
f =

f
f
f

•

t =
t = t

laws are useful because they
allow us, in an
argument, to avoid the negation
of complex conjunctions and
complex disjunctions. Therefore,
„e need never apply
negation to a complex disjunction,
or a complex conjunction.
Therefore, we may replace any
statement in an argument with
s

logically equivalent statement and
preserve validity.
Therefore, we may justify such a
move simply by citing
Demorgan s laws, written DM.
a

'

Inere are many other logical equivalences.

%

(iii)

P

J°
(° =

(iv)

A)
A

)

For example,

is logically equivalent to 0
^ A
is logically equivalent to m 0 E
A
•

and to 0 E % A
0
A is logically equivalent to %
0
0 = A is logically equivalent to (0
^ A)
0

(v)

(vi)

.

E
*

A.
A) V

.

Again, in an argument, these may be justified simply
by

writing DM even though strictly speaking they are not

Demorgan

'

s

laws.

277
It should be obvious
that all contradictions
are logically

equr valent.

Recall that contradictions
are necessarily
false because of their
logical form.
Just as there are
necessarily false statements,
there are necessarily
true
statements. As we might
expect, these statements
are
necessarily true because of
their logical form.
Such
necessarily true statements are
called tam-ni
canea
tautologies. Also,
then, it should be obvious
Vious thatthat all tautologies are
logically
equivalent.
i

Consider statements of the
form 0 V

Q

^ 0

O v V o

t
f

f
t

t
t

+.

,

^ o

Since statements of this form are
true in all possible

interpretations of their components, such
statements are
necessarily true. A tautology need not
have the form

0 V v o.

Just as with contradictions, there may
be complex

statements not of this form that are tautologies.

Models
1

.

Work logical equivalences using
truth tables. Explain
carefully that 'logical equivalence'
does not mean 'has
the same meaning,' i.e.,
a)

Mary got pregnant, and she was
married.

I
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Mary was married, and
she got pregnant.
I terns a
and b) are lnninai
have the same truth
eCaUSe the ^
table
^ n °t
nd
the same meaning.
do
have
b)

.

'

)

t

'
,

“

aPhY
d Pr ° Ve Sorae logical
equ?vflLces/expLiniia°?h
P
S
nmentS ° f tr^h values
so that students can
become faL !?
tables for
trUth
the

various^cl^^,^

Explain carefully the use of
arguments anticipate

ir^rr-i

i

;

Exercises
Have the students show
whv for the .P ur Pose of
for validity,
testing
Y/ the °
order
rder of
nf\h
the Premises does not
matter.
Have them prove using the
truth table method, that
'' UV)
(V) and (lv) d °
express logical equivalents.
th
OVe that ,p '=’ Q is logically
•* V
equivalent to
l o
p ?!
'

r

'

usefuf he^!

PraCtiCS 6XerCiseS in the

have them translate
Then have them tes?

Subsection

8

-

stat

texts

®” ts .™a

^
tfTre^uhs

using Demorgan’s,
1091031 eqUivalents

Proofs of Deductive Validity:

pc

Given these rules of valid inference
and the ability to
translate such arguments into PC symbols,
we must now
establish what we shall call a proof
procedure.
Suppose
that we are given the assumptions and
asked validly to
derive a specific conclusion from them.

procedure is as follows:

Our proof

•
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FlrSt

We Write and
number the assumptions
and o th ri ht
side, indicate
f
A as » ijustification
_ «
We bnaii
shall also use A
forSUmPtl ° nS in SUb
lustify each line
of t
Pr °
nUmbered consecut
ively on the left
to the
h
f the Une
and indiCate
°
lines and
'

•

“-

.

.

-

-U

.

2

*** -ions

h

3UStlfY

UnS

Then WhSn WS
reach the
con
cl
nclusion,
we can check to
see that
a
'
°" the
lines which we
called assumptions
and on our rules
of valid
inf erence
Consider the following
argument 148
'

'

•

<-

.

:

Holmes wil
.-v
if he insults
Mycroft.
However,
with
and only if Watson h| lufl “"h With Mycrof t if
has
dlserlll^ 1S post or
is on vacation.
Lestrade
is not ° n vaca tion, Lestrade
Holmes will solve the
and
murfinr!
u
d
Therefore,
deserted his post
Watson has
1

'

The conclusion is
obviously

Watson has deserted his
post
All the other
statements are premises,
since there are no
irrelevances.
Let:

P -

Holmes will solve the
murder

Q - He

(Holmes)

consults with Mycroft

K - Lestrade is
on vacation
S =

Watson deserted his post

Thanks to N. Scoff Arnold,
from a brief set of
exercises prepared fo r
Rhetoric 100E by Jon Nordby
N. Scott Arnold.
'and

:
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The argument can be
translated as follows

.

P

3

2.

Q

=

(S

3

.

'v

R

•

4

.

P

1

5.
6.

Q

7

.

^ R

8

.

S

S

Q

6

p

A
3,
1 /

V R

We see that

that

A

V R)

5,
3,
7,

7

depends on

1,

2,

and

.E
6, VE.

3,

and

6

1

and

3,

in turn depends on

depends on

.E

3,JE
2,3E

depends on

5

and

and

2,

so the conclusion

8

3.

Models
1

.

In
k
f o no°w

yOU
^l P r° fS ;.1GSe

mUSt explain the strategy you
proofs are sometimes best worked
backwards
You ma y now use the same
arguments that
for, and Le the rules
that the va lid ones are valid.
Show why the
nvalid( ones cannot be proven, i.e.,
that reaching the
US1
involves violating one or more of these
rules
Explain such violations clearly.
You may if
the class is more advanced,
introduce alternative proof
procedures, such as the Montique and
Kalish show line
boxing and canceling method.
-

•

^

™

'

2

.

Use the complex argument that you
used as an exercise
in Subsection 5 and prove that
it is valid using
these rules, again explaining the strategy
to follow.

.
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3

.

SuK:

for

bpr °° fS ex P lain the
nature of the rule of
assuL?
used to bring a
reiteration as
the restrictions.previous l?ne nto a sub Proof.
Explain
'

?V

4

.

a

fc

n

S
r ° m the l0gi °
using thele riles ?
texts
?xpl??n
th
stra tegy for proving
them.
Explain the virtue
" 9 backward s
the conclusion to
from
be' derived Tn
in ei
this particular
method.
emphasize the n^pfninn
c
f ° r P resen ting
arguments, organizing
writing
b
ass wel1 as critically
9
evaluating arguments 9

of^

5

.

'

Exercises

^Wing

them
the^ules? ^he^o^rtlits^re^
f°
examples, or you mly
formulate as we?? S prove r
yourself from Berlitz or VonnLtv
them
haVe them translate them as well as
??
them
Hake su re all are
in fact, valid.
This^ofd S onfus:
%
|-ug their inability
to master the rules
r
with th'
8lbllity
° f ™nrectiy
proving an
v

T*

'

“ P

<

invaEra£^ SH?

Present more complex
arguments, same as

1

.

3 rafut ation of some

form to organize

^

gi^secticm

-

tLi^writlng^

Evaluating Aron mpnfc

:

obviously false
deductive argument

PC

We now have a simple
procedure for testing an argument
for
validity (the truth table method)
and
a proof

procedure
not only for testing an
argument for validity, but also for
proving that a conclusion validly
follows from given
assumptions.
We now, given the notions of
validity and
soundness, have a means to evaluate
deductive arguments like
A 1
.

.
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If the argument is
valid and if it is sound,

then „e know
that the conclusion must
be true.
However, if it is valid
and unsound, we do not
have any guarantee that
the conclusion is true, nor do we
have any guarantee that
the
conclusion is false.
If the argument is
invalid, then we
face a similar situation
regarding the truth of the
conclusion as when the argument
is valid but unsound.

Therefore, to evaluate an
argument like A.l, „ e must
consider both its validity and
soundness.

We have shown that A.l is
valid.

answer is clearly no.
false.

Premise

We see that both

1

and

However, is it sound?

The

1

is false and premise 2 is

2

of A.l are assumptions

from which the conclusion is
said to follow.
Therefore,
since 1 and 2 are false, this valid
argument does not
establish the truth of the conclusion.
Therefore, we are
entitled to reject the argument as a
failure.

From this we can see that valid arguments
must have true
premises (that is, they must also be sound)
before they
may be said successfully to establish
the
truth of the

conclusion.

Therefore, to evaluate arguments like A.l in

which the conclusion is said to follow deductively
from the
premises, we must consider the validity of the
argument and
the soundness of the argument

.
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Models

^

" 0111
them as
readin <?' formulate
deductivel^valid
ld
ar 9 u ™ents in
evaluate them.
class fi!
if „
C
S
U
them ° n behalf
ike V ° n Ddni ^en
of an
or BBerli
a Pseudo-scientist
1 tZ
ps°V
t
° r on b ehalf
i
n
of
CarHn
e valid
3 * 6 SUre you
argument.
''?
Pro
construct
ve
Ct
that
evaluate its soundness
Valid then
Thlt Wl11 an
ability to reconstruct^
ticipate
arguments for evaluationthe
Section Three.
in
1

'

'

*

2

Point out thp
Sta eS ° f affa
»ents, propositionsrand a
^s, statet?C?h
?U
advanced and cur iou
1
F ° r the mo
;, this ?s a
r-opportunity
introduce theories
good
of truth
to
Resrst the temptation
a little
metaphysics,
,
early under control. unless
cdass has the
material

.

+.

•

™

^

S

Jrgu^nts'lrofSgi^t^^r
they

if you use
” in El
must translate.
UUsh
so
Also' von®
S;
the world is like"
y “ might
tel1
them
"What
for
question, so they can the'
in
evaluate
.

1

sourness"*

sound argument to
orgL^e*

T®

P seu<^° “Scientific

Logical Form ot Statements
With Tprmo
Quantification LPC

so far, we have
considered the logical
form of complex

nts tormed by relating
simple statements with
the
logical connectives.
However, there are many
simple
logically valid inferences
for which the above
tests of
ty and Pr0 ° f
P
«•
uate.
consider the
following example:

:r

—

—
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10.1
1

.

'Ll
3 .

.

No pseudo-scienH cfo
CaUtiOUS
Some Americans are
pse!ido
1
Some Americans are

n^utio^

^
‘

To translate 10.1
into PC will be of
no help

10.2

•

1

.

2

.

3

.

P

Q
R

What are logically
Y related

in
m

in
10.1
are not statements
at
i

all, but what we shell
shall call terms,
or predicates.
So far,
we have considered
red the logical
iorrin,i
structure of complex statej_

ments composed of the lorri^i
logical connectives and
simple
component statements.
These6 simple
simni^ component
statements
were the smallest logical
unit.
Now to determine the
validity and soundness
of arguments like
10.1, „ e must consider breaking down these
component statements in turn
into
their components, namely
terms.

Again, all valid arguments
depend for their validity on
their logical form as
defined by our rules of valid
inference.
However, the arguments may
be either composed
of the logical relations
among complex statements
composed

''
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Of simple statements,
o r compose, of
the lo g ical relations
among the terms composing
the statements.

Statements are either true
or false. Terms are
true of
° bjeCtS
»° object, an, false
of all the
other objects.
For example, the term
•American' is true
of each American, and
false of each Canadian.
We shall call
the set of all the objects
(in a broad sense,
of which a
term is true the extension
of the term.
Thus,
'

the

extension of the term 'American'
is the set of all
Americans. Terms are said
to have extensions, just
as
statements are said to have
truth values.

Consider 10.1.

'Pseudo-scientist' is a term that is
true of
each pseudo-scientist.
'Cautious' is a term that is true
of each cautious thing, and
as we have seen, 'American' is
a term true of each
American. Let:

F -

'Pseudo-scientist'

G =

'

Cautious

H =

1

American

We may then capture the logical
form of 10.1:

3
»
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10

.

1

•

2

3.

No F are G
Some H are F
Some H are not G

We may use a method
invented by a man named
Venn (1880) to
Show the logical relation
among the presses and
conclusion
°f 10.3.
Let three overlapping
circles stand for the

extensions of the terms.
and let

Let shading stand for
emptiness

stand for the presence of
an object or objects.
Thus, we may picture
premise 1 as:
'X'

and premise

2

as:

We may combine these circles and
simply read the results
to see if

3

follows given

1

and 2:

G
We see that the
X is not in G

H

thereto re
valid conclusion;
some H are not G.
,

'

this pictures a

he Venn diagram
method for deter™-;
- termming
the validity of
arguments like in
10.1, however,
•

l

W

We h3Ve

- d °P

“

——

beco.es extremely
cumbersome
We shall therefore
simply

the rules we have
provided so far for PC
and add four
rules to deal with
such arguments composed
of statements
which depend upon the
logical
9
relations among terms.
The
result we shall call
LPC PC standing for

-w

;

propositional
calculus, and LPC standing
for the lower predicate
calculus.
('Predicate' is another
word
for

1.

'term'.)

Point out and explain
why the rules of PC
pc are all
corporated into LPC
p.*-, a
.

.

.

m.

6

grammatical^
from the
reading which employ 'all'.nme'
° ome
and terms in
logical re laf- ion
P
6 tllG1 r difference
from
arguments using simple staf
'

,

raents

'

.

composed^ sLple staSments"^^""^^
en is and the logical

connectives.
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2

.

diagrams^o^hovf'thatThe

*

c

some invalid a
that the conclusion
is'no
"
especially.)
3

syl j°9isms using Venn
US1
valid.
include
51 " 9 enn dia 9ra„,s
Y
"llidly
l" reached.
(see Quine,
'

««

.

b
4

«

*=~*

S

.

and the notion offset
advanced students.

as^kind
lna

^

tion of cla sses

?°
° f class
to the more

Exercises
1

.

2

.

have the students diagram
a
arguments, showing that they number of syllogistic
are valid or invalid.
Have them, in a specific
reading assignment in Gardner,
or Von Ddniken, reconstruct
such an argument, and
diagram its validity.

S ubsection

11 - Quant ifer Rules

What we shall call the existential
quantifier, written
UX)
corres P°nds to the words 'there is
something x such
that', where x is a variable
referring to objects in a given
domain, or set of objects.
For example, consider a
statement using the term 'American':
'There are Americans'.
This may be written
(EJx) (Ax)
where A is what we shall
call a predicate constant standing for
'American'.
We know
that terms are true of objects; that
'American'
’

’

'

'

'

,

is true of

each American and false of each
non-American.
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Intuitively, this allows
us some insight into
the
existential quantifier.
Existential quantifiers may
be
understood in terms of what
we may call a domain of
objects
and disjunction.
Hx) (Ax) then, can intuitively
be seen
as a disjunction picking
out each object in the
world,
represented by natural numbers
(0,1,2.
o; A1 v A2 V
v A “)
Recall that a disjunction
is true, just in
case one of the disjuncts
is true.
Therefore we can see
that (f?x) (Ax) will be
true just in case there is at
least
one American in the world.
.

'

•

.

•

What we shall call the universal
quantifier, written
(Vx)
corresponds to the words ’each thing
x is such that', where
x is a variable referring to
objects in a given domain. For
example, consider a statement using
’

the terns

'mortal';
(Vx) (Ax

'All Americans are mortal'.

Mx)

'

'American' and

This may be written

where A is a predicate constant standing
for
American' and M is a predicate constant
standing for

mortal'.

,

Again, since we know that terms are true of

objects, we may gain some intuitive insight into
the

universal quantifier.

For our purposes, universal quantifiers may be
understood
in terms of a finite domain of objects and
conjunction.
(Vx) (Ax
a

'3>

Mx)

,

,

then, can intuitively be seen in terms of

conjunction; picking out each object in the finite
domain.

. ..

:

'
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represented by letters
Mb

Ac

Me

.

.

.

Az

a
?

b

,

Mz

.

,

c

,

.

.

.

etc

.

:

Aa o Ma

.

Ab

•

Recall that conjunction is

true just in case all the conjuncts
are true. Also recall
that a conditional is false just
in case the antecedent is
true and the consequent is false.

We shall now consider 10.3 and see
how we can use these
quantifiers to capture its logical form.
Premise 1 may be
written
(Vx) (Fx
i Gx)
capturing the claim that 'each
thing x in the domain is such that if it
is F, then it is
not G
'

'

Premise

can be written

2

,

•

(3x) (x

.

Fx)', capturing the claim

that 'there is something x such that it is H and
it is F.

The conclusion

may be written

3,

'

(3x) (Hx

.

v Gx)

capturing the claim that 'there is something x in the domain
such that it is H and not G.

Therefore, 10.1 may be written

as follows

11.1
1.
2
:

.

3

(Vx) (Fx 25 % Gx)
(3x) (Hx
Fx)
'v
(3x)
(Hx
Gx)
.

.

It is evident that we now need to add to our set of rules

some rules of valid inference for the existential and

.

:
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universal quantifier so
we can determine
the validity of
11.1 given these rules.

Consider the existential
quantifier, Existential
quantifier
introduction written EQI
allows the following
valid
inference
,

Aa

1
2

•

(3x) (Ax)

(Where there is an object,
represented by

premise for every X in the
conclusion.)
move because if, for example,

'a'

here, in the

This is a valid

’Joe is an American' is

translated 'Aa', where a is a
constant referring to Joe,
then it is true that there is
something that is an American,

namely Joe.

Existential quantifier elimination,
written
EQE, is slightly more complex
and requires a special kind of
what we have called, in the case
of * I and O I,
a subproof.

Consider the following simple arguments:

11.2

A

•

B

lj_

-

•

2

.

2

1.

.
:

.

.

(3x) (Fx
(3x) (Fx)

Fa
Fa

•

Ga

(.E)

•

Gx)
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In 11.2 A., we cannot
simplv
USe
P Y use

H*2

®

*

^

f to u
E
breab up 1, as we do

since what we shall call
ca11 the scope of the
quantifier ranges over both
F an, G
Therefore somehow wg
must eliminate the
quantifier to allow us to
apply E like
in 11.2 B.
Clearly, if we can get Fa
as in n>2
we can get 0x| (Fx,
simply by EQI
To get (gx) (px)
11.2 A., we shall use what
we shall call a strict
subproof.
The intuition here is that
if 0x) (FX
G x) is true, then
there must be some object
in the domain that is
both F and
G.
Let us call that object
’a'.
However, it may not be
it may be
b
or 'c'); so we do not want
anything in the argument to
depend on its being 'a'. This
subproof is strict with respect
to 'a' in that it must
contain no assumptions depending
on a and must not contain
a
in the last line of the
subproof.
This guarantees that
as no logical relations among
any of the premises outside the strict subproof.
•

'

.

,

,

^

,

^

.

•

I

9

/

*

•

,

In this sense

,

then, a strict subproof is a model;
nothing

m

the proof depends on picking the
correct object in the
domain; whatever the correct object is,
we can show that the

logical relations hold.
inference.

EQE allows the following valid

One may eliminate an existential quantifier
by

forming a strict subproof with respect to
some constant,
such that the subproof does not contain that
constant in
the last line of the subproof and such
that the last line
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of the subproof is validly
reached by our rules and
one may
bring the last line of the
strict subproof out of the
strict
subproof. Consider the
following simple proof of
11.2 A
involving EQE and a subproof
strict with respect to -a'.

11.2

^
-

1

.

2

.

3

.

'

C3x) (Fx

Fa
Fa

•

i-

(--3x)

5

Bx)

.

*

Gx)

Ga
(Fx)
(Fx)

A
1,

for EQE

2

.E

,

EQI
2-4, 1, EQE
3,

Consider the Universal Quantifier.

Universal Quantifier

elimination, written UQE, is very
simple, and allows the
following valid inference:

12

(Where

(Vx) (Fx

Fa

.

a

o

Gx)

Ga

is a constant referring to objects
in the domain.)

This is a valid move because if, for
example, everything, if
it is F then it is G, then some
particular thing, call it a,
if it is F then it is G.

Universal quantifier introduction, written UQI

,

is, like EQE,

slightly more complex and requires
another subproof, strict

:
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with respect to some constant,

Consider the following

simple arguments:

11.3

A

1
2

*

:

B

•

3

•

1
2
3

.

:

•
•

.
.
•

(Vx) (Fx ZD Gx)
(Vx) (Bx ZD Hx)
(Vx) (Fx
Hx)

3

3

Fa
Ga
Ga ZD Ha
Fa ZD Ha 73 E and
ZD I

n 11.3 A., we cannot simply
use ZD E and ZD

conclusion

(Vx) (Fx

Hx)

I

to reach the

since the scope of the quantifiers

covers both Fx ZD Gx and Gx

Hx.

We can use UQE to validly

conclude Fa ZDHa:
->3.
4

.

!

5
6
7
8

.
.
.
.

Fa
Fa ZD Ga
Ga ZD Ha
Ga
Ha
Fck Z> Ha

A
1,
2,

UQE
UQE

3

,

5

,

4, ZD E
6 , ZD E
7, 73 I

3/

The problem remains going from one particular
object a if
it has F then it has H, to every object in
the domain, if
it has F,

then it has H.

be

9.

(Vx) (Fx ZD Hx)

The next line in our proof must
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But how do we justify such
a step?

First, we must notice that
nothing in the proof depends
on
our choosing 'a'; we might
just as easily have chosen
-b'
or 'c
This series of steps, 3
through 8, is a model for
all the constants in the domain.
Therefore, we may take
ourselves as having proven all
substitution instances,
providing that we specify successful
guidelines for such
a procedure.
These guidelines involve introducing
a subproof strict with respect to some
constant.
'

.

,

We can now see that UQI allows
the following valid

inference:

from a subproof containing no assumption
about

constant c, strict with respect to c, and
not containing
c
the last line, one may validly infer
the universal
quantification of the result of replacing every
occurrence
of c by a variable.
Consider the following simple proof of
a

m

11.3 A. involving UQI and a subproof strict with
respect
to

'

a

'

:

11.3

•

a

1

.

2

.

'

(Vx) (Fx ZD Gx)
(Vx) (Gx
Hx)

5

.

Fa
Fa
Ga

6

.

Gel

r>3.
4.

7.
8.
9.

Ha
Fa

ZD

o

A
A
A

Ga
Ha

1,
2,

UQE
UQE

3

4

Ha

5, 6,
7 Z>I
1, 2,

(Vx) (Fx '3 Hx)

,

,

ZD E

ZDE
UQI

’

.

.
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Finally

it is important to note
certain logical equivalences between the existential
and the universal
quantifier.
,

Using 'Fx' to mean
are

F'

'x is an F

'some things are F-,

,

negation,

•„

is an F',

'

Ox)

(Fx)

1

,

'

means:

'

then <3x) (Fx) means:

'there

F exists', and therefore,

'there are no F',

its

'nothing

F do not exist'.

But to say 'there are
no F' is
the same as saying 'everything
is non-F'.
Thus „e have two
logically equivalent ways of
saying 'there are no F'.

(i)

(3x) (Fx)
(Vx) ^ (Fx)

a,

(ii)

Similarly,

F\

(Vx) (Fx)

and

means:

'everything is an F',

'all is F',

'there is nothing but F', and,

therefore, its negation, w (Vx) (Fx)
is an F

to
<

tax)

x

'

means:

'not everything

,

'there are non-F', which is logically
equivalent

v

(Fx).

'

and

"

>

'each thing is an

,

Thus,

'

t

(

x

1

)

-w

(vx)'

is logically equivalent to

is logically equivalent to

’

(Vx)

v.

1

Therefore, we may translate universal
quantifications of the
form
(Vx) (Fx)
into the logically equivalent existential
1

quantification 'w

(3x)

%

(Fx)

'

We may translate

existential quantifications of the form

'

(Hx) (Fx)

'

into the

logically equivalent universal quantification
(Vx)

%

(Fx)

'

The decision can be based on convenience.

To justify such a step in a proof we may simply
write 'DM'.
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Models

use^hfrule^a^rthe^"

!

validity!

(Construct
use exiples prodded
r

™

tat
pro

f

arguments into LPC,
dure to Prove their

”

C»f pS ^SS°Sl

d"

e
and working backward from the no s ^ rate 9Y of sub-proofs
n
ia the rUleS
Show how tL conc^Ssionepe^ds
o!
r!°
t
h
:
given
assumptions in a valid argument.

Reemphasize the material covered
4
regarding validity, and relate it- in-t-n Subsection
-t-h
Point out the usefulness of
these toalT^
r e
1Uating the validi
of complex arguments and
Ss o
Presenting original arguments, especially
critical
^o em Phasize the material
•
covered
s!bsec?!on ”!4 regarding
subsection
soundness.

V

r

m
S

Exercises
1

.

Have the students translate any
quantifier statementlnt ° LPC ' and USe tha "dies
t^prove thSr

v!?“
2

trUCt

.

!h2^
them
3.

r?

ne S Ch ar 9 u ment from the reading,
and have
r V S
itS

eval^e

S s^un=.

^

an argument from the reading for
the students
^
critically
to evaluate.
Have them organize their
evaluation
terms of a quantifier statement argument.

m

Subsection 12

-

Relations

Quantification will not only help us capture and evaluate
the logical form of terms in statements, but it
will also

help us capture the logical form of statements such
as
'Berlitz and VonDSniken are acquainted'.

This is not a

conjunction or any other truth function of the statements:

.
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k
13 ac< uaint ed',
and
?
'Berlitz is acquainted

(il)

P ""'

as

« «.mu

“

acquainted'

'small'

in
'Kn.
between

'

,

'loves',

'hates',

etc
are often called
relative terms or
relations, because they
depend for their
n=
°n ln a Particular
context on the
objects that are relate
related. v
Furthermore, relations
may relate
more than two obipr+-<;
objects
For example, 'New
Haven is between
New York and Hartford.,
However, for the most
part, we
shall simply consider
relations between two
objects, called
dyadic relations.
'

rew

+.

i

.

Before discussing
properties of relations, and
their role
arguments, we must see how
to capture their logical
form.
Once we see this, we
shall be able to use
our rules of valid
inference to construct and
evaluate proofs containing
relations.
w e have seen that to
symbolize

m

'Joe is an

American', we may use a
constant, like a letter
assigned to
Joe in the domain and
write -Aa- or "Aj
This is simply
what we call a substitution
instance of 'x is an American',
written Ax
Similarly, when we say that
-

.

’Berlitz is

acquainted with VonDSniken
substitution instance of

,

this can be regarded as

"x is

acquainted with y".

pick a relation constant that
does not conflict with

a

we must

:
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predicate constants in an
argument.

^ose

'A.

where

-A-

result.

to stand for

For example, if we

'is acquainted with-

in an argument

already stood for -American-,
confusion would
Thus, care must be taken
in symbolizing

statements,

terms and relations.
with-.
y

.

-x is

Let's let

acquainted with

Similarity,

v-

,

stanri for
f
stand

is acquianted

then, can be written

-Berlitz is acquainted with
VonDflniken-

can be written -BbV,
where

Berlitz and

y-

'B'
b

-

b

-

is a constant referring
to

is a constant referring
to VonDSniken.

The order of replacement is
very important. For example
it is true that Berlitz is,
in fact, acquainted with
VonDSniken, then it may not be
true that VonDSniken is
acquainted with Berlitz. This is
so because of various
properties relations have, as we
shall see in
a moment.

So -BbV may be true, but -Bvbmay be false.

These are

clearly not logically equivalent.

Consider some simple relations and
their correct
translation

Everything attracts everything
Everything is attracted by everything
Something attracts something

(Vx) (Vy) (Axy)
(Vy) (Vx) (Ayx)
(dx) (3y) (Axy)

Such relations have many interesting
properties.

First,

they may be characterized as
symmetrical, asymmetrical, or

if

.

,

,

,

,
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non-symmetrical

A symmetrical relation
= def if one

.

individual has it to a second,
then the second must have
it
to the first.
'Rxy' designates a
symmetrical relation if and
only if (Vx) (Vy) (Rxy 3
Ryx)
i.e., '’is next to," "is
married
to." An asymmetrical
relation = def if one
individual has it
to a second, then the
second cannot have it to
the first.
'Rxy designates an asymmetrical
relation if and only if
,

(Vx) (Vy) (Rxy

3

^ Ryx)

i.e.

,

'is north of',

A non- symmetrical relation =
def

a

'is older than',

relation that is neither

symmetrical or asymmetrical.

Secondly, they may be characterized
as transitive, intransitive, or non-transitive. A
transitive relation = def
if one individual has it to a
second, and the second to a
third, then the first must have it
to the
third.

'Rxy'

designates a transitive relation if and
only if
(Vx) (Vy) (Az) [(Rxy

.

is the father of'.

Ryz)

3 Rxz], i.e.,

'is the mother of

'

An intransitive relation = def if one

individual has it to a second, and the second
to a third,
then the first cannot have it to the third.
'Rxy'

designates an intransitive relation if and only if
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz)

or
a

[

(Rxy

.

Ryz)

'is the father of',

3

^ Rxz)

,

i.e.

'is the mother of'

etc. A non-transitive relation = def

relation which is neither transitive nor intransitive,

i.e.,

'

loves

'

,
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Thirdly, they may be
characterized as totally reflexive,
reflexive, irreflexive, or
non-reflexive. A totally
reflexive relation = def every
individual has it to himself.
Rxy designates a totally
reflexive relation
'

'

iff (Vx) ,Rxx,

i-e.,

'is identical with'.

individual

A reflexive relation =
def one

a,

has that relation to itself
if something, b,
is such that either Rab
or Rba.
'Rxy' designates a
,

reflexive relation iff
'is same age as',

(Vx) (Vy)

[

(Rxy v Ryx)

'has same color hair as'

totally reflexive relations are
reflexive)

3

Rxx]

'is north of',

'is

married to'.

i.e.,

(obviously all

An irreflexive

.

relation = def no individual has
it to himself.
designates an irreflexive relation
iff

,

(vx)

v

'Rxy'

(Rxx),

i.e.,

A non-reflexive relation =

def a relation that is neither
totally reflexive, reflexive,
or irreflexive.

Clearly, relations may have various
combinations of
properties described. For example, the relation
of

'weighing more than' is symmetrical,
transitive, and

irreflexive, while the relation of 'having the
same weight
as'

is symmetrical,

transitive and reflexive.

Relations

enter into arguments in many ways, as we shall see.
However, there is one relation, namely identity, which
is

important enough to consider alone.
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Models
nS
e
and their translaiLn°into 1
ar9uments
LPC° This inTOl°
lv
n
y ar9Uments usln *
onsult

?^“

-^io^? ^

^?sT
G

f

Cons t rue t^using rel at ions

'

10 ti0n

“^o

o^a^r elationn

'

°f

STS*-**

the r eading° supply
in^the^implic it p emise to make
the argument valid.
This is a nnoa
^
place
to introduce
9
the principle of charity.

Exercises
1

.

Have the students name the
following dyadic relations,
i»e., 'equals' - trans symm,
reflexive.

not less than
greater than or equal to
the successor of
a predecessor of
congruent with
is fond of
is the spouse of
defeats the brother of
is the uncle of
is the brother of
is the sibling of
is logically equivalent to
is
is
is
is
is

2.

is the friend of
is north of
is hungry for

loves the wife of
is next to

defeats
is on the right of
is the square root of
is sour as
is compatible with
logically implies

Have the students prove the following
about relations:
totally reflexive
reflexive
asymmetrical 3 irreflexive
intransitive 3? irreflexive
(transitive and irreflexive) 3> asymmetrical
(transitive and symmetrical) 3? reflexive
(intransitive
symmetrical) 3? irreflexive
reflexive e (Vx) (Vy) (Rxy 3? (Rxx
Ryy)
%
'x) 0 y (Rxy) 33 (symmetrical
asymmetrical)
.

.

(

)

3.

.

Have them symbolize and deduce a contradiction
from:
There are two different things each taller than anything different from it.
(Note - this is an enthymeme.)

)
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§afe5g

^gLl3^Identity

and Define. De scriptions

Many arguments depend for
their valid logical form
on the
identity of an object. For
example, consider:

Sis

6 D° dgS ° n
Carroll S"
Charles Lutwidge Dodgson was
an author.

aSaShoS”^

The usual notation for
identity
uty is

-

t+It
is obvious that
.

.

'

.

Identity is transitive, symmetrical,
and totally reflexive.
In our symbolic notation:

(i)

(ii)

(iii)

Transitive:

(Vx) (Vy) (Vz)
(x =

0

Symmetrical:
(Vx)
Total reflexivity:

z)

(

(

(x = y)

(y =

•

z)

)

=>

)

(Vy)
(x = y) 3>
(Vx) (x = x)
(

(y =

x)

We may, therefore, introduce a rule,
for convenience, called
identity introduction, written = I. we
can see that x = y
iff every property of x is a property
of y, and every

property of y is

a

property of

this biconditional =
x - y,

I

x.

Given the second half of

allows us validly to conclude that

i.e., that x and y refer to one object.

Identity

elimination, written = E, allows the following valid
inference, based upon the same biconditional:

.

.
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X = y

Fx
Fy

(

= E)

Identity has other uses in
arguments,
it allows us both to
capture the logical form of
certain exceptive statements
and
what are called definite
descriptions. Consider a
statement
like "Bill is on the Green
Bay Packers and can out-run
any-

one else on it'.

Using b for Bill, Gx for

Green Bay Packers' and 'Oxy'
for
capture this by Gb
(Vx) (Gx

'x can

= Obx)

•

'x

is on the

out-run y', we cannot

because this entails Obb,

which is false because being
able to outrun is an irreflexive
relation.
Thus, this translates the false
statement 'Bill
IS on the Green Bay Packers
and can outrun anyone on it'.

The word 'else' is missing.
to identity:

Gb

*

(Vx)

(Gx

(

The proper translation appeals
•

* (x =

b)

)

Obx)

Consider

statements containing 'at most’ and 'no
more than'. For
example, 'there is at most one explanation'.
This does
not say that there is an explanation,
only that there is no
more than one. Again, the proper
translation appeals to
identity:
(Vx) (Vy) ((Ex
Ey)
x = y)
Similarly, the

3

•

statement 'there are not more than two explanations'
leaves
open the question of there being any at all:
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz) ((Ex

.

Ey

‘

Ez)

3

(x = z)

V

(y =

z)

V

(x

= y)

Identity is also useful for capturing the logical
form of
statements containing 'at least'.
It is not needed for

)

.

)

.

:
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'at least one',

since the existential
quantifier alone
handles this case.
However, consider the statement
'there
are at least two explanations',
using identity, the proper
translation is:
(dx) (3y) (Ex
Ey
v x =
•

•

(

t

We may also combine the
translations for 'at least one* and
at most one
to develop a method for
symbolizing definite

numerical propositions.

Thus, the statement 'there is one

correct explanation', meaning exactly
one, is translated:
Ox) (Vy) (Ey
Cy) = y = x)
The statement 'there are
(

)

two probable causes', meaning exactly
two, is translated:
C3y) (3z) ((Cy

x =

z)

)

.

Cz

.

%

(y =

z)

)

.

(Vx) (CX

3>

(X = y)

V

.

We may also use identity to translate what
have been called

definite descriptions.

Consider the following statement:

'The author of De Motibus Stellae Martis is a
genius'.

This statement seems to assert first, that there is some

individual who wrote De Motibus Stellae Martis

,

second, that

at most, one individual wrote it, and third, that that

individual was a genius.
'

De Motibus Stallae Martis

'W'

for

Using
',

'G'

'm'

to represent

to represent

'genius', and

'wrote', each of these may intuitively be translated

as follows

(

.

.
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(
(

i)
ii

Px)
)

(iii)

Vy
Gx
(

)

(Wxm)

Wym

•

3

y = x

)

Combining these, we get the correct
translation of such a
definite description:
x) (Wxm
(

•

(Wy)(Wym=> x

- y)

.

Gx)

Models
1

.

2

.

Point out that two objects are not
identical, and
Dlstln 9 uish identity and similarity
via
properties!*
tr anslate statements of the forms
considered
nere
at least two, at most one, exactly
one, etc
using identity.
Such statements may come from the*
reading (Gardner)

3.

Consider and discuss the notion of the scope
of
quantifiers.

4.

Translate and discuss various define descriptions,
used
the various explanations mentioned by Gardner.
Consider the problem of non-denoting definite
descriptions and Russell's proposed solution. Resist
t e temptation to present too many
metaphysical
complications.
However, this is a good point to
introduce the notion of an ontology.

5.

Reemphasize the interpretations of the quantifiers in
terms of a domain and disjunction (fix) and a domain
and
conjunction (Vx)

m

Exercises
1.

Have the students translate statements like the
following, using identity:
a)
b)
c)

d)

There is at least one person, but everyone has at
most one father.
At most two robbers held up the store.
One and only one man issued the invitation to at
most two men.
No one but John or Bob has the keys.

:
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e)
f)

Distinct men have distinct
wives.
A function is one- ono if
values is the value for
i

a

-

unique^ent

1
lilt the^fol lowing!
uTinlTalnlity?

a)

.

^

,° f ltS

°f

Honolulu's mayor is a native
Hence some
mayor is a native of Hawaii. of Hawaii
orse in th e race is a
thoroughbred
a
y
Thus
inus
if at ^
least two horspq =
;
6 race
then
some thoroughbred
isS faster
g
The ugliest m on:rch was
British" "gl
9S
are dead and all male
monarlhs'are kinL ^huf
U
1
B
t S
m ° narCh W “ B * ale «“» th
*
uglIe: t
*

,

b)

t

'

c)

'

Sn :^

'

Is de ad

Find other exercises in the
logic texts.

S ubsections

-

Summary of the Rules of Valid
Inference

We now have the logical tools
to capture the logical form
of

most ordinary deductive arguments,

we shall now summarize

the rules of valid inference for
convenience, and then work
some proofs to become familiar with
their operation. The

rules we have are as follows

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

^ I
^ E

(6)

R

(7)

A

.E

(8)

VI
vE

UQI
UQE

(9)

EQI
EQE

.

I

^

I

IDE

(10)

DM

=

(11)

=

I

I

'

.

.

.
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Note that all the rules
for PC apply to LPC

Models
1

X

in

other
2

n ati ° nS
uf^'
w ^ ti
exercises

SubsectLn

P

thS^

™

signed

fs

.

ValUS ° f SUCh
° ° Ur s y mb °lic

proofs/the value°of translation
notation, and the orarn!
?

'

i

terms of evaluating

argument^Lr^r^nLL^^rujng

3.

r

^

arguments ?ike l?2.

"-nsS^„s LTe
Cann0t
Capture the

f

ntS

°™s

'

or

of

Exercises
e

k

re!ding o rtfke^%rom lSgic
llltl*™
Have the students evaluate the fnrm

aSSigned from the
n

"“ re

supported by valid dedSot^e

Subsecti on 15

-

Proofs of Deductive Validity;

LPC

Given these rules and the ability
to translate arguments
into LPC symbols, we must now apply
our proof procedure
from Subsection 8. Consider the
following argument:

The professor of Greek at Siwash is very
learned,
Therefore, all professors of Greek
at Siwash are
very learned.

Let^Px - x is a professor
of Greek, Sx
Lx - x is very learned.

x is at Siwash,

1

3

:
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The proof,

translations and justifications,
appears as

follows

1.

(Ax

Sx

a
?

.

>3.

la

(Vy) (Py

b
4

.

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
1
—

(Pa

b = a

)

b =

Lb

Sy

ZZ> b =
yl
for EQE
UQE
R

4

5

6

La
(

Sa)
(Px

,

,

y)

.

Lx)

lb

,^E

.E
7,

=E

EOE

o
.

X

1,
3,
2,

3,

Lei

(Pa
(Vx)

o

11

Sa
Sa

Pa

Sy

.

A
A

Sa
Sb

(Pb

(Vy) (p y

La
Sx)

2,
-z>

9

I

,

Lx)

10, UQI

The strategy here, as pointed
out in preceding models, is
to work backwards from the
conclusion, anticipating the rule
needed to derive what is required
to get each line.

Models
1

.

2

.

Work more difficult translations and
clearly explaining the proof procedureproofs, again
as you proceed.
This may take the form of a review.

^

n
in
USS ° f thiS USing the final exercise
from
quhS^
rom Subsection
14 as a basis for discussion.
value of clarity in the process of evaluation. Note the
'

Exercises
1

2

.

.

Provide a representative sample of proofs,
ranging from
PC proofs to difficult LPC proofs.
Have the students
work these proofs, making sure to justify each line
according to our proof procedure.
the stadents evaluate the strengths and
weaknesses
r
r0 d re
" hat makeS i<: hard? what "lakes
!t easv? °whv?
i
-v
Xt usefu1 and why?
what are
the limits
its of
Of' its
-itf use, and
a why?
Point out other proof
H V
f

fu

^

'

.

.
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Ure

^ ' an<^ ^i scuss their merits and uerects
defects
Tn°mn^
In
more advanced
^pp-h nnca
5003
lace
P
to
discuss completeness?
,

,

•

'

Subsecti on 16

-

Evaluating Arguments-

me

We now have a method for
translating relatively complex
arguments into LPC and proving
them valid. Again, given a
valid argument, we must check to
see if it is also sound.
Note that the truth value of a
quantified statement depends
on no more than the extension
of the statement under the

quantifier:

an extential quantification is
true or false

according to whether its extension is
not empty or empty,
and a universal quantification is
true or false according
to whether its extension exhausts the
universe
or not.

Models
1*

Discuss the assignments of truth values to
quantified
statements, recalling our intuitive picture of
the
quantifiers
Discuss the soundness of various valid arguments
for the
purposes of evaluation.

3.

Review 'states of affairs' and 'truth' and a simple
view of theories of truth.
Exercises

1*

Have the students evaluate the soundness of various
valid LPC arguments.
(You might consider describing
a world for the purposes of providing a context for
the argument.)
Have them come up with truth conditions
for various quantified statements and compare the
assignments with the stipulated world.

311
2

.

Have the students
write a hri a f essa
uses of this material
Y describing the
and
i
this material
USe ° f
Have
deductive argument to thS U se te* e°
° f a valid
be used as discussion present tef
S SaY
(These ^7
material1 to lead
f
a
consideration of inauctive
inductive arguments.) lnto a
1

.

™

-

.

,

:
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Section Two:

Subsection

“

1

Induct ive Arguments
and Their Evaluate
ion

-

h ""

“•
«o,. o, complex
composed of simple
simnio component
statements and the
logical connectives
I7q11
33 COmplex statements
composed
of terms, regions
and all or some
quantifiers
capturing this iogicai
form we aiso have a
means for
capturing the iogicai
form of deductive
arguments and
evaluating them by
determining their validity
and soundness.
However, there are some
arguments, like A.
2, for which the
above mentioned evaluating
techniques are inadequate,
while
we may capture the
logical form of the
statements composing
A. 2, the logical
relations among such
statements are not
truth- functional logical
relations.
Such arguments are
deductively valid because
they are not deductive
arguments. Arguments like
A. 2 rely on a totally
different
sort of following from"
when we say that "conclusions

2
statements

'

.

.

.

.

.

_

follow from the premises"
of such arguments.
called inductive arguments.

^

These are

in deductive arguments
we said that true premises
in a valid

deductive argument form guarantee
the truth of the
conclusion.
Thus, valid sound deductive
arguments provide
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the strongest
possible support for
their conclusion;
they
guarantee that they are
true.
However, in arguments
like
A- 2, the support
provided by the premises
for the conclusion, even if the
premises are true, is
not nearly so
strong; the support
does not guarantee
that the conclusion
13 trUS
ThS PremiSSS raere1
^ ^ovide evidence to
support
the conclusion.
Intuitively
e can see that
y we
thee sometimes
the
Premises provide evidence
that strongly supports
the
conclusion, and that sometimes
the premises provide
evidence
that weakly supports the
conclusion.
‘

We can see that inductive
arguments do not guarantee
the
truth of their conclusions
by considering the
following
argument and supposing that
the premises are true:

1.1
1

.

2

.

3

.

James Earl Ray confessed to
killing Martin Luther
FBI is satisfed that Ray
committed the murder

the^hots
.

4
5

^
.

Ray

^relir^."

killef^ng^

f ° U "d

^

guUty

^om^Ich
° f the

Although the premises seem to
provide evidence that
supports the conclusion, the truth
of the premises does
not guarantee the truth of the
conclusion.

This is to say

that it is logically possible
that the conclusion is false
while the premises are true. For
example, it is logically
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POSSible that

COnf

—

d

^

reasons other than his

that the FBI was guxlty
of some willful or
inadvertent oversight, that
the witnesses were
lying or mis _
taken, and that relevant
evidence was suppressed
during the
trial.
To determine that
these logically possible
explanations are true, we neea
need to obtain
nh<-„<
more evidence to
support them.

Sometimes the premises provide
evidence that strongly
supports the conclusion, and
sometimes the premises provide
evidence that weakly supports
the conclusion. Consider
the
following argument:

1.2
1

.

River.'
Z-L
.

3

.

h ° USS 1S thrSe feet from
the Ra 9 in 9 Mud

ng Mud River flooded its
banks 12 feet
i
Tnn^ g basement
Jones'
is wet.

We can easily see, given that
the premises are true, that the
premises of 1.2 provide evidence
that is very weak support
for the conclusion.
For example, from the premises we
do
not even know if Jones' house has
a basement.
For all we
know, Jones may live in a mobile
home, or a houseboat.

Furthermore, we do not know when
the Raging Mud River
flooded
its banks twelve feet;
it could have been a
hundred years
before Jones' house was
located three feet from
this river.
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we can see, then, that to
provide evidence that is
strong
support for the conclusion
of an inductive argument
like
1.2, „e must provide more
evidence, and that evidence
must
increase, not decrease, what
we shall call the probability
that the conclusion is true.

Consider the following argument:

1.3
1

.

2

.

3.

4.
.

57

hOUSS iS threS feSt fr ° m the Ra<
? in<? Mud
River'
Jones' conventional house was
built in 1965 with
conventional methods, and has a
basement and is still standing. conventional
The Raging Mud River flooded its
banks twelve
feet yesterday at noon.
Jones famiiy escaped to high ground,
and saw
their house submerged in the muddy
river.
Jones' basement is wet.
'

We can easily see, given that the premises
are true, that

the premises of 1.3 provide evidence that
is very strong

support for the conclusion.

We can see, therefore, that the

premises of inductive arguments can be said to
provide
evidence in various degrees of strength when providing
evidence to support a particular conclusion.

Indeed, such

strength may diminish to the point where the premises are
irrelevant to the conclusion.

We may, therefore, begin to

evaluate such inductive arguments by considering
the

.
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strength with which the
premises are said to provide
evidence to support the
conclusion.

1

.

a gUments from the
reading and^sk
th^students^Dl^
£
ace
bets
P?;
on the
conclusions.
Then as
2 they are
reluctant to
bet, what they want to
know'h^f
placin 9 the bet.
Soon they will catch on
* I s*
blstln
^shes a strong
and a weak inductive
araumeS
Y
°
U
may
then Provide
answers to their qUeStl ° nS
;
produce
a
^ong inductive argument

^

2

d

.

induc?ivelv s^on

ely Valid and sound arguments
and

ft,
Exercises
1

.

Have the students verify, using
truth tables that 1
ar n0t deductive ly vai id
1.3, ld
have them provide logically arguments. Given
possible situations
where the premises are true
and^he conc^ulion false.
Point out the role of evidence
and the need for
er ng aS mUCh evidence a s
g
possible,
have the
2nH
i
tudents
(or a group of them) gather
information
and
ttempt to construct a strong
inductive argument from
1.1 using either -Ray killed Kingor ’it is not the
case that Ray killed King’ as the
conclusion.
This”
points out the role of research in
inductive
argument and the need to appeal to all
relevant
available evidence, not just selective
facts.

^

/

S ubsection

2

-

Possi bili ty Versus Probability:

Inductive

Strength and the Probability Calculus

We must now more clearly define the
notions of "providing

evidence which strongly supports a
conclusion" and

1
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"providing evidence which weakly
supports a conclusion."
We
can see that in 1.2 we
need more evidence - more
research to
provide relevant facts. Now
this research may provide
relevant evidence that requires
us to change the conclusion.
For example, we may discover
that it is a fact that
Jones'
house does not have a basement.
A fact, for our purposes
here, is simply a statement
that is true.

But suppose that our research
uncovers the facts listed as
premises 1, 2, 3 and 4 in 1.3.
since 1, 2, 3 and 4 are
facts, by definition we know they
are true.
We know that
the conclusion, 5, is a statement.
Therefore, we know
that this statement has a truth
value since having a truth
value is a property of all statements.

The problem, of course, is that knowing
that five is either
true or false does not help us to decide
which truth value
to assign to five.
Furthermore, we know that 1.3 does not

guarantee the truth of the conclusion given true
premises,
since it is logically possible for the premises

to be true

and the conclusion to be false.

(For example, Jones may have

his basement packed solidly with a water repellent
chemical

which prevents the basement from getting wet.)

It is also

physically possible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion to be false.

(For example, packing his basement

solidly with such a water repellent
chemical does not
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violate any laws of nature

We may discover this
relevant
fact about Jones' basement
given further research.
and
change our decision about
which truth value to
assign to 5
)

What is of interest in
argument 1.3 is not the
logical or
Physical possibility of the
premises being true and the
conclusion false, but the
probability of the premises being
true and the conclusion false.
We may now see that if „ e
have evidence that supports
the conclusion, the
probability
Of the conclusion being
true given this evidence is
greater
than the probability of the
conclusion being false, given
this evidence.
That is, we are interested in
determining
what we shall call the inductive
strength of the argument.
We can say that the probability
of the conclusion being
true given the premises is the
degree of likelihood that
the conclusion is true, given the
statement composed of the
conjunction of the premises. In the case
of 1.3, this can
be expressed using the premise numbers
as propositional
constants, as

'5

given

1

,

2

,

3

and

4

'

.

So we must somehow

determine the probability that this is true.

If this is

more probably true than the denial of the
conclusion, given
the premises, it is clear that the argument
supports its

conclusion.

If this statement is less probably true than

the denial of the conclusion given the premises,
it is

clear that the argument fails to support
its conclusion.
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However, we must consider
this matter more carefully
and
precisely define what it is
fo r premises to be
evidence fo r
a conclusion and the
notion of inductive strength.

Ideally,

'probability ought to be more
precisely
characterized.
Indeed, there are competing
alternative
interpretations of this term.
Various philosophers have
provided alternative interpretations
attempting to give a
precise meaning to and foundation
for 'probability.
Such
alternative interpretations have
been described under
categories such as classical,
empirical, logical,

subjectivist and epistemological.

it is beyond the scope of

our interest here to consider
this matter.

We shall see

the importance of such interpretations
when we discuss what
is called the problem of induction,
but both providing such
an interpretation of 'probability
and addressing what we
shall call the problem of induction are
beyond the scope
of this course. We shall rely on this
intuitive under-

standing of 'probability' and deem that
understanding

sufficient for our purposes here.

Practically, we may use part of what is called the

probability calculus technically to define the notion
of
evidence for a conclusion and inductive strength
for the
purposes of intuitive determinations.

'
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The probability calculus
states, in the form
of certain
definitions how the
probability of a complex
statement
5 9iVSn ^
3, 4
is related to the
probability
of its simple constituent
statements.
Thus, „e can see
at least a general
relation between the
probability calculus
and the propositional
calculus; both relate a
property
of a complex statement
to properties of its
simple component
statements.
However, the probability
calculus deals with
tatement probabilities, while
the propositional calculus
deals with truth values.
Truth value and probability,
as
we have seen, are very
different notions. Yet both
the
probability calculus and the
predicate calculus face a
Similar problem regarding the
assignment of statement
probabilities and truth values
to the simple component
statements; the problem of
determining the probability of
the simple component statement
is not resolved by the
,

^

'

.

probability calculus, just like
the problem of determining
the truth value of the simple
component statement is not
resolved by the propositional
calculus.

We can, however, begin the
assignment of probabilities to
statements. 149 if a statement S is
a tautology, 's
s
See Brian Skyrms Choice and
Introduc tion to Inductive Logic SecondChance: An
Edition,
pp. 130-149.
t

,

,

]

.

322

or a logical equivalent,
then the probability of
S, written
P(S)
equals 1.
if a statement S is
a contradiction,
'S
^ S' or a logical
equivalent, then P(S) = 0.
if two
statements S and S' are
logically equivalent, then
they have
the same probability,
written P( s = P(S')
•

)

.

Given these assignments of
probabilities to statements, „e
may define other assignments
and relationships among
statements and their probabilities. 150
However, for our
practical purposes here, we shall
simply define what we
shall call conditional probability
as follows:

p (q/p)

= P(p

In English,

•

f

q)

P(p)

this says that the probability of
q given p

equals the probability of
p and q divided by the probability
150

T~l

or example if p and
q are mutually exclusive,
that is, contrary where not both
can be true, or contradictory, then, using a combination of our
ventions for probability, arithmetic, and symbolic condeductive logic
9
we shall write [P(pvq) = P (p) + P
- P (p
(q)
q
English this says that the probability of
or
probability of pplus the probability of p the q equals the
quantity
q,
t S Pr ° b bllltY of
and
We
ma
p
also
say
q
that
y
^
that is, that the probability of not
7
?
p
equals
1 minus the probability of
The probability of p
p.
and q, written P (p
equals P(p) x P(q/p).
q)
In English
this says that this equals the probability of
times
the
p
P bab litY of q qiven PWe
shall
define
what
we shall
f° the
i
call
independence of two statements,
and q, as
p
oliows; p and q are independent
iff P(q/p) = P (a)
if
D
If P
and q are rndependent, then
P (p
q) = p%f’ x p
,

•

.

)

m

*

i

.

.

.

,

'

.

'
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of p.

The probability of
q given p is called a conditional
probability.

Given this basic relationship
among the assignments of
probability to statements, we
are now in a position
rigorously to define evidence
and inductive strength and
to
consider the inductive strength
of 1 3
.

.

We shall define what is to
be evidence for a particular
conclusion in terms of the conditional
probability of the
conclusion given the evidence, written
P (c/0), where 'C
is a propositional variable
standing for the conclusion and
'0' is the variable
representing the conjunction of the

evidence as premises.

Intuitively, if we have evidence
0
that supports the conclusion C, the
probability of C being
true given 0 is greater than the
probability of * c being
true given 0.
Therefore, we can say that in an argument
of
the form 0 :. C, 0 is evidence for C iff
p (C/0) > P(^ C/0).

We shall now define inductive strength in
terms of evidence.

Intuitively, if we have evidence that supports the
conclusion, then the argument is inductively strong.

If,

on the other hand, we cite premises that are not
evidence
for the conclusion, then the argument is inductively
weak.

Since

1

is the highest probability,

intuitively we can see

that for an argument to be inductively strong, a
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calculation of the conditional
probability of the conclusion given the
premises must be closer

to 1 than to 0
since an argument is
inductively strong iff
it is probable
that its conclusion
is true given the
premises. But just
what value is that,
This is the problem
that now arises
for our system.
For our purposes here,
let us say that
an argument of the form
n
torm 0
c is a strong inductive
argument iff p (C/0)
,
/V) > pfn,
PC'- o/ai
C/0).
Let us also say that an
argument of the fnrm
r>
is a weak inductive
argument iff
01

•
.

.

.

01

P

(C/0) 4= p (v c/pf)

.

We may now more precisely
consider whether or not the
premises of 1.3 are evidence for
the

conclusion, and thereby consider the inductive
strength of 1.3. If the
statement
5 given 1
4
2
3
is more probably true than
5 given 1
4
2 . 3
the premises will be evidence
for
the conclusion and 1.3 will
be a strong inductive argument.
This is to say that if p (5/1
2
3
4) > p (-. 5/1
2
3
.

.

.

.

'

.

'

,

.

4)

,

P

(

.

then it will be strong, but if P
% 5/1

.2.3.4),

.

(5/1

.

.

.2.3,4)^

then the premise do not be evidence

for the conclusion, and 1.3 will
be a weak inductive

argument.

For our purposes here, on this intuitive
level, we shall
avoid actual calculations and simply appeal
to our
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intuitions to determine whether
or not given premises
are
in fact evidence for the
conclusion.
This, as we shall

see,

involves exercising our
intuitions for establishing
the
best explanations relative
to a particular set of
premises.
in 1.3,

the statement

given

5

1

2

•

3

•

to have less probability
than the statement
3

4

•

it is more likely true than

;

3-4'.
(

%

This is to say that P (5/1

5//1

2

3

*

4)

*

'

•

v

can be seen

'5

given

given

5
2

4

•

.

3

.

4

1

.

)

>

2

1

.

2

.

.

Therefore, we can intuitively see

•

that the premises of 1.3 provide
evidence for the conclusion
and that 1.3 is an inductively
strong argument.

We can easily see that 1.2 is
inductively weak, since,
again using the numbers of the premises
as propositional

constants,

given

'3

1

2

•

•

is less likely true or has a

lower degree of probability than
is,
P

P

(3/1

(%
.

3/1
2)

^

2)

.

P

>

(v

p

3/1

(

3/1
.

.

2 ).

2

)

3

given

1-2'.

That

or in our terms,

Since it is more probable

that its conclusion is false given its
premises than that
its conclusion is true given the premises,
the premises of
1.2 are not evidence for the conclusion and
1.2 is a weak

inductive argument.

This determination of inductive strength is not affected
by the fact that some of the premises are not probable or

..

:

. ,...
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are, in fact, false.

Intuitively, therefore, we can
view
the notion of inductive
strength as a measure of the
evidential relation between the
premises and the conclusion,
much like validity in deductive
arguments is a measure of
the logical relation between
the premises and the conclusion.
Therefore, just as valid deductive
arguments do not

guarantee true conclusions (i.e., if
one or more premises
are false)
so strong inductive arguments
do not guarantee
highly probable conclusions. Consider
the following
argument
,

2.1

There
There
There
There
There
There
There
There
There

is
is
is
is
is
is
is
is
is

intelligent
intelligent
intelligent
intelligent
intelligent
intelligent
intelligent
intelligent
intelligent

life
life
life
life
life
life
life
life
life

on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on
on

Mercury
Venus
Earth
Jupiter
Saturn
Uranus
Neptune
Plato

Marsel

Intuitively, the conclusion of 2.1 is not probable.
P
5

(9/1
•

6

2

.

•

7

.

•

3

8)

.

.

4

.

5

.

6

.

7

.

8

)

>

P

('x*

9/1

However,

.2.3.4.

Therefore, the premises of 2.1 do provide

evidence for the conclusion, and 2.1 is an inductively
151 This
argument is from Brian Skyrms, Choice and
Chance: An Introduction to Inductiv
e
Second Edition
/
(California:
Dickinson Publishing Co
•/ 1915
p. 9.
)
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strong argument.

However, the conclusion is
intuitively

not probable.

We must ask, then, under what
conditions are
the conclusions of inductively
strong arguments highly

probable?

Models
1

.

Construct a number of inductively strong
arguments
using VonDdniken's book Chariot of the
Gods for
example, to support the conclusion the
pyramids were
11: bY
lsltors from outerspace.
Show
that they are
Y
^i
inductively
strong, given the low probability of
the
statement formed from the conjunction of
the premises
(assumed to be true) and the denial of
the conclusion,
nciude as premises obviously false statements
about
the stupidity of ancient people, etc.
Point out
the improbable and false premises.
Suggest that while
the argument is strong, we still need
to be able to say
that the argument is no good; it fails to
support the
conclusion.
r.

For comparison use the above material and
construct
valid deductive arguments to support the same conclusions, for example, to support the conclusion
'the
pyramids were built by visitors from outerspace
Prove
that they are valid, and show that they are unsound.
Suggest that we need something like soundness for
inductive arguments.
'

.

Critically consider VonDdniken's discussion of the
"possibility of life" on other planets. Point out the
interesting question is the probability of life, not
the possibility of life.
4.

Stress an understanding of the probability calculus
on an intuitive level
"high" and "low" rather than
actual calculations. Use examples from Berlitz to
construct more inductively strong arguments, and
anticipate how we shall appeal to the notion of 'all
relevant facts to avoid the problem of a selective
approach to data.
_

'

;

s

??

.
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statemen^probabilities^ut^oint^ut^hat 6 ValUSS

make such decisions

=0^011^!^!^

t0
111
J?

Exercises

A°^oT^a^!“L a

^“

r

us?ng von D Lii^n's

°b!ok

SStS^SSSi

‘

The

aHvfden^ a“d

and which are improbable.
Then
the support the premises, found ask ttem ?o evaluate
in their research to
U3lly giVS for the conclusions?
Have ?hem
point^out
Ut :f
the improper selection of
certain true
en ad ed to the argument,
affect the
?
proDaoiiity
probabilit^of
of Vh^
the conclusion.
.

Have them reformulate the above
arguments into
deductively valid arguments. Have
them evaluate their
soundness, given their research into
VonD&niken
cla 1 ms
'

3.

Have the students become familiar
with these basic
0f
babilitY Calculus b * doi "9 some
problem!.
Giv| n r°
P
a)
b)
c)

(p)

- 1/2 P

(q)

= 1/2, p and
q are independent,

What is P (p
q)
Are p and q mutually exclusive?
What is P (p v q)
.

(Consult Skyrms or Cox for other exercises.)

Subsection

3

-

Ind uctive Strength, Inductive Inconsistency,

and the Epistemic Probability of Conclusions

We have seen that an inductive argument like 2.1 may
be
strong, yet we cannot truly assert that the argument's

conclusion is highly probable.

The conclusion of 2.1 is
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not probable.
6,

7

and

8

We might also know that
premises 1, 2, 4,

are not probable.

5

,

We might think that given
an’

inductively strong argument,
we can truly assert that
its
conclusion is highly probable
given that we know the
premises to be true, or highly
probable. While knowing
that the premises of an
inductively strong argument are
true
or highly probable is a
necessary condition for establishing
the high probability of its
conclusion, it is not a
sufficient condition. To see that
this is so, we must
consider what we shall call inductive
inconsistency.

Inductive inconsistency arises from
what we shall call the
problem of the detachment of premises.
In inductive logic,
we seek to provide premises which are
evidence for a

conclusion.

However, we may willfully or inadvertently

select evidence which supports a particular
conclusion while
ignoring evidence which supports the denial of
that
conclusion.

Thus, the premises we select, even if true, may

be detached from the set of relevant evidence
which must be

considered to arrive at a correct probability for the
conclusion.

This detachment of true premises from the set of all

relevant true premises gives rise to inductive inconsistency
as follows.

Suppose in an inductively strong argument A,
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in relation to true
premises 0,

probable.

That is, P

(C/pr,

>

the conclusion C is
highly

p * c /«

Furthermore,
suppose that, since the
premises are true, P
(0) > p
„ 0)
However, in an inductively
strong argument B, in
relation
to true premises
*, the conclusion * c is
highly probable.
That is, P ('< C/i>) > p (c/*).
Furthermore, suppose that,
since the premises are true,
P(*> > p <„
This is calle(J
inductive inconsistency because
in relation
(

.

(

’

.

to one set of

true premises 0, c is probable;
in relation to another set
of true premises
*, the conclusion „ c is probable.
We are
not justified in asserting
that a conclusion is highly
probable just given that the premises
are true and that the
premises provide evidence for the
conclusion.

To truly assert that a conclusion
of an inductively strong
argument has a high probability of being
true, we must,
therefore, not only require that the
premises of the argument
be true, or highly probable, but also
avoid this problem of

detachment.

We must be assured that the premises
have taken

into account all relevant available information.

To do so

we must require that inductive arguments assign
what we shall

call epistemic probabilities to their conclusions.

The epistemic probability of a given statement is
the

conditional probability of the statement given all
relevant

,
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available evidence.

This is written

'P

(

c/all relevant

available evidence,'.

We shall, for convenience,
abbreviate
'all relevant available
evidence' as 'K', thus,
this is
written 'P(c/K, '. K for
our purposes, is the
set of all
relevant available evidence
such that each member of
K is
more probable than its
mi_ Q
negation
ion.
g
The epistemic probability
statement can vary from
person to person and time
to
time since different
people have different evidence
available
in different amounts at
the same time, and the
same person
has different amounts of
evidence available at different
times.
It follows, therefore,
that the epistemic

probabilities of certain statements
change, given additions
to human knowledge and
probable
truths.

For example, the

epistemic probability of 'cancer
is caused by a virus' is
very low, but through advances
in cancer research, we may
increase our body of evidence about
cancer

and learn facts

that increase the epistemic
probability of 'cancer is
caused by a virus'. This increase
in our body of evidence
in turn provides additional
premises which affect the

inductive strength of the inductive
argument having 'cancer
is caused by a virus' as a
conclusion and all relevant
available evidence as premises.

Here it is useful to distinguish the
epistemic probability
of a statement from the truth value of a
statement.

,
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Clearly, since it is a
statement,

’cancer is caused by a

virus’ has a truth value;
it is either true or
false.
However, the problem is that
we do not know at this
time
Which truth value to assign
to it, although we are
inclined
to bet more toward false
than toward true. We,
therefore,
forced into a position in which
we must deal with the
epistemic probability of the
statement; the probability
that the statement is true
given that the premises are
true or highly probable, where
the premises are relevant
available evidence. In this
position, we must remain
open to the introduction of new
evidence which will affect
the epistemic probability of the
statement under

consideration.

We tust remain open to new
evidence as it

becomes available.

Since the epistemic probability of a
given statement

conditional probability of the form

P

(S/K)

it may be

calculated as P (all relevant available evidence
all relevant available evidence)

probability calculus.

,

or P

(I<

.

is a

S

S)

t

.

p

s)

*

p

(k)

To further clarify the notion of

epistemic probability, consider the epistemic
probability of
a statement with a determined truth value.
First consider
a

statement that we know to be true.
the capital of Massachusetts'.
'p'.

For example,

'Boston is

Let us call this statement

Using p as a propositional constant,
according to our

,

'

.
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definitions

the epistemic probability
of p
probability of the form P
(p/K)
Clearly,

is

a conditional

among this

relevant available evidence
K is the fact that
Boston is the
capital of Massachusetts.
This conditional probability,
then, can be seen to have
the form P

where

'P

facts.
p

P

.

q

.

According to our calculations,
P
q

r)

=

p

q

.

r

.

represents other relevant available

r'

.

(p

(p

q

.

r

.

.

p)

*

since the numerator and the
denominator
of this fraction are identical.
(For logical purposes,
recall that P
p is logically equivalent to
p.)
Statements
own to be true, therefore, have
an epistemic probability
of 1, since given the calculation
procedure and the
(

•

.

1

.

definition of epistemic probability,
the resulting fractions
have identical numerators and
denominators.

Secondly, consider a statement that we
know to be false.
For example, 'New York is the capital
of Massachusetts'.
Using 'U' as a propositional constant,
let us call this

statement U.

According to our definition, the epistemic

probability of U is a conditional probability of
the form
P

(U/K)

.

Clearly, among this relevant available evidence

K is the fact that it is not the case that
New York is the

capital of Massachusetts.

This conditional probability,

then, can be seen to have the form P
r

.

.

.

)

where

'

p

.

q

.

r

.

.

.

(U

.

v u

.

p

represents other

.

q

•
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relevant facts.
r

*

•

.

U)

.

According to our
calculation( p
-f

P

P

•
.

y

q

_

TT

C

•

q

r

•

•

•

•)

= o.

Since the

probability of the
numerator is 0 because
the
probability of a
contradiction . 0
Statements known to
e false, therefore,
have an epistemic
probability of 0
SlnCe giVSn thS °
alCUlati0n
-»™. and the definition of
epistemic probability,
the resulting fractions
have
numerators equal to zero.
,

.

we may now see how
this notion of epistemic
probability
helps us to avoid the
problem of the detachment
of premises,
and thereby to avoid
the problem of inductive

inconsistency
and to assert that an
inductive argument's
conclusion is
highly probable, with
the restriction that
this assertion
is made given all
relevant available evidence.
We can
assert that C is highly
probable if and only if c
is the
conclusion of an inductively
strong argument, and we
know
the premises are true or
highly probable, and the
selection
of the premises takes
into account all relevant
available
evidence. This can be stated
in our notation as follows:
if 0
C is an inductively
strong argument where 0
'

represents a conjunction of
premises and 'C represents a
conclusion, and P (0) > p (v
0

p

,,j

(

C/0

.

K)

,

then P

(C)

>

p

)

,

and p (c/0

c)

.

_

R)

>

™
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Models
1

.

™

Do

a "before and
after" P uain 3 f
° f the e Pistemic
probability of some of
v
the research was
done, and ffter"^ Statements before
to show the students
reaearch was done
k !
increases, there is anthat as
Y °- knowled 9e
effect on th» e a
probability of statements
P stemic
like
® ?hc
khose made by VonDdniken,
or cite some claims,
such
mystical numerical
properties of the pyramids'as
etermine
the epistemic
probability, then provide
31
they are false, and
t0 Show that
redetermine^
etermine
the
epistemic
probability.
'

^

•

3 1
° f SOme m y st erious
force at wort
^^!
in^he'^Bermuda ! rlan
le
given the
9
student's present knowTfa
^
e
Be
mUd
Begin a consideration
Trian le
of ^lerUtz^ book
h
J and
5 oint 9
that, like VonDdniken
P
°ut
s
f
i " t"
•

'

calculate th,
miSSS kn ° Wn t0 be false
and premises known to
be true?

Exercises
S

epIItemL probabflrty
learning fa'cts

statement.
3

S

orf statem l6 t “

WMch

the
bY

learnin ® facts that do not
support the

.

sLlementf^fBerlrtfsuch

L^ce^i^

if’ltTe
warps' and 'UFO's are visitors
from outerspacl'

'
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Subs ection

4

- Th<=

~.c

T ..

Inducti ve Arguments:
Tn
Establish
a
Deqree
of Prnh^Mm.„
~
££Q^ability £for a Conclusion

^

One might suppose,
given 1>3
2>lf
sinpiy
conduct certain tests and
make certain observations
to
determine the truth value
of their conclusions.
Por
example, we might just
go down Jones’ basement
and conduct
some agreed upon test
procedure sufficient to
determine
whether ’Jones basement is
wet' is true or false.
„ e might
send up a Viking satellite
to conduct conclusive
tests on
Mars to determine whether
’there is intelligent life
on Mars'
is true or false.
In fact, given recent
technological
developments, this is now
technologically possible and
having sent such a satellite
we now know that 'there is
intelligent life on Mars' is
false.
Similarly, it is

obviously technologically possible
to test Jones' basement
to determine whether it is
wet or not. We may then assign
a truth value to a statement
'Jones basement is wet',
based on the results of this test.

However

the determination of the truth
values of these
statements is independent of the
inductive arguments under
,

consideration.

When we know the truth value of a
statement

forming the conclusion in an
inductive argument, the
probability of the conclusion is
0 or 1, since the
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probability of the conclusion
is based on all
relevant
available evidence.
However, when we do
not know the truth
value of the conclusion,
an inductive ardent
is only able
to provide the
probability of the conclusion
given the
premises and all relevant
available evidence. To
ask any
-re of it is to overextend its
logical function.
Therefore, inductive
arguments never, in principle,
absolutely establish the
truth value of the
conclusion.
If
this is to be done, it
is not logically
possible to do so
with inductive arguments.
it may instead be done
by
independent methods such as
direct empirical
tests, as in

the case of the conclusions
of 1.3 and

2

.

1

.

The fact that inductive
arguments never in principle

absolutely establish the truth
value of the conclusion give
us some intuitive insight
into the use of inductive
arguments.
For example, inductive
arguments

like 1.3 and
2.1, are useful under conditions
such that direct empirical

tests to determine the truth
value of a statement are not
Physically or technologically possible.
We must, therefore,
rely on statements as evidence
to support the given
statement.

Inductive arguments are also useful in
supporting claims
for non recurring events that it
is not physically possible
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to test directly

Consider, for example,
the statement
LeS HarVSY ° SWald dld
**
and till JFK
Clearly
»e cannot conduct a
direct empirical test
to determine the
truth value of this
statement.
It is not physically
possible to ash him, since
he is dead.
lt is not physically
to go back in time
and observe Lee Harvey
Oswald
on November 22, 1963.
All we have are statements
by
witnesses; statements about
doctored photographs, and
statements about a lack of
physical evidence connecting
Oswald with the murder.
We may conduct indirect
empirical
tests to determine the
physical possibility of his
firing
three shots in 5.6 seconds,
test the weapon to determine
the technological possibility
of its firing quickly
and
accurately, do forensic
pathology, study the Zapruder
film,
etc.
This is only useful regarding
this statement if „ e put
it in the form of evidence
which is inductively strong
.

1

.

support for the conclusion 'Lee
Harvey Oswald did not shoot
and kill JFK'.

To do so, we must consider all
relevant available evidence.
We may then determine the
probability of the conclusion.
It is important to notice that
since the conclusion is based
on all relevant available evidence,
we must allow for new
discoveries; we must allow for the
disclosure of new facts
which might change the probability of
the conclusion.

.
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indeed, this is characteristic
of all i nductive
arguments
The probabilities assigned
to their conclusions
depend on
relevant available evidence.
As we add to the store
of
knowledge and change the
probabilities of certain
statements
given new information, we
may affect the probability
of
inductively reached conclusions.
Consider the following
argument as an example of
such an inductive argument
dependent on all relevant
available evidence:
.

4.1
1

,

2

.

3

.

4

.

5

.

e
SW ld was seen
^
of .w
the S
Texas school

witnesses on the first floor
book depository Seconcls
seconds after
the President was shot and
killed
The photograph of Oswald holding
the alleqed
g
murder weapon was faked.
Oswaid had no trace of nitrates
on his cheekss or
hands when arrested.
nt aWay from bein 9 released
from
Sr^rTne rT P P °ibecause
of P°°r marksmanship.
The MannV® £ er c
Carcano Rife
Oswald is adangerous to the allegedly used by
Oswald,
marksman and
inaccurate
Oswald did not shoot and kill JFK.
'

Inductive arguments are also useful in
supporting claims
that it is not yet technologically
possible
to test

directly.

Consider, for example, the statement 'successful

human brain transplants cure Parkinson's disease'.

Clearly

we cannot as yet conduct a direct empirical
test to

determine the truth value of the statement.

However, we may

assemble evidence and put it in the form of inductively

.

strong

argents

to support the conclusion

'successful human
brarn transplants cure
Parkinson’s disease'. We
may then
calculate the probability of
the conclusion, given
this
and all relevant available
evidence.

However, generally, and most
importantly, inductive
arguments are useful in supporting
statements for which
conclusive evidence is not yet
or never will be available.
These arguments are based on
all relevant available
evidence, given the impossibility
of obtaining more
evidence. Consider, for example,
the statement 'the three
TBM Avengers in flight 19
crashed into the Atlantic Ocean,
and sank
'

Clearly, in investigating the crash
we can find no direct
proof that this statement is true.
No wreckage was ever
found.
However, we can gather information about
their
flight path, the experience of the pilots,
the weather
conditions, the range of the planes, their
fuel capacity,
the time they left and the time a search
for them began.
This information is useful regarding this
statement if we

put it in the form of evidence for the conclusion
'the TMB

Avengers in flight 19 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean and
sank

.

We may then determine the inductive strength of
the

argument and calculate the probability of the conclusion.

.

.
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Such an argument might look
like the following:

4.2
1

.

2

.

Eight of the nine crewmen were
only one pilot was an instructorstudent trainees
From radio communications, the
instructor appeared
disoriented, and had no watch or clock.
r
W3S neWlY transferred and unfamiliar
withThe area!
instructor failed to
radio to the emergency frequency and switch his
contact was
«as the last flight of the day, and
the
w ® a ther turned bad and it was dark.
discd P li ne kept the flight together
1
even
though several students knew they were
off
course
flying north over the Atlantic.
The planes flew north long enough to
run out of
'

3.

4.

5.
6

.

7.

tiTT

'

fuel.

8

.

9.

10
:.

.

TIT

There was a long delay in sending out rescue
craft
TBM avengers sink in 90 seconds.
Storms at sea quickly dissipate wreckage
and oil
slicks.
The three TBM avengers crashed into the Atlantic
Ocean and sank

While inductive arguments do not allow us to assign

a

specific truth value to their conclusions, they do allow us
to calculate the probability of the conclusion.

We must

now consider how one might begin to perform such

calculations

Models
1.

Consider several of the "mysterious disappearances"
discussed by Berlitz. Use the information provided in
Kusche's book to construct strong inductive arguments
to explain these disappearances.
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V

d

t

U
ntS r ° m the Views
suggested by BerUtz to
»
explain
th
events" in the Bermuda
ySterloUS
T at
she
inductively weak. Consider
they are
n
space time warps, UFO's
claims
about
5 and the lost
Atlantis.
civilization of

TrS^e

'

i

Exercises

2

+.

^

tive

.

S ubsection 5 - State
ment

Probabilities and Evaluating

jlnductive Arguments

We have seen that in order
to get an inductive logic
off
the ground, we need some way
to assign probabilities
to the
premises. Unfortunately, this
must remain on an intuitive
level.
We shall assume that we can
intuitively recognize
what we have called evidence,
thereby intuitively

recognizing inductive strength by
applying the above
definition of a strong inductive
argument in terms of
evidence.

However, we shall first consider
this problem
of assigning statement probabilities.

There is no general agreement among
authorities about how
to assign these statement
probabilities. For our purposes

.

,

.

here, „e may define the
statement probability of
statement
s as the epistemic
probability of S. Thus, if a
statement
S is known to be true,
its epistemic probability,
as we have
seen, equals 1; therefore,
its statement probability

equals

1.

If a statement S is known
to be false, its epistemic

probability, as we have seen, equals

statement probability equals

0.

therefore, its

0;

Unfortunately for state-

ments that we do not know to be
true or know to be false,
the problem we experienced earlier
with the calculation for
inductive strength reappears. Therefore,
here, too, we
must rely on intuitions

Consider a statement,

S,

that we do not know to be true

and that we do not know to be false.

The epistemic, and

therefore, the statement probability of S, P

calculated P

(S

.

K)

t

p

(S/K)

is

The problem is to assign a

(k)

numerical value to the numerator and to the
denominator.
We can check to see if S and this relevant
available

evidence are independent.

However, intuitively, we must

check to see if it is more likely that

S,

given all relevant

available evidence, is more probably true than

relevant available evidence.

a,

s

given all

Consider, for example, the

statement 'Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, shot and killed
JFK'.

Intuitively,

P

(S/K)

>

P

S/K).

We might work out

a system to assign numerical values to the numerator and
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the denominator
resulting in a value
of say 1/9 or
1/19 or
V100 for P S/K,
However, for our
purposes Here, it is
sufficient to stick with
our intuitively
arrived at
comparison. When P (S/K)
> P <„ S/ K,
it is obvious that
,
P <S/K> 13 l0W
ThlS
intuitively be determined
by considering how much money
you would be willing
to bet that
it is false or that
it is true.
(

'

we now have an intuitive
method for evaluating
inductive
arguments. First, we must
intuitively determine whether
the
premises of the argument
are evidence for the
conclusion,
that is, determine the
inductive strength of the
argument
by determing if p (c/0)
> P( „ c/0)
Secondly/ wg
determine the truth value
or the probability of
the
P mises.
thirdly, we must determine
the probability of the
conclusion not only in relation
to the premises but also
in
relation to all relevant
available evidence to determine
if the premises are
relevantly selected.

^

.

Let us now consider a simple
application of this material
to an inductive argument.
Consider 1 1
We must first
.

.

determine if the premises of this
argument are evidence
for the conclusion, thereby
determining if the argument is
inductively strong, or is inductively
weak.
To do so, we
must ask whether P(5/l
2
3
4) > P (a,
.

.

.

5/1

.

2

.

3

.

4

..

.

.
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or P

(5/1
3

4>

'

2

.

^

P

>

3

.

4) £.
~ p

.

5/1

2

•

(
1

•

.

of 1.1 provide evidence for
strong.

if P

(5/1

.

2

3

.

5/1
VI
3.4),

.

4

.

^
3

.

4)

.

If p

.

(

5/1

_

then the premises

and 1.1 is inductively

5,
.

?
2

-

)

P

(* 5 /l

.

2

3

.

4

.

)

,

then the premises of 1.1 do
not provide evidence for the
conclusion and 1.1 is inductively
weak.
On an intuitive
level, we might proceed as
follows.
We are concerned with
assuming that (1) through (4) are
true, and then determining
whether, given these premises,
the conclusion is the best
explanation for them. Consider
(1).
if true, this is
evidence for Ray's guilt. Intuitively,
p

Therefore,

is evidence for

(1)

(5/1)

Consider (2).

(5).

(m

P

>

5/2).

Therefore,

(2)

5 / 1 ).

if

true, this might be considered to
be evidence for

Intuitively, P (5/2)

(m

p

>

(5).

is

evidence for (5).

Consider

if it is true that witnesses saw him
at the

(3)

scene, then this is evidence for
P

(5/3)

Consider
(5).

>

P
(4)

(^

5/3).

if it is true,

Intuitively, P

evidence for

Therefore,

(5/4)

>

(3)

is evidence for

(5).

then this too is evidence for
P

(a,

5/4).

Therefore,

(4)

is

(5)

Consider intuitively the results?
(2)

Intuitively,

(5).

is evidence for

(5),

(3)

(1)

is evidence for

is evidence for

(5),

and

(5),
(4)

,
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is evidence for
p

(5/1

2

.

3

.

(

5

)

,

>

4)

.

ri,, on thl s,
Glven
we can see that

'

p

.

.

5/i

V1

1

?
2

*

p
3

4)
Therefore,
this shows by our def ini finn
definition of inductive
strength, that
is a strong inductive
argument.
*

.

.

,

•

la

The next step in evaluating
an inductive argument
is to
consider the statement
probabilities of the premises
1
(2), (3), (4), and all
relevant available evidence,
since
the premises are true,
their probabilities are each
1
Note, however, that saying
that they are true does not,
as
with valid deductive arguments,
allow us to conclude that
the conclusion is true.
We must now construct an
intuitive
determination of the probability
of the conclusion 5 of
1.1.
To do so, we must consider
whether P
(

)

.

(

(5/1

K)

P

>

5)

4

K)

•

p

5/1

If P

.

,

(%

P

.

(5/1

(5) £: P

(%

2

.

2

.

5

)

,

3

.

4

.

.

3

.

4

K)
.

2

.

if so, then P

.

K)

p

('•v,

)

.

3

>

(5)

.2.3

5/1

and this shows that the argument

even though it may be inductively
strong, fails to support
the conclusion.

We must be satisfied to show why P
P

(^

5/1

.

2

.

3

.

4

.

K)

(5/1

.

2

.

3

on an intuitive level.

.

4

.

k)

^

Consider

Even if true, when we appeal to all relevant
available
evidence, we learn that Ray was coerced
into confessing.
Consider (2). Even if true, when we
appeal to all relevant
(1)

.
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available evidence, we learn
that it is more probable
than
not that the FBI is covering
up their own involvement.
Consider (3). Even if true,
when we appeal to all
relevant
available evidence, we learn
that it is more probable
than
not that he had other reasons
for being there.
Consider (4)
Even if true, when we appeal
to all relevant available
evidence, we learn that it is
more probable than not that
the trial was unfair and that
Ray was found guilty just
to
satisfy public pressure for swift
"justice." Therefore, we
can intuitively see that the
premises
of 1.1 are not

relevantly selected, and that P
(5/1
P

5/1

2

.

3

.

4

.

.

K)

2

.

Therefore, P

.

3

.

(5)

.

^

the argument does not support
the conclusion.

<

4

.

p

(v 5 ),

k)

and

Therefore,

1.1 is not a good inductive argument.

Consider an argument that we said earlier
is an inductively
strong argument. Consider 1.3. Let us
use the numbers of
the premises as propositional constants
to determine if the
premises are evidence for the conclusion, thereby

determining the inductive strength of the argument.
if P

(5/1

.

2

.

3

.

4)

>

P

5/1

an inductively weak argument.

might proceed as follows.

assuming that

(1)

through

.

2

.

3

.

4)

,

Again,

then 1.3 is

On an intuitive level, we

Remember, we are concerned with
(4)

are true.

true, this alone is not evidence for
(5).

Consider

(1)

However,

.

if
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considering (2),

(

3

,

and

with

,4,

,1,
we can intuitively
see that the conjunction
of these premises is
evidence for
the conclusion.
Given this, p (5/1
2
3
,

.

/

3

.

.

4)

>

4 ).

Therefore, this shows that
the
premises of 1.3 are evidence
for the conclusion and
that
1-3 is a strong inductive
argument.
.

.

We must now consider the
statement probabilities of the

premises (1),

(

2 ),

and

(3)

(

4

)

and all relevant available

evidence.

since the premises are, in
fact, true, their
statement probabilities are each
1.
Consider the intuitive
calculation of the probability of
1 3 's conclusion.
If
.

P

<V1

P

(

P

(5/1

5

>

)

2

'

p
•

'

3

’

4

(1 5).
2

.

3

.

intuitive level.

'

K

>

>

p

5/1

2

.

3

.

4

.

.

K)

then

,

Again, we must be satisfied to
show why
4

.

K)

>

P

(-v

Clearly (1),

5/1
(2),

2

.

(

3

3

.

)

and

4

.

(

.

4 ),

K)

on an

along with

all relevant available evidence,
is evidence for (5).
premises are not irrelevantly selected.
Therefore, P
P

(^

is,

5 ),

The
(5)

and the argument does support the
conclusion.

>

1.3

therefore, a good inductive argument.

Let us consider an argument that we said
was inductively
strong, yet also has a conclusion that is more
probably

false than true, namely 2.1.

Again, we shall use the

numbers of the premises as
propositional constants to stand
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for the respective
statements and then
determine whether
the premises are
evidence for the conclusion,
thereby

calculating the inductive
strength of the argument.

”

P

(VI
5

'

'

6

•2-3.4.5.6.7.8)>p
'

7

'

8)

'

then

2

*

1

(

„ 9/1

.

2

3

_

_

is an inductively
strong

argument.

Again, assuming that the
premises are true,
alone is not evidence for
(9).
Intuitively P ( 9/1)

(

1

)

^

(-

9/1).

However, considering that

(2) through (8) state
that all other planets
in our solar system
have intelligent
life, we can intuitively
see that the conjunction
of these
premises is evidence for the
conclusion, (9).
Intuitively,
given this, we can see that P
(9/1
2
.

7

.

8

)

>

p

(%

9/1

o

1

A

n

*

5

*

3

.

r
^

.

7

this intuitive calculation
shows that 2.1
inductive argument.
It is useful

4

.

is

8)

5

.

6

Therefore,

a strong

to see why this argument

does not have a highly probable
conclusion.

To determine the probability of

9

of 2.1, we must first

consider the statement probabilities
of premises (1) through
(8) and all relevant available
evidence. Only (3), ’there
is intelligent life on Earth’,

is,

in fact, true.

Scientists have concluded that there is no
life on Mercury,
and while they do not know that
the rest of the premises are
false, they have an extremely
minute probability, given all
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the relevant available
evidence about p hyslcal
conditions
necessary to support intelligent
life and the physical
conditions on these planets.
Thus,
P

“P
p

<

2)
6

(9/1

6

.

= 1

(3)

P

)

If P

P

'

2

)

.

P

,

3

>

p

^

(7)
.

4

P

.

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

p

(t,

5

6

7)
.

•

7

.

8

.

K)

(%

P

,

7

8

.

2

*

3

*

K)

£

(9/1
4

*

)

p
p

(*
2

„ 1(

^p

^

P
.

(

^

(8)

.

(9)

P

(5

and p

K), then P

9/1

^

4), P

we must be satisfied to
show that P
6

,1,

(-,

(2)

„ 5)j
8

)

.

9/1.2.

(

9)
.

(

p

f

Again,

.

3

.

4

.

5

.

-6.7.8.K)

5

on an intuitive level.

premises except

Since the probability of each
of the
is less than or equal to the
probability

(3)

Of its denial, the probability
of

9

given their conjunction

is less than or equal to the
probability of its denial when

we consider all relevant available
evidence.
P

(9)

±

P

(%

9)

Therefore,

and the argument, even though it
is in-

ductively strong, does not support the
conclusion.

Finally, let us consider A. 2, the argument
that we said in
the introduction was an example of an
inductive argument.
Again, referring to A. 2, we shall use the numbers
of the

premises and the conclusion as propositional constants
and
begin to determine whether the premises are evidence
for

the conclusion, thereby determining the inductive
strength

of A. 2.

then A.

If p
2

(5/1

.

2

.

3

.

4)

^ P (~

5/1

is an inductively weak argument.

premises are true,

(

1 ),

.

2

.

3

.

4)

,

Assuming that the

even if true, taken alone or in

,
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conjunction with the other
presses, that B x 10 Eastman
view
cameras take accurate
undistorted pictures is not
evidence
for (5); intuitively P
(5/1)
P „

^

5/1).

Even if true> (2)
also easily and clearly
seen not to be evidence
for (5),’
since the objects were
in the camera’s range
and d is not
great enough to show any
curvature of the earth,
intuitively, P (5/2,
P
„ 5/2).
Even if true, ,3, is also
not evidence for (5)
since the distance covered
by the
entire surface of Lake
Winnebago is not great enough
to show
curve
y
in the earth's surface.
Intuitively, p 5 / 3
P (- 5/3).
Even if true, (4) is not evidence
for (5) since
this does not show anything
about the curvature of the
Earth’s surface; such cameras
at such distances do not
have
a long enough focal length
to show any curve on the
Earth's
surface.
Intuitively, P (5/4)
P (v 5/4).
Therefore,
none of the premises are evidence
for the conclusion.
Given this, P (5/1
2 . 3 . 4)
P (,, 5 /l . 2 . 3
4)

^

(

(

(

^

)

^

.

^

.

.

Therefore, this shows that A. 2 is a weak
inductive argument.
We need to go no further to judge
that A. 2 is not a good
argument since the premises are not evidence
for the conclusion, A. 2 does not support the conclusion
that the Earth
is not a sphere, but is flat.
,

We,

therefore, have a clear intuitive basis for evaluating

various inductive arguments.

First, we determine whether
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the premises of the
argument are evidence for
the
conclusion, thereby determining
the inductive strength
of
the argument.
If p (c/flT) > P (* c/0>
then 0 is evidence
for C, and 0
c is a strong inductive
argument.
If
P (C/0)
P(v C/0)
then d is not evidence for
c, and 0
c
is a weak inductive
arqument
argument
Tf the argument
if
is weak, then
we are justified in rejecting
the argument as support for
the conclusion.
if the argument is strong,
then we must
determine the truth value or
the probability of the
premises
by determining if P
(0) > P („ 0)
„e may tten determine
the probability of the
conclusion.
,

:

^

.

,

:

.

.

.

If p

P

(t

C/0
C/0

P

.

.

K)

,

K ),

then P
then P

(C)

>

P

«LP

(C)

(n,

(-v

C)

.

(c/0

If p

.

(c /0

k)
.

>

K)

t

C), and the argument fails

to support the conclusion.

Models
1

.

n id
t hS ar 9 aments th ^t have been presented
on behalf
o?
n.
of w
VonD&niken
and clearly evaluate them.
Point
out
S S ° f 1 ductlvel
Y strong arguments with conclusions
? have
?u
K
^
that
low probability. Mote the problems of
detachment and inductive inconsistency.
i

2.

Consider student arguments and evaluate them,
using this
intuitive procedure. Carefully explain and make
as
explicit as possible the considerations that are involved in forming these intuitive views.
Exercises

1.

Have the students write an evaluation of
4.1 and 4.2.

2

Have the students evaluate the arguments
that thev
presented on behalf of Berlitz.

.
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§££

U
a
class discusslon to evaluatI ®® rmuda Trian 9le

ir nt

to

Use a

.

o^LSub section

6

-

A Brief Glance

af

the Problem of

TnHnc^

The problem of induction was
pointed out, in its classical
form, by the 18th century
philosopher, David Hume. We can
see that one way of looking at
induction is to see inductive
arguments as shaping our expectations
of the unknown on the
basis of what is known. For example,
the anticipation of
the future based on our knowledge
of the past.
The problem
of induction is simply:
why this method of relating

premises and conclusions rather than some
other method?
The problem, then, takes the form of a
request for the

justification of this method of inductive argument.

Intuitively, we could rationally justify induction if
we

could prove that it reliably predicts the future, based
on
our knowledge of the past

.

Certainly we could not require

that true premises yield true conclusions all the time in

inductively strong arguments with a high inductive
probability.

This would be to require that inductive
argu-

ments guarantee true conclusions, which we saw
only valid,
sound deductive arguments can do.
However, intuitively, we
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do want an inductive loqic
0 fc true
tftat a
g C thatgets
conclusions most
Of the time, given that
this logic determines
that the
argument in question is
inductively strong and that
the
conclusion has high probability.
We might, therefore,
justify induction by showing
that such inductive arguments
yield true conclusions from
true premises most of the
time.
*.

However, Hume asks by what sort
of reasoning could we
establish that inductively strong
arguments with high inductive probability yield true
conclusions from true
premises most of the time? The
answer, of course, is
either by deductively valid reasoning,
or by inductively
strong reasoning.
It is claimed that Hume then
shows that
neither will successfully reach the
desired result.

Suppose, argues Hume, that we attempt to
use a de-

ductively valid argument to justify induction.

Since we

want the argument to be sound, we can only
use as premises
things that we know.
However, we do not know what the
future will be like.

If we did,

there would be no need for

an inductive logic upon which to base our
predictions.

only know things about the past and present.

We

If the

argument is deductively valid, then the conclusion can make
no factual claim about the future.

(After all,

"most of

the time" does not mean most of the time in the past and
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present, it neans most of
the time in the past,
present
future.)
Since the conclusion
cannot tell us how
successful inductive arguments
will be in the future,
it
cannot prove that inductively
strong arguments with a
high
inductive probability give us
true conclusions "most of
the
time." Therefore, argues
Hume, a deductively valid
argument cannot be used to rationally
justify induction.

Suppose, Hume is said to argue,
that we attempt to use an
in.
uctively strong argument to
justify induction. But how
do we determine that this
argument is inductively strong?
The answer, of course, is that
we test it according to the
standards of inductive strength
defined in inductive logic.
The problem here, of course, is
obvious.
If we attempt to
justify induction in this way, we must
assume that induction
is reliable in order to prove
that it is reliable. This,
as we shall see later, is an instance
of the fallacy known
as begging the question.

Therefore, Hume has shown that there is a
problem in

attempting to justify induction by showing that
providing
both deductive and inductive arguments fails to
justify it.
These are clearly the only alternatives.

Many other proposals for justifying induction, either
by

deductive or inductive arguments, can be
shown to suffer

356

the same consequences,

one such attempt worth
noting
here is based on the claim
that the future resembles
the
past because it is true
that nature is uniform.
However,
as Bertrand Russell pointed
out, nature is not uniform
in
all respects:

The chicken on slaughter day
micrht reason
e

past

,

4-u

a+

.

t

,

hut he was dead wrong."

Therefore, clearly the future does
not resemble the past in
all respects.
Therefore, this principle will not
do to

justify induction.

In our discussion of inductive
logic, we have avoided this

problem by keeping on an intuitive level.

The problem

arises, however, in that there appears
as yet to be no
clearly acceptable solution to the problem
of assigning

actual values to the probabilities of statements
with unknown truth values. One might raise the problem,
given
some assignment of numerical value, by asking
us to justify
this numerical value and not some other.

Many philosophers of science have
attempted to solve or
dissolve this problem raised by
Hume.

For example, this has

been attempted by some of
those philosophers offering
an

.
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account of 'probability.

(The problem of induction

remains one of the important
philosophical problems
demanding solution.)
However, for our purposes here,
it is
clear that inductive logic,
justified or not, is here to
stay, and that it is a useful
and important argumentative
tool

nuutilb
1.

In advanced classes, explain the
various interpretations
of probability and especially how
the
view avoids the problem of induction. subjectivist
Stress that
is problem, while philosophically
very important,
does not prevent us from intuitively
considering
^ rules
of inductive support.

2

Go through several other attempted
solutions, and show
the problems with them.
This anticipates further uses
for the critical skills considered in
this course

.

Subsection

7

-

Evidence and Causes

Many non-deductive arguments do not involve the
notion of

probability at all.
notion of

cause

1

,

Some of these arguments involve the
and are designed to establish, as a

conclusion, the cause of a particular event.

Some of these

arguments involve the notion of 'symptom' and are designed
to establish as conclusions, the symptoms for particular

events.

Such arguments involve particular kinds of

evidential relations between premises
and conclusions;
casual relations and symptomatic
relations.

Although in the
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preceding subsections we were forced
to rely on our
intuitions in accounting for
inductive evidential strength
and inductive probability, we
need not rely completely
on
our intuitions in accounting
for casual evidential
relations
or symtomatic evidential relations
between premises and
conclusions.

The word

'

many different concepts.

cause' as used in English
captures
In fact, ever since Hume

published this Inquiry Concerning Human
Understanding
concept of what may be called empirical
cause has been
a cloud of controversy.
Similarly, the word 'symptom'
used in English captures many different
concepts. For
reason, in considering such non-deductive
arguments it
,

the

under
as

this
is

clearer and more useful to abandon talk of
causes and
symptoms and, instead, to adopt talk of what we

shall call

necessary conditions and sufficient conditions.

From our consideration of deductive logic, these notions
should be familiar.

To state, using 'O' and

'A'

as propo-

sitional variables, 0 I3A, is to state that 0 is a

sufficient condition for
I

A.

For example, to state that 'if

am shot in the head with a bazooka, then

I

shall die'

is

to state that being shot in the head with a bazooka is a

sufficient condition for death.

However, in this statement,

being shot in the head with a bazooka is not

a

necessary

condition for death, since one might die in other ways.

)
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For example, one might
die by being run over by
a train, by
being decapitated ' or by
succumbing to swine flu.
Saying
'I shall die if i
am shot in the head with
a bazooka' is to
say that death is a necessary
condition of being shot in the
head with a bazooka.
This is not to say that death
is a
sufficient condition for being
shot in the head with a
bazooka, because one might die
in other ways.
Therefore, we
can see that to say that 0
is a sufficient condition
for

also to say that
that to state 0

s

and sufficient for
A

is a necessary condition of
o.

A
A

A

is

Recall

is to state that 0 is both
necessary
A.

It follows, of course,

is both necessary and sufficient
for 0.

from this that

(As a

review

exercise, verify these logical
equivalences using truth
tables
.

When we use 'cause' in English, we sometimes
refer to
sufficient condition, as when we say that being

a

shot in the

head with a bazooka caused his death.

refer to a necessary condition.

However, we sometimes

For example, being exposed

to the common cold virus is a necessary
condition for

catching a cold, but is not sufficient, since many who
are
exposed to the common cold virus do not catch

a cold.

Therefore, we refer to this necessary condition when we say
that catching a cold is caused by being exposed to the

common cold virus.

On the other hand, when we refer to

.
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necessary and sufficient
conditions, we sometimes
do not
refer to causes at all but
rather refer to symptoms.
For
example, we might say that
a burning candle is
a sufficient
condition for the presence of
oxygen, but this is not to
say that a burning candle
causes the presence of oxygen;
it
is only to say that the
burning candle is a symptom
of its
presence. Or we might say that
a fever is a necessary
condition for an infection, but
this is not to say that a fever
causes an infection; it is only
to say that the fever is a
symptom of the infection.

Many non-deductive arguments use
both this notion of cause
and this notion of symptom in a very
confusing way.
However, we shall avoid many complex
terminological and
conceptual difficulties by rejecting both
the notions of
cause and symptom in favor of the simple
and rigorously
defined notions of necessary conditions and
sufficient

conditions, since these notions capture all that
we need to
capture for such non-deductive arguments.

Models
1.

Point out the role of logical equivalences in the
discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Together with the class, apply DeMorgan's laws and
list the logical equivalences of 'Pr? O' and of
'P

2.

=

Q'

Show how avoiding questions about causes and symptoms
can lead to more clarity.
Consider teleological
causes, etc.
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.

C

^seeking caus^
Triangle."

1

Lr

e

USe -° f the
the disappear'
disappearances in the notion in
Bermuda
'

Exercises
1

.

equivalences^cite^i^Subsection
2

.

17

t

arI%uf| ic\ ^rconditL:r^ e S

causes that are necessary

Subsection

8

-

s o°

?^
f

tables

SeVeral
,h

the logical

—
'

that

condiSn^L^thLT

Terms, Properties. and
Presence Tables

We must now see how the
notion of necessary conditions
and
sufficient conditions can
be used to provide an
account of
the evidential relations
in non-deductive arguments
that
do not involve a notion
of probability,
In PC we saw that
complex statements were
constructed from simple statements
and the logical connectives.
We may similarly construct
complex terms from simple terms
and the logical connectives
Thus, the term 'bald' may
be conjoined with the term
'fat'
to form the complex term
'bald and fat'.
For clarity,
let us say that terms name
what we shall call properties.
For example, 'bald' names the
property we identify on men
having no hair.
since terms are true of things or
events,

whether a complex term is true of a
given thing or event
depends upon whether what we shall
call the corresponding
complex property composed of constituent
simple properties
IS present or absent in the
given thing or
event.

Thus, for

H

'

:
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clarity, „e may say that a
term is true of a thing
or event
if and only if the
corresponding property named by
the term
is,

in fact, present in that
thing or event; otherwise it
is false of that thing or
event.

We shall use a method to examine
complex properties similar
to the method of truth tables,
and we shall call this
method the method of presence tables,
when the logical

connectives are used to form complex
terms naming complex
properties, we can let 'F\ 'G',
stand for simple terms
and 'P' stand for 'present' and 'A'
stand for
1

'

absent.

the present table for

F

^ F

P

A

A

P

1

% f

is:

and the presence table for F

F

G

PA
P

F

.

P

P

A

P

A
A

A

A

A

.

G is

G

and the presence table for

'

F V G'

is:

Thus,

)

.
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F

G

F V G

P
P

PA

P
p
P

A

A

A

P

A

'

Note that these tables are the same as the truth
tables for
the logical connectives with 'present' substituted for
'true'

and 'absent' substituted for 'false'.

Thus, presence

tables for properties may be constructed for all the logical

connectives, just as truth tables for propositions were

constructed for the logical connectives.
construct a presence table for
'F

e

G'

'FDG',

(As an exercise,
'G

3G',

and

.

We may now define necessary conditions and sufficient con-

ditions in terms of properties:

(i)

A property F is a sufficient condition for a
property G iff whenever F is present, G is
present

(ii)

A property H is a necessary condition for a
property I iff whenever I is present, H is present.

Given these definitions and using the notions of logical
equivalence, the logical connectives, and the presence
tables, we may prove the following principle:

)

.
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If whenever F is
present, G is present.
then whenever
G is absent, F is
absent.

(As an exercise,

construct a presence table
to prove this

principle.

Models
The discussion of terms

present

rrmnovi- ;

j

for 'true', and 'absent' for
'false'.

Exercises
Have the students write presense
tables for all the
1
co nectlve s.
Then present complex properties
J|
and have them
construct presence tables for^them
For example, F 3
G
(H V I)
(

2

.

.

)

® tud nts prove the principle
stated at the end
J
subsection,
and have them deduce anything that
ollows from it, given our notions of
necessary and
sufficient conditions.
.

3.

Prove that the following are correct:
a)

If % G is a sufficient condition for ^
F, then F
is a sufficient condition for G.

b)

If v d is a necessary condition for ^ G,
then G
is a necessary condition for D, etc.

365

Given the presence table
method for determining
the presence
or absence of complex
properties based on the
presence or
absence of simple component
properties, and given our
discussion of necessary and
sufficient conditions, we
are now
ready to consider the method
for finding the necessary
or
the sufficient conditions
of a given property.
We shall
call this method inductive
elimination. The method is
very
simple and is based on testing
alternative properties
to

determine if they are necessary
or sufficient conditions
for
a given property.
Inductive elimination allows
us to

evaluate arguments designed to
show that certain properties
are necessary or sufficient
for certain other properties.
It does so by allowing us to
evaluate the selection of
certain properties that are claimed
to be the causes or to
be the symptoms of certain other
properties by providing a
mechanical test for the proposed
properties.

We shall call properties whose
necessary or sufficient con-

ditions are being sought the conditioned
property

.

We

shall call the properties suspected of
being necessary or
sufficient conditions for a given conditioned
property

poss ible conditioning properties

.

We may select the
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necessary or sufficient
conditioning property for
the
conditioned property from among
the possible conditioning
properties by one of five test
methods: 1) the direct
method of agreement, 2)
the inverse method of
agreement,
3)
the method of difference,
4)
the double method
of

agreement, and

5)

the joint method of agreement
and

difference.

Furthermore, if the examined
possible conditioning properties include the
actual conditioning
property (either necessary,
sufficient, or necessary and
sufficient conditioning property)
then these test methods
,
of inductive elimination lead
to it with certainty.
That
is, successful applications of
inductive elimination allow
us to conclude that a statement
of the form 'if the actual
conditioning property is among the considered
possible
conditioning properties, then this it is'.
It is important
to recognize that everything we shall
say about inductive

elimination, and everything that we shall exclude
concerning
more complex properties, is based upon two
simple

elimination principles:

A necessary condition for a conditioned property
cannot be absent when the conditioned property
is present.
(ii)

A sufficient condition for a conditioned property
cannot be present when the conditioned property
is absent.
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The Direct Method of Agreement

Suppose that we are asked to evaluate
the statement 'a fever
is a necessary condition for
an infection'.
Infection, here,
is the conditioned property, K,
and among the alternative
conditioning properties we find fever,
C.
The direct method
of agreement allows the discovery
of necessary conditions
for a given conditioned property
by the elimination
of

possible necessary conditions by what
we shall call "counterexamples." Given our definition of
'necessary condition',
we know that possible necessary
conditioning property c is
eliminated as an actual necessary conditioning
property for
conditioned property H iff conditioned property
H is present
and C is absent. A counterexample, in
this
test, therefore,

is a specific case that is an example of the
presence of H

and the absence of C.

statement
infection

'a

'

,

To find a counterexample to this

fever is a necessary condition for an
we must find a case in which an infection is

present and a fever is absent.
us to conclude that

'a

Finding such

a case

entitles

fever is a necessary condition for

an infection' is false.

Suppose that the possible conditioning properties E, F, G,
H and I are to be

tested to determine which are necessary

conditions for conditioned property

J.

By our definition,
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any such property
that is absent
sent when Jt is
<
present cannot be
a necessary
condition for J. Clearly,
clearlv experimental
e

“

° th

"

observations are

« g „l„ a

to datereine tt.
F r,„ n= . 0 r absent, o, the,.
.a „ aitlo „ im
,

properties in occurrences
where the conditioned
property
as present.
Thus, the determination
of a counterexample
wall depend on tests and
corresponding observations.
Consider the following
presence table:

Possible Conditioning
Properties
H

Conditioned
Properties
J

test

occurrence

1

A

occurrence

2

A

test
occurrence

3

A

A

test

Occurrence

A
A

A

shows us that E is not a necessary
condition
for J.
Therefore, this occurrence counts
as a counterexample to the statement 'E is a
necessary condition for
1

J'.

Therefore, we know that this statement
is false.
Occurrence 1 also shows us that I is
not a necessary con-

dition for J.

Occurrence

again for E and occurrence
again for E.

has the same results for G and

2

3

has the same results for F and

.
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The only candidate left is
H.
yet, show that H is

However, this does not, as
a necessary condition
for j.
it

is

important to note that it only
shows a conditional of the
torm 'If one of the possible
conditioning properties E,
P- G, H,

I

is a necessary condition
for J, then H is that

necessary condition'.

However, we might consider the
claim that while E is not a
necessary condition for J m e is.
Remember that, according
to the presence table for negation, m
E is present when E
is absent.
Therefore, we might consider adding
such complex
properties
,

Possible Conditioning Properties
Simple
Complex
E

test
occurrence

1

test
occurrence

2

test

occurrence

3

F

G

H

I

apppa
APAPP
aappa

^ E

^ F

^ G

P

a

A

A

P

p

a

p

a

a

p

p

a

a

p

Conditioned Property
J

test
occurrence

1

P

test
occurrence

2

P

test
occurrence

3

p

H

%

I

.
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Occurrence

1

shows that E,

necessary conditions for J.
^ F,

-v

H,

Occurrence

and
3

a.

I

I

'

% F, % g and ^ h
are not

Occurrence

2

shows that E, G,

are not necessary conditions
for J.

shows that E, F, I, a G and
,

necessary conditions for J.

a,

H are not

Therefore, all have been

eliminated as necessary conditions
except H and a, E
Therefore, if one or more of the
possible conditioning
properties, E, F, G, H, I, a E , a, F, a
a,
.

G

,

H

,

and a I are

necessary conditions for J, then H and a
E are those
necessary conditions

Since we can determine the presence or absence
of a complex

property like

'E

V F' in a given occurrence by knowing the

presence or absence of its simple component
properties, we
may assign values to complex properties simply by
appeal to
the presence tables for their logical connectives,
and by

appeal to the actual values of their simple component

properties in a given occurrence

.

Any such property that

is absent when J is present cannot be a necessary
condition

for J.

This method can be compared to a method by which Sherlock

Holmes eliminates suspects in a murder case, one by one.
Holmes does not know beforehand that he will be able to

eliminate all but one suspect, since there may have been

.
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a

conspiracy or since the list of
suspects may not includ e
the real murderer.
Likewise, in this method we
must real i z e
that a conditioned property
may have more than one
necessary
condition and that our list of
possible conditioning

properties may not include the
necessary conditions.

Models
1

.

wsTiaiSK sr2

.

3.

a
the ® llm nation principles and
explain how
simole their
simple
?he?r application
j
is, given test procedures.
9
USS thS
method of agreement
to ?est
test claims
c^imf about necessary direCt
conditions for
disappearances in the Bermuda Triangle.

Exercises
1

2.

.

In the first example, which of the
following complex
properties are eliminated as necessary conditions
for
J by test occurrences
1, 2 and 3?
a)

% F

b)

^ G

c)

^ H

d)

% I

e)

F v

f)

G v H

I

Consider Berlitz' suggestions about the causes of
various disappearances in the Bermuda Triangle.
Construct a series of tests to determine the necessary
conditions for such disappearances. Consider the ships
Rosalie the Mary Celeste and the Cyclops
,

,
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§Hbgg£^AO^nduc^e^llminat ion

:

The Inv.r..

of Agreement

Suppose that we are asked to evaluate
the statement 'being
shot
the head with a bazooka is a
sufficient condition
for death
Death here is the conditioned property

m

1

.

H,

and

among the alternative conditioning
properties we find being
shot in the head with a bazooka, C.
The inverse method of
agreement allows the discovery of sufficient
conditions for
a given conditioned property by
the elimination of possible
sufficient conditions by counterexample. Given
our

definition of 'sufficient condition

1

,

we know that possible

sufficient conditioning property C is eliminated
as an
actual sufficient conditioning property for
conditioned

property
absent.

II

iff C is present and conditioned property H
is

A counterexample in this test, therefore, is a

specific case that is an example of the presence of C and
the absence of H.

ment

To find a counterexample to the state-

being shot in the head with

condition for death

1

,

a

bazooka is a sufficient

we must find a case in which someone

is shot in the head with a bazooka and does not die.

Finding such a case entitles us to conclude that 'being
shot in the head with a bazooka is a sufficient condition
for death

1

is false.
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Suppose that the possible conditioning
properties E F, G,
H and I are to be tested
to determine which are
sufficient
conditions for conditioned property J.
By our definition,
any such property that is present
when J is absent cannot
be a sufficient condition for J.
Again, the determination
of counterexamples will depend on
tests and corresponding
observations. Consider the following presence
,

table:

Possible Conditioning
Properties
F

G

H

I

J

test
occurrence

1

P

A

A

A

a

test
occurrence

2

A

P

a

A

a

test
occurrence

3

P

A

P

a

a

Occurrence
for J.

1

shows us that F is not a sufficient condition

Therefore, this occurrence counts as a counter-

example to the statement
J'.

Conditioned
Property

'F

is a sufficient condition for

Therefore, we know that this statement is false.

Occurrence

2

has the same result for G, and occurrence

3

has the same results for H and again for F.

The only candidate left is
yet, show that

I

is

a

I.

However, this does not, as

sufficient condition for

J.

It is
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important to note that it only
shows a conditional of
the
form 'if one of the possible
conditioning properties P, G,
H 3nd 1 iS suffic ient
condition for J, then 1 i s that
sufficient condition'.

We may use the same method when
dealing with complex
properties; a complex property that
is present when a
conditioned property is absent cannot
be a sufficient condition fo r that property.

This method also can be compared to
a method by which
Sherlock Holmes eliminates suspects in
a murder case, one
by one.
Like Holmes in regard to his suspects,
in this
method, we must realize that a conditioned
property may have
more than one sufficient condition and that
our list of

possible conditioning properties may not yet
include the
sufficient conditions.

Models
1.

Suggest how one might use the inverse method of
agreement to test claims about sufficient conditions
for disappearances in the Bermuda Triangle.

2.

Begin a consideration of Arigo and point out the
possible use of such test procedures to determine
causes for phenomena cited by Fuller.

Exercises
1.

Prove that the inverse method of agreement is logically
equivalent to the direct method of agreement applied to
negative properties.
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2

.

3.

Construct a series of test occurrences
designed to
determine the sufficient condition for a
property J given complex properties (F V conditioned
%
(H
cm
and (I r? F) in addition to the properties G)
listed in the
example and their negations.
Propose tests that could be used to point out
the
sufficient conditions for Arigo's meaningless scroll
translated" by a typist into prescriptions.
(Focus
on the relation between the scroll and the
typist.)

Subsection 11

-

Inductive Elimination:

The Method of

Difference

Suppose that we find a man dead, with no evidence of physical
violence, and are asked to evaluate the statement 'this man
disd of cancer

'

.

It is clear that we seek a sufficient

condition for death, but we are not seeking just any
sufficient condition; we seek a sufficient condition for

death among the properties present in this particular
occurrence.

This question limited to a particular context

cannot arise for necessary conditions, since it follows from
the definition of

'necessary condition' that whenever the

conditioned property occurs, all necessary conditioning
properties automatically occur.

Therefore, we can see that

the question "What are the necessary conditons for death?"

and "What are the necessary conditions for this man's death?"

have the same answer.

sufficient conditions.

However, such is not the case for

When a given conditioned property

such as death is present, some of its sufficient

.

,
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conditioning properties may be absent.

Thus, the list of

conditioning properties to be considered in
this particular
occurrence will be shorter than if we are
considering
a

list

of possible conditioning properties simply
sufficient for
death.

We might proceed as follows.

Since we know that there is

no evidence of physical violence, we may rule
out as

possible conditioning properties all properties having
to do
with physically violent death (bazookas, trains, knives,
etc.).

attack

We may, therefore, consider poisons, disease, heart
,

etc.

and rule them in or out on the basis of the

other properties that are present.

For example, being

emaciated, or being muscular, etc.

The actual method is

the same as the inverse method of agreement.

A property

that is present when the conditioned property is absent

cannot be a sufficient condition for the conditioned

property

Let us define such an actual occurrence as follows:
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Narrowed Down
Possible Conditioning
Properties

actual
occurrence

Conditioned
Properties

F

G

H

I

J

P

A

P

p

P

test
occurrence

1

P

A

A

A

A

test
occurrence

2

A

A

A

P

A

Test occurrences

1

and

2

eliminate F and

I

as sufficient

conditions for J by our principle, since F is
present and J
is absent in occurrence 1
and I is present and J is absent
,

in occurrence 2.

Only H is left from among the possible

conditioning properties present in the actual occurrence.
Therefore, we may conclude that if one of the possible

conditioning properties F, G,

H,

or

I,

which were present in

the actual occurrence is a sufficient condition for
J, then
H is that sufficient condition.

sufficient condition for J

,

Mote that G might also be a

but it is not of interest to us

for the method of difference because it was absent in the

actual occurrence.

Again, we may use the same method when dealing with complex

properties.

Again, we are limited to the properties involved

in the actual occurrence.

Otherwise the method is the same

as for the inverse method of agreement.

For example:
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Narrowed Down Possible Conditioning
Properties
Simple
F

actual
occurrence

Complex

G

H

I

P

A

P

p

test
occurrence

1

P

A

A

P

test
occurrence

2

A

A

A

p

^ F

^ G

H

'V

^

I

A

Conditioned Property
J

actual
occurrence

p

test
occurrence

1

a

test
occurrence

2

A

Clearly, given the actual occurrence, if both simple

properties and their negations are allowed as possible

conditioning properties, exactly half will be candidates
for being the sufficient condition since exactly half will
be present in any occurrences.

occurrence F, H,

I,

conditions for J.
test occurrence

2

^ G

,

Therefore, given the actual

are candidates for being sufficient

Test occurrence

eliminates

G.

1

eliminates

I

and G, and

Therefore, if one of the

possible conditioning properties present
in the actual

occurrence is a sufficient condition
for J, then H is that
sufficient condition.

.

.

•
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Models

Explain that the method of
be applied to what we have differencef iq moct-1 llkely to
referred n
non-recurring
events in which we seek the
oartirinL
1
condition for the event in
case
Use
f^
t
f h" Fuller s book
such as Arigo ’s "eye
surgery
surqerv" with the
y
t
rusty knive
Tt W3 q
u
““
anyone but Arigo placed a knife
t£“yXi?
ormuiate a set of possible conditioning
properties
ex la i n several test occurrences
?
to discover the
sufficient condition for this
phenomenon.
Discuss the use of complex conditioning
properties other
than negative properties. Consider
conjunctive
S
COn itional Properties
Give examples
of stth nrooett
^
les
fr ° ra Fuller s book on Arigo.
p
Use
2
^
°
°
rfference to discover from among a set
of
compiex properties a complex property
that is a
Clent cond rtion for the property of
'appearing
y
to have an operation.'
i

L

•

1

n

^

,

'

.

T

1

“

Exercises
1

*

the students apply the method of difference
to the
following situation:

Possible Conditioning Properties
Simple

actual
occurrences

Complex

FGHI
PAAP

A

P

p

a

Conditioned Property
J

actual
occurrences
a)

P

Describe a test result that would eliminate all the
candidates but one
i

b)

Describe a test result that would eliminate
all the
candidates
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c)

mat

are the conclusions to be
drawn, given the
actual occurrences and the results

you^escribe?

2

.

t e rodents
P ick an occurrence described in
PnT?
uiier V s book and formulate a test
procedure to find
the sufficient condition for
this particular occurrence

S ubsection

12

-

I nductive

Elimination:

The Double Method

of Agreement

Suppose that we are asked to evaluate a
statement of the
form F is a necessary and a sufficient
condition for J'.
We have already considered a method for
finding necessary

conditions, namely the direct method agreement, and
two

methods for finding sufficient conditions, namely
the
inverse method of agreement and the method of difference.
We may combine the direct and inverse methods of
agreement

form what we shall call the double method of agreement.
This will allow us to apply our principles of elimination
to determine necessary and sufficient conditions.

Consider the following example:
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Possible Conditioning
Properties

—lm P le
—
test
occurrence

1

test
occurrence

2

test
occurrence

3

test
occurrence

4

£

Complex

£

PAp

A

A

APPP

p

Ap

P

P

AAA

A

p

A

PA

P

AAA
AP

A

PPP

Conditioned Property

J_
test
occurrence

1

p

test
occurrence

2

p

test
occurrence

3

A

test
occurrence

4

a

First, applying the direct method of agreement,
test

occurrence

occurrence

1
2

eliminates G,

% f, and

I,

eliminates F, ^ G, ^ H, and ^

and test

,

I

as necessary

conditions for J, since they are absent when J is present.
Given test occurrences

1

and

2

,

by applying the direct

method of agreement, we can conclude
that if one of the
possible conditioning properties
is a necessary condition
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for J, then H is that necessary
condition.

Secondly,

applying the inverse method of
agreement, test occurrence
3 eliminates G, I
% F, and % H, and test
occurrence 4
eliminates F, % G, % H and % I as
sufficient conditions
for J since they are present when
J is absent.
,

,

Given test

occurrences

3

and

4

,

by applying the inverse method
of

agreement, we can conclude that if one
of the possible conditioning properties is a sufficient
condition for J, then
H is that sufficient condition.

We may then combine these

test results obtained by the direct method
of agreement and
the inverse method of agreement and
conclude that if one of
the possible conditioning properties is both
a necessary

and a sufficient condition for J, then H is that
property.

Models
1.

Introduce the notion of an expectation influenced
observation.
(Rely on a magic trick to explain this
concept.)
Consider a simple rope trick; tie a knot
in a rope while "holding" the ends in each hand, and
ask students to record their observations, and produce
a condition that is both necessary and sufficient
to
explain the trick, by using the double method of
agreement. Point out that the difficulty will be
selecting the possible conditioning properties.

2.

Provide more examples from Fuller's book on Arigo to
show how the double method of agreement can be used
to find necessary and sufficient conditions.
Exercises

1

.

Have the students use the double method of agreement to
provide a possible necessary and a sufficient
condition
°r Ango's supposed ability to
stop the flow of blood
P ° int
to them the
ty and the importance of
selecting possible
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inf luence^observation^nd 11

^

*

abou? the complex properties^?
|“ ~g‘“ Y
I
- F), given the presence
table as ‘desclibld?
a)
Test occurrence 1?
•

(

b)

Test occurrence 2?

c)

Test occurrence 3?

d)

Test occurrence 4?

e)

What can we conclude about these
properties in
xn
relation to J?

S ubsection

13

Induct ive Elimination:

The Joint Method of

Agreement and Difference

Suppose that we are asked to evaluate a
statement of the
form F is a necessary and a sufficient
condition for J',
limited to a particular actual occurrence of
possible

conditioning properties.

This, as we can see, combines the

direct method of agreement and the method of
difference.

Consider the following example:
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Possible Conditioning
Propert les
Simple
Complex
F

G

H

% F

I

Papa

actual
occurrence
test
occurrence

1

p

A

A

A

test
occurrence

2

A

P

p

p

% Q

^ H

%

I

A
A

Conditioned Properties
J

actual
occurrence
test
occurrence

1

test
occurrence

2

First, applying the method of difference
to the actual

occurrence provides us with the candidates for
the
sufficient condition for J: F, H, % g, and %
I.

occurrence

1,

however, eliminates F, ^ G, and ^

sufficient conditions for J
when J is absent.

,

I

Test
as

since they are all present

This leaves only H.

actual occurrence and test occurrence

Therefore, given the
1,

if one of the

possible conditioning properties present in the actual

occurrence is a sufficient condition for
sufficient condition.

J,

then H is that

Secondly, applying the direct method
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Of agreement again to the
actual occurrence
provides us
with the candidates for the
necessary condition for
F
j,
H, «. G, and v i.
Test occurrence 2, however,
eliminates F,
-v
G, and - I.
Test occurrence 2, however,
eliminates F,
G
and v
as necessary conditions
for J since they are
absent in an occurrence where
J is present.
This leaves
,

,

only

H.

Therefore, given the actual
occurrence and test
occurrence 2, if one of the possible
conditioning properties
present in the actual occurrence
is a necessary condition
for J, then H is that necessary
condition. We may then
combine these test results obtained
by the method of
difference and the direct method of
agreement and conclude
that if one of the possible conditioning
properties present
in the actual occurrence is a
sufficient condition for J
and if one of the possible conditioning
properties is a

necessary condition for J, then the possible
conditioning
property H is both a necessary and sufficient
condition
for J.

Models
1.

Fuller describes the investigation of Arigo as a
full
scale, complete scientific investigation.
Suppose
that this is a particular conditioned phenomena.
First
use the double method of agreement to arrive at a
necessary and sufficient condition for such an investigation. Then use the joint method of agreement
and difference (given the investigation of Arigo that
Fuller presents) to determine the necessary and
sufficient condition appealed to by Fuller for such an
investigation.
Point out that the problem of course.

%

..
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complete scientific investigation? W3S n0t 3
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Exercises
1

.

Suppose you observe the following:
Possible Conditioning Properties
S-

_F

Test
Test
Test

1
2
3

P
P

A

im P le

Complex

—-

H

p

A

A

A

A

p

P

v G

v h

A

A

P

P

A

A

p

P

P

P

p

A

A

A

1

F

%

i

Conditioned Property

_jJ

2.

Test

1

P

Test

2

A

Test

3

P

a)

Which could be a necessary condition for
J?

b)

Which could be sufficient for J?

c)

Which could be both necessary and sufficient?
Why?

Why?

Have the students write a short essay in which they:
a)

State sufficient conditions for using inductive
elimination

b)

State necessary conditions for using inductive
elimination

why?

.
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Subsection 14

-

The Applications of Inductive
Elimination

Inductive elimination is useful, as
we have seen, when we
are evaluating statements for which
we can devise some sort
of empirical test procedure.
For example, suppose that we
are asked to evaluate the statement
'Norbu Chen's psychic
power is a sufficient condition for
restoring health to his
patients'.
Clearly we shall use the inverse method
of
agreement.

However, this method depends for its
usefulness

on the selection of possible conditioning
properties likely
to include the actual sufficient condition
for restoring

health to his patients.

Furthermore, it assumes for the

purpose of the test, that his patients are indeed healthy
after this psychic treatment.

This, unfortunately, is not

mechanical decision procedure, like inductive elimination.
based again on what we have referred to as inductive
intuitions.

In providing possible conditioning properties

to test using inductive elimination we must use our in-

ductive intuitions to distinguish relevant conditioning

properties from irrelevant, yet still possible, conditioning

properties

For example, in determining sufficient conditions for the

conditioned property, we might include as possible con-

ditioning properties:

already healthy, psychic power.

388

Placebo effect, earlier drugs,
simultaneous medical treatment, spontaneous remission,
psychosomatic
illness, and

certain properties formed by
negation, or the other
logical
connectives, and these simple
properties. We might exclude
as irrelevant possible
conditioning properties: dormancy
of disease, since the case
described assumes
that his

patients are indeed healthy after
his psychic treatment.
We may then observe test occurrences
to note the presence
or the absence of the possible
conditioning properties and
and the corresponding presence or
absence of the conditioned
property.

However, the method of inductive elimination
also depends
for its usefulness on the ability to
gather such data and

perform such tests in numerous test occurrences
to eliminate
one by one the possible conditioning
properties. When it
is not physically or technologically possible
to gather such

data or to perform such tests

(as

when Norbu will not, in

fact, permit such tests or when there are no records
to

serve as data)

,

we must again rely on constructing

inductively strong arguments with a high inductive
probability.

Therefore, the application of inductive

elimination depends upon the selection of possible con-

ditioning properties and the ability to gather data and

perform such tests.

s
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Section Three:

Su bsection 1 - Clarifying

Clarifying Arguments

^

Logical Form of

.

The Principles of Charity

We have now seen how we
can evaluate both inductive
and

deductive arguments.

We have also seen that
when such

arguments are used in an attempt
to support certain conclusions, they are often not
presented as clearly as they
might be.
For example, both A. 1 and A. 2
were formulated on
Voliva's behalf, given less clear
statements of each
argument. We have also considered
various arguments uncleanly presented by various authors
and found that in order
to evaluate these arguments, we
must first attempt
to

present them in deductively valid or
inductively strong
logical form.
If this is not possible, then we
may argue
that they are invalid, or inductively
weak.
Therefore, an
argument composed of a statement or set of
statements as
premises and a statement of a conclusion said
to follow
from them deductively or inductively may be
unclear because
the logical form of the statement or set of statements
is

unclear

We may use PC

,

LPC or inductive logic in the attempt to

capture the logical form of such unclear arguments.

First
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we must decide if the
argument can be most
plausibly and
Clearly formulated as a
deductive or as an inductive
argument. For example, reading
over the paragraph from
which A.i was formulated,
we can see the logical
relationships of statements in a
conditional form and the negation
of the consequent in the
premises leading to the negation
of the antecedent as the
conclusion. We immediately

recognize this as a deductively
valid logical relation.
However, reading over the
paragraph from which A. 2 was
formulated, we can see no such
logical relationship between
the premises and the conclusion.
Rather, the premises are
intended as evidence to support the
conclusion. Therefore,
we immediately recognize this as
an attempt to provide an
inductive relation between the premises
and the conclusion.

Sometimes authors presenting such arguments
present
obviously invalid deductive arguments.
In clarifying such
arguments, it is important to capture this
invalid logical
form if and only if the conclusion reached
by the argument

depends for its support completely on this invalid
logical
move.
We may, therefore, clarify the argument by capturing
this logical form, and evaluate the argument by
showing
that the argument fails to support the conclusion because
the conclusion depends for its support
completely on an in-

valid logical move.

For example, an author may present

,
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an argument of the
form:

1

•

A

2

.

O

30

We may then just capture
its logical form and point
out that
deductive arguments of this
form do not support their
conelusions even if the premises
are true.

Sometimes authors like Voliva,
in presenting such arguments,
present what are invalid deductive
arguments when rigorously
interpreted. However, in clarifying
such arguments, it is
important to capture a valid logical
form if the conclusion
reached by the argument does not
at all depend for
its

support on this invalid logical move.

We may, therefore,

clarify the argument by presenting it
in a valid deductive
logical form and evaluate the argument
by showing that the
argument is or is not sound.
In clarifying Voliva s first
argument, we put it into deductively valid
•

logical form in

terms of A.l and then showed that while
valid, A.l failed to
support its conclusion because it was unsound.

sometimes authors presenting such arguments present

obviously inductively weak arguments.

In clarifying such

arguments, it is important to capture this inductive
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weakness if and only if
the concluslon reache(J
by
argument is supportable by
no other

^

relevant, known

evidence.

We may,

therefore, clarify the
argument by
capturing this inductive
weakness and evaluate the
argument
by showing that since
the argument is weak,
the probability
of the conclusion is
low, and that, therefore,
the argument
fails to support the
conclusion. For example, in
clarifying
Voliva's second argument, we
put it into an inductive
logical form in terms of A.
2 and then showed that
A. 2 was
inductively weak and that,
therefore, A. 2 failed to support
its conclusion.

Sometimes authors presenting such
arguments present what are
inductively weak arguments that may
be strengthened on the
basis of other relevant known
evidence.
clarifying such
arguments it is important to capture
an inductively strong
argument if the conclusion reached
by the argument is
supported by other relevant known evidence.

m

We may,

therefore, clarify the argument by
providing the additional
premises required to present an inductively
strong argument,

and evaluate the argument by calculating
the probability of
the conclusion.

In supplying such missing premises and
putting arguments

into deductively valid logical form, or inductively
strong

.
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logical form, given the
necessary and sufficient
conditions
for doing so stated
above, or deciding that
argents
depend upon invalid deductive
form or inductively weak
logical form, we are applying
what we call the principle
of
charity.
The principle of charity
states that the clearest
and most plausible
construal possible of a given
argument
that is consistent with
its author's expressed or
implied
views must be provided before
a conceptually significant
critical evaluation of the
argument can take place. This
prniciple was applied to all
four cases considered above.
To preserve conceptually
significant criticism, we shall
require the principle of charity
be applied when evaluating
arguments presented by various
authors.

However, we often must apply the
principle of charity to
more than simply the logical form
of arguments in order to

clarify such arguments before evaluating
them.
This
principle may also be applied to unclear
expressions as
well

Models
1

.

Present several examples of arguments with unclear
logical form.
Consider arguments presented by
VonDSniken, Berlitz, Fuller, or Blum. While repairing
t eir logical form, explain the
principle of charity
by intuitively considering the
notion of conceptually
significant criticism. Point out
that conceptually

rp

“'* "*• “*

detects of a given
argument

- in

this case
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Exercises
V
hS studei ts distinguish
arguments which depend
on Qom
me error ? logical form to
support the conclusion
from arguments that have repairable
logical forms

m

Have the students repair these
repairable arguments bv
^
applying the principle of charity.

S ubsection 2

-

Clarifying th e Intensions and Extensions
of

Expressions

To see when and how we might apply the
principle of charity
to an author's use of a predicate or
a term or a statement,

we must first understand how a predicate,
term, or statement can be used unclear ly, and how their unclear
uses are
to be evaluated.

We may, therefore, by appeal to the

principle of charity, reconstrue arguments using such
unclear predicates, terms or statements, or show that
such
arguments fail to support their conclusions because of such
unclear predicates, terms or statements.

We have seen that predicate terms are true of
certain things.

We have also seen that the set of
things that

a

predicate

p

.
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is true of is called
the extension of the
predicate term,

Thus, for example, the
extension of 'red' is all
red things.
Predicate terms also have what
are called intensions.
The
intension of a predicate term
is its meaning, which
is the
property or concept it expresses
For example, the
intension of the predicate 'red'
is the property or concept

redness

Individual terms such as ’dog' also
have extensions and
intensions.
The extension of an individual
term is the set
of things it refers to. For
example, the extension of 'dog
is the thing that the individual
term refers to; namely all
dogs. The intension of an individual
term is its meaning,
which is the concept it expresses.
For example,
the

intension of 'dog' is the concept of dog.

Statements also have extensions and intensions.

The

extension of a statement is the truth value
of the statement.
For example, the extension of
(p
is
q) 3>
'

'true'.

'

The intension of a statement also is its meaning,

which in turn is what we shall call the proposition
it
expresses.

For example, consider the statement 'Miss

Jones and Miss Smith walked to Woolco to buy

a

box of candy

and an umbrella', and the statement 'Miss
Smith and

Miss Jones walked to Woolco to buy an umbrella and
candy'.

Both statements have the same intension.

a

box of

)

,
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Therefore, we say that the two
statements are cointentional
that is, they express the same
proposition.

This consideration of the
extension and the intension of
predicates, individual terms, and
statements leads to the
following definitions:

D. (1)

D. (2)

1I dlvdua l term, or statement
is
?
sa?d
said to be coextensional
with a given predicate
term, individual term or statement
iff both
predicate terms, individual terms, or
statements have
the same extension.

A predicate term, individual term,
or statement is
saad
pomten sional with a given predicate term
individual term, or statement iff both
predicate
terms, individual terms, or statements
have the
same intension.

These two definitions, in turn, lead to two
principles which
are important for the evaluation of certain
arguments:

P.(l)

The substitution of coextensional predicates,
individual terms, or statements for corresponding
predicates, individual terms, or statements
preserves extension.

P

The substitution of cointensional predicates,
individual terms, or statements for corresponding
predicates, individual terms, or statements
preserves intension.

•

(2

Consider

P. (1)

.

Suppose we know that 'the morning star' and

'the evening star' are both expressions
that refer to the

planet Venus; that is, that they are
coextensional.

.

.
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before,
f°r

'

P.,1, allows us to
substitute

thS SVening Star

'

ln the following
statement and

preserve extension; that is,
be assured of making
the
statement about the same
object, namely Venus:
'the evening
Star is further from Earth
than Mars'.

Consider P.

Suppose we know that 'brother'
and 'male
sibling' both have the same
meaning; that is, that they
are
cointensional.
Therefore, P. (2) allows us to
substitute
'brother' for 'male sibling- in
the following statement
and preserve intension; that
is, be assured of making a
statement with the same meaning:
'Joe is Henry's male
sibling
These principles are, therefore,
useful in
arguments for assuring the preservation
of extension or
intension
(2)

.

However

often authors of arguments confuse these
two
principles and the result may be seen as
an appeal to
false principle: the substitution of
coextensional
,

expressions preserves intension.
to be false.

of a tautology
star'.

a

This can easily be seen

Suppose we have a statement in the logical form
,

'the morning star is identical to the morning

This statement is necessarily true since everything

is self-identical.

The assignment of 'true' to this

statement is based on the intension of 'the
morning star'.

'
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Now suppose we substitute
'the evening star' into
this
statement as follows:
'the morning star is identical
to the
evening star'. This also turns
out to be true,
but for

quite different reasons.

The substitution has not
preserved

intension.

We must learn some astronomy
to determine that
this statement is true; we must
learn that, as a matter of
fact, 'the morning star' and
'the evening star' refer to
the
same object.
We needed no astronomy to determine
that the
tautology was true; we know that
everything is

self-identical.

coextensional

,

Therefore, if two expressions are
their substitution one for the other
does

not preserve intension.

It follows from our consideration of
extensions and

intensions that

statement in an argument may be unclear

a

because the extension or the intension of a term
or terms in
that statement is unclear.
For example, consider the
following statements:

There is rational and viable evidence that many cases
of psychosis, from schizophrenia to dementia praecox,
could be ascribed to the phenomenon of "possession" by an
alleged spirit that refuses to accept the fact that he
or she is dead
and
1

,

'The spirit, whether good or bad, is said to be
incorporated" in the living body of a receptive person.
(Fuller, p. 7)
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There are several unclear terms
in these two statements
which must be clarified as much
as possible before they
are
used in statements of evidence
in inductive arguments,
or in
statements involving logical relations
in deductive
arguments.
This uncertainty can be seen by
asking questions
like "What is the extension of
'rational and viable

evidence'?"

"Does it include the claims of
mediums?"

is its intension?"

"what

"what is the intension of 'spirit'?"

"What is the extension?"

"Do spirits refuse to accept

facts?"

"What is the intension of 'refuses to
accept a

fact'?"

"What is the intension of 'receptive
person'?"

Does its extension include members of the
traveler's aid
society?" These questions and the absence of
clear answers
to them, given the passage,

show that we do not understand

the argument well enough to evaluate it.

Often, however,

our evaluation may simply be that the terms have no
clear
intension, and that, therefore, arguments using these

unclear terms are simply no good.

Such no good arguments are said to contain improperly vague
or ambiguous terms.

Properly vague terms like 'bald' can be

used clearly without being able clearly to specify its
extension.

However, improperly vague terms have no clear

intension.

For example,

improperly vague term.

'spirit' considered above is an

A term, in a given context, is said

.

,
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to be ambiguous when
we are unable clearly
to determine
which of the possible extensions
or which of the possible

intensions of the term is being
used.

For example,

'incorporated' as used above is
an ambiguous term.

The notions of extensionality
and intensionality help
us
understand other confusions which
must be recognized
or

clarified before we can proceed
with conceptually
significant criticism of conceptually
significant arguments
Often, however, we must be content
to point out that the
extensions and intensions of terms and
statement used in
some arguments cannot be determined
and that,
therefore,

the arguments are not conceptually
significant and can be
relegated to the rubbish.

Models

Clearly distinguish vagueness from abmiguity.
Provide
examples of arguments with improperly vague
and ambituous
terms (anticipate our discussion of fallacies
in
Section 5)
Point out that many are so unclear as to be
conceptually insignificant, but that others, while
unclear, may be clarified somehow (anticipate
our
discussion of definition and explication in Subsections
5 and 6)
.

Exercises
1.

Given D. (1) and D. (2)
P. (1) and P. (2)
provide all the
true principles you can about intensionality and
extensionality.
,

.
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^ ve

2

th e students a list of statements
and ask them
116
m P ro P® rl y vague, and ambiguous to
terms.
terms
Have them explain
|
why each is vamio^- improperly
-im^vvague, or ambiguous in terms of
extensions
intensions.

'

““L^th™

Subsection

3

-

'

i

Equivocal Uses of Terms

As well as being unclear because its
terms are unclear,
statements in arguments may also be unclear
because of what
we shall call the equivocal use of a term
or terms in the

statements.

The equivocal use of a term involves
confusing

different intensions or extensions of the same term.
For example, consider the following argument:

3.1
1.
2
:.

3.

The end of a thing is its perfection.
Death is the end of life.
Death is the perfection of life.

In premise 1,
2,

'end'

end

1

is used to mean

is used to mean

'good

'termination'.

1

,

but in premise

In this case,

different intensions of the same term are confused.
Therefore, if we were capturing the logical form of this
argument, we could not correctly translate both occurrences
of 'end' using the same predicate constant 'E'; we instead

distinguish the non-cointensional senses of 'end' by using,
for example,

'G'

for

'end'

in premise

1

and

'T'

for 'end'

.
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in premise

in accordance with our rule
that predicate

2

constants be used univocally.

Therefore, when correctly

capturing the logical form of this
argument by recognizing
the equivocal use of end
we can see that the argument
is not deductively valid.
’

•

,

Models
1

.

Review briefly our requirement that
propositional
constants and predicate constants be used
univocally.
Point out why we specified this as a
requirement for
transition of an argument's logical form into
PC and

J-J

£

•

2.

Provide examples from the reading of
equivocation
(anticipate our discussion of informal fallacies
in
Section 5)

3.

Point out that an argument that depends on an
equivocal
use of a term to support the conclusion is
intuitively
not conceptually significant.
Explain why this is so
and consider examples from Fuller.
Consider 'surgery'.

Exercises
1.

Present a series of arguments involving the equivocal
use of terms, either from the reading or from logic
texts.
Have the students correctly capture their
logical form and point out the equivocal use of a term
or terms.

2

Have the students write a paper in which they argue that
'cure* is used equivocally by faith healers (this will
anticipate our discussion of definition and explication)

.

Subsection

4

-

Psychological Contexts

Arguments are sometimes unclear because of errors resulting
from the failure to notice the presence of what we shall

.
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call psychological
contexts.

By 'psychological
contexts'

we shall mean statements
containing the expressions
'is
aware that', 'believes
that', 'is so called
,,
says
nows that , doubts that',
or others containing
what we
might intuitively call
psychological expressions.
Many
uses of such psychological
contexts are clear and
unproblematic. For example.

^

,

4.1
1

.

luTanT?
the farth.

27

:.

I

7

at the arth travels
around the
? 3t the
a ” are
Moon Navels around

am aware that the Moon
travels around the Earth

However, the failure to understand
and correctly deal with
psychological contexts can lead to
the construction of

deductively invlaid arguments.

Consider the following

example of a deductively invalid
argument:

4.2
1.
2
.

•

3.

Bigfoot is so called because he wears
size 15
shoes
Bigfoot is Jim Wilson.
Jim Wilson is so called because he wears
size 15
shoes.

The problem with this argument involves
premise one.

Premise one, for the purpose of a deductive
argument, should
be translated as "'Bigfoot' is used to
refer to Jim Wilson
because he wears size 15 shoes." Thus, correctly

translated,
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the conclusion

3

does not follow deductively
from

1 and 2
However, other deductive
arguments using psychological
contexts are more difficult and
demand more attention.
.

Suppose that we are attempting
to translate and evaluate
the
validity of an argument containing
as a premise, the
statement

believes a = the President of the
United States
S a person and a is
another
person. Let'
f
p stand i
P
for President of the United
Given our discussion of translating State'
definite
° Ur logical symbols, we can
translate 1 in two ways, which we
shall call
small scope and large scope.

(i)

s

,

(

(ii)

(

(iii)

Here

(ii)

s

x)

)

[(Vy) (Py

believes

(

—

x)

y = x)
[

.

s

believes a =

(Vy) (Py e y = x)

.

x]

,

or

a = x]

is called small scope since the scope
of the

belief is limited to a = x.

A statement with this logical

form is false either if there is no x that is P,
or if
there is more than one of them.

Here

(iii)

is called large scope since the scope of the

belief covers the entire statement.

A statement with this

logical form may be true even if there is no x that is P,
or even if there is more than one of them.

The implications

of this psychological context for an argument can be seen
as follows.
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Suppose that:

(iv)

Here

b = President of the
United States.

(iv)

is translated in our symbols
as

(v)

(

lx)

[

(Vy) (Py e y = X )

Suppose that we use

(ii)

and

2

.

(v)

= b)

as premises in a deductive

argument as follows:

4.3
1.

2^
:

•

3

.

(Vy) (Py = y = x)
(Vy)
(Py E y = x
(
s believes a = b
(~!x)

s

(

(J3X)

believes a =

x)

b = x)

)

Also suppose that we use (iii) and

(v)

as premises in a

deductive argument as follows:

4.4
1.
2
:.

•

3.

s

believes

Cd-x) ( (Vy) (Py e y = x )
(Vy) (Py = y = x)
b = x)
S believes a = b

(3x)

(

.

a = x)

.

Neither 4.3 nor 4.4 are valid deductive arguments, and both

represent a logical error that results from failing to
notice the presence of a psychological context.
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onsider 4.3.

The first premise is a
small scope trans-

lation of the statement

's

believes that a is identical
with

the President of the United
States'.

translation of the statement

a

President of the United State s
no claims about s's beliefs.

'b is
'

.

The second premise is

identical with the

The second premise makes

Therefore, we can see that

it is logically possible for
the premises to be true and
the

conclusion, the statement

's

believes that a is identical

with b', to be false; b may, in fact,
be identical to
s may not, in fact, believe
it.
Therefore,

but

a,

4.3 is an in-

valid argument which ignores

"s

believes."

The problem here

is that believing is not a truth
functional relation.
is,

That

the truth value of statements involving
'believes' and

other statements is not always determined by
considering the
truth values of the component statements.

The same problem arises with 4.4 that arises
with 4.3.

The

first premise is a large scope translation of the
statement

believes that a is identical with the President of the

s

United States'.

The second premise again, is a translation

of the statement 'b is identical with the President of the

United States'
s

s

beliefs.

.

The second premise makes no claims about

Again, we see that it is logically possible for

the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false; b

may, in fact, be identical to a, but

s

may not, in fact,

.

,

:
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believe it.

Therefore, 4.4, like

4

.

3

,

is an invalid

argument ignoring "s believes."

Both 4.3 and 4.4 may be
confused with the following
valid
argument

4.5

:

.

1.

Px)

(Vy)

(

fL

(3 X ) (Vy)

(

a = b

3.

(Py e y = X )
(Py e y = X )

a = x)
b = x))
)

Argument 4.5 is a valid deductive argument
which can be
proved so by using our rules of inference.
The context here
is clear, and there is no logical
problem with
4.5:

1.
2

C
(

d

.

3

'

,
4

.

5

.

6.
7.
8.
9

10
11.
12.
13.
14.
15

.

.

16

.

Ox) (Vy) (Py
-JMX.) (Vy) (Py
(Vy) (Py = y
(Vy) (Py = y
(Vy) (Py E y
(Vy) (Py E y
(Vy) (Py E y
Pa E a = d
Pa E a = c
a = c
Pa
a =
b =
a =
a =
a =

d
d
b
b
b

=
=

y = x)
y = x)

=
=
=
=
=

c)
d)

.

c)

.

d)

c)

.

.
.

a = x)
b = x)

a = c
b = d
a = c

aiven A
gi ven A
1, for EQE
for EQE
2
3, R
4

,E
.E

,

5,
6,
7,
5,
9,
8,
4

UQE
UQE
.E

10
11,

,

.E

,

12
4,
3,

E E
E E

,

13, =
14, EQE
15, EQE

Other deductive arguments that involve psychological contexts may be deductively valid, but evaluated as unsound

•
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because of the psychological
context

For example:

4.6
If

I believe in God,
then God exists.
believe in God.
God exists.
I

BP
BP

1.
2

.

o

Q

Let 'BP' stand for
'God exists'.

'I

believe in God' and let

'Q'

Therefore, 4.6 is a valid
argument

instance of Z7E.

However, it is unsound; premise

stand for
a simple

,

1

is false,

since nothing follows about
God's existence from one s
beliefs.
in this case, the psychological
context causes
problem for soundness, not for
validity.
1

a

It is useful to note the
difference between 4.6 and the

following argument which is invalid
because of the presence
of a psychological context:

4.6’
1.
2

3.

1

believe if I believe in God, then God exists.
believe in God.
God exists
I

I

.

B

BP
:

.

3

.

Q

(BP

Q)

7

:
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Therefore, 4.6' is not a valid
argument since in premise
the entire conditional
is what is believed.

1

This failure to recognize
the presence of
psychological
contexts can also lead to the
construction of inductively
weak arguments.
Consider the following inductively
weak
argument

4

.

1

.

2

.

3.

.

:

4

.

Charles Hickson claims he was taken
aboard a
flying saucer from another galaxy
Calvin Parker believes he was tak^n
flying saucer from another galaxy. aboard a
Hundreds of other people claim to
have been in
contact with beings from another
galaxy
J who fly
Y
flying saucers.
Beings from another galaxy have
visited Earth
flying saucers.

m
m

On an intuitive level, we might
procede as follows.

Consider (1).

Even if this is true, he could be
mistaken,

deliberately lying, drunk for his experience,
mentally ill,
or seeking publicity.
Therefore, (1) is not evidence
for

(4);

P

(4/1)4^ P

4/1).

Consider (2).

Even if this is

true, he too could be mistaken, deliberately lying,
drunk
for his experience, mentally ill, or in collusion
with

Hickson.
(3)

.

Therefore,

(2)

is not evidence for

(4).

Consider

Even if this is true, these people could be fooled by

hoaxes, under the influence of drugs, deliberately lying,
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or attempting to gain
publicity.

evidence for
(2),

and

(3)

Therefore,

3

)

is not

Consider intuitively the
results:
are all not evidence
for
(

(4),

rcP (t 4/1

(

4 ).

2

so P

(4/1

(

.

1

)

2

,

.

3

)

3 ).

Therefore, this shows
that 4.7 is a
weak inductive argument.
.

.

The reason that 4.7 is
such a weak inductive
argument is
that each of the premises
involve a statement of a
belief
that a person has, or a
statement of a claim that
a person
makes.
From such true statements,
nothing follows about the
existence of the objects of
belief, or about the
existence of
the referents that the
claims concern. From the
stated
belief or claim, we cannot
infer that the objects of
belief
have existing referents,
or that the claims are claims
about
existing referents.
Thus, it may be true that
Hickson and
hundreds of people make those
claims, and it may be true that
Parker believes that he was taken
aboard a flying saucer
from another galaxy.
However, it may at the same time
be
false that flying saucers from
another galaxy exist, since
we have determined that 4.7 is
inductively weak, we know
that 4.7 is a no good argument.

Psychological contexts, therefore, must
be recognized when
used in both deductive and inductive
arguments. Failure
to do so often results in a failure
to recognize invalid or

unsound deductive, and inductively weak
inductive arguments.
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Have the students capture the
logical form of inductive
arguments involving psychological
contexts
(Consider
examples from Blum.)
Have them show that ihey re
inductively strong or inductively weak

Subsection

5

-

Clarifying Unclear Terms by Definition

We have seen that an author's inattention
to the logical
form of arguments, the unclear intensions
or extensions of

terms or statements, the equivocal uses of
terms, and the
inattention to psychological contexts can result
in unclear

arguments, which must, where possible, be clarified
in

.
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accord with the principle of
charity before conceptually
significant criticism can occur.
Of course, many such
arguments cannot be clarified, and
it is sufficient to
evaluate these conceptually
insignificant arguments by
pointing out the above errors

Having considered methods for
clarifying the logical form
of logically unclear arguments,
we shall now consider
methods for clarifying unclear terms
and for the evaluation
of such proposed clarifications.

One way to clarify an unclear term is
to provide a

definition of the term.

Intuitively, however, simply pro-

viding a definition for a term does not
necessarily mean
that we have successfully clarified the term.
The

definition may simply be no good, or may simply
reflect the
unclarity of the term. Therefore, we must also
understand
how to evaluate proposed definitions, and we must
understand the limitations and serious problems involved with

providing and evaluating definitions.

Providing and

evaluating definitions of a term involves providing and
evaluating specific claims about the term's extension or
the term's intension.

We shall begin by proposing what we

shall call definition by extensional equivalence, and showing

that definition by extensional equivalence does not succeed
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m

defining a term.

In attempting to fix
this defect, we

shall show that while there
are many different accounts
of
the function and evaluation
of many different kinds
of
there are serious limitations
and philosophical
problems with providing an
account of definition.

What may be called definition
by extensional equivalence
relies on one of the logical
connections, the biconditional
(=).
The biconditional connects a
statement of term or
Phrase to be defined, called the
definiendum, with a statement defining the term or phrase,
called the definiens.
Providing this biconditional
connective between the
definiendum and the definiens can be
called definition by
extensional equivalence because the
biconditional can be
viewed as asserting that the definiens
and the definiendum
are coextensional
Consider the following example:
.

x a PP ear s to be an aerial phenomenon
f
for which
we have no specific, certain explanation

Definition 5.1 asserts that appearing to be an
aerial

phenomenon for which we have no specific, certain
explanation is both a necessary and a sufficient condition
for
being a UFO.

In other words,

all and only those objects

that are in the extension of the definiens are in
the

extension of the definiendum.

.
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To evaluate a definition
like 5.1, we must simply
consider
whether, in fact, all and only
those objects that are in
the
extension of the definiens are
in the extension of the
definiendum. That is, we attempt
to find an object that is
either clearly in the extension
of the definiens and clearly
not in the extension of the
definiendum, or clearly in the
extension of the definiendum and
clearly not in the extension
of the definiens.
Finding such an object is called
providing
a

counterexample to the proposed definition.
We can see
that this process is similar to the
process of inductive
elimination

Consider the following example of a
proposed definition and
its evaluation by counterexample:

5.2

x is an automobile
motorized vehicle.

=

x is a four-wheeled,

To evaluate 5.2, we must consider whether,
in fact, all and

only those objects that are in the extension of
the

definiendum are in the extension of the definiens.

For 5.2,

we can easily find an object that is clearly in
the

extension of the definiens that is clearly not in the

extension of the definiendum.

For example, consider a fork-

lift, or a farm tractor, or a
garden tractor, or a riding

lawnmower

.

These objects are four wheeled
motorized

:

.
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vehicles, yet they are not
automobiles. These objects
are
all counterexamples to
the proposed definition.
One
counterexample, however, is
sufficient to show that it
is not
the case that all and only
those objects that are in
the
extension of the definition
are in the extension of
the
definiens. Therefore, by
providing such a counterexample,
we have show that 5.2 is
not a good definition by
extensional
equivalence of 'automobile'.
The definiendum and the
definiens are not coextensional

This means of evaluating given
definitions by extensional
equivalence also gives us a means
for providing such
definitions.
We attempt, in initially
providing the
definition, to provide a definiens
that is coextensional
with the definiendum. We then reflect
on this initial
definition and search for counterexamples.
Finding counterexamples, we then modify the definiens to
eliminate
the

counterexamples, thus building a definition
in which the
definiens is coextensional with the definiendum.

Consider the following example of this procedure.

Suppose

that we are attempting to provide a definition
by extensional

equivalence for the term 'brother'.

We may propose the

following

5.3

x is a brother

x is a male relative.

,
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g a male relative is certainly a necessary
condition of

being a brother, but it is not
a sufficient condition.
example, an uncle, a father or a
grandfather,

For

are all

clearly male relatives, yet not all
are brothers.
These are
counterexamples to 5 3 which we must rule
out.
Thus we may
consider revising 5.3 as follows:
.

5.3'

x is a brother
- x is a male relative that
is not
a father or a grandfather.

Yet 5.3' also has counterexamples.
a nephew,

a grandson,

a son,

Consider a male cousin,

or a great uncle.

5.3 also fails as a definition.

Therefore,

We can see from these

counterexamples that to rule out each male relative that
is
not a brother will be a long process indeed.

great-great-great-grandfathers
etc.

,

We must rule

great-great-great-uncles

Therefore, we might consider the uniqueness of being a

brother, and revise 5.3' as follows:

5.3"

x is a brother

=

x is a male sibling.

Definition 5.3" does not have counterexamples, and clearly
the definiens and definiendum are extensionally equivalent.

Therefore, according to the procedure for evaluating such

definitions, 5.3" is a good definition.

:

.
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However, this procedure
points lo a serious problem
with
this account of definition.
By reflecting carefully,
we
can see that there are
problems with this procedure for
evaluating definitions by extensions
equivalence that lead
us to conclude that what has
been called definition by

extensional equivalence is not a
workable form of
definition, while 5.3" is a good
definition, it is not a
good definition simply because ti ic
deliniens and definiendum
are extensionally equivalent
(coextensional
Consider the
following biconditional to clarify
the nature of this
)

.

problem

5,4

x
a creature with
.f® a kidney.
with

a

heart

x is a creature

Clearly, upon sufficient reflection, we can
see that the
definiens and the definiendum are coextensional.
However,
>.4

js

designed to show that simply requiring

coextensionality is not sufficient to guarantee
definition.

Tn fact,

del inition at all

a

good

we don't want to say that 5.4 is a

The problem, then, is to rule out

biconditionals like 5.4 as definitions and rule in
biconditionals like 5.1 and 5.3" as definitions.

W(

may consider introducing an appeal to intensions
here,

and argue that what we have called a good
definition by
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extensional equivalence
provides a definiens that
is both
coextensional and cointensional
with the def iniendum. Thus,
we might attempt to solve
this problem by abandoning
the
attempt to provide definitions
by extensional equivalence
and instead, adopt the
attempt to provide definitions
by
intensional equivalence. This
automatically accounts for
extensional equivalence because
of the following principle:
P.< 3)

If a term A is cointensional
with a term B, then
en
A is coextensional with B.

Thus, we might argue, 5.1 is a
good definition by

intensional equivalence because the
definiens and the
def miendum are cointensional, just
like 5.3" is a good
definition by intensional equivalence
because the definiens
and definiendum are cointensional.

However, by reflecting carefully, we can
see that there are
problems with this procedure for evaluating
definitions by

intensional equivalence.

The first and most obvious

problem is how to determine whether or not a proposed
definiens is, in fact, cointensional with a given
definiendum.

However, there is a more serious problem.

Consider the following biconditional to
clarify this more
serious problem:
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5.3

Clearly

x is a brother

,

e

x is a brother.

the definiens and the
definiendum of 5.5 are

comtensional.

Therefore, by our principle P.

coextensional.

(3)

,

they are

So 5.5 is a good definition
by intensional

equivalence.

However, we do not want to say
that 5.5 is a
good definition.
The problem we now face is to
rule out
biconditionals like 5.5 as definitions
and to rule in
biconditional s like 5.1 and 5.3" as
definitions.

We may consider introducing an
appeal to some notion of

informativeness, and argue that what we have
called a good
definition by intensional equivalence provides
a definiens
that is both cointensional with the
definiendum and
informative.

In fact, many philosophers such as
G. E. Moore

have attempted to provide specific conditions
for

informativeness.

However, these are deep and murky problems

for philosophers to solve, well beyond the
boundaries of our

present purpose.

It is sufficient for our purposes to

notice that these problems arise in attempting to explain
how to provide and how to evaluate such definitions.

We must, for our purposes, avoid these problems by carefully

considering and screening candidates for def iniendums

.

are relatively safe with definiendums
that have a clear

We

.
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extension and a clear intension.

However, the price of

this safety is often
conceptual in significance.
Often,
the unclear terms in the
argument that need clarification

by

definition do not have clear
extensions, or intensions, and
this is why they need
clarification. For example, the
extension of 'dead' is all dead
things, yet the problem is
that it is not always clear
which objects fit this extension
and which do not.

Often the best we can do, while
avoiding the above problems
with definitions, is to provide
what are called dictionary
definitions

5.6

x is a dictionary definition of
e x correctly
reflects current usage of y and y
x is cointensional
with y.

Such definitions are easily evaluated.

clearly applies

a

Where current usage

term to some object, a good dictionary

definition may not withhold it; where current usage
clearly
withholds a term from some object, a good dictionary
definition may not apply it.

Yet while dictionary definitions may be helpful as reports
of linguistic usage, often they simply capture
the unclarity

that we are attempting to avoid by providing
the definition.

.
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Therefore, such definitions
are not helpful completely
to
clarify terms which must be
clarified to proceed with

evaluations of conceptually
significant arguments.
vide the necessary clarification
of such

To pro

terms, we must
abandon definition altogether
and adopt what we shall call
explication.

moaeis
1

.
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definitions by extensional equivalence
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?he problems
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}
mtensional equivalence, and show that extensional Y
equivalence fails to provide a workable
account of
definition.
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Discuss 'informativeness' and attempt to
formulate conditions of informativeness in class.
In more advanced
groups, you might discuss the problem of
analysis.

Consider discussing other commonly used
"definitions"
like stimulative definitions and operational
definitions
stipulative definitions can be show to be either
formulated and evaluated for systematic clarity,
or to
be what we shall call explications.
Operational
definitions can be shown not to be definitions, much
like what have been called definitions by extensional
equivalence can be shown not to be definitions.
Consider dictionary definitions and explain how
dictionaries are written.
Consider proposing and evaluating dictionary definitions
and point to their limitations in clarifying unclear
terms
Exercises

1.

2

.

Have the students formulate counterexamples to
proposed definitions by extensional equivalence.
may be made up from terms in the reading.)

(This

the students formulate counterexamples
to proposed
descriptive definitions.
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of t he Unclear Property or
Concept

As we shall see, explications
avoid the problems we considered that face definitions. We
may, therefore, appeal
to explications to clarify unclear
terms, and thereby, to
allow us to proceed with evaluations
of conceptually

significant arguments.

We must, therefore, consider how

to propose and how to evaluate
explications.

In providing an explication, we provide
an explication of
a

property, or concept, not an explication of a
term.

it

is the nature of properties or concepts
that they cannot be

changed; that is, they are objective.

Intuitively, we can

see this by seeing that the same property or concept
can be

apprehended as the same by different people.

Recall that

properties are the intensions of predicates and that
concepts are intensions of individual terms.

To explicate

a property or concept, we replace this original property

or concept called the explicandum with another property or

concept called the explicatum.
a definition,

While, as we have seen in

the definiendum and the definiens are

coextensional or cointensional

,

in an explication, the
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explicandum and explicate are
neither coextensional nor
cointensional. Clearly then,
the process of explication
is
distinguished from the process
of definition.

We shall also
see that explications are
proposed and evaluated differently
from definitions.

We can begin our consideration
of explication by intuitively
understanding the purpose for replacing
one property or

concept with another.
one property or concept

We often use explication to
replace
(the explicandum)

with another

property or concept (the explicatum)
when the explicandum
does not usefully serve some conceptual
purpose as the
explicatum. We can intuitively see this
by considering an
analogy offered by Rudolf Carnap, in
which the explicandum
is compared to a pocket knife and
the explicatum is compared
to a scalpel.
While the pocket knife is a handy instrument,
useful for many pruposes, it is not as well
suited to open
heart surgery as the scalpel. Consequently,
we lay down
the pocket knife and pick up the scalpel when
we do open

heart surgery, since we can accomplish our purpose
better

with a scalpel than with the pocket knife.

By analogy,

while the explicandum may be a handy property or concept,
useful for many conceptual purposes, it is not as well
specific conceptual task as the explicatum.

Consequently, we adopt the explicatum for this specific

426

conceptual task, and cast
aside the explicandum
since we
can accomplish our purpose
better with the explicatum
than
with the explicandum.

With this in mind, we can
consider the steps involved
in
providing an explication of a
property or concept. Consider,
for example, the concept
expressed by 'fish' as a candidate
for explication.
The first step in providing
an explication
is to determine if the
concept to be explicated is, in
fact,
an explicandum; that is, to
determine if the concept is
sufficiently clear to be suitable
for explication.
To do

so, we must provide an informal
clarification of the concept

by informal explanations and
examples.

For example, an

informal clarification of the property
expressed by 'fish'
might include an informal explanation
like "lives in the

water; spends most of its time in fresh
or salt water,"
etc., and an example of something that
clearly has the

property like "Charlie the Tuna."

since the property

expressed by 'fish' can be informally clarified,
we can
conclude that the property expressed by 'fish'
is an

explicandum.

Once we have determined that we have an explicandum,
the

next step is to provide the explication of the explicandum
in light of the specific conceptual purpose at hand.

For

example, the explicandum of 'fish' serves certain clearly
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recognizable purposes (like the
pocket knife).
it serves to distinguish
creatures

For example,

that live in water from

creatures that live on land.

Yet if our purpose is to

classify and order groups of
living things clearly, in
ways that may allow us to
investigate how various groups
of living things evolved,
then the explicandum
fails to

serve this purpose well.

Therefore, to serve this purpose

better, we introduce a new property,
the explicatum, that
serves similar purposes as the
old property, the

explicandum, but that also serves this
new purpose.

Providing the explicatum is, to some
extent, simply a matter
of ingenuity.
Strictly sepaking, there is no correct
or
incorrect explicatum. However, not all
explicata are
equally justified for a given conceptual
purpose, as we

shall see.

For the explicatum of 'fish', in light
of the

above conceptual purpose, consider 'member
of the class
Pisces'.
This explicatum of 'fish' does allow us to
classify
and order groups of living things clearly, in ways
that

allow us to investigate how

various groups of living things

evolved, while the explicandum does not allow us to do this.

For example, the explicandum of 'fish' includes whales
and

porpoises.

However, the explicatum of 'fish' does not

include whales and porpoises.

.
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However, substituting the
explicatum for the explicandum
in certain statements
does preserve truth value
in certain,
intuitively desirable extensional
contexts. For example,
consider the statement 'Charlie
the Tuna is a fish'.
This
statement is true for both the
explicandum of 'fish' and
the explictum of 'fish'.
However, consider the statement
'Moby Dick is a fish'.
This statement is true given
the
explicandum of 'fish', but false
given the explicatum of
'fish'.
This is certainly not a defect
of the explicatum;
the explicatum serves to introduce
a certain precision and
care for the purpose of classifying
and ordering groups of
living things clearly. Therefore,
we are entitled
to say,

given the explicatum, that 'Moby Dick
is a fish' is simply
false

We can see, therefore, that while the
explicatum must

preserve some extensional overlap with the
explicatum,
there is no requirement that the explicatum
be

coextensional with the explicandum.

As we have seen, the

explicatum of 'fish' and the explicandum of 'fish' are not
coextensional.

We must also note that often in a given

context, for a given purpose, the explicatum need not be
the one with the most extensional overlap.

For example,

'swims with appendigial fins' as a proposed explicatum of
'fish'

has far more extensional overlap with the explicandum
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Of 'fish' than 'member
of the class Pisces'.
However, it
fails as an explicate,
given the purpose of
classifying
and ordering groups of
living things clearly,
since it fails
fruitfully to advance this
purpose. Therefore, while
strictly speaking, there are
no correct or incorrect
explicate, we are certainly in
a clear position to
evaluate
and discard proposed explicate
given their failure fruitfully to advance a given
purpose.

We have similarly understood
recognizing the need for an
explication.
In providing 'member of the
class Pisces' as
an explicatum of 'fish' in this
context, we are not avoiding
the problem of the correct
descriptive definition of 'fish'
(which has since changed)
In not using a pocket knife
and
using a scalpel, we are not avoiding
the problem of the
correct use of a pocket knife; we are
simply in a position
to say that a pocket knife is not
useful for open heart
surgery, and a scalpel is useful for this
purpose.
.

Analogously, in not using a descriptive definition,
or an
explicandum, and using an explicatum, we are
not avoiding
the problem of the correct use of a definition
or an

explicandum; we are simply in a position to say that

a

definition, or an explicandum is not useful for this

specific conceptual purpose, and that an
explicatum is more
useful for this purpose.
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We shall now consider
several examples of providing
and

evaluating explications.

Fir

1.

^

decision procedure.

Determine if the property or
concept to be explicated
is sufficiently clear to be
an explicandum by:
a)
providing an informal clarification
of the property
or concept and by b) providing
informal examples.
Failure clearly to do a) or b) and
showing that a)
or

cannot be done is sufficient to show
that the
property or concept to be explicated is
too unclear for
explication, and is, therefore, without
cognative
b)

significance.

2.

Determine the specific conceptual purpose at
hand by
asking and answering the question "Why is the
explicandum
not as useful in this context as a different
concept?"

3.

Choose or evaluate the explicatum in reference to this
specific conceptual purpose by:

a)

determining that

there is at least some extensional overlap between the

explicandum and the explicatum, by b) determining that
the substitution of the explicatum for the explicandum
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in certain statements
preserves truth value in
desirable

extensional contexts, and by

c)

determining that the

explicatum fruitfully advances
the specific conceptual
purposes at hand.

We shall now work through
two examples.

Consider, in the
context of John G. Fuller’s
explanation of Arigo's healing
powers, the statements:

S

SDir?t o?

lle ed tha
a

instantaneous

*i

Arig ° claimed he incorporated
the

^

S&2&!*

Suppose that we are attempting to
understand what it is for
a "spirit to be incorporated" into
a living
person.

Therefore, we proposed to explicate 'spirit'
to enable us to
understand and then evaluate Arigo's alleged
claim.

First,

however, we must determine if the concept
expressed by
spirit' is sufficiently clear to serve as an
explicandum.
To do so, we attempt to provide an informal
clarification of

the concept and informal examples.

Suppose that spirit is a

concept of the mind of a human being.

This does not help

because it seems that a mind is able to function only in

conjunction with its body.

There is nothing to indicate that

minds can move from body to body.

This concept, therefore.

:
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does not help us to clarify
the concept of spirit
as used
here.
Suppose that the concept is
a concept of the
influence of one human mind on
another.
This does not help
because for one mind to influence
another, there must be
some form of contact.
For example, one person
using his
mind for teaching, writing.
or speaking, and another
person
correspondingly using his mind for
learning, reading, or
listening, since Fritz died in
1918 and Arigo was born in
1923, the contact would have to be
written.
However,
Fritz wrote nothing and Arigo was
illiterate, so this does
not help to clarify this concept.

We can begin to see that

spirit' is not a good candidate

for explication, since we are unable
to provide an

explicandum by informally clarifying the
concept.

Therefore,

we are entitled to conclude that the concept
in this

context

is too unclear for explication, and is,
therefore, without

cognitive significance.

Explication is, however, useful when an author's use of

a

term expressing a explicandum is not as well suited to
the author's apparent purpose as some other concept.

context of Charles Berlitz

's

fifth chapter entitled "Is

There a Logical Explanation?", consider the following
statement

In the

s

.

"
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independent'researchers'concerned^ithhthe

thro4

h

6

^ lanati0n

’

8

r^^a g e

otter a theory or combination
of theories
C
that \hl
the phenomenon
may be essentially caused bv sMll
functioning man-made power complexes
belonging to a
n
ly
d
different^fron^ours.

“

SlL|° p ?1lof
Consider
use of

^

logical explanation' in this context.

Berlitz'

'logical explanation' does not allow
us clearly and

precisely to specifiy which explanations
count as logical
explanations and which explanations do not
count as logical
explanations and why they do or do not.

Clearly, Berlitz

does not simply mean to distinguish
explanations which

violate the laws of deductive logic or inductive
logic from
explanations which do not. We might, therefore,
consider
logical explanation' in this context as a candidate
for

explication

First, we must determine if the concept expressed by
'logical

explanation' is sufficiently clear to be an explicandum.
The concept seems to be a concept of a good explanation, or
an explanation that is commonsensical

.

Consider, for

example, the statement 'there is a logical explanation for

my missing car keys'.
an explicandum.

We,

therefore, have a clear case of

'
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NOW we must determine the
specific conceptual purpose
at
hand,
we may do so by asking why
the explicandum is not as
useful in this context as some
other concept. The answer is
that the explicandum does not
allow us to determine on what
grounds we determine that an
explanation is a good

explanation and on what grounds we
determine that an
explanation is a no-good explanation.
Therefore, the
purpose for replacing the explicandum
with an explicatum is
to allow us to better classify
explanations
as good or

no-good on precise grounds.

We must now consider the selection
of an explicatum, given
this specific conceptual purpose in this
context.
Let's

consider first our earlier rejected proposal,
the concept
expressed by 'an explanation that does not violate

the laws

of deductive or inductive logic'.

This clearly allows us to

classify good and no-good explanations on precise
grounds.
However, it does not allow us to distinguish good and
no-good

explanations in a way that is useful in this context.

For

example, we can inuitively see that an explanation that
is
not logical, in the sense that is expressed by the concept
of
the negation of the explicandum, may at the same time not

violate the laws of deductive or inductive logic.
we can have explanations that are not
in Berlitz'

'

That is,

logical explanations

sense, yet are explanations that do not violate

.
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the laws of deductive or
inductive logic.

Therefore, this

proposed explicatum is not useful
for this purpose.

TO arrive at an explicatum
for 'logical explanation',
let's
consider what may be classified as
not logical explanations
Berlitz' sense.
These can be found in the selection
from
Chapter 5, quoted above, and presented
as sufficient conditions for not logical explanations
which we shall simply
illogical explanations:

m

6.1

given x is an explanation:
a)

if x entails that the world is such
that
laws of nature may not hold, then x is an the
illogical explanation.

b)

if x entails that the world is such that
there
are holes in the sky," then x is an illogical

explanation

c)

if x entails that the world is such that
creatures living in inner space from Atlantis
exist, then x is an illogical explanation.

d)

if x entails that the world is such that
creatures living in outer space exist, then x
is an illogical explanation.

e)

if x entails that the world is such that
ancient, advanced technology's power sources
exist, then x is an illogical explanation.

We can see that 6.1 classifies as illogical any explanation

which entails the existence of things that are not known
to
exist.

Berlitz, therefore. seems to provide an ontological
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basis to determine that an explanation
is illogical.
Applying the appropriate negations,
then, we can see that a
likely explication of 'logical
explanation' will he a concept
of an explanation that does not
entail the existence of
things not known to exist.

We can see that adopting this explicatum
will allow us

successfully to classify explanations in this
context as
good or no-good on precise grounds consistent
with Berlitz'
view.

For example, an explanation proposed to
explain the

disappearance of my car keys that entails that elves
exist
is not a logical explanation, but one that
does not
entail

the existence of things not known to exist is a
logical

explanation.

The explicatum seems to preserve truth value

in contexts provided by Berlitz, and seems
fruitfully to

advance the purpose of allowing us clearly to distinguish,

according to Berlitz' view, logical from illogical
explanations.

Therefore, this explicatum is successful.

It is important to note that in the above example, we have

provided an explicatum to clarify a concept on Berlitz'
behalf.

We may now, of course, having explicated his

concept of a 'logical explanation', evaluate his use of
the explicated concept and even argue that such a concept
is not useful enough for evaluating all the explanations

we must consider.

This indeed involves conceptually

.

437

significant criticism.

The explicate provided
on Berlitz'

behalf can be seen as an
instance of the principle
of
charity. We must, therefore,
briefly consider the role
of
definition and explication in
evaluating arguments.

_l
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tL rLding
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nS ° f conce P ts

n
X
as usefby ?iner
Po in t^out^that^ these
depend on their descriptive
definition and Lf +.u 6
explicatum, and that this leads to
of
P
equivocation we considered earlier. the'problem
Di s cuss the use of explication
to clarify terms, and
thereby avoid equivocations in
arguments.

Exercises
Have the students provide an
explication of the concent
expressed by conceptually significant
argument', as we
have used it
this course.

m

2

.

'

Have the students provide and evaluate
on behalf of Berlitz, Fuller, Blum, and explications
VonDSnigan
Consider explicating:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)

g)
h)

Mystery - for Berlitz
Disappearance - for Berlitz
Space-time warp - for Berlitz
Prescription - for Fuller
Established fact - for Fuller
Possession - for Fuller
Signal - for Blum
Legend - for VonDUnigen

Subsection

7

-

The Reconstruction and Evaluation of Arguments

This discussion of definition and explication has two
obvious
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applications to the evaluation of arguments.

The first

obvious application of our brief
consideration of definition
and explication to the evaluation
of arguments is to
evaluate an argument as no good because
a definition of a
term has a counterexample, or an
unclear term cannot be
explicated and, therefore, is not cognitively
significant.
(This is often straight forward,
but sometimes it is more
difficult to detect.) The second obvious
application
of our

brief consideration of definition and
explication to the
evaluation of arguments is to evaluate definitions
or

explications given in arguments, according to the
procedures
briefly outlined above. However, this discussion
of

definition and explication has
f

t

a

less obvious and more

application to the evaluation of arguments.

We mentioned this less obvious application of explication
to the evaluation of arguments when we explicated Berlitz'

concept of a 'logical explanation'

.

This application of

explication to Berlitz' arguments is an example of a step
in what we shall call the reconstruction of an argument.

The reconstruction of an argument can be understood in

terms of the principle of charity; a reconstruction of
an argument that is consistent with the author's expressed
or implied views.

Given

a

reconstructed argument, we are

in a position to provide that we have intuitively referred
to as a conceptually significant critical evaluation.
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The reconstruction of an
author's argument involves
clarifying the argument by
clarifying its logical form, by
clarifying the intensions or
extensions of terms by
eliminating improper vagueness or
ambiguity where possible,
by Clarifying equivocations
where possible, or clarifying

psychological contexts where possible,
by clarifying terms
by providing definitions where
possible, or by clarifying
an author's concept by providing
explications where possible
We may evaluate such reconstructions
by asking if the

proposed reconstruction is consistent
with the author's
expressed or implied views. We may thereby
apply the
material we have considered in this
section to provide
reconstructions of given arguments and then
critically
evaluate the reconstruction according to the
rules of

deductive or inductive support to determine if
the premises
support the conclusion.

Consider the following example of such
its evaluation.

E.

J.

a

reconstruction and

Ruppelt, in his book The Report on

Un identified Flying Objects

,

in arguing for the existence

of UFO's, states:

7.1

"What constitutes proof? Does a UFO have to land
at the River Entrance to the Pentagon, near the
Chief's of Staff offices? Or is it proof when a
ground radar system detects a UFO, sends a jet
to intercept it, the jet pilot sees it and locks
on with his radar, only to have the UFO streak, away

.
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at phenomeMl speedTIs it proof when a
jet
pilot fires at a UFO, and
sticks to his storv
er threat of court-martial?"
(Berlitz,
p. 131K

In providing a reconstruction
of this argument, we must
first explicate two unclear
concepts; the concept expressed
by proof and the concept
expressed by 'UFO'
First consider ’proof, we may clarify
the explicandum as
.

"supporting a conclusion with various
steps, or
information," and give as examples
"Euclid's proof of the
Pythagorean theorem," or "the proof that
convicted Bruno
Hauptman.
Therefore, this is an explicandum, and
we may
proceed with explication. The explicandum
is not well suited
for the author's purpose here because
given the explicandum
it is not clear what sort of conclusion
is to be established

by a proof.

However, he seems to claim that we may con-

clusively establish the truth of

a

conclusion by "proof"

that is less dramatic than a landing at the
River Entrance
to the Pentagon.

Therefore, we may propose, as an

explicatum of 'proof', the concept expressed by 'evidence
that is sufficient to conclusively establish the truth of
a

conclusion

'

Secondly, consider 'UFO'.

We may clarify the explicandum as

"an aerial phenomena that we cannot explain," or "a

mysterious moving object that appears to be from
outer space

441

and give as examples "the UFO
later learned to be a large
weather balloon" or the "UFO
Calvin Parker believes he saw
Therefor e, this is an explicandum,
and we may proceed with
explication. The explicandum is
not well suited for the
author's purpose here because
given the explicandum, it is
not clear what is at stake in
providing proof that UFO’s
exist.
Given the explicandum, it is unclear
what he is
seeking to prove.
Therefore, we may propose, as an
explication of UFO, the concept
expressed by ’extraterrestrial spacecraft piloted by
intelligent extraterrestrial astronauts'.

In providing these two explications
on the author's behalf,

we now see that in reconstructing his
argument we must

provide a valid deductive, rather than a strong
inductive
argument.
of

This is because his claim, given the explicatum

'proof', and the explicatum of 'UFO', is that he
is

providing evidence that conclusively establishes the
truth
of the conclusion that extraterrestrial spacecraft
piloted

by intelligent extraterrestrial astronauts exist.

Clearly,

an inductive argument will not do; an inductive argument

establishes some degree of probability, not truth.

Given these explications, we may, therefore, propose to re-

construct the argument as follows:

If
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7.2
1

If a ground radar operator
detects a UFO
and a jet is sent to intercept
it, and the let's
e
P
flres 3t the UF0
the
UFO°flvra„av at °h
menal SPeed then thlS iS
proof
^x!st
A ground radar operator
detected a UFO, and a
jet was sent to intercept it,
and the iet's niloi
W
e
n
th
Pil0t
locked his radar
on the UFO°and
UFO and ?fired
Z
d at the
UFO, and the UFO
flew away at phenomonal speed.
This is proof that UFO's exist

.

“

'

^har^s

2

.

'

•

•

•

J

•

Argument 7.2 is clearly a valid
deductive argument.
logical form may be captured as follows:

Its

7.3

:

.

1

•

2

•

3

HP
[P

Q

.
.

Q

R

.

R

.

(SvT)

.
.

S

T

.

.

.

U)OV]

U]

V

.

Conclusion

3

clearly follows from

1

and

2

by

7.2 is only a proposed reconstruction of 7.1
a

DE.

However,

We are not in

position to evaluate 7.2 as it stands; both premise

premise

2

contexts.

1

and

involve what we have called psychological

Therefore, our reconstruction is not finished.

Consider premise

1

of 7.2.

Intuitively, if a ground radar

operator knew by observing his radar scope that he had
detected a UFO, then one would not need to send up a jet to
verify his observation.
detects what he believes

However, we can see that he
to be a UFO,

since it may be an

s
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enemy missile, a radar anomaly
or a misplaced weather
balloon.
Similarly, the jet's pilot sees
what he believes
to be the UFO in question,
since it may be some other
Phenomenon.
(To see this, consider
that it may be a
different UFO.)
Therefore, both premise 1 and
premise 2
require the introduction of a
psychological context.

7.2
1

If a ground radar operator
believes that he
detected a UFO, and a jet is sent to
intercept
it, and the jet's pilot believes
he sees the
UFO and the jet's pilot locks his radar
on what
he believes to be the UFO, or fires
at what he
believes to be the UFO, and what he believes
to
be the UFO flies away at phenomenal
speed, then
this is proof that UFO's exist.
A ground radar operator believed that he
detected
a UFO, and a jet was sent to
intercept it, and
the jet
pilot believed he saw the UFO, and the
jet's pilot locked his radar on what he believed
to be the UFO, and fired at what he believed
to
the UFO, and what was believed to be the UFO
flew away at phenomenal speed.
This is proof that UFO's exist.
|

^

The logical form of 7.2' may be captured as follows:

7.2'
1.
:

'B'

.

2
3

.
.

[BP
[BP

.
.

Q
Q

.
.

BR
BR

.
.

(BS V BT)

BS

.

BT

.

BU]
BU]
.

O

V

V

is used to prefix statements containing

'believes'.

can see that 7.3' is also a valid deductive argument;

3

We
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clearly follows from

1

and

2

by 3 E.

We can see that 7.2'

xs the clearest possible
construal of 7.1 that is consistent

ith the author s expressed and
implied views.
7.2'

is a reconstruction of 7.1.

Therefore,

We are now in a position

to evaluate 7.2'.

While 7.2' is

valid deductive argument, it is not
a sound
deductive argument. Premise 1 is clearly
false.
Given the
explicatum of 'proof' and the explicatum
a

of 'UFO', this

can be seen even more clearly.

if a radar operator and a

jet pilot believe that they detected or
saw an extra-

terrestrial spacecraft piloted by extraterrestrial
astronauts, it does not follow that these beliefs
conclusively

established the truth of the statement 'UFO's exist'.

claim that it does is to invalidly conclude
'

B

t(3x)(Px)]', where

taining 'believes'.

'B'

(3x) (Px)

To

from

is used to prefix statements con-

We may conclude our evaluation of 7.2'

by stating that the premises do not support the truth of the

conclusion, and that, therefore, 7.2' is not a good argument.
However, this is not to say that 7.2' is not a good recon-

struction of 7.1;

it is the clearest possible construal of

the author's views; it just so happens that the author's

views are mistaken.

Such reconstruction may also be provided in the form of

inductive arguments.

This may be done whenever conclusions

.
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are stated and we note that
evidence is presented that the

author claims supports these
conclusions. Reconstruction
of such arguments proceeds
in a similar manner, except
that we capture the logical
form of an inductive, rather
than a deductive argument, and
appeal to all relevant
available evidence. Reconstructions,
therefore,
can be

seen to involve all the material
we have considered so far.

jyioae l s

1

.

pr °vide an example of a reconstruction
that involves
providing an inductive argument.
(Consider one from
e fading
Point out that providing conceptually
7
significant criticism first
.

)

.

involves
arguments such that they avoid obviousreconstructing
errors and are
consistent with the author's expressed or
implied
views, and secondly, involves evaluating
the
reconstruction
2

‘

3.

Pr ° vlde several reconstructions, both
deductive and
inductive arguments, involving all the clarifications
we have considered and explain how they are
provided
and evaluated.

Point out the importance of providing reconstructions.
Consider the advancement of knowledge in science the
solution of philosophical problems, and the solution
of crimes, etc.
Consider, for example, the reconstruction of arguments about the assassination of J.F.K.
Point out the advantage of knowing that certain conclusions are not supported by the evidence for providing alternative conclusions.
,

Exercises
1.

Have the students carefully consider the conclusions
Fuller draws about Arigo from the evidence he presents
book, Arigo:
Surgeon of the Rusty Knife
Then
have them each provide a reconstruction of an argument
on Fuller's behalf designed to establish one of
these
conclusions.
Then ask them to show that it is indeed
a reconstruction, according to the principle
of
.

°
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UFO

T

D °° K geyond Earth:

Man's Contact with

s-nsr^r^
P
£CE s^rsaa .^sjssss
1

q

Thcn h3

Ssrir

,

,

‘

P rinci Ple
f charit Y*
Then ask them to evaluate
vuiuace
the reconstruction to determine
if +-u
the argument supports
the conclusion.
i

-f

Have the students repeat the
above
conclusions Von Ddnigan draws about procedures for the
m t e evi ence he presents in his ancient astronauts
book Chariots of
^h
5
^ for the
t
he r
Gods
and
conclusions Berlitz suggests
about a mystery in the Bermuda Triange
from the
SnCe he P resents in his b ook The
Bermuda
m^?
TrianalP.
hese reconstructions are very useful
for instructional
purposes when the students present them
orally
Llit:
y to the
group.
,

•

.

,

.

:

:
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Section Four:

S ubsection

1

-

Providing Arguments

Providing Ve r sus Reconstructing
Arguments

We have seen, given certain
reconstructions of arguments,
that when we evaluate the reconstructions,
some fail to

support their conclusions, and we have
considered ways that
both inductive and deductive arguments
can be shown to fail
to support their conclusions.

Now suppose we find that

a

given conclusion C is not supported by
deductively sound, or
inductively strong arguments. This may lead us
to suppose
that ^ C may be supported by deductively sound,
or in-

dudictively strong arguments.

Note that in pointing out

that C is not supported by deductively sound or
inductively

strong arguments, we are not entitled to claim, simply
on these grounds alone, that C is false.

To make and

support such a claim, we must give a deductively sound or
an inductively strong argument with ^ C as the conclusion.

Giving such an argument to support any statement, whether
or not the statement is the negation of a conclusion that
we have shown not to be supported by arguments, we shall

call providing an argument to support a given conclusion.

Providing an argument to support a given conclusion C
involves, among other things, gathering our own information
to form the premises to support the conclusion.

Gathering

.
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this information may mean gathering
evidence in providing
inductively strong arguments, or may
mean providing
certain logical relationships among
premises known to
be true and the conclusion in
providing deductively sound
arguments. Clearly, in gathering such
information, we are
not limited by the principle of charity
to select infor-

mation consistent with a given author's
expressed or implied
Views, since we are giving our own
argument in an original
form.
We are the authors of the argument.
Therefore,
providing an argument is not the same as reconstructing
an
argument

However, in the process of providing an argument we may

employ the methods of reconstruction discussed above.

For

example, once we have proposed an argument, we must evaluate
it,

and perhaps engage in reconstructing our own argument,

given that we find errors which do not provide the only
support for the conclusion.

Of course, we may find in our

evaluation that the argument is not conceptually significant, and that, therefore, we must provide a different

argument to support the conclusion.

Providing an argument,

therefore, also involves all the techniques we have

considered for evaluating arguments.

.
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Su bsection

2

-

Provi d ing Deductive Argument

Providing deductive support for a
given statement s may be
as simple as providing what
we call the suppressed premise
or premises of an enthymeme
with the given statement S as
the conclusion.
This could be interpreted as the
simplest
form of the reconstruction of a given
argument, but providing such suppressed premises is also
useful in providing
deductive support for a given statement.
Consider
the

following example:

2.1
1*
2_^_

:.

3.

Stonehenge is older than the pyramids.
The pyramids are older than the Piri Reis Map.
Stonehenge is older than the Piri Reis Map.

Statement 2.1 is translated into our symbols, using
as a constant to stand for
to stand for

2.2
1

.

2
:

.

3

.

Osp
Opr
Osr

'p'

as a constant

'pyramids' and 'r' as a constant to stand for

'the Piri Reis Map', and

as follows:

'Stonehenge',

's'

'O'

as the relation

'older than'

.
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argument 2.1, as represented
by 2.2, is obviously a
valid
argument.
However, strictly speaking,
given just premises
1 and 2, 3 does not
follow deductively. Ordinarily,
in
presenting such an argument, one
might present only these
two premises and the
conclusion on the grounds that

everyone knows that 'being older
than' is a transitive
relation

Relational arguments are very common
ways of providing
deductive support for given statements,
and many of them
depend on the relations we discussed
earlier.
But
the

relation itself is seldom, if ever,
explicitly stated as
a premise because it is
generally assumed to be among the
body of common knowledge presupposed
in the context in
which the argument appears.
Such incompletely expressed
arguments, with one or more of the premises
implicitly
understood, are called enthymemes.

We may supply the missing premise for 2.1
by simply stating

that being 'older than' is a transitive relation
as an

additional premise.
as follows:

This can be captured in rewriting 2.2
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2.3
1

•

2-.

-Ll
:

.

4

.

Osp
Opr
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz)

[Oxy

.

Osr

Oyz)

ZZ>

Oxz

1

We may now prove that, written
as 2.3, 2.1 is a valid

deductive argument.

When such arguments are provided by

others, we are obviously bound by the
principle of charity
to include such missing premises in
a reconstruction of
such arguments for conceptually significant
evaluation.
However, a consideration of enthymemes can
more importantly
provide some insight into the process of providing
deductive

support for particular statements.

The insight provided by this consideration of
enthymemes is
that we must often appeal to the body of common knowledge

presupposed in a given context to provide premises to support
a

given conclusion.

Consider the following example.

Suppose that we are attempting to provide deductive support
for the statement "Pluto is further from the Earth than the

Moon."

By inspecting the relation 'is further from the Earth

than', we can determine that this relation is transitive,

asymmetrical and irreflexive.

property of the relation.

Consider the transitive

We know that if Pluto is further

from the Earth than Mars, and if Mars if further from the

.

,
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Earth than the Moon, then it follows
that Pluto is further
from the Earth than the Moon,
given transitivity. This can
be seen in our symbols as follows,
letting 'F' stand for the
relation 'is further from the Earth than',
and 'p' stand for
'Pluto', 'm' stand for the 'Moon',
and 'a' stand for 'Mars'.

2.4

:

.

1

.

2

.

~L.
4
.

Fpm
Fma
(Vx) (Vy ) (Vz)

[

Fpa

(Fxy

.

Fxz)

zz>

Fxzl

Argument 2.4, therefore, appeals to the transitive
nature
of the relation and our common knowledge about the
planets
to provide deductive support for the given statement.

We

may do so by considering the other properties of the

relation

Consider the asymmetrical property of the relation.

We know

that Pluto and the Moon are not the same distance from the
Earth.

Given the asymmetrical property of 'is further

the Earth than'

from,

we know that it is not the case that Pluto

is further from the Earth than the Moon and that the Moon is

further from the Earth than Pluto, so either the Moon is
further from the Earth than Pluto or Pluto is further from
the Earth than the Moon.

This leads us to see that our

.

::
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argument can begin with:

if it is not the case
that Pluto

is further from the Earth
than the Moon, then the Moon
is
further from the Earth than Pluto.
Secondly, we Know that
it is not the case that the
Moon is further from the Earth

than Pluto.

Therefore, Pluto is further from
the Earth
than the Moon.
We are thus able to consider
the asymmetrical
property of this relation to produce
simple deductive support
for the given statement.
This can be seen in our symbols
as
follows

2.5
1

.

2
:

.

3

.

^ Fpm
^ Fmp
% % Fpm

Fmp

Argument 2.5, therefore, appeals to the asymmetrical
nature
of the relation and our common knowledge about
the planets
to provide deductive support for the given
statement.

(We

may also consider the irref lexivity of the relation.)

From the consideration of these simple properties of
relations, we may provide deductive support for state-

ments involving relations.
involve relations.

argument

However, enthymemes do not only

For example, consider the following
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2.6

Any ocean-dwelling mammal can
outswim any
y landdwelling mammal.
Some humans can outswim any cat.
Any dolphin can outswim any cat.

There are several unstated premises in
2.6 which we must
provide to prove that 2.6 is a valid argument.
Obviously
a premise stating the transitivity of

'can outswim' must

be stated, but also the following
non-relational premises

must be stated:

a)

All humans are land-dwelling mammals.

b)

All dolphins are ocean -dwelling mammals.

These non-relational premises are also assumed to be among
the body of common knowledge.

We may, therefore, capture

the logical form of 2.6, letting

dwelling mammal',

'L'

for

for

'can outswim',

for

'dolphin' as follows:

'H'

for

'

'O'

stand for 'ocean-

land -dwelling mammal',
'human',

'C'

for

2.7
1.
2

.

3.
4.
:.

5

.

6

.

D

(Vx) ( Vy
[(Ox . Ly)
Sxy]
(Vx) (Hx
Lx)
z) (Hz .
w) (Cw ZD Szw) ) ]
(
[ (
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz) [(Sxy
Syz) ZD Sxz]
(Vx) (Dx ZD Ox)
(Vx) (Vy) [ (Dx . Cy)
Sxy]
)

D

.

3

'S'

'cat', and

'D'
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Consider the following example, again
appealing to the body
of common knowledge presupposed in
a given context to
provide deductive support for a given
statement. Suppose
that we are attempting to provide
deductive support for
the statement 'it is not the case
that Arigo prevents germcaused infections in unclean wounds without
using antiseptics or other sterilization'.

We may begin our attempt to provide deductive
support for

this statement by considering what we know to be
true about

killing germs, about infections, and about antiseptics.
First, we know that only killing germs prevents
germ-caused

infections and that only antiseptic or other sterilization
can kill germs.
follows.

Given this knowledge, we might proceed as

Since we want the conclusion of the argument to be

of the form ^ 0, where 0 is the proposition expressed by the

statement 'Arigo prevents germ caused infections without

using germ-killing antiseptics or other sterilization', we
might assume 0

,

and then attempt to present an argument

which derives a contradiction from assuming 0
course, allows us to conclude ^ 0

.

.

This, of

Such an argument,

therefore, if valid and sound, will deductively support ^ 0

Consider formulating the following argument:

.

.
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2.8
1

.

2

.

Only killing germs prevents germ-caused
infections
in unclean wounds.
Only antiseptic or other sterilization
can kill
germs
Only antiseptic or other sterilization
can prevent
germ-caused infection in unclean wounds.
Ango does prevent germ caused infections in
unclean wounds without germ-killing antiseptics
or other sterilization.
It is not the case that only antiseptic
or other
sterilization can prevent germ-caused infections
unclean wounds.
Only antiseptic or other sterilization can
prevent
germ caused infections in unclean wounds.
[Contradiction]
It is not the case that Arigo prevents germ
caused
infections in unclean wounds without antiseptics
or other sterilization.

3.
4.

5.

m

6

.

Premise

1

and Premise

2

are given knowlege about germs,

infections and antiseptics.
as we shall see shortly.

Premise

3

follows from

1

and 2,

So the strategy is to assume the

negation of the conclusion that we want to prove as we do in
premise

4

and given this assumption, to derive a contra-

diction as we do in deriving

5,

which contradicts

allows us to conclude that the given assumption

4

2.

This

is false.

This, of course, is logically equivalent to concluding that

the negation of the assumption is true, which we do in
7.

However, given this intuitive view of the argument pro-

vided deductively to support the given statement, we must

clarify the argument, translate it into LPC, and prove that
it is valid.

)

..
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Consider the translation of 2.8 into LPC

.

As we can see,

the English wording is slightly difficult
to translate

easily into LPC.

For this reason, we must consider the

proposition expressed by each statement and
express the
proposition in clearer English statements which
we may then
easily translate into LPC.
In this case, it is helpful
to think of the quantifiers as ranging
over persons.

We

may, therefore, translate 2.8 into logically
equivalent

English statements and also into LPC as follows:

2.9
1.

Anyone who prevents germ-caused infections in
unclean wounds kills germs.
(Let 'Px' stand for
'x prevents germ-caused infections in unclean
wounds' and Gx stand for 'x kills germs')
(Vx) (Px
(Gx)
Given Assumption
Anyone who kills germs uses antiseptic or other
sterilization.
(Let
Ux stand for 'x uses antiseptic or other sterilization')
(Vx) (Gx 'D Ux)
Given Assumption
Anyone who prevents germ-caused infection in
unclean wounds uses antiseptic or other
sterilization
1

'

'

2.

'

3.

(Vx) (Px
4.

Ux)

'

2

1,

Arigo succeeds in preventing germ-caused infections
in unclean wounds and yet does not use antiseptic
or other sterilization.
(Let 'a' stand for
'Arigo
% Ua
Pa
A
It is false that anyone who prevents germ-caused
infections in unclean wounds uses antiseptic or
'

.

5.

other sterilization.
^
6.

:.

7.

(Vx) (Px

O Ux)

4

But anyone who prevents germ-caused infections in
unclean wounds uses antiseptic or other
sterilization
(Vx)(PxG>Ux)
3, Reit.
It is false that Arigo succeeds in preventing
germ-caused infections in unclean wounds and yet
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^°1p a

n

°Vua)

ant Se P tic or other sterilization.
^

We must now prove that 2.9 is a deductively
valid argument
This is quite easy to do, given our proof
procedure:

2.10

b

1.
-Z.
[>3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
.

^lO.
11.
12.
13.

O

(Vx) (Px
Gx)
(Vx) (Gx CP Ux)

Given Assumption
Given Assumption
A
l, UQE

Pb
Pb O Gb
Gb
Gb CP Ub
Ub
Pb CP Ub

3

O Ux)

(Vx) (Px

Pa
^ Ua
^ (Vx) (Px

~C? Ux)

,

6

7

,

ZD I

3,

UOI

9,

^ Ua)

.

ZD E

,

5

10,

(Vx) (Px zp- Ux)

(Pa

4

UQE
ZD E

,

A

.

^

,

2,

11,

DM
Reit.
12, % I

The conclusion, of course, is logically equivalent to Pa
Ua, or in English,

3>

if Arigo prevents germ-caused infections

then he uses antiseptic or other sterilization.

The argu-

ment is deductively valid, we must now evaluate the
argument's soundness.

Clearly 2.9 is a sound argument.

According to our proof

of its validity, 2.10, the conclusion depends only on the

given premises

ment is sound.

1

and

If these are true, then the argu-

2.

Clearly

1

and

2

are true; there are no

.

..
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obvious counterexamples to either

1

or

2.

Therefore, 2.9

is a sound argument.

Therefore, we can see that we have
indeed provided deductive
support for the given statement in
providing this sound
deductive argument. To do so, we simply
appealed to

relevant common knowledge, much like we do
when we supply
the implicit premises in an enthymeme
We then formulate
.

the argument, perhaps reformulate it, then
translate it into
our symbols, prove that it is valid, and then
evaluate its

soundness

Models
1.

Since this is the most difficult material so far,
present many statements and provide deductive support
for them in class, as a group.
Point out how and why,
for example, you avoid the word 'can' or relations that
are not specifically related to objects in a specified
domain.
(You might consider introducing Modal Logic
rigorously at this point, since there will be many
English statements for which we cannot provide
deductive support without Modal Logic.)

2.

Attempt to provide deductive support for a given statement that, in fact, fails to support the statement,
because the statement is false. Show that while the
argument is valid, at least one premise must be false
if the conclusion is false.
Exercises

1.

Have the students prove that 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7 are
valid

2

Have the students provide deductive support for the
statement 'Pluto is further from the Earth than the
Moon' by considering irref lexivity

.

3

:

'

.
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3
'

e stadants Provide deductive
support for the
statements

ST?
following
a>

The Pyramids were not built by men
from outer
space
'Arigo does not stop the flow of
blood from deep
P
wounds with verbal commands.'
'

.

b)

Have them present their arguments
and then evaluate them
as a group reconstructing them when
necessary.
4.

,

Subsect ion

-

3

Providing Inductive Arguments

From our study of inductive logic, we can see
that providing
inductive arguments to support a given statement S may
involve providing statements of evidence E for

S

such that

the statements composing E are all true or have high

probability, and such that

P

(S/E

.

K)

>

P

(v

s/E

.

K)

Or, if S is a statement about the relation of a conditioning

property to a conditioned property
support for

S

,

then providing inductive

involves providing possible conditioning

properties and supporting the relation of the conditioning

property to the conditioned property stated in

S.

This

relation, as we have seen, will be that the conditioning

property is either a necessary, a sufficient, or a necessary
and sufficient condition for the conditioned property.
This, of course, involves applying what we have called

inductive elimination.
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Subsection 3A

-

Statements of Evidence

We shall first consider providing
statements of evidence
for a given statement.
To provide such an inductive

argument, we may, like in providing
deductive support for a
given statement, appeal to relevant common
knowledge.
However, we are more likely to function as
"detectives,"
and appeal to investigations and research.
Of course, in

doing such investigations and conducting such
research, we
must remain open to the possiblity that we may
fail to
support the given statement, and, perhaps, support its
negation.

Obviously, we must follow the facts where they

lead us rather than fit the facts to our desired end.

Consider providing inductive support for the statement 'the
crew of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship and were lost at
sea'.

The first step, of course, is to function like a

detective and to research the disappearance of the Mary
Celeste

1

s

crew. 15 2

Our research shows that the Mary Celeste

was a 103-foot brigantine found abandoned at sea by the
Dei Gratia on December 4, 1872.

received a small salvage fee.

The crew of the Dei Gratia
The Mary Celeste left New York

152 The following account is from Lawrence David
Kusche,
The Bermuda Triangle Mystery:
Solved New York, Warner
Books, 1975.
,
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in early November,

1872, bound for Genoa, Italy.

When she

was found. Captain Griggs, his wife, daughter
and crew of
eight were gone; the ship was completely deserted.
The

lifeboat was gone; launched but not ripped away by
accident.
The ship carried 1,700 barrels of alcohol, which
was intact.
However, there was 3-1/2 feet of water in the hold.
ship

s

The

papers, except the Captain's log, were missing

along with the navigation instruments.

When found, the

Nary Celeste's sails were set, but some were torn.

The

forehatch was found ripped open, and a line was trailing
the ship, but there was no serious damage.

Given this basic information and all relevant available
evidence, we shall initiate our investigation by formulating

what we shall call hypotheses.

An hypothesis, for our

purpose here, is simply a suggestive and physically possible
explanation, which given what we already know, allows us to

gather other specific relevant facts to guide our investi-

gation and our attempt to formulate probabilities based on
these facts.

For example, consider as an hypothesis that

the crew mutinied, killed the captain and his family, and

delivered the ship to the captain of the Dei Gratia for the
salvage fee.

Proposing this hypothesis warrants our

investigating the size of the salvage fee, the financial
interests of the crew members, the character of the captain,

'
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the financial interests of the owners, the
character of the

crews of both ships and the financial interests
and

character of the captain of the Dei Gratia

.

Suppose that our investigation reveals that the salvage
fee was very small, that the crew members had little
to

gain financially, that the Captain was well liked, that
the

owners had nothing to gain by insurance claims and that the
Captain of the Dei Gratia was friendly with the Captain of
the Mary Celeste

,

well liked and had no potential for

financial gain given the situation, and that the crew

members of the Mary Celeste

were never seen again.

This

information shows that the hypothesis is not highly
probable; it is not evidence for this hypothesis.

If we

formulate an inductive argument with the hypothesis as the

conclusion and this information as premises, the resulting
argument will be judged to be weak.

However, note that

proposing this hypothesis has been far from worthless; we
have discovered evidence that rules out conclusions that may
be incompatible with the statement 'the crew members of the

Mary Celeste abandoned ship and were lost at sea'.

For

example, proposing and evaluating this hypothesis rules out
the statement 'the crew members of the Mary Celeste jumped

ship for the salvage money' or the statement 'the crew

members of the Mary Celeste sailed home on the Dei Gratia

.
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We formulated this hypothesis to
gather information to

discover evidence to support the statement
'the crew
members of the M ary Celeste abandoned ship
and were lost at
sea'.
Once we discover relevant evidence, we
shall put
it

m

the form of an inductive argument, test
its inductive

strength, and then determine the probability
of the

conclusion.

Since we have ruled out that the crew jumped

ship for financial gain, and that the crew
sailed home on
the Dei Gratia we must consider proposing
another
,

hypothesis to discover further evidence.

For example,

consider as an hypothesis that some natural disaster with
bad weather caused the crew to abandon ship.

Proposing

this hypothesis warrants our investigating the weather

patterns in the area where the Mary Celeste

was found, and

the physical evidence of any such natural disaster aboard
ship.

It also warrants our investigating the standard

procedures the crew followed in the event of such natural
disasters aboard ship, or experience with bad weather.

We already know that we may rule out an actual fire since
the only damage found was the torn sails and the ripped-open

forehatch.

We might suppose that the sails were torn

because the ship sailed without a crew for some time in
bad weather.

We know that the ship carried 1,700 barrels

of alcohol, and we know that alcohol is extremely volatile,
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that is, it gives off fumes.
C eleste was a wooden ship,

We also know that the Mary

illuminated by kerosene lamps.

Therefore, we might suppose that alcohol fumes
from a
poorly vented hold illuminated by kerosene lamps
blew open
the forehatch. Vapor resembling smoke would
then billow
out of the forehatch.

Fearing

a

fire, the Captain and crew

may then have simply followed the standard procedure
in the
event of a fire on a ship with a flammable cargo. We
discover, upon investigation, that this standard procedure
is to abandon ship;

to remove the ship's papers, the

navigation equipment, attach a line to the ship, launch
the lifeboat and secure the line from the ship to the life-

boat containing the crew.

That this occurred is supported

by the discovery that the ship's papers, navigation

instruments, and lifeboat were missing, and that

trailing the ship.

a

line was

We also discover, upon investigation,

that this area of the Atlantic is noted for its sudden,

violent storms, which may account for the separation of the
line trailing the Mary Celeste from the lifeboat containing
the crew.

Further evidence that there was bad weather is

that the hold had 3-1/2 feet of water in it, which, in the

absence of structural damage, had to come from the open
forehatch, and that the sails were torn.

Therefore, we can see that by formulating and evaluating
such hypotheses in an attempt to gather and evaluate

.

'
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evidence, we may discover evidence for
constructing inductively strong arguments to provide
inductive support for
the statement 'the crew members of the
Mary Celeste

abandoned ship and were lost at sea

However, we may also see that given our detective
work,

providing such inductive support for this statement
involves
providing more than one simple inductive argument.
Intuitively, we can see that we must, in this case, provide

inductive arguments inductively to support conclusions, in
turn, to be used as premises in our argument inductively
to

support the statement.

While it is desirable to use premises

known to be true in providing inductive support for given
statements, often the best we can do is to use premises that
have high probability.

This is why our appeal to all

relevant available evidence is not restricted to knowledge.

We must first establish that they had some reason to abandon
ship, consistent with the physical evidence, and secondly,

establish that there is some reason that they were lost at
sea consistent with the physical evidence.

To do so is to

provide inductive support for the statement 'the crew members
of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship and were lost at sea

'

Given our detective work and the evidence gained by forming
the hypotheses, consider the following argument:

.

.

.
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1.

2.
3.
4.
•

•

5

Given

.

5

When found abandoned, the Mary Celeste was
structurally sound except the forehatch to the
hold was blown off.
She carried 1,700 barrels of alcohol in the hold.
Alcohol gives off fumes, which, when ignited,
explode and produce vapor resembling smoke.
The hold was poorly vented and illuminated by
kerosene lamps.
Alcohol fumes ignited and blew open the forehatch
producing vapor resembling smoke.

of 3.1, we must now attmept to establish that they

abandoned ship.

Consider the following argument, given 3.1:

3.2
1.

2.

3.

4

.

5.

:.

6.

The Mary Celeste's lifeboat was gone and a line
trailed the ship when she was found abandoned at
sea
The lifeboat held 12 people and the Mary Celeste
carried 11 people: the Captain, his wife, his
daughter, and a crew of eight.
The ship's papers, the navigation equipment and
the crew were gone when she was found abandoned
at sea.
Standard procedure in the event of a suspected
fire on a wooden ship containing flammable material
was to launch the lifeboat containing the ship's
papers and navigation equipment and crew, and
attach a line to the ship and to the lifeboat
saving the crew in the event the ship exploded.
Alcohol fumes ignited and blew
(5 from 3.1)
open the forehatch producing vapor resembling
smoke
The crew of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship in the
lifeboat secured to the Mary Celeste by a trailing
line

Given 3.1 and 3.2, we must now attempt to establish that
they were lost at sea.

Consider the following argument:

.

,
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3.3

The Mar y Celeste had 3-1/2 feet of
water in the
hold some sails were torn, and a line
trailed
the ship when she was found abandoned
at sea.
The area of the Atlantic where she was
found and
through which she sailed is noted for its
sudden
violent storms and heavy seas.
Lifeboats are structurally weak and unable to
withstand heavy seas, especially when fully
loaded.
Lifeboats are easily separated from lines securinq
them during heavy seas.
Abandoned ships under full sail in violent storms
and heavy seas take water through open hatches
tear sails, and pull hard on trailing lines
securing launched, loaded lifeboats.
Abandoned ships under full sail in violent storms
and heavy seas sail randomly, quickly changing

1.

2
.

.

'

3.

5.

6.

direction
(6 from 3.2)
The crew of the Mary Celeste
abandoned ship in a lifeboat secured to the Mary
Celeste by a trailing line.
The crew of the Mary Celeste were lost at sea.

7.

.

.

8.

Combining 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, therefore, we have provided
inductive support for the given statement.

We must now, in

turn, evaluate 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 to determine that they are

inductively strong and that their conclusions are highly
probable.
P

(S/E

.

This will allow us to determine whether or not
K)

at sea and

>

'E'

P

s/E

.

K)

where

'S’

is

'the crew was lost

stands for all the evidence we have provided

through our detective work to inductively support 'S'.

Consider 3.1.

Again, let the numbers of the premises and

conclusion be propositional constants.

The premises of 3.1

are evidence for the conclusion provided that P (5/1

.2

.

.

.
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3

P

>

4)

.

.2.3.4).

5/1

(%

alone is not evidence for

1

P

5/1).

However, when

we can see that

premises.
2

3

•

4

*

1

Even if true,

1.

Intuitively, P (5/1)

5.

is conjoined with 2,

and

3

4

,

we

is the best explanation, given these

5

Intuitively, P (5/1
)

Consider

2

.

3

.

4

.

>

)

P

5/1

(%

Therefore, the premises of 3.1 provide evidence

•

for the conclusion, and 3.1 is a strong inductive
argument.

We must now consider the probability of the conclusion.

Since the premises of 3.1 are all true and they are not

detached, P

(1

.

2

.

3

4

.

Since this is the case, P
2

3

.

4

.

K)

.

)

>

(^

(1

.

2

(5)

>

P

3.4)).

.

.2.3.4

(5/1

Therefore, P

.

P

K)

.

P

>

5/1

('v

.

5), and 3.1 is a

(%

good inductive argument that inductively supports its

conclusion

Consider 3.2.

The premises of 3.2 are evidence for the

conclusion provided that P (6/1
2

.

6

6

;

3

.

4

.

Consider 1.

5)

.

.

2. 3. 4.

If true,

>P

5)

(^6/1

is evidence for

1

there may, of course, be other explanations for

1

,

but

intuitively seems to be the best explanation so we can

see that P

(6/1)

>

P

(^

6/1)

.

Consider

2

alone does not seem to be evidence for

P

(%

,

P

3,

4

6

However, when conjoined with

6/2)

Even if true,

2.

(6/2)

and

5,

23

can intuitively see that the conjunction is evidence for
P

(6/1

.

2

.

3

.

4

.

5)

>

P

(^

6/1.

2

.

3

.

4

.

5)

.

6

;

,
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Therefore, the premises of 3.2 provide evidence
for the

conclusion, and 3.2 is a strong inductive argument.

We must now consider the probability of the
conclusion.

Premises

1,

2,

and

3

of 3.2 are all true.

4

Premise

of

5

3.2 is the conclusion of 3.1, which we have shown to
be more

probable than its denial
detached, P
5
>

.

K)

P

(1

2

.

3

.

Since these premises are not

.

4

.

.

5

K)

.

Since this is the case, P

.

6/1

2

.

3

.

4

.

5

.

K)

.

>

(v

P

(6/1

(l
2

.

.

Therefore, P

.

.

2

.

3

.

4

3

.

4

.

5

.

>

P

(6)

K)
6)

and given 3.1, 3.2 is a good inductive argument that in-

ductively supports its conclusion.

Consider 3.3.

The premises of 3.3 are evidence for the

conclusion provided that
P

(^

8/1

true,

P

(8/1

.2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

.

However, when conjoined with

2,

Consider

7).

alone is not evidence for

1

2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

P

8;

4,

3,

6

(^

p

(8/1

.

2

5.6.7).

.

3

.

4

.

5

.

6

.

7)

>

P

(v

8/1

8/1)

.

and 7, we can

intuitively see that the conjunction is evidence for
P

>

Even if

1.

(8/1)

5,

7)

.

2

.

3

.

8;
4

.

Therefore, the premises of 3.3 provide evidence

for the conclusion, and 3.3 is a strong inductive argument.

We must now consider the probability of the conclusion.

Premises

1,

2,

3,

4,

5

and

6

of 3.3 are all true.

g

.

472

Premise

of 3.3 is the conclusion of 3.2, which
we have

7

shown to be more probable than its denial.

premises are not detached, P
>

P

(1

case, P

2

.

.2

(8/1

3. 4. 5.

3

.

6

.

.

4

.5 .6 .7

.3.4
7.

3.1 and 3.2,

(1.2.

K).

.

K)

3

.

Since these
4

.

5

7

.

j

Since this is the

.

.5 .6 .7.K) >P (^8/1.2.
Therefore, P

(

8

)

>

P

(v

8

)

,

and

3.3 is a good inductive argument that

inductively supports its conclusion.

Given 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, and our evaluation of them we can
see that the probability of

'the crew of the Mary Celeste

abandoned ship and were lost at sea', given the evidence
we have gathered to provide inductive arguments to support
the statement, is greater than the probability of the

statement without such inductive support.

Therefore, we

have successfully provided inductive arguments to support
the statement

'

the crew of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship

and was lost at sea'

Subsection 3B- Inductive Elimination

We shall now consider providing inductive support for a given

statement

S

by applying inductive elimination.

Note that

we may apply inductive elimination only to statements about
the relation of a conditioning property to a conditioned

property.

Providing inductive support for such

a

statement
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S

by applying inductive elimination, then,
involves pro-

viding possible conditioning properties and
supporting the
relation of the conditioning property to the
conditioned

property stated in

S.

Consider providing inductive support for the statement
'the
epileptic convulsions of a 9-year old American boy
treated
by Arigo subsided because of the doses of the drugs

Phenobarbi tal and Dilantin, given by the boy's physician,
and not because of Arigo

's

treatments'.

Let S be a propo-

sitional constant standing for this statement.

S

claim about a particular sufficient condition for
case.

makes a
a

specific

The claim is that the conditioning property, namely

the dose of the drugs Phenobarbital and Dilantin

given by the boy's physician is the sufficient condition
for the conditioned property, namely the absence of

epileptic convulsions in this particular 9-year old boy.
Let J stand for the conditioned property and let H stand for
this conditioning property.

support for

S

Clearly providing inductive

involves an application of what we have

called the method of difference.

Recall that in practice

the actual method is the same as the inverse method of

agreement; a property that is present when the conditioned

property is absent cannot be a sufficient condition for the

conditioned property.

First, let us clearly specify this

case as described by Fuller.
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According to Fuller, the 9-year old American
boy treated by
Arigo had Jacksonian Epilepsy. He had been
treated by his
physician with Phenobarbital and Dilantin.
be a normal treatment for epilepsy.)

(This we know to

The boy's mother

brought him to see Arigo who prescribed eight
different
drugs

(none of these drugs are identifiable in any drug

index)

.

Two months later, the boy went to summer camp.

A

year later, the boy was free of epileptic convulsions.
Fuller, of course, concludes that the conditoned
property
was caused by Arigo

'

s

treatments.

Let

I

stand for the

conditioned property of Arigo'

s

then, is that in this case,

is the sufficient condition

for J

.

I

S

treatment.

Fuller's claim

The statement we are attempting to support is that

in this case, H is the sufficient condition for J.

Note that in providing inductive support for

S,

we must con-

sider complex conditioning properties as well, besides the

simple conditioning properties H and

conjunctive property

(H

.

I)

.

I.

For example, the

We might also consider the

complex properties of the absence of certain properties such
as the property of the absence of an inferiority complex,

since through research we discover that an inferiority

complex may contribute to epileptic convulsions.

Let G

stand for the property of having an inferiority complex.
Of course, ^ G, then, is the complex property of the
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absence of an inferiority complex.
(H

.

I)

Given ^ G, H,

I,

and

as possible conditioning properties, and J
as the

conditioned property in the actual occurrence, the
actual
occurrence one year after the events described can be
represented as follows:

Narrowed Down
Possible Conditioning
Properties

Actual occurrence
one year later

^ G

H

I

P

P

P

(H

.

Conditioned
Property

I)

j

p

P

We must now apply the method of difference by constructing

test occurrences to determine the particular sufficient

conditions in operation here.

In the inverse method of

agreement, these test occurrences simply involve empirically

providing the properties in various combinations and

determining which is sufficient for J by ruling out
properties which are present when J is absent.

In this

case, however, applying the method of difference, we must

provide test occurrences from research of the specific case
at hand since we are looking for a particular sufficient

condition.

In this case, then, we may also rule out

conditioning properties which are absent when J is present,
because while they may be sufficient conditions for J, they
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are not the sufficient conditions of interest
in this

specific case.

Suppose that our research in this case first reveals
that
the boy, in fact, had an inferiority complex until he
was

free from epileptic convulsions.

out

^ G.

This allows us to rule

Secondly, we learn that Dilantin takes a long

period of time to have any effect, and that the

8

"drugs"

prescribed by Arigo cannot be identified in any drug index
and are, in fact, fictional names for harmless substances

that are completely excreted by the body in the urine

shortly after they are taken.

This allows us to rule out

and thereby rule out

The results of this

(H

I)

.

.

I,

research are as follows:

Narrowed Down
Possible Conditioning
Properties

Conditioned
Property

^ G

H

I

actual occurrence

P

P

P

P

P

Test-Research

1

A

P

P

P

P

Test-Research

2

A

P

A

A

P

(H

.

I)

J

Simply applying the method of difference to the results of
this research summarized above allows us to conclude that H
is the sufficient condition for J.
S

This, in turn, supports

by supporting the relation of the conditioning property
to

.
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the conditoned property stated in S

.

In this way, then,

inducitve elimination can be used to provide
inductive
support for statements about the relation of a
conditioning

property to a conditioned property.

Models
1*

This is a good opportunity to introduce students to
research techniques and the use of the library. Point
out the crucial role of research in providing inductive
support for a statement. This is a good opportunity to
review both inductive probability and inductive
elimination in conjunction with a discussion of the
importance of research.

2.

Present many statements and provide inductive support
for them in class as a group by providing statements
of evidence and inductive arguments. Appeal to
research already done earlier. For example, research
done on Von DSnigan's claims, or research done on Blum's
or Berlitz' claims.

3.

Present many statements of a relation between a conditioning property and a conditioned property and
provide inductive support for them in class as a group
by applying inductive elimination.
Be sure to apply
the direct method of agreement, the inverse method of
agreement, the method of difference, the double method
of agreement and the joint method of agreement and
difference. Again, point out the importance of test
procedures as well as research.

4.

Provide inductive support for a given statement that,
in fact, fails inductively to support the given statement because research shows that the evidence is
against the statement. Use statements that involve
providing inductive arguments involving probability,
and use statements that involve applying inductive
elimination
Exercises

1.

Have the students provide inductive evidential support
for the following statements:
(Note:
this involves
specific research)

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.
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a)

Ar ig° did not cure Belk's back
condition (research
such back conditions)

-b)

r g
d1 n t ° Ure the America n women's
migraine^
i °u
^
?
like
headaches
(research such migraine-like
headaches)

c)

Arigo did not cure acute leukemia in
the
girl (research acute leukemia in children)6-year o

d)

The UFO that seemed to follow a police
officer
change colors from red to yellow to white,
and' hover
in the sky to the west over his house
all night was
the planet Venus (research appearances
of Venus
when it is close to the Earth)

e)

The UFO's reported to "take off very quickly"
from
specific points are not extraterrestrial spacecrafts
(research the laws of physics; thrust, properties
of
chemical rockets, nuclear rockets, etc. and what
was found at these specific points)
,

2.

Have the students provide inductive elimination support
for the following statements:
(Note:
this may involve
research and test procedures)
a)

Leukemia is not cured by Potassium Chloride (KCL)
(research medicinal effects of Potassium Chloride)

b)

Back pain is not eliminated only by Vitamin B12
(research medicinal effects of Vitamin B12)

c)

Faith in the healer is not a necessary condition
for being healed (research to provide test
procedures)
.

d)

Appearing to be an aerial phenomenon for which we
have no specific, certain explanation is a
necessary and a sufficient condition for being a
UFO.

3

.

Have the students present their arguments and then
evaluate them as a group, reconstructing them when
necessary
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Section Five:

Subsection

1

-

Informal Fallacies in Arguments

The Goal of Arguments:

Persuasion Ver.n.

Truth or High Probability

Thus far, we have considered the evaluation,
reconstruction
and provision of arguments designed to
support a particular

conclusion.

Such arguments are usually presented to

establish the truth or the high probability of a
particular
conclusion:

the goal of these arguments is rationally to

support a particular conclusion.

when such deductive argu-

ments are evaluated and found to be deductively valid and
sound, we know that the conclusion is true.

When such in-

ductive arguments are evaluated and found to be inductively
strong and to have a highly probable conclusion, we know
that the conclusion is more likely true than false.

In

either case, we know that the argument in question

rationally supports the conclusion.

If we know how to

evaluate such arguments correctly, and we find by evaluation
that a deductive argument is valid and sound, or that an

inductive argument is inductively strong and has

a

highly

probable conclusion, then we are rationally persuaded to
accept the conclusion.

In this way,

then, such arguments

may be said to persuade us to accept the conclusion.
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However, given such valid and sound
deductive arguments, or
such inductively strong inductive
arguments, there may, in
fact, be unreasonable people who
refuse to accept the conclusion; people who are not, in fact,
rationally persuaded
to accept the rationally supported
conclusion. This, of
course, should not trouble us, since our
interest in arguments is to establish the truth or the probability
of the

conclusion, and not simply to influence people's
beliefs.
A valid, sound deductive argument has a true
conclusion

whether or not anyone believes that the conclusion is
true.
Truth, as we have seen, is independent of people's
beliefs.

For example, to determine the truth value of the statement
the Earth moves around the Sun

'

,

Nicholas Copernicus did

not formulate a questionnaire asking people if they believed

that it was true or false, and then assign the most popularly

believed truth value to be the proposition expressed by the
statement.

In fact,

at that time most all people believed

that the statement was false.

Perhaps after our evaluation of Voliva's arguments, Voliva

may still believe that it is not the case that the Earth is

travelling at 600,000 miles per hour as astronomers claim,
and believe that the Earth is not a sphere but is flat.

This fact should not trouble us, since the matter has been

rationally resolved by research and by argument.

There is

.

482

no need to conduct further research or
to provide or re-

construct other arguments to support the above
conclusions
since we know that the above conclusions
are
false.

Voliva's irrational belief in the truth of these
conclusions
is not of any importance to the rational
resolution
of the

question.

We may simply dismiss his failure to be

rationally persuaded by the research and arguments as
his
own shortcoming and not a shortcoming of the research
or

arguments

Sometimes, however, the goal of arguments used by people in

various situations is not rationally to support
conclusion.

a

particular

Often the goal of an argument is simply to

persuade opponents or an audience to accept

a

conclusion.

In many such situations, valid and sound deductive argu-

ments, or inductive arguments that are inductively strong

with a high inductive probability are used rationally to
persuade an opponent or an audience to accept a conclusion.
However, sometimes arguments are designed simply to persuade

opponents or an audience to accept a conclusion, yet fail

rationally to support the conclusion.

Such arguments are

said to be psychologically persuasive, yet are neither valid

nor sound deductive, nor strong inductive arguments with

highly probable conclusions.

The psychological

persuasiveness of such arguments comes from errors in
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reasoning that are psychologically
persuasive.

We shall

call such errors in reasoning that are
psychologically

persuasive fallacies.

Arguments containing fallacies we

shall call fallacious arguments.

Recognizing such

psychologically persuasive fallacious arguments and
exposing
the psychologically persuasive error in reasoning
is

sufficient to evaluate the argument and to show that
it
fails rationally to support its conclusion and is,

therefore, of no cognitive significance.

We may understand a psychologically persuasive reason in a

very broad and general sense for our purposes here.

Clearly

the notion must be broad enough to capture rationally

persuasive valid and sound deductive arguments and

rationally persuasive strong inductive arguments with
highly probably conclusions, as well as persuasive errors in
reasoning.

Therefore, we may simply say that r is a

psychologically persuasive reason for conclusion

c

if and

only if there is some person x who is persuaded by r to
accept c.

This obviously includes many kinds of reasons.

However, our interest in psychologically persuasive reasons
in this section is limited to what we have called fallacies.

The interesting and important feature of fallacies is that

they are errors in reasoning that are also psychologically
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persuasive.

For this reason, it is important
to distinguish
what we have called rationally
persuasive deductive and indeductive arguments from fallacious
arguments which may be
psychologically persuasive even though
they fail rationally
to support their conclusions.
Our interest, of course, is
to insure that conclusions are
rationally justified and that
we are able rationally to justify our
acceptance of
a

particular conclusion.

Fallacies simply attempt to persuade

without justifications.

Models
1*

Discuss and give examples of arguments designed
simply
to persuade opponents to accept a conclusion,
without
rationally supporting the conclusion. You might
consider advertising as a common example.
Suggest that
we might, given persuasion as the only goal,
evaluate
the success or failure of such arguments by
counting
the number of people who were persuaded by them.
Point out how this differs from the evaluation of
arguments that we have considered.

2.

Discuss rational resolution and the role of people's
beliefs in the evaluation of arguments. Point out that
universal agreement is not common even though a
particular question has been rationally resolved.
Underline the fact that universal agreement has no
bearing on the evaluation of arguments.
Exercises

1.

Have the students find examples of arguments presented
by scientists which rationally resolved a particular
question, even though the majority of people refused to
believe the conclusion. Have them consider Copernicus,
Kepler, Harvey, Semmelweis, Pasteur, and other figures
from the history of science. Ask them to draw
parallels to other disciplines as well.
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2.

Have the students find examples of arguments
simply to persuade us to accept a conclusion designed
and
rationally to support the conclusion. Consider not
arguments in collective bargaining. Are such
arguments
esigned simply to persuade us to accept a
conclusion
and not rationally to support the conclusion?

Subsection

2

-

Formal Fallacies

Fallacies may be divided into three groups:

formal

fallacies, fallacies of ambiguity, and fallacies of

relevance.

We shall first consider formal fallacies.

Formal fallacies involve violation of PC or LPC rules.
Intuitively, we can see that not all violations of PC or
LPC rules may be psychologically persuasive.

For example,

often blatant contradictions are psychologically persuasive
even though they are a violation of PC and LPC rules.
However, recall that our account of psychologically

persuasive reasons is broad enough to include such blatant

contradictions if one person is persuaded by the contradiction to accept an invalidly reached conclusion.

Again,

our interest in exposing these fallacies is to show that
one has no reason to be persuaded;

that the argument

employing the fallacy does not support the conclusion.

contradictions buried in

a

Often

complex argument are not

blatant, and may more clearly be psychologically persuasive.
In either case, it is sufficient for our purposes here to

say that a formal fallacy is any psychologically persuasive

A

.

)

.
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Violation of PC or LPC rules.

Some such psychologically

persuasive violations of PC and LPC
rules are common enough
in arguments to be given specific
names,
One such formal
fallacy is called denying the
antecedent, and involves an
error of the following form:

1
2
:

3

.

0

.

% A
^ 0

.

If we unionize
then our troubles are over
It is not the case that we unionize,
It is not the case that our troubles are
over.

1.
:

.

2

.

3

.

,

From our study of logic and our discussion of necessary
and
s ufficient

conditions in inductive elimination, we know that

the absence of one particular conditioning property

sufficient for a particular conditioned property does not
guarantee the absence of the conditioned property; there may
be another conditioning property present that is sufficient
for the conditioned property.

For statements, we may prove

that 2.1 is invalid by using the truth table method.

A

0

t
f
t

t
t

t
t

f
f

f

[

(

0)

(

•

•

f

•

•

t

*

f

•

f

•

t

*

t

•

^ A
t = f
t = t
f = f
f = f

•% bQ
r

]

.

.
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Recall that one case (here, the case where
is true)

A is

false and

0

in which the conjunction is true is sufficient to

show that it is not a contradiction, since a contradiction
is never true.

Therefore, this argument form is invalid.

Another such formal fallacy is called affirming the consequent, and involves an error of the following form:
2.2

:

.

1.

A

2^

0

3

A

.

1.
2
:.

3.

0

If Oswald shot JFK in the head, then JFK is
assassinated
JFK is assassinated
Oswald shot JFK in the head

From our study of logic and our discussion of necessary
and sufficient conditons in inductive elimination, we know

that the presence of some conditioned property does not

guarantee the presence of any one particular conditioning

property sufficient for the conditioned property.

For

statements, we may prove that 2.2 is invalid by using the

truth table method.

A

0

[((A

t

t
t

t
t

f
f

f

t
f

D

.0)

0)

.

t
t

f

.

f

.

t

.

f

.

.

.
.

f =
t =
f =
t =

.^A]
f

t
f
f
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Again, in the case where A is false and

junction is true.

0

is true,

the con

Therefore, the conjunction is not a

contradiction so the argument form is invalid.

Another such formal fallacy is called the fallacy of
conjunction, and involves an error of the following form:

2.3

:

.

1.

'V'

3

% A
^ 0

.

.

3.

:.

.

0)

It is not the case that both the Secret Service and
the CIA conspired to kill JFK.
It is not the case that the Secret Service
conspired to kill JFK.
It is not the case that the CIA conspired to kill

1.
2

(A

JFK

Again, from our study of logic, we may prove that 2.3 is

invalid by using the truth table method:

A

0

t

t
t

f

t
f

f
f

[

A

(^

(

f

.

f

.

.

t

.

.

f

.

.

t

.

t
t
t

0)

.

.

^ A)

.

^ ^ 0]

t = f
t = t
f =
f =

f
f

Again, in the case where A is false and

conjunction is true.

0

is true, the

Therefore, the conjunction is not a

contradiction, so the argument form is invalid.
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We can see then, that any formal fallacy can
be exposed by

capturing the logical form of the statement composing
the
argument containing the formal fallacy. We may then
simply
appiy PC or LPC rules to point out the error in reasoning
involved which allows us to show that such fallacious

arguments offer no reason to persuade one to accept their

conclusions since we have shown that the argument employing
the fallacy fails to support the conclusion.

Models
1.

This provides an opportunity to present invalid arguments or valid arguments that are unsound for
evaluation. Point out that valid but unsound arguments
do not commit formal fallacies, since they do not involve errors in formal reasoning.

2.

Consider the invalid arguments you have previously
presented from Gardner. This is a good opportunity
briefly to discuss the psychology of persuasion. Point
out and underscore that our interest in persuasion is
to be persuaded by arguments which successfully support
their conclusions, and not to be persuaded by arguments
which fail to support their conclusions.

3.

This is also a good opportunity to relate our consideration of arguments to a consideration of reasonable
Consider Ullian's and Quine's discussions in
beliefs.
The Web of Belief
.

Exercises
1.

Have the students bring in examples of formal fallacies
from the reading, or from advertising. Have them
evaluate them as a group.

2.

Have the students write a short paper in which they are
asked to persuade a wealthy individual to fund a particular project by any means they desire. Have them
exchange papers and evaluate the arguments.

.
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Subsection

3

-

Fallacies of Ambiguity

Besides formal logical errors in reasoning resulting from

violations of PC or LPC rules, there are also what we shall
call informal errors in reasoning that, when exposed, also

allow us to show that arguments containing them fail
rationally to support their conclusions.

Some philosophers, however, have argued that there are no

informal fallacies; what have been called informal fallacies
are not errors in reasoning, but simply enthymemes.

Consider the following example.
E.
1
:.

2.

Event A precedes event B in time
Event A causes event B.

Such philosophers claim that E does not involve an error in

reasoning, since E is already an enthymeme.
E.l
1.
2.
:.

3.

Event A precedes event B in time.
If event A precedes event B in time, then event A
causes event B.
Event A causes event B.

E.l is a valid deductive argument.

informal fallacy?

Where, they ask, is the

.
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We know from our study of deductive logic
that any argument

such as E can be made deductively valid by
supplying a

conditional with the conjunction of the premises as

antecedent and the conclusion as consequent.

However, this

just leads us to find an error in reasoning involved
in

formulating such a conditional.

For example, we may account

for the unsoundness of E.l by arguing that

2

is false.

It

is false because to reason that if event A precedes event B

time

,

then event A causes event B is to commit a specific

error in reasoning which we shall call the false cause

fallacy

Such errors are not formal errors in reasoning, but usually

involve providing evidence of some kind which fails to

support the truth of a particular conclusion.

This

evidence, while failing to support the truth of a particular

conclusion, may be psychologically persuasive.

Therefore,

it seems that there are informal fallacies, and we ought to

consider them.

One group of such informal errors in reasoning are called

fallacies of ambiguity.

Fallacies of ambiguity involve

errors in reasoning resulting from ignoring the ambiguities
of ordinary language like ambiguous words, phrases, or

sentences.

From our consideration of clarifying arguments,

.

:
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we may now clearly recognize the specific fallacies
of

ambiguity, which include equivocation, amphiboly, accent,

composition, and division.

We shall now briefly consider

each fallacy of ambiguity.

^ c3 u voca tion
-^-

.

We have already considered the equivocal use

of terms in our discussion of clarifying arguments in

Section Three, Subsection

3.

As we have seen, the

equivocal use of a term involves confusing different

intensions or extensions of the same term.
ments, relative terms like

(non-moral)

In many argu-

'good',

'small',

'between', etc. lend themselves to equivocal uses.

Consider

the following example

3.1
1.
2
:.

3.

Mike is a small man.
A small man is a small animal.
Mike is an small animal.

Like in Section Three, Subsection 3, 3.1, this argument 3.1

involves the equivocal use of a term.

However, here the

relative term 'small' is used equivocally in premise

2.

Of

course, we know that in relation to other men, Mike may be
small, however, in relation to mice, for example, Mike may

not be small at all.

'Small'

is,

therefore, used

equivocally since it is used to relate two different things;
Mike to other men and Mike to all animals.

'Small'

is

.

.
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equivocal not because it has different
intensions, but
because a sentence like 2 or 3 of 3.1 can
express different

propositons depending on what the extension of
'small' is
taken to be

Amphiboly

.

The fallacy of ambiguity known as amphiboly

involves the ambiguity of grammatical constructions
rather
than the ambiguity of terms.

committed when

a

The fallacy of amphiboly is

conclusion is invalidly inferred from

a

premise because of the premises' ambiguous grammatical
structure

.

Consider the following argument:

3.2
1.
2.
3.
:.

4.

The teacher assigned term papers.
The teacher asked the students to think about a
topic for the term papers
The teacher said "leave a note saying what you
will do with me."
The teacher requested a note describing physical
assaults on her person.

The fallacy of amphiboly is committed in this case, given
the teacher's admittedly ambiguous statement, when one

infers that the teacher was requesting a note describing

physical assaults on his or her person, such as
to twist your arm off."

"I

am going

This is a fallacy because the

conclusion inferred is not supported by the context in
which the gramatically ambiguous statement occurs.

The

"

.

.
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statement does not provide evidence to support
the
conclusion.

Obviously, the principle of charity requires

one to translate the ambiguous statement as
"Leave me a note
in which you state the topic you have chosen
for your term

paper

.

Accent

.

The fallacy of ambiguity known as accent also in-

volves the ambiguity of gramatical constructions.
fallacy of accent is committed when

a

The

conclusion is in-

validly inferred from a premise because of placing

unwarranted emphasis on certain words in a premise cited as
evidence for a conclusion.

Consider the following argument:

3.3
1.
2.
3.
:.

4.

The Biju Theater sells popcorn, candy, and soft
drinks
There is a cigarette machine in the lobby of the
Bi ju
There is a sign on the door which reads "smoking
is permitted in the last four rows."
One may only smoke in the last four rows, one may
not eat popcorn, candy, or drink soft drinks.

The fallacy of accent is also commmitted in this case,

given the sign in the theater if one puts equal emphasis on
all words and cites the sign as evidence to support the

conclusion that it is a simple fact that one may smoke in
the last four rows, although one may also smoke in any

other row.

It is also committed if one puts emphasis on

.
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permitted' and cites the sign as evidence that the

theater management disapproves of smoking but allows for it
in the last four rows.

These are fallacies of accent

because the conclusions inferred by putting emphasis on

different words or groups or words are not supported by the
context in which the grammatically ambiguous statement
occurrs

Compositon and Division

.

The fallacies of ambiguity known

as composition and division both involve inattention to

language attributing properties to a part or to a member in
a class,

and properties to a whole or to class.

The fallacy

of composition is committed when one argues that if the

parts of a complex object or the members of
a property,

a

class have

then the complex object or the class has this

Consider the following argument:

property.

3.4
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

lift
lift
lift
I
lift
I
lift
I
lift
I
lift
I
(and so on
I can lift

I
I

can
can
can
can
can
can
can

a piston for a Cadillac.
a door for a Cadillac.
the wheels for a Cadillac.
the crank shaft for a Cadillac.
the transmission case for a Cadillac.

the block casting for a Cadillac.
the front seat of a Cadillac
for each individual part)
a Cadillac.

This is an example of the fallacy of composition because
the fact that

I

can lift each individual part of a Cadillac

.
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does not provide evidence that

I

can lift the car.

Obviously, when the car parts are assembled, their cumulative weight will be too much for me to lift.

Thus, from the

fact that the individual parts of a complex object like a

Cadillac each have a property, it does not follow from this
that the complex object as a whole has the property.

Similarly, the fallacy of division is committed when one

argues that if a complex object or class has

a

property, then

the parts of the complex object or the members of the class

have this property.

Consider the following argument:

3.5
1.
2.
3.
4.

:.

5.

No one can lift a Cadillac.
No one can lift a Chrysler Imperial.
No one can lift a Lincoln Continental.
A Cadillac, a Chrysler Imperial and a Lincoln
Continental all have steering wheels the same size
and shape
No one can lift the steering wheel of a Cadillac,
or a Chrysler Imperial, or a Lincoln Continental.

This is an example of the fallacy of division because the
fact that no one can lift any one of these cars does not

support the conclusion that no one can lift the steering

wheel from any one of these cars.

Thus, from the fact that

the complex object as a whole has the property, it does not

follow that the individual parts of a complex object, like a
car, each have the property.

.
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Such fallacies of ambiguity

involve errors in reasoning

which fail to provide support for

a

given conclusion.

In

the absence of further argument and the
reconstruction of
such fallacious arguments, we are entitled
to say that such

arguments are simply no good.

Models
1.

Present examples of each of these fallacies of ambiguity
from situations in which one is required to interpret
an ambiguous word or phrase.
Point out how to recognize
which interpretations are fallacious and which are not,
and how to tell the difference.

2.

Review the principle of charity as discussed in
clarifying arguments and as applied to reconstructing
arguments.
Point out how applying the principle of
charity often allows one to reconstruct an ambiguous
statement and thereby to avoid drawing a conclusion
from the statement fallaciously.

3.

This is a good opportunity to discuss the notion of a
class, and to distinguish it from the notion of a set
as a more specialized kind of class.

Exerdises
1.

Have the students classify and explain various fallacies
of ambiguity:
(you can consult the logic texts for

other examples)
a)

"Each person's happiness is a good to that person,
and the general happiness, therefore, a good the
aggregate of all persons."
(J. S. Mill)

b)

Fords are expensive cars, so each part must be
very expensive.

c)

Chevrolets are numerous. A 1920 Chevrolet is a
Chevrolet.
Therefore, 1920 Chevrolets are numerous.

:
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d)

2.

A spark plug for a 1932 Dusenberg is only
50C,
so the car must be very inexpensive.

.Have the students

draw as many fallacious inferences as
they can from the following. Have them explain
why the
they are fallacious, and then have them provide
a
clarification of the ambiguous statemement

a)

In the context of a TV news program:
I

k)

am Mike Wallace for Sixty Minutes."

"Good evening.

In the context of an advertisement for a particular
brand of soft-drink:
"Every serving that you pour
costs a nickel not a penny more."

Subsection

4

-

Fallacies of Relevance

While in all the fallacies we have considered so far, an

argument involving an error in reasoning fails rationally
to support the conclusion, there is a group of fallacies
in which this failure is particularly obvious.

What we

shall call fallacies of relevance involve errors in

reasoning resulting from no rational connection between
premises and conclusions such that the evidence stated in
the premises is totally irrelevant to the truth or

probability of the conclusion.

Particularly common specific

fallacies of relevance that have been given names are
ad baculum

,

ad misericordiam

ad populum

,

ad ignorantium

,

,

ad hominiim

,

ad vercundiam

false cause, ignoring

,

the

question, complex question and begging the question.

It is

useful to note that these are the common ones which have
been given names but this, by no means, exhausts such

.
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errors in reasoning.

With this in mind, we shall now

briefly consider each of these common fallacies
of relevance.

Ad^Baculum.

Ad baculum

means "to the stick."

is a Latin phrase which literally

Consequently, this fallacy is often

referred to as the appeal to force.

The ad baculum fallacy

involves the most blatant examples of offering reasons that
do nothing to support the truth or probability of a

conclusion.

The ad baculum fallacy involves offering

threats as premises, perhaps intended to coerce one to

accept the conclusion, but which fail to offer support for
the truth of the conclusion.

Consider the following

argument

4.1
1.
2.
3.
4

:.

5.

Mr. Big likes his friends to be generous.
Mr. Big takes care of his generous friends by
letting them live.
Mr. Big kills friends who are not generous.
You want Mr. Big to like you.
It is financially sound to sell Mr. Big your
Polaroid stock at $.50 per share.

The ad baculum fallacy is committed in this case since

premises

2,

3

and

4

contain threats which do not support

the financial wisdom of selling your Polaroid stock at

$.50 per share.

This is a fallacy because it is not

relevant to the issue at hand; the premises have no rational

connection with and offer no rational support for the truth

500

of the conclusion.

The connection is merely a psychological

one, which although practically important to
consider, fails

rationally to support the conclusion.

Since our interest

here is limited to rational support for given conclusions
by arguments, we can simply refer such threatening

situations as the above, or threats of force or physical

violence to practical moral problem solvers.

Ad miser icordiam.

.

Ad misericordiam is a Latin phrase which

literally means "toward mercy or pity."

Consequently, this

fallacy is often referred to as the appeal to pity.
The ad misericordiam fallacy involves offering claims

that harmful consequences or unhappiness for others will
result, as premises, to support the truth of a given

conclusion.

Consider the following argument:

4.2
1.

2.
3.
:.

4.

My father worked overtime to earn money to send me
to college.
My mother took in wash to earn money to sent me
to college.
My parents' only chance for happiness is that I get
good grades in college.
I deserve an 'A' in Physics.

The ad miser icofdiam fallacy is committed in this case since
the chance of parental unhappiness is cited as support for

s
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the conclusion.

This is a fallacy because such a harmful

consequence is not relevant to the awarding of
grades;
making one's parents unhappy has no rational
connection to
the awarding of grades in the grading system.
Therefore,
such a claim offers no rational support for the
truth of
the conclusion.

Ad hominum

Ad

.

horn in urn

means "to the human."

is a Latin phrase which literally

Consequently, this fallacy is often

referred to as the personal attack.

The ad hominum

fallacy involves offering claims about some person as

premises in an argument against
supports.

a

conclusion that he

The ad hominu m fallacy has two forms; first the

abusive form, and secondly, the circumstantial form.

The abusive form of the ad hominum fallacy involves

attacking the claim that a person makes by directly

attacking the person.

Consider the following argument:

4.3
1.
2.
3.
4.
:.

5.

Lars claims that abortion is wrong.
Lars is a stupid Norwegian.
Lar
mother's brother is Lars’ father.
Lars is so ugly that Trolls drop dead when they
see him.
It is not the case that abortion is wrong.
'

.
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The abusive form of the ad hominum fallacy is committed in

this case, since the man making the claim is personally

attacked without any specific critical evaluation of the
man's claim.

This is a fallacy because such a personal

attack is not relevant to the truth or falsity of his claim;
even stupid Norwegians can utter true propositions.

Therefore, in the absence of more specific criticism of the

claim itself, the statement that the man making the claim is
a stupid

Norwegian offers no rational support for the

conclusion that his claim is not true.

The circumstantial form of the ad hominum fallacy involves

offering as premises reasons why, by virtue of certain
personal circumstances, one should, accept or reject a

particular conclusion.

Consider the following argument:

4.4
1.
2

:.

TT

Shawn claims that abortion is wrong.
Shawn is a devout Irish Catholic.
It is not the case that abortion is wrong.

The circumstantial form of the ad hominum fallacy is

committed in this case since that Shawn is a devout Irish

Catholic is offered as evidence to support the denial of his
claim that abortion is wrong.

In this form,

an appeal
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appeal is made to the personal circumstances of the man
r^^hincf

the claim and this is cited as evidence to support

the truth of the conclusion.

This is a fallacy again

because the man's personal circumstances are not relevant
to the truth or falsity of his claim.

The fact that he is a

devout Catholic and that the Catholic Church is officially

against abortion does not imply that abortion is wrong, nor
does it imply that abortion is not wrong.

Therefore, in

the absence of more specific criticism of the claim itself,
the fact that the man making the claim is a Catholic offers
no rational support for the truth of the conclusion that

his claim is false.

Ad vercundiam

.

Ad vercundiam is a Latin phrase which

literally means "toward diffidence, or lack of trust."
Consequently, this fallacy is often referred to as the

illegitimate appeal to authority.

The ad vercundiam

fallacy involves appeal to an unsuitable authority as

premises to support a given conclusion.

It is useful to

note that not all the appeals to authority are fallacious.
For example, appeals to the claims of an expert forensic

pathologist about a murder victim's cause of death count
as evidence for a conclusion as to the cause of death since

the expert is making claims in his field of expertise.
the other hand, the ad vercundiam fallacy involves an

On
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appeal to a given authority in a field to support a claim

about something in an unrelated field.

Consider the

following argument:

4.5

The retired English Teachers Association of New
York passed the statement that nuclear power plants
are safe.
The senior class at West High School passed the
statement that nuclear power plants are safe.
AFL-CIO Local 404 of the United Garbage Collectors
voted to pass the statement that nuclear power
plants are safe.
Nuclear power plants are technologiclaly and
environmentally safe.

1.

2.
3.

:.

4.

The ad vercundiam fallacy is committed in this case since
the authorities appealed to in support of the claim that

nuclear power plants are safe are not authorities on nuclear
power.

This is a fallacy because these claims about the

safety of nuclear power plants are irrelevant to determining
that they are safe.

The claims have no rational

connection to the resolution of the question.

Therefore,

such claims offer no rational support for the conclusion
that nuclear power plants are safe.

Ad oopulum.

Ad populum is a Latin phrase which literally

means "to the people."
^gfQ]f]f 0 d

2

Consequently, this fallacy is often

to as the popular, or the band wagon fallacy.

The ad populum fallacy involves an appeal to generally

..

.
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accepted beliefs or majority opinion as premises to support
a

given conclusion that is not about generally accepted

beliefs or majority opinion.

In this sense,

then, the

ad populum fallacy involves an appeal to majority opinion
as an authority to be used as evidence for or against a

particular claim.

Consider the following argument:

4.6
1.

2.
3.
:.

4.

51% of the people interviewed in the U.S. believe
that UFO's are flown by intelligent visitors from
outerspace
60% of the people interviewed in England believe
this
90% of the people interviewed world-wide believe
this
There are intelligent life forms able to contact
our Earth from outerspace.

The ad populum fallacy is committed in this case since

majority opinion is cited as evidence to support the claim
that there are intelligent life forms able to contact
Earth.

This is a fallacy because such majority opinion

is not relevant to the claim at issue;

that intelligent

visitors from outerspace are believed in by

a

majority of

those individuals interviewed has no rational connection
to the claim that there are intelligent life forms in

outerspace able to contact our Earth.

Many children

believe in Santa Clause, yet that is hardly taken as
serious evidence to support a serious claim that

.
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Santa Clause exists.

Therefore, such an appeal offers no

rational support for the truth of the claim that there are

intelligent life forms in outerspace able to contact our
Earth

Ad ignorant iam

.

Ad ignorantiam is a Latin phrase which

literally means "toward ignorance."

Consequently, this

fallacy is often referred to as the appeal to ignorance.
The ad ignorantiam fallacy involves offering appeals to

ignorance as premises to support

a

given conclusion.

This

involves arguing that a certain conclusion is true or highly

probable because either it has not been disproven (i.e., we
do not know that it is false) or one does not know how it

could be disproven.

Consider the following argument:

4.7

:

.

1

.

2

.

3

.
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The Air Force has explained various UFO sitings
as natural phenomena
Scientists have explained various UFO sitings as
natural phenomena.
Neither the Air Force, nor scientists, nor anyone
else have proven that extraterrestrial flying
saucers do not exist.
Extraterrestrial flying saucers do exist.

case since
The ad ignorantiam fallacy is committed in this

claim that extra
the evidence appealed to in support of the

terrestrial flying saucers exist is the fact that no one
has been able to prove that they do not exist

.

This is

a

:

.
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fallacy because the fact that no one has been able to disprove that extraterrestrial flying saucers exist is

irrelevant as support for the claim that they do exist.
While we may show that all phenomena claimed to be evidence
for their existence are natural terrestrial phenomena, and

that, therefore, there is no evidence to support the claim

that they do exist, the claim that no one has been able to

disprove that they exist has no rational connection to the

resolution of the question.

Note that this is not the

same claim as that no one has been able successfully to

refute evidence claimed to support that they exist, which is
false.

Therefore, such a claim offers no rational support

for the conclusion that extraterrestrial flying saucers

exist

False cause.

The false cause fallacy involves an appeal to

result
premises stating simply that event A came before
caused C.
in time to support the conclusion that A

C

While

time, it is
many causes do, in fact, precede the result in
precedes the result in
not simply the fact that the cause

time that determines the cause.

argument

Consider the following
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4.8
1.
2.
3.

:.

4.

Every morning Sidney puts on brown socks while
dressing, and drives safely to work.
Sidney does everything the same way every day.
Today, Sidney put on blue socks for the first time
while dressing and had an auto accident on the way
to work.
Sidney's putting on blue socks caused him to have
an auto accident.

The false cause fallacy is committed in this case since the
fact that Sidney's putting on blue socks precedes the

accident in time is used to support the conclusion that
Sidney's putting on blue socks caused the accident.

This

is a fallacy because the fact that putting on blue socks

precedes the accident in time is not relevant to the

determination of the cause of the accident.

An infinite

number of events precede the accident in time.

For example,

and the
the sacking of Rome, the invasion of Normandy,

these
resignation of Richard Nixon as President, yet none of

because they
can be said to cause the accident simply
a claim
precede the accident in time. Therefore, such
that putting
offers no rational support for the conclusion
on blue socks caused the accident.

ignoring the question

.

The fallacy of ignoring the question

support of some conclusion
involves offering an argument in

question at hand.
that is totally irrelevant to the

.
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Consider the following argument:

4.9
1.
2
:.

.

TT

Murdering an innocent person violates the laws of
God and the laws of men.
All violations of the laws of God and the laws of
men deserve strict punishment.
Peter is guilty of murdering his mother.

The fallacy of ignoring the question is committed in this

case since the argument presented supports a conclusion that
is totally irrelevant to the actual guilt or innocence of

the defendant.

This is obviously a fallacy.

The truth

or falsity of the conclusion actually supported by the

premises provides no rational support for the conclusion in

question

Complex question

.

The fallacy of complex question involves

simple
supposing that a simple yes or no answer, or another

hidden
short answer to a question containing another

question is appropriate to support

a

particular conclusion.

one is required to
Thus, in answering a complex question,
that one may
presuppose an answer to the hidden question

not wish to presuppose.

Thus, one may ask such complex

giving an answer
questions in order to trick someone into

conclusion that is
that implies support for a particular
Consider the following
not supported by other evidence.

argument
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4.10

.

:.

1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

The principal asked Joe if he still hated school.
Joe answered "no."
Joe flunked chemistry six months ago.
Since Joe does not still hate school, he must have
hated it six months ago.
Joe flunked chemistry because he hated school.

The fallacy of complex question is committed in this case

since both "yes" and "no" answers to this question imply

that the student did at some time hate school, and this may

not be the case at all.

questions.

First,

Thus, the question is really two

"Did you ever hate school?", and second,

"If you ever did hate school, do you still hate it now?"

This is a fallacy since if the student answers no, the

principal may fallaciously conclude that the student
at one time did hate school.

Yet a "no" answer to this

complex question is not good evidence for the claim that the
student once hated school.

Therefore, answers to such

complex questions do not offer rational support for conclusions concerning the hidden question.

Begging the question

.

The fallacy of begging the question

involves assuming as a premise the conclusion to be proved
by the argument.

This fallacy is sometimes called

circularity, or arguing in a circle.

Often in arguments

which involve the fallacy of begging the question, the
premise often simply says in different words what the
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conclusion affirms.

Consider the following argument:

4.11
1.
:.

2.

The unrestrained expression of one's opinions is
for the public welfare.
Freedom of speech is good.

The fallacy of begging the question is committed in this

case since the conclusion simply says in other words what
the premise affirms.

This is a fallacy because there is no

support offered for the conclusion at all since we must

assume that the conclusion is true to prove that the con-

clusion is true.

Therefore, such a claim offers no rational

support for the claim that freedom of speech is good.

We have seen that each of these formal and informal

fallacies involve errors in reasoning which result in
failure rationally to support a conclusion.

a

Upon

recognizing such errors, we are, therefore, entitled to

claim that arguments employing them are no good.

Models
1.

Present examples of each of these fallacies of
relevance. Consider Blum's book as a source for many
fallacies of relevance.

2.

Point out that while all fallacious arguments fail to
support their conclusions, that is, that the premises
are in some sense irrelevant to the conclusion,
fallacies may be more precisely classified by

.
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considering the exact nature of this irrelevance.
Review the formal fallacies, and the fallacies of
ambiguity by providing examples of these fallacies and
by providing examples of fallacies of relevance.
3.

Review the nature of psychological persuasion. Consider
obvious examples such as torture.
In more advance
sections, you might raise the question as to whether
this may be said to involve rational persuasion. Have
the students offer explications of 'rational
persuasion'.
Consider ethical and aesthetic arguments,
and raise the question "Do such arguments involve
rational persuasion?" Point out that this is a
philosophical problem which many philosophers have
prolifically addressed.
Exercises

1.

Have the students classify and explain various fallacies
(You can consult the logic texts for
of relevance:
other examples)
a.

There is intelligent life on other planets because
John Young, a former astronaut, believes that there
is

b.

Charlie Hixon and Calvin Parker are good old country
boys so their story of being studied by extraterrestrial spacemen must be true.

c.

deserve to be paid more for my work because the
cost of living has gone up, my wife is sick, and
I can't make my car payments.

d.

More cigarettes have been smoked in America than
anywhere else for years and during these years,
America has become the strongest nation in the
smoke
world, so help strengthen America:
cigarettes

e.

I

He is a rich man so we need not listen to his argu-

ments opposing welfare.
f.

will not contribute to the college alumni fund
unless my kid is passing Chemistry.

g.

Most people believe in God, so God exists.

h.

No one has been able to prove that reincarnation
does not occur, so reincarnation does occur.

I
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i.

j

.

k.

2.

The defendant is accused of running a red light.
A stop light is not necessary at that intersection.

When did you stop beating your dog?
One ought not to commit fallacies because one
ought not to commit psychologically persuasive
errors in reasoning.

Have the students write a paper in which they discuss
practical consequences of ignoring fallacies in arguments and adopting conclusions for which there is no
rational support. Have them consider, for example,
politics, education, and business.

,

.
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